

# YUKTIDĪPIKĀ

VOL. I

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Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona

and

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Eastern Book Linkers

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Published by :

**EASTERN BOOK LINKERS**

5825, New Chandrawal, Jawahar Nagar,

Delhi-110007

First Edition : 1992

@ Author

Price : Rs. 400.00

ISBN : 81-85133-67-0

Printed by :

**Delhi Offset Press**

199/5, Chaudhery Braham Singh Marg,

Mauj Pur Ghounda, Delhi-110053

PROLOGUE

The system of Sāṃkhya is honoured in the ancient Indian literature and is considered to be an important system by the opponents of Sāṃkhya. The other systems have utilised the theories of Sāṃkhya in the course of their development. The *Yuktidīpikā* (=YD) serves as a decisive testimony for it. Basically, Sāṃkhya stands for the highest knowledge attained through intensive deliberation. It is derived from the word *sāṃkhyā* which is in turn derived from *saṃ*+*√khyā*. It comes to mean number or philosophical investigation. The system of Sāṃkhya explains the facts of experience through enumeration of categories and also culminates into the highest knowledge. In spite of its great antiquity it has suffered a lot for the gaps in literary continuity and finally is so much overpowered by other systems that no powerful author undertook the task of its defence from the onslaught of other systems. Its origin is oblivious and the pre-systematised form of it available in the references to it in the ancient literature suggests its rich tradition. It was considered necessary for all intellectuals and thinkers. The other systems with their stress on different specialised aspects invited the attention of the later thinkers interested in particular aspects and the Sāṃkhya giving a general framework was reduced to the position of the opponent in the development of many doctrines.

The earliest authentic work on Sāṃkhya available to us is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This text, however, systematises the theories of Sāṃkhya in such a brief that its import cannot be understood without a detailed commentary on it. The YD is the earliest commentary to satisfy this need. The other commentaries like *Māṭharavyṛtti*, *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Jayamaṅgalā* and the

*Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, etc., are very brief and, hence, are not sufficient to provide the details required for the understanding of the Sāṃkhya system. The *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra is the only commentary which explains the *kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in detail. The *Y D*, however, excels over it in many respects. Since it was not available for a very long time to the scholars of Sāṃkhya, its importance has not been fully realised.

The *Y D* adopts a most comprehensive approach to the *kārikās* as containing aphoristic statements and justifies it with all possible details. It regards the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* as containing all the excellences of a complete philosophical text, such as aphorisms, means of knowledge, components, completeness, statement of uncertainty and decisiveness, brief enunciation, detailed statement, succession, naming the objects and advice. It illustrates all these elements in the text of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, its approach to the wording of the *kārikās* is quite critical and analytical. It suggests amendment in the *kārikās* as in 28th that the reading should be *śabdādiṣu* instead of originally found *rūpādiṣu* terming the latter as reading adopted through carelessness. In this case, it can be rightly termed a *vārttika*. It justifies its another name as *Rājavārttika*. The propriety of such a name will be discussed later on.

Here, the author resorts to the grammatical rules to discuss the wording of the *kārikās*. He analyses the problem of compound in the expression *tadapaghātaka*.<sup>2</sup> The author gives the etymological meaning of the technical terms to justify their use by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The technical terms are used to expound the nature of the object denoted. The author of the *Y D* believes that the technical terms were coined by the *ācāryas* after having realised the nature of the objects. Thus, the author of the *Y D* explains *pradhāna* as the resorting place of all the evolutes (at the time of dissolution) and

1. *Y D* on *Kārikā* I.

2. *Ibid.*

*puruṣa* as the entity which rests in the body.<sup>3</sup> The later followers of these *ācāryas* use the same terms as these terms were enough to serve the purpose of the intended meaning.

The *Y D* justifies not only the reading of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* but also the contents of the Sāṃkhya system. Such a purpose is served in two ways. It is the only text which saves the system of Sāṃkhya from the intellectual onslaught at the hands of the other systems. The Sāṃkhya system has been severely criticised by the other systems. There is no other existing text than the *Y D* which undertakes the issue of defending the Sāṃkhya doctrine from such a criticism. Secondly, the *Y D* adopts the method of criticising the theories of other systems also to justify the position of the system of Sāṃkhya. Such a unique approach makes the *Y D* essential for the complete understanding of Sāṃkhya. Sometimes the text enters into so minute details that it becomes difficult to make out the statement of the opponent or of the Sāṃkhya. The *Y D* does not leave the topic until it squeezes no more out of it. The author spares no argument to justify the tenets of Sāṃkhya. The name *Yuktidīpikā* is given with the same background. It is illuminator of (all possible) reasoning (to justify the system of Īśvarakṛṣṇa). The *Y D* recognises that such a task of refuting the contention of the opponents was shouldered by the authors of Sāṃkhya before Īśvarakṛṣṇa also. The controversy had become so subtle that its import could not be grasped easily.

तेषामिच्छाविघातार्थमाचार्यैः सूक्ष्मबुद्धिभिः ।

रचिता स्वेष्टु तन्त्रेषु विषमास्तकंगह्वराः ॥

Since such a purpose was not carried on by Īśvarakṛṣṇa or his followers, the *Y D* undertakes the continuation of the same intel-

3. प्रयत्नतो भगवतः परमर्षेण ज्ञानेन सर्वतत्त्वानां स्वरूपमुपलभ्य संज्ञां विदधतो नास्ति स्वरूपनिबन्धनः शब्दः । तद्यथा प्रधीयन्तेऽत्र विकारा इति प्रधानम्, पुरि क्षेते इति पुरुष इत्यादि ।

ctual warfare with the other systems. The appellation *Yuktidīpikā* also suggests the same as the author considers the text as proposing to dispel the darkness of the wrong doctrines through the light of reasoning by the noble persons of unconfused mind.<sup>4</sup> Thus, as the light serves twofold purpose of removing the darkness and revealing the objects, the *YD* also serves twofold purpose of discarding the opponent's stand and of throwing light on the doctrines of Sāṃkhya in a true perspective. It may casually be observed that *P. B. Chakravarti*<sup>5</sup> thinks that the *YD* proposes to reply to the hostile criticism of the *Paramāthasaptati* of Vasubandhu. Such a restriction, however, ignores the statement about various opponents of Sāṃkhya as

प्रतिपक्षाः पुनस्तस्य पुरुषेशाणुवादिनः ।

वैनाशिकाः प्राकृतिका विकारपुरुषास्तथा ॥

The author recognises in the introduction of the text that the *YD* proposes to expound the Sāṃkhyakārikā with an intention of justifying it with all possible arguments :

तस्य व्याख्यां करिष्यामि यथान्वायोपपत्तये ।

कारण्यादप्ययुक्तां तां प्रतिगृह्णन्तु सूरयः ॥

This was also a practical need of the time. Īśvarakṛṣṇa wrote the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* without making the reference to the stories as also the theories of other systems.<sup>6</sup> The controversy between the Sāṃkhya and the other systems could not be grasped without having the knowledge of the doctrines of Sāṃkhya. Such a purpose was served by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. He expounded the Sāṃkhya doctrines along with their technical details. He himself recognises that the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is a summary of the text called *Śaṣṭitantra* which dealt with

4. *Y D* on kārikā 72

5. *Origin and development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, p. 160.

6. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 72

sixty topics.<sup>7</sup> The *YD* enumerates these sixty topics as existence of the cosmic matter, singleness, purposefulness, distinction, subservience, plurality, disunion, union, duration, lack of agency (forming the basic topics); and the fivefold error, nine kinds of contentment, twenty eight types of disability of organs, and eight types of attainment. Īśvarakṛṣṇa deals with all these topics in his own way in very brief. Hence, the *YD* is an attempt to explain the kārikās in a right perspective.

The unique feature of the text which raises it to the height of importance is the reference to the views of pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṃkhya teachers, the works of whom are lost to us. The *YD* is the only source to have a glimpse of various schools in the Sāṃkhya itself before the advent of Īśvarakṛṣṇa during the gaps in its literary continuity. It mentions that the seers like Pañcaśikha experienced the existence of effect in the cause.<sup>8</sup> Īśvarakṛṣṇa followed thoroughly the views of Pañcaśikha. According to Pañcādhikaraṇa the sense-organs are elemental in nature<sup>10</sup> and ten in number.<sup>11</sup> Being elemental in nature these cannot function of their own. They are compared to the dry rivers and can operate only with the influx of the Prakṛti.<sup>12</sup> Regarding the transmigration of the subtle body, Pañcādhikaraṇa holds that the subtle body enters the organs of the father and the mother at the time of their intercourse and gets

7. *Ibid.*

8. प्रधानास्त्वमेकत्वमर्थतत्त्वमथान्यता ।

पारार्थ्यञ्च तथाऽनैक्यं विद्योगो योग एव च ॥

शेषवृत्ति रक्तृत्वं चूलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।

विपर्यय पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥

करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।

इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टाभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ॥

9. *Y D* on kārikā 9

10. *Y D* on kārikā 22

11. *Y D* on kārikā 32

12. *Ibid.*

merged into the semen and blood of the father and mother and grows in the womb.<sup>13</sup> The *YD* records the views of Patañjali also in various contexts. He believes that the sensation of I is by the intellect itself and, hence, he rejects the separate existence of egoism. The organs are, therefore, twelve in number according to him.<sup>14</sup> The senses operate of their own without any external influx. Patañjali holds a peculiar view about the subtle body and the transmigration. The subtle bodies, according to him, are many. These subtle bodies vary in each birth. It helps in uniting the organs to the womb suitable to the past impressions of acts. Having pushed the organs to the heaven or the place of torture, it vanishes. A new subtle body is produced which takes the organs to the womb and vanishes. Again, a new subtle body is produced which continues up to death.<sup>15</sup> The *YD* criticises Paurika's view of multiplicity of the Prakṛti. According to Paurika, there is a separate Prakṛti assigned to each Puruṣa. It creates the body, etc., for that particular Puruṣa. The activity and desisting from activity of this particular Prakṛti is governed by those attached to the divine personalities. When the Prakṛtis of the divine personalities create, or the Prakṛtis attached to divine personalities desist from activities, the others also do so.<sup>17</sup> The *YD* refers to the views of Vārṣaganya who defines perception as the functioning of the sense-organs, ear and the rest.<sup>18</sup> The manifest world deviates from its derived form and not from its existence at the time of dissolution.<sup>19</sup> The Puruṣa imitates the intellect existing as knowledge when commingled with the functioning of the intellect.<sup>20</sup> Vārṣaganya along with the other

13. *YD* on kārikā 39
14. *YD* on kārikā 32
15. *YD* on kārikā 22
16. *YD* on kārikā 39
17. *YD* on kārikā 56
18. *YD* on kārikā 5
19. *YD* on kārikā 10
20. *YD* on kārikā 17

authorities does not subscribe to the view that some other element comes out of Prakṛti out of which the intellect comes forth.<sup>21</sup> To illustrate the unprompted spontaneous activity of the Prakṛti Vārṣaganya holds that the Prakṛti proceeds to activity as the insentient bodies of man and woman proceed towards each other (for sexual intercourse).<sup>22</sup> Vārṣaganya has beautifully explained the mutual relation of three constituents. One of them dominates the other two. Still there is no mutual contradiction between the dominant and the dominated. Those having intensity in form and function contradict, while the ordinary ones co-operate the dominants.<sup>23</sup> Unlike all other authorities Vārṣaganya holds that the subtle elements are not of a single form.<sup>24</sup> Vindhyavāsin is an important teacher specially for explaining the theory of knowledge. Unlike other authorities he holds that the egoism and the five subtle elements are produced from the intellect. Thus, the bifurcation into the elemental and psychological aspects takes place in the products of egoism according to others, while it happens so in the products of intellect according to Vindhyavāsin.<sup>25</sup> The sense-organs, according to him, are located at eleven points and are all-pervasive in nature. Unlike all other teachers, he holds that the knowledge of all the objects arises in mind. Vindhyavāsin does not feel the need of admitting the subtle body. He holds that the same organs are all-pervasive and the attainment of the state of their functioning is birth while its adandonment is death.<sup>26</sup> As regards the classification of the dispositions, Vindhyavāsin rejects the classification of natural (*prākṛta*) dispositions into three—*tattvasama* (arising in the intellect at the very time of its production), *sāh-siddhika* (existing innately in a composite body but requiring a

21. *YD* on kārikā 22
22. *YD* on kārikā 57
23. *YD* on kārikā 13
24. *YD* on kārikā 22
25. *Ibid*
26. *Ibid*

stimulus). Vindhyavāsin holds that the dispositions cannot be *tattvasāma* and *sāmsiddhika*. They require the stimulus for their manifestation and, consequently, are of the nature of accomplished. That is why the knowledge in lord Kapila was manifested after hearing from the teacher.<sup>28</sup> Besides, there is a reference to many doctrines of other systems which require deep consideration separately.

The *Y D* classifies the text into four Prakaraṇas and eleven āhnikas. Such a division is not observed in any other commentary of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

The authorship of the *Y D* has posed a complicated problem still unsolved. The crux of the problem lies in the mention of Vācaspati Miśra as the author of the *Y D* in the colophon at the end of the manuscript as also the mention of some Rājā, the assumption of which is gathered from the statements of Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.<sup>29</sup> The admittance of Vācaspati Miśra's authorship of the *Y D* involves a lot of valid objections. Firstly, the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra does not show any sign that he has already written a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. If it is presumed that he wrote it after the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, we do not understand the need of writing the two commentaries on the same at the hands of the author like Vācaspati Miśra. Secondly, there are some differences of interpretation of the kārikās in the *Y D* and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, which hinder the assumption of admitting the same author of the two. Thirdly, the style of the two is so different that one cannot accept the same author of the two when read side by side. Fourthly, there are ample evidences to prove that the *Y D* was written long before Vācaspati Miśra. The difference between them is not less than a century according to

27. *Y D* on kārikā 39

28. *Y D* on kārikā 42

29. *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 100, Varanasi 1936

*P. B. Chakravarti*<sup>30</sup> while *R. C. Pandey*<sup>31</sup> puts forward three proofs in favour of the existence of the *Y D* long before Vācaspati Miśra. (1) The *Y D* quotes the definition of perception offered by Dinnāga while Vācaspati Miśra refutes the Dharmakīrti's revised definition of the same. (2) Vācaspati Miśra quotes three verses towards the end of the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* from a text named *Rājavārttika*. These verses occur in the beginning of the *Y D*. (iii) While refuting Śvarakṛṣṇa's definition of perception, Jayantabhaṭṭa refers to the elucidation of the same by some Rājā. A similar statement is found in the *Y D*. Since Jayantabhaṭṭa is a contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra, the *Y D* must be earlier to him. To discard the authority of the mention of Vācaspati Miśra's name in the colophon, *R. C. Pandey* considers it an error on the part of the scribe. The authority of the second and the third argument leads us to assume that *Rājavārttika* is another name of the *Y D* and its author was some Kājā respectively. The author of the *Y D*, however, nowhere names his work as the *Rājavārttika*. It must have been given by someone else. It is certainly a work of vārttika class and resembles to a certain extent to the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara, though the latter is a vārttika on the *Bhāṣya* while the earlier is a vārttika on the kārikās treating them as sūtras. The addition of the term *rāja* in the beginning begs justification. It may be assumed that it was called *Rājavārttika* because it is the most eminent explanation of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, or, because it was written by some person known as Rājā. The latter finds support from the statement of Jayantabhaṭṭa. There is no decisive evidence to identify that Rājā with the famous kind Bhoja or Bhartṛhari. *R. C. Pandey*<sup>32</sup> feels that the identification of Rājā with Bhoja is too naive, and is prompted by the tendency of attributing any good thing to Bhoja and to identify any *rāja* with Bhoja.

30. *Origin and Development of Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, p. 161.

31. Introduction to the *Y D* p. xv

32. *Ibid.*, p. xiv

It is equally difficult to find out the date of the YD. In this regard we find no definite proof and, therefore, have to be satisfied with mere conjectures. P. B. Chakravarti thinks that its upper limit cannot be before Bhartṛhari (first half of the seventh century) as the author quotes some couplets which are found in the *Vākya-padīya* with slight variation.<sup>33</sup> R. C. Pandey feels that since the YD quotes the definition of perception offered by Dinnāga, the upper limit is the advent of Dinnāga. There is, however, no satisfactory criterion to decide the lower limit of the date of the YD. On the basis of the style of the text and different authorities quoted therein P. B. Chakravarti is inclined to think that it cannot be put later than the eighth century A. D.<sup>35</sup> The style of the text, however, leads one to think that it may be contemporary of Uddyotakara.

It is interesting to note that the author of the YD spares no argument in his fierce intellectual warfare with others in defence of Sāṃkhya. This turns the style of the author highly polemical. Generally the opponent's views are presented with *āha* and the reply with *ucyate*. But, even having raised a *pūrvapakṣa* the author raises some plausible reply and then the plausible objection with these words and it becomes difficult to analyse where the views of the opponents begin and where the reply to it ends. One is lost in the arguments of attacking, counter attacking and re-attacking continuously till the final conclusion is reached. This difficulty led the translators to arrange the text in a different manner. For the same reason it was felt useful to give the Sanskrit text also. In presenting the Sanskrit text we have consulted three available editions—by P. B. Chakravarti, (Calcutta,

1938), by R. C. Pandeya (Delhi, 1967) and by Ramashankar Tripathi (Varanasi, 1970).

The herculean task of translating the YD was undertaken in 1976 and was completed within a couple of years. However, it could not be placed before the readers until the work of its publication was shouldered by Shri Sham Lal Malhotra, Prop., Eastern Book Linkers, Delhi. The translators are thankful to him. The next part is expected to see the light of the day soon.

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33. *op. cit*

34. *op. cit*

35. *op. cit*



Published by

EASTERN BOOK LINKERS

5825, New Chandrawal, Jawahar Nagar,  
Delhi-110007

First Edition : 1990

© Author

Price : Rs. 180.00

Printed by :

Amar Printing Press (Sham Printing Agency),  
8/25, Vijay Nagar, Double Storey, Delhi-110009

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Y8513

1990

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## PROLOGUE

The system of Sāṃkhya is honoured in the ancient Indian literature and is considered to be an important system by the opponents of Sāṃkhya. The other systems have utilised the theories of Sāṃkhya in the course of their development. The *Yuktidīpikā* (=YD) serves as a decisive testimony for it. Basically, Sāṃkhya stands for the highest knowledge attained through intensive deliberation. It is derived from the word *sāṃkhyā* which is in turn derived from sam+√khyā. It comes to mean number or philosophical investigation. The system of Sāṃkhya explains the facts of experience through enumeration of categories and also culminates into the highest knowledge. In spite of its great antiquity it has suffered a lot for the gaps in literary continuity and finally is so much overpowered by other systems that no powerful author undertook the task of its defence from the onslaught of other systems. Its origin is oblivious and the pre-systematised form of it available in the references to it in the ancient literature suggests its rich tradition. It was considered necessary for all intellectuals and thinkers. The other systems with their stress on different specialised aspects invited the attention of the later thinkers interested in particular aspects and the Sāṃkhya giving a general framework was reduced to the position of the opponent in the development of many doctrines.

The earliest authentic work on Sāṃkhya available to us is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This text, however, systematises the theories of Sāṃkhya in such a brief that its import cannot be understood without a detailed commentary on it. The YD is the earliest commentary to satisfy this need. The other commentaries like *Māṭharavṛtti*, *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Jayamaṅgalā* and the

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## INTRODUCTION

(Objections against Sāṃkhya are not serious)

वीतावीतविषाणस्य पक्षतावनसेविनः ।

प्रवादाः सांख्यकरिणः सल्लकीषण्डभङ्गुराः ॥१॥

Accusations against the elephant of Sāṃkhya possessing the direct inference (vīta) and inference by elimination (avīta)<sup>1</sup> as the tusks and rejoicing in the forest of subject (pakṣatā) are fragile like a group of the sallakī (boswellia thurifera) trees.

(Obeisance to Kapila)

ऋषये परमायार्कमरोच्चिमतेजसे ।

संसारगहनध्वान्तसूर्याय गुरवे नमः ॥२॥

Obeisance to the preceptor, the greatest seer who is lustrous like the rays of the sun and is (again) like the sun for (dispelling) the dense darkness of the world.

(Tradition of Sāṃkhya Teachers)

तत्त्वं जिज्ञासमानाय विप्रायामुरये मुनिः ।

यदुवाच महत्तन्त्रं दुःखत्रयनिवृत्तये ॥३॥

न तस्याधिगमः शक्यः कतुं वर्षशतैरपि ।

भूयस्त्वादिति संचिन्त्य मुनिभिः सूक्ष्मबुद्धिभिः ॥४॥

ग्रन्थेनाल्पेन संक्षिप्य तदार्थमनुशासनम् ।

निबद्धममलप्रज्ञैः शिष्याणां हितकाम्यया ॥५॥

1. For details see *Yuktidipikā* 4 and *Sāṃkhya-yoga Epistemology* pp. 148-67

- 3-5. Thinking that due to the vastness it is not possible to master even in hundreds of years that great system taught by the sage to Āsuri, a brahmin desirous of knowing the truth for the alleviation of threefold misery, the sages possessed of acute discernment and pure intellect summarised that archaic teaching and composed a small treatise with a view to doing good to the disciples.

(Opponents controverted by pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa teachers)

प्रतिपक्षाः पुनस्तस्य पुरुषेशानुवादिनः ।  
वैनाशिकाः प्राकृतिका विकारपुरुषास्तथा ॥६॥  
तेषामिच्छाविघातार्थमाचार्यैः सूक्ष्मबुद्धिभिः ।  
रचिताः स्वेषु तन्त्रेषु विषमास्तर्कगह्वराः ॥७॥

- 6-7. The opponents of that (system) are the expounders of the theories of (one conscious entity (i.e.) the non-dualists), God (Īśvara, i.e. the theists), and the atoms (i.e., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the nihilists (i.e. the Buddhists), the materialists (i.e. the Cārvākas) and the perverted persons. To foil their desires, the teachers with an acute discernment have contrived in their philosophical treatises, the ditches of arguments, which are difficult to traverse.

(Īśvarakṛṣṇa summarised the Sāṃkhya position)

शिष्यैर्दुरवगाहास्ते तत्त्वार्थभ्रान्तबुद्धिभिः ।  
तस्मादीश्वरकृष्णेन संक्षिप्तार्थमिदं कृतम् ॥८॥  
सप्तत्याख्यं प्रकरणं सकलं शास्त्रमेव वा ।  
यस्मात् सर्वपदार्थानामिह व्याख्या करिष्यते ॥९॥

- 8-9. Those (subtle arguments) are difficult to be understood by the disciples whose intellects are confused in knowing the true nature of Reality. Therefore, Īśvarakṛṣṇa composed this text Saptati (by name)—a monograph or (so to say) a

complete treatise precise in meaning; all the categories would be explained therein.

(Topics in Sāṃkhya)

प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।  
पारार्थ्यञ्च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥१०॥  
शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं चूलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।  
विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥११॥  
करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।  
इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टाभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ॥१२॥  
यथाक्रमं लक्षणतः कात्स्न्येनेहाभिधास्यते ।  
तस्मादतः शास्त्रमिदमलं नानात्वसिद्धये ॥१३॥

- 10-13. (i) Existence of the cosmic matter, (ii) singleness, (iii) purposefulness (iv) distinction, (v) subservience, (vi) plurality, (vii) disunion (viii) union, (ix) duration and (x) the lack of agency are the ten basic topics;<sup>2</sup> (xi-xv) the fivefold

2. These verses inform of the sixty topics treated in the *Śaṣṭi-tantra*, a text lost to us and supposed to be the source of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 72). Vācaspati Miśra in his *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* (kā. 72) quotes these verses and ascribes them to the *Rijzavārttika* which is, perhaps, another name of the *Yuktidīpikā*. He further explains that out of ten basic categories singleness, purposefulness and subservience relate to the cosmic matter; distinction, lack of agency, and plurality to conscious entity; existence, disunion and union to both, and duration to the subtle and gross objects. R. C. Pandeya (cf. Appendix 2 to his edition of the *Y.D.*) follows Vācaspati except in case of duration which he relates to the conscious entity. In fact, existence is related with cosmic matter only. Subservience relates to cosmic matter alongwith

error<sup>3</sup> and (xvi-xxiv) contentment of nine kinds,<sup>4</sup> (xxv-Lii) twenty-eight types of disability of the organs,<sup>5</sup> (Lii-Lx) along with eight types of attainment<sup>6</sup>—these sixty topics<sup>7</sup> will be fully discussed with their definitions in this text in due succession. Hence, this text (lit. scripture) is competent to prove multiplicity.<sup>8</sup>

(Praise of the Sāmkhyakārikā)

अल्पग्रन्थमनल्पार्थं सर्वैस्तन्त्रगुणैर्युतम् ।  
पारमर्षस्य तन्त्रस्य बिम्बमादर्शगं यथा ॥१४॥

the gross and subtle objects firstly because the *S. K.* (11) speaks of subservient nature of both the cosmic matter and its evolutes and secondly because while supplying the reasons for subservience the *Y. D.* itself gives the example of the evolutes stating that the fact that the objects functioning collectively are meant for other, leads to their subservience. In the light of this, the observation of Vācaspati that the subservience relates only to the cosmic matter appears to be insufficient specially because in case of duration he takes the subtle and the gross objects as a separate entity from the cosmic matter. For a different account of these topics see *Jayamaṅgalā* (p. 108), *Mātharavṛtti* (p. 63) *Sāmkhya-aptavṛtti* (p. 80), *Sāmkhyavṛtti* (p. 39), *Sāmkhyatattvavivecana* (*Sāmkhyasaṅgraha* p. 16), *Tattvayāthārthya-dipana* (p. 21) and *Tattvasamāsa-sūtravṛtti* (*Sāmkhyasaṅgraha* p. 86)

3. Cf. *Y.D.* 46

4. Cf. *S.K.* 50

5. Cf. *S.K.* 49

6. *S.K.* 49

7. For a detailed account of sixty topics see *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* 12 20-29

8. Multiplicity refers to the plurality of the conscious entity, and the ultimate dualism of cosmic matter and the conscious entity may be an alternate meaning.

14. The text though small in size is great in import, endowed with all the characteristics of a philosophical treatise (and is) just like a reflection in a mirror of the philosophical treatise composed by the supreme seer (Kapila)<sup>9</sup>.

(Purpose of the Yuktidipikā)

तस्य व्याख्यां करिष्यामि यथान्यायोपपत्तये ।

कारण्यादप्ययुक्तां तां प्रतिगृह्णन्तु सूरयः ॥१५॥

15. With a desire to justify (*Sāmkhyakārikā*) through proper argumentation I will explain that. Scholars are requested to receive it through compassion, even though it may be wrong.

(Characteristics of a complete treatise)

आह, करिष्यति भवान् व्याख्याम् । इदं त्वादावुपन्यस्तं सर्वैस्तन्त्रगुणैर्युतमिदं तन्त्रमिति । के तन्त्रगुणाः, कियन्तो वेति ?

Opponent: You will explain (this treatise). It is stated in the beginning that the present text is endowed with all the characteristics of a complete philosophical treatise. What or how many are those characteristics of a philosophical treatise ?

उच्यते—

सूत्रप्रमाणावयवोपपत्तिरन्यूनता संशयनिर्णयोक्तिः ।

उद्देशनिर्देशमनुक्रमश्च संज्ञोपदेशाविह तन्त्रसम्पत् ॥

सूत्राणि च प्रमाणानि च अवयवाश्च, सूत्रप्रमाणावयवाः । तेषाम् उपपत्तिः सूत्रप्रमाणावयवोपपत्तिः । उपपत्तिः सम्भव इत्यनर्थान्तरम् । अनन्योऽर्थोऽनर्थान्तरम् । उपपत्तिशब्दः प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्यते सूत्रोपपत्तिरित्यादि ।

9. The analogy suggests that it does not leave anything from the original text of the system and does not substantially add to the same. Hence, it represents the system in the true form.

Proponent : (i) adequacy of aphorisms, (ii) means of knowledge and (iii) components, (iv) completeness, (v) the statement of uncertainty and (vi) decisiveness, (vii) brief enunciation and (viii) detailed statement, (ix) succession (of the objects), (x) naming (the object) and (xi) the advice form the excellences of a philosophical treatise.

The (dvandva) compound term sūtrapramāṇāvayavāḥ denotes the three : (i) aphorisms, (ii) means of knowledge and (iii) components. The compound term sūtrapramāṇāvayavopatti denotes the adequacy of these three. The synonym of upapatti is possibility or adequacy. The term 'anarthāntra' stands for the same meaning. The word upapatti is to be attached to the end of every word. i. e., sūtropapatti, etc.

आह, लक्षणोपेतसूत्रोपपत्तिरिति वक्तव्यम् ।

इतरथा हि अलक्षणोपेतस्यापि सूत्रस्य तन्त्राङ्गभावः स्यादिति ।

Opponent : The statement should be as adequacy of an aphorism with characteristics. Otherwise an aphorism devoid of its characteristics would also be a part of the philosophical treatise.

उच्यते न, नान्तरीयकत्वात् । न ह्यन्तरेण लक्षणोपेतत्वं सूत्रत्वम् । अतो न वक्तव्यमेतदिति ।

Proponent : No, because otherwise it cannot be so. There cannot be an aphorism without possessing its characteristics. Hence, it should not be stated.

(Definition of an aphorism)

आह, अथ सूत्रमिति कस्मात् ?

Opponent : Why is a sūtra so called ?

उच्यते—सूचनात् सूत्रम् । सूचयति तांस्तानर्थविशेषानिति सूत्रम् । तद्यथा—कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम् (का० १६), भेदानां परिमाणादिति (का० १५) । अत्र प्रतिज्ञाहेतु कण्ठोक्तौ । तयोरुपयोगि दृष्टान्तं साध्यसिद्धये समर्थमिति कृत्वा मूलशकलादयोऽत्रान्तरनभिहिता अप्येतस्मादवसीयन्ते । अथवा भिक्षोरुपसंहृतबहिष्करणान्तःकरणस्य

तेषु तेष्वतोन्द्रियेषु अपि प्रधानादिष्वर्थेषु बुद्धिं सूचयतीति सूत्रम् । अथवा, सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिरिति (का० ८) सूत्रम् । तद्यथा—

अल्पाक्षरमतन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।

अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥

अस्तोभमपुनरुक्तमित्यर्थः । तथा

लघूनि सूचितार्थानि स्वल्पाक्षरपदानि च ।

सर्वतः सारभूतानि सूत्राण्याहुर्मनोषिणः ॥

Proponent : Because it informs (sūcanāt). A sūtra (aphorism) is called so because it informs of the various particular objects. For example, 'unmanifest is the cause' (kā. 16), 'because of the finite nature of specific objects' (kā. 15). Here, the proposition and the reason are stated explicitly. In view of the fact that an example useful for them (i. e., proposition and reason) is capable of proving probandum, the original passage and their remaining portions though not stated here are deduced from it only. Or, (alternatively) a sūtra (aphorism) is that which informs of (sūcanāt) the knowledge of a mendicant who has withdrawn his internal and external organs (from their objects), with reference to even various super sensible objects like cosmic matter, etc.

Or, the example of an aphorism would be as 'non-perception of that (cosmic matter) is due to subtlety' (kā. 8). So, it has been stated :

“Those who are conversant with aphorism declare that an aphorism is that (statement) which has the minimum words, is beyond doubt, contains the quintessence, has a universal application, is not tautologous and is not faulty.”

The word astobham (tautologous) means that which has no repetition.

Moreover :

“The learned call those (statements) aphorisms which are short, informative of objects, have very few letters and words, and contain quintessence from every point of view.”

(Means of knowledge)

प्रमाणानि च प्रत्यक्षादीनि, तान्युत्तरत्र वक्ष्यति ‘दृष्टमनुमानमाप्त-वचनं च’ (का० ४), ‘प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टमित्यादि’ (का० ५) ।

The means of knowledge are perception, etc., and the text will speak of them later on as ‘perception, inference and verbal testimony’ (kā. 4), and ‘perception is determination of an object caused through sense-object contact’, etc. (kā. 5)

(Components)

अवयवाः पुनर्जिज्ञासादयः, प्रतिज्ञादयश्च । तत्र जिज्ञासादयो व्याख्याङ्गम् । प्रतिज्ञादयः परप्रत्यायनाङ्गम् तानुत्तरत्र वक्ष्यामः ।

The components are desire to know, etc., and proposition, etc. Out of these, desire to know, etc., are essential requisites of explanation. Proposition, etc., are essential requisites of explaining (something) to others. We shall discuss them later on.

आह, अवयवानभिधानमनुपदेशात् । न हि यथा प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणान्युपदिष्टानि तथा अवयवा उपदिष्टाः । तस्मादवयवोपपत्तिरित्येतदसत् ।

भाष्यकारप्रामाण्याददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । यद्यपि सूत्रकारेणावयवोपदेशो न कृतस्तथाऽपि भाष्यकाराः केचिदेषां संग्रहं चक्रुः । ते च नः प्रमाणम् । तस्माद्युक्तमवयवोपपत्तिरिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ?

उत्सूत्रत्वात् । नह्युत्सूत्रं व्याचक्षाणा भाष्यकाराः प्रमाणं भवन्ति । तथा चैतदुत्सूत्रितमिति ।

Opponent : *The components should not be mentioned as they do not occur in the (present) text.* The components are not mentioned in the (present) text in the manner the means of knowledge like perception are mentioned. Hence, the statement regarding adequacy of components is not correct.

*What if it is said it is faultless due to the authority of the commentator ?* It may be like this Though the author of the aphorisms has not mentioned the components, yet some commentators have collected them. They are the authority for us. Hence, (the statement regarding) adequacy of the components is justified.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because it deviates from the aphorism.* The commentators who speak something deviating from the aphorism are not authoritative. This also deviates from the aphorism.

उच्यते, न लिङ्गात् । नैतद्युक्तमनुपदेशान्न सन्ति जिज्ञासादयः । किन्तु नुपदिष्टमप्येषामस्तित्वं लिङ्गात् प्रतिपद्यामहे यदयमाचार्यो दुःखत्रयाभिधाताजिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेताविति (का० १) जिज्ञासाप्रयोजनमाचष्टे । कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति (का० १६) प्रतिज्ञां करोति । भेदानां परिमाणादिति (का० १५) हेतुमुपदिशति । नटवद् व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गमिति (का० ४२) दृष्टान्तं द्योतयति । क्षीरस्य यथा तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्येत्यु- (का० ५७) पसंहरति । तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारीति (का० ३५) निगमयति । न चानभिप्रेतैराचार्याणां शास्त्रे व्यवहारो लक्ष्यते । तेन वयं लिङ्गात्प्रतिपद्यामहे सन्ति जिज्ञासादयोऽवयवाः शास्त्र इति ।

Proponent : *No, it is not so because we have inferential mark.* It is not proper (to say) that the desire to know, etc., do not exist because they do not occur in the text. On the contrary, we know their existence through inferential mark, though not propounded in the text; as the teacher speaks of the purpose of



the desire to know in 'on account of the stroke of threefold misery, (there arises) a desire to enquire into the means of alleviating them' (kā. 1). The author makes proposition in 'unmanifest is the cause' (Kā. 16). He speaks of the probans in 'because of the finite nature of specific objects' (kā. 15). He suggests the illustration in 'the subtle body acts like an actor' (kā. 42). He states the application in 'the act of the cosmic matter is like that of milk' (kā. 57). He concludes in 'therefore, the threefold (internal) organ is the gate-keeper' (kā. 35). The teachers are not observed making use of that which is not acceptable to them in their works. Hence, we come to know from the inferential mark that the components like desire to know occur in the present work.

आह, सतामनुपदेशे प्रयोजनवचनम् । एवं चेन्मन्यसे—सन्ति जिज्ञासा-  
दयोऽवयवाः, शास्त्रे तेषामनुपदेशे प्रयोजनं वक्तव्यम्—अमुष्माद्वेतोरा-  
चार्येण नोपदिश्यन्ते, सन्ति च ते इति ।

**Opponent :** *The purpose of not stating them, which exist, should be mentioned.* If you hold that the components, like the desire to know, exist, the purpose of not stating them in the work should be mentioned as to for such and such reason the teacher does not mention them and yet they do exist.

उच्यते, प्रमाणान्तर्भावात् । प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भाव एषामित्ययमुपदिष्टो  
हेतुस्माभिः । अनुमानाङ्गं हि जिज्ञासादयः, तष्मात्तदन्तर्भूतास्ते इति न  
पृथगुपदिश्यन्ते । किञ्च, तन्त्रान्तरोक्तेः । तन्त्रान्तरेषु हि विन्ध्यवासि—  
प्रभृतिभिराचार्यैरुपदिष्टाः । प्रमाणं च नस्ते आचार्या इत्यतश्चानुपदेशो  
जिज्ञासादीनामिति ।

**Proponent :** *Because of their inclusion in the means of knowledge.*  
They are included in the means of knowledge. This is the  
reason which we put forward. Desire to know, etc., are

essential constituents of inference. Therefore, they are included in it and, hence, are not separately mentioned. *Moreover, they are described in other philosophical texts.* They are mentioned in other philosophical texts by the teachers like Vindhyavāsin. And, as those teachers are authority for us, the desire to know, etc., are not mentioned here.

आह न, प्रमाणानुपदेशप्रसंगात् । यदि च तन्त्रान्तरोपदेशादेवाऽव-  
यवानामनुपदेशः, प्रत्यक्षादीन्यपि च तन्त्रान्तरेषूपदिश्यन्ते । श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः  
प्रत्यक्षम् । सम्बन्धादेकस्माच्छेषसिद्धिरनुमानम् । यो यत्राभियुक्तः कर्मणि  
चादुष्टस्तत्राप्तस्तस्योपदेश आप्तवचनमिति तेषामप्यनुपदेशप्रसङ्गः । अथ  
सति तन्त्रान्तरोपदेशे प्रमाणान्युपदिश्यन्ते नावयवा इति, नन्वेतदिच्छामात्र-  
मिति ।

**Opponent ;** *It is not so ; otherwise there would arise the (undesirable) contingency of non-mention of the means of knowledge (also).* If the components are not mentioned because they are mentioned in other philosophical treatises, perception, etc., have also been mentioned in other philosophical treatises, e.g., 'perception is the function of ear and other senses'<sup>11</sup>; 'inference is that by which the existence of the other (remaining) objects is known from the relation perceived

10. Y.D. 5

11. The Y.D. is perhaps the first extant text to refer to this view. It ascribes this definition to Vārṣaganya. Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* (p. 43) records this definition and refutes it. His commentator Vācaspati Miśra *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* p. 155) also ascribes the definition to Vārṣaganya and remarks that the functioning of the senses signifies the primary unqualified apprehension (ālocanamātra) through the five senses modified into the form of the object.



earlier in the case of some<sup>12</sup>; someone well versed in some action and not vitiated (by evil intention) is an authority and his statement is the verbal testimony'. And, therefore, there would arise the (undesirable) contingency of non-mention of all of these (means of knowledge). And, if even having been (commonly) mentioned in other philosophical treatises the means of knowledge are mentioned (here) but not the components, it is surely nothing more than a matter of (one's sweet) will.

उच्यते, पूर्वं एव तर्हि परिहारोऽस्तु । अथवा पुनरस्तु तन्त्रान्तरोक्ते-  
रित्ययमपि परिहारः । यत्कृतं प्रमाणानुपदेशप्रसङ्ग इति अत्र ब्रूमः—  
अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? प्रयोजनवतामुपदेशस्यादोषत्वात् । अनुपदेशो हि  
प्रयोजनवतश्चोद्यत इति युक्तमेतत् । उपदेशमेव तु सदोष इति कृत्वा कः  
प्रत्याचक्षीत ? तस्मान्न किञ्चिदेतत् । किञ्चान्यत्, प्रधानोपदेशे गुण-  
भूतान्तर्भावसिद्धेः । तद्यथा, तक्षणुहि चैत्र इत्युक्ते यावद्भिस्साधनविशेषै-  
र्विना तक्षणं नोपपद्यते सर्वास्तांश्चैत्र उपादत्ते । तथा प्रत्यक्षादिषु प्रमाणेषु-  
पदिष्टेषु यैरेषामविनाभावः सर्वाणि तान्युपादास्यामहे । किञ्चान्यात्,  
अन्यत्रापि तदनुष्ठानात् । न केवलमिह, अन्यत्राप्ययमाचार्यः प्रधानाना-  
मेवोपदेशं करोति । तदङ्गभूतास्तु तदुपदेशादेव प्रतीयन्ते । तद्यथा, कारण-  
मस्त्यव्यक्तम् (का० १६), भेदानां परिमाणादिति (का० १५) । इतरथा  
हि दृष्टान्ताभावादसाधनमेतत्स्यात् । पश्यति त्वाचार्यो नादृष्टान्तं साधनं

12. The Y.D. refers to this definition perhaps for the first time. Uddyotakara (*Nyāyavārttika* p. 57) raises objections against this definition also. Vācaspati Miśra (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* (p. 194) ascribes the definition to the Sāṃkhya and explains that here the relation refers to that between the probans and the probandum. The definition, according to him, comes to this. Inference is that where the existence of the object is known from the concomitant relation with the probans when the probandum is supported by a stronger means of knowledge, viz., perception.

साध्यमाप्नोतीति कृत्वा प्रतिपादकाः प्रतिपादनकाले तन्त्रान्तरोपदिष्टानपि  
मूलशकलादीनाक्षेप्यन्ति इति । किञ्चान्यत्, अनुमाने भूतवदुपदेशात् ।  
अतश्चैतदेवं यदयमाचार्यस्त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातमिति (का० ५) ब्रवीति  
कथं कृत्वा ज्ञापकम् ? आख्यातस्य हि प्रत्याम्नाये भूतवाचिना शब्देनोप-  
देशो भवति । नचानेन पूर्वं त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् । आख्यातमिति चेत्,  
न तदाख्यातं क्वचिदिति शक्यं प्रतिपादयितुम् । सोऽयमनाख्यायापि यद्भूत-  
वाचिनं शब्दमुपादत्ते तज्ज्ञापयत्याचार्यस्तन्त्रान्तरकल्पितानामपीह सन्नि-  
वेशोऽङ्गीक्रियते । किमेतस्य ज्ञापने प्रयोजनम् ? तन्त्रान्तरोपदिष्टोऽपि  
कर्मयोनीनाम् प्राणभेदादीनां च लक्षणोपदेशस्संगृहीतो भवतीति सिद्धं  
तन्त्रान्तरोपदेशादवयवानुपदेशः । तस्मात्सूक्तमेवावयवोपपत्तिरिति ।

Proponent : Here the answer offered earlier itself should be accepted. Or, again the reason that they are mentioned in the other philosophical treatises should also be accepted as an alleviation. As regards the objection that it will lead to the (undesirable) contingency of non-mention of the of means knowledge, our reply is : your statement is wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no fault in mentioning those which serve purpose. It is right that the non-mention of that which serves some purpose may incite someone to object. (But) who will object that their mention itself involves a fault. Therefore, it carries no weight, *Moreover, because in the mention of the principal, the inclusion of the auxiliaries is (automatically) proved.* For example, when it is said, "Caitra, cut the wood", Caitra takes all the instruments without which the act of cutting is not possible. In the same way, when the means of knowledge like perception are mentioned, we take everything invariably required for these. *Moreover, this is the practice elsewhere too.* Not only here, but elsewhere also the present teacher mentions only the principal while the auxiliaries of that are understood through the mention of that only. (Take) for example (the text) 'unmanifest is the cause' (kā. 16); 'because of the finite nature

of the specific objects' (kā 15). It would not have been otherwise (the case of) syllogism on account of absence of illustration. The authority realises that a syllogism of an illustration does not lead to the probandum,<sup>13</sup> and in view of this the propounder while propounding will imply the original or the part thereof even though mentioned in other philosophical treatise. *Moreover, in the context of inference the topic has been mentioned as if already dealt with in the past.* It is because of this that the present teacher states : 'the inference has been said to be three-fold' (kā. 5).

How does it indicate ?

When some proposition already stated is re-stated, only then it is mentioned in the words denoting past tense. (Obviously) the three-fold inference is not discussed earlier by the present author himself.

If it is said that it has been discussed earlier ?

It is quite possible to prove that it is not discussed anywhere. The fact that he uses the words denoting past tense even without discussing it earlier, indicates that the present teacher admits the inclusion of facts postulated in other philosophical treatises also.

What purpose is served by this indication ?

The teachings regarding the distinctive features of the sources of action as also regarding the classification of vital airs, etc., mentioned in other philosophical treatises are collected (admitted) by this text and, hence, it is proved that the components have not been discussed (in the present text) because they have been discussed in other philosophical treatises. Therefore, it is justified that the adequacy or components (form the excellence of a philosophical treatise).

13. Here the author mentions only the probans and the probandum.

(Completeness)

अन्यूनता । पदार्थकात्स्न्यमशेषताऽन्यूनतेत्यभिधीयते । पदार्थाश्च दश चूलिकार्थाः, पञ्चाशत्प्रत्ययाः । तत्रास्तित्वमेकत्वं पञ्चभिर्वीतैः सिद्धम् । अर्थवत्त्वं कार्यकारणभावः । पारार्थ्यं संहत्यकारिणां परार्थत्वात् । अतएवान्यत्वम् । चेतनाशक्तेर्गुणत्रयाज्जन्ममरणकरणानामित्येवमादिभिः पुरुषबहुत्वम् । पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं इति संयोगः । प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे इति वियोगः । सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमादिति शेषवृत्तिः । तस्माच्च विपर्ययादिति पुरुषस्याकर्तृत्वमित्येते दश चूलिकार्थाः ।

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।

अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ (का० ४७)

इति पञ्चाशत्प्रत्ययाः । सैषा षष्टिः पदार्थानाम् । तदुपपत्तिरन्यूनता ।

The all inclusiveness of the categories is called completeness or exhaustiveness. The categories are : ten basic categories and fifty psychic dispositions. Out of these, (i) existence and (ii) singleness are proved by five (components) of direct inference. (iii) Purposefulness means to stand in relation of effect and cause. (iv) Subservience is due to the fact that the objects functioning collectively are meant for others. From this very fact (results) (v) separateness. (vi) The plurality of the conscious power inferred through the diversity of (proportion of) three ingredients of cosmic matter and the (definite adjustment of) birth, death and organs (kā. 18) means the plurality of the conscious entity. (vii) Union is known by the statement 'for the perception of the conscious entity' (kā. 21), etc., (viii) Disunion is known by the statement 'when the separation from the body is attained' (kā. 68), etc., (ix) Duration is known through the statement by the attainment of right knowledge' (kā. 67), etc. (x) The non-agency of the conscious entity is known by the statement 'and from that contrast' (kā. 19), etc. These are the ten basic categories.

"There are five forms of perversion,<sup>14</sup> twenty eight of disability

14. For five reasons see S.K. 15.

arising from the imperfections (defects) of the organs. Contentment has nine forms and attainment eight" (kā 47). These are the fifty Psychic dispositions. These (along with the ten basic categories) form the sixty categories. The adequacy of all these is the completeness.

(Statement of uncertainty and decisiveness)

संशयनिर्णयोक्तिः । संशयश्च निर्णयश्च तौ संशयनिर्णयौ । तयो-  
रुक्तिस्संशयनिर्णयोक्तिः । सामान्याभिधानं संशयः । तद्यथा महदादि तच्च  
कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं चेत्युक्ते (का० ८) संशयो भवति केन धर्मेण कार्यं  
प्रकृतिविरूपं केन वा सरूपमिति । विशेषाभिधानं निर्णयः । स च द्विविधः;  
शब्दतोऽर्थतश्च शब्दतस्तावत् यथा हेतुमदादिभिः कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपम्,  
त्रैगुण्यादिभिः प्रकृतिसरूपमिति । अर्थतस्तत् यथा तेभ्यो भूतानि पंचभ्यः,  
एते स्मृता विशेषाः (का. ३८) । किं कारणम् ? यस्मात् शान्ता घोराश्च  
मूढाश्च (का० ३८) । अशान्तघोरमूढत्वात्तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः ।

The statement of uncertainty and decisiveness. The compound term *saṁśayanirṇayau* denotes uncertainty and decisiveness. And, the statement regarding them is the statement of uncertainty and decisiveness. Uncertainty means a general sort of description. For example, when it is stated that 'its effects, the great principle and the rest are dissimilar and similar to the cosmic matter (kā. 8), etc., there arises the uncertainty (doubt) as to in respect of what characteristics the effect is dissimilar to the cosmic matter and in respect of what it is similar to the cosmic matter. The statement regarding specification is decisiveness. It is twofold : verbal and through implication. Verbal (is exemplified) as—'the effect is dissimilar to the cosmic matter in respect of having a cause (kā. 10), etc., and 'it is similar to the cosmic matter in respect of being possessed of the three ingredients' (kā. 11), etc. That through implication is (exemplified) as—'from five of these proceed the five gross elements; these are said to be specific' (kā. 38).

Why is it so ?

Because (these are) calm, turbulent and deluding (kā. 38). The subtle elements are non-specific because they are not calm, turbulent and deluding.

(Brief enunciation and detailed statement)

उद्देशनिर्देशम् । उद्देशश्च निर्देशश्च उद्देशनिर्देशम् । सर्वो द्वन्द्वो  
विभाषयैकवद् भवति इति द्वन्द्वैकवद्भावः । सङ्क्षेपवचनमुद्देशः ।  
तद्यथा, एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्धिचाख्यः (का० ४६) ।  
विस्तरवचनं निर्देशः । तद्यथा, पंच विपर्ययभेदा भवन्ति (का० ४७)  
भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविध (का० ४८) इत्यादिः ।

Brief enunciation and detailed statement : The compound term *uddeśānirdeśau* denotes brief enunciation and detailed statement. Since all the copulative compounds are optionally treated as a single unit, this copulative compound is treated as a single unit here. *Uddeśa* means brief enunciation; for example, 'such is the creation from intellect called as perversion, disability, contentment and super natural power (kā. 46). *Nirdeśa* is the detailed statement; for example, 'there are five types of perversion', etc. (kā. 47); 'there are eight types of (mental) darkness' (kā. 48), etc.

(Succession)

अनुक्रमश्च । पदार्थानामानुपूर्व्या सन्निवेशोपदेशोऽनुक्रमः । तद्यथा,  
प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशक (का० २२) इत्यनेन ।

And succession (is like this). Succession means the mention of arranging the objects in succession; for example, 'from cosmic matter issues the great principle and from it issues the 'I' principle and from that proceeds the set of sixteen' (kā. 22).

(Naming)

संज्ञोपदेशौ । संज्ञिप्रत्यायनार्थः शब्दः संज्ञा । सा च द्विविधा । अर्थ-  
निबन्धना स्वरूपनिबन्धना च । तत्रार्थनिबन्धनाऽर्थवशेनाऽर्थक्रियापेक्षा ।  
जात्याद्यर्थस्वरूपान्तर्भावी यथाऽर्थस्तथाभूतमेव संज्ञिनं प्रत्याययति । तद्यथा

पाचको लावक इति । स्वरूपनिबन्धना पुनः संज्ञिप्रत्यायनोपायमात्रम् । स्वरूपमात्रोपकारिणी विनाऽवयवार्थं समयवशादतथाभूतमपि संज्ञिनं प्रत्याययति । तद्यथा, गजकर्णोऽश्वकर्ण इति । प्रयत्नतो भगवतः परमर्षे-  
राशेण ज्ञानेन सर्वतत्त्वानां स्वरूपमुपलभ्य संज्ञां विदधतो नास्ति स्वरूप-  
निबन्धनः शब्दः । तद्यथा, प्रधीयन्तेऽत्र विकारा इति प्रधानम्, पुरि शेते  
इति पुरुष इत्यादि । तन्मतानुसारिणामप्याचार्याणां ताभिरेव संव्यवहा-  
रान्नास्त्यपूर्वसंज्ञाविधानम्प्रत्यादरः ।

Naming (the object) and the resultant : Naming is the word used for indicating the object signified by it. It is twofold : dependent on etymological meaning and dependent upon its own form (conventional meaning). Dependent upon meaning is that where the purposeful activity of an object is in accordance with the (etymological) meaning. It denotes the object exactly as it is included (as a member) in the class, etc., in accordance with its denotation, e.g., a cook and a cutter. Again that dependent upon its own form serves only as means to convey the (individual) object (denoted by it). It is useful (in yielding the meaning) merely through its form, not caring for the meaning of its component and indicating an object which is not really like that on account of the convention or particular usage. For example, *Gajakaraṇa*<sup>15</sup> and *Aśvakaraṇa*,<sup>16</sup> etc. There is no word in the scripture which conveys its meaning merely through its own form (conventionally), used by the supreme sage who has with great efforts coined the names of all the principles after having seen their essential nature through direct knowledge. For example, the *pradhāna* (cosmic matter) is called so because its

15. Lit. having ears like an elephant.

16. Lit. having ears like a horse. The literal meaning here, as in the case of *gajakaraṇa*, is irrelevant because these names could be given to anybody, irrespective of the shape of the ears.

evolutes merge in it (*pradhīyante*) at the time of dissolution<sup>17</sup>; the *Puruṣa* is called so because it rests in the body (*puri śete*),<sup>18</sup> etc. The authorities also, who follow his views, are not eager to coin new names since they can better communicate through these very names.

### (Resultant)

उपदेशः । इतिकर्तव्यताफलसमाख्यानमुपदेशः । तद्यथा,

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥

—(का० ६४)

Resultant : the statement of resultant is stating the fruit of process of the acts prescribed; for example,

“In this way, through the repeated study of the principles there arises the knowledge in the form ‘I am not’, ‘nothing is mine’ and ‘I am not that’, which is complete, pure on account of being incontrovertible and solitary” (*kā. 64*).

### (Other Characteristics of a Philosophical Treatise)

एते सूत्रोपपत्त्यादयस्तन्त्रगुणाः ।

इति करणं प्रकारार्थम् । एवम्प्रकारा अन्येऽपि द्रष्टव्याः । तद्यथा, उत्सर्गोऽपवादोऽतिदेश इत्यादिः । तत्रोत्सर्गः प्रकृतिविरूपं (का० ८) व्यक्तम् सरूपं (का० ८) चेत्यपवादः । तथा तद्विपरीत (का० ११) इत्युत्सर्गः, तथा च पुमान् (का० ११) इत्यपवादः । सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि व्यक्तं, तथा

17. *Pradhāna-pra* (excessively) *dhā* (to place, i. e., to merge absolutely). *Na in Pradhāna* is the remanent of the grammatical suffix *lyuṣ* in the sense of locus (*adhikaraṇa*).

18. *Puruṣa-puri* (in the body) *śete* (rests).

प्रधानम् (का० ११) इत्यतिदेशः । इत्येवमन्या अपि तन्त्रयुक्तयः शक्या इह प्रदर्शयितुम् । अतिप्रसङ्गस्तु प्रकृतं तिरोदधातीति निवर्त्यते । सिद्धं तन्त्रयुक्तीनां सम्बन्धोपपत्तेस्तन्त्रमिदमिति ।

These, viz., the adequacy of an aphorism, etc., form the characteristics of a philosophical treatise.

The mention of 'iti' is to suggest the other characteristics of this kind. The other characteristics of this kind should also be understood; for example, a general rule, exception and extended application. etc. Out of these, the general rule is laid down in 'the manifest is dissimilar to the cosmic matter' (kā. 8), etc. And, 'It is similar to cosmic matter' (kā. 8) is the exception. Similarly, 'the conscious entity is opposite to that' (kā. 11), etc., is the general rule, and 'the conscious entity is also similar to them' (kā. 11), etc., is an exception. Here is an example of extended application. 'The manifest is common, insentient and prolific and similarly is the cosmic matter' (kā. 11). In this way, it is possible to indicate some characteristics of a philosophical treatise, but as the excessive stress on a side issue conceals the relevant issue, we close (discussion) here. On the basis of the (above) justification of the relationship (of the text) with the characteristics of a philosophical treatise, it is established that the text at hand is a philosophical treatise.

(Another proof for Sāmkhyakārikā's being a philosophical treatise)

किञ्च तन्त्रान्तराविरोधात् । यदि खल्वपीदमपि प्रकरणं स्यात् तन्त्रान्तरे पातञ्जलपञ्चाधिकरणवार्षगणप्रभृतीनामन्यतमस्य शषभूतं स्यात् । तैश्चाप्यविरोधस्तत्र तत्रेति वक्ष्यामः । पूर्वतन्त्रशेषभावादिति चेत्, तुल्यम् । एतान्यपि । पूर्वतन्त्रशेषभूतानि, तेषामपि प्रकरणत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ मतम्—सकलपदार्थसंग्रहात्तन्त्रान्तराण्येतानि, एवमिहापि सकलपदार्थसंग्रहात्तन्त्रान्तरत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्तन्त्रमिदम् । इत्युपोद्घातः ॥

Moreover, it is not in contradiction with (the form of) the other philosophical treatises. If it also would have been a partial manual

of some philosophical treatise, it would have been secondary to any of the philosophical treatises, of Pātañjala, Pancādhikaraṇa, Vārṣaganya, etc. Its non-contradiction with them will be shown at pertinent places.

If it is argued that on account of its being a residual of the earlier philosophical treatise (it is a partial manual) ?

*It is equally applicable to all the cases (this and other texts).* These (the other texts) are also secondary to earlier philosophical treatises and, therefore, there would be an (undesirable) contingency of considering them also as partial manual. The principle, therefore is—just as others are philosophical treatises because of the inclusion of (the treatment of) all the categories, similarly this should also be accepted as an independent philosophical treatise as it also includes (the treatment of) all the categories. Therefore, it is proper to say that this is a philosophical treatise.

Here ends the Introduction

## KĀRIKĀ 1

(Qualities of a disciple)

आह, किं गुणविशिष्टाय शिष्याय पुनरिदं तन्त्रं व्याख्येयमिति ।।

Opponent : Again, to a disciple possessed of what qualities should this philosophical treatise be explained ?

उच्यते—जिज्ञासवे मतिमते मीमांसकायार्थिनेऽभ्युपगताय शिष्याय व्याख्येयं शास्त्रम् ।

Proponent : This philosophical treatise should be explained to a disciple who is desirous of knowing, intelligent, investigator (seeker of truth), needy and has approached the teacher.

कस्मात् ?

Opponent : Why (what is the proof for that) ?

परमर्षिप्रामाण्यात् । यस्माद् भगवान् विश्वाग्रजः परमर्षिर्भगवदासुरेजिज्ञासामुपलभ्योत्तरगुणविशेषसम्पदं च व्याख्यातवान् । रज एव दुःखं, तन्निराकरिष्णोर्विवेकोऽयं, सत्त्वात् । सत्त्वं चास्मान्नानेत्येवमादिना वचनप्रतिपाद्योऽयमर्थो महद्भिश्चोक्तः । तस्माद्भजोदुःखोपघातकजिज्ञासोः सत्त्वाद्धर्मादिकुशलमूलविपाकोत्पत्सोर्दुःखत्रयनिवृत्तय इदं शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तम् । तदर्थोत्परिणम्यते शिष्यस्येति । कथं नाम शिष्यस्य निःश्रेयसेन योगः स्यादित्येवमर्थमिदं व्याख्यानं क्रियत इति ।

Proponent : On the authority of the supreme seer. Because lord (Kapila) who was born first in the world expounded (the system) to Āsuri after knowing his desire to know and his

accomplishment of the successive particular qualities.<sup>19</sup> The stimulating and moving quality (*rajas*) itself is the misery. The discriminative knowledge is meant for the person who desires to alleviate it (*rajas*) since it (knowledge) is of the nature of buoyant and shining quality (*sattva*)<sup>20</sup>. This sense is expounded by the statement 'on account of this, the *sattva* becomes manifold', etc., and is also propounded by the great persons. Therefore, this scripture is engaged in the alleviation of the three-fold misery of the one who is desirous of (knowing) the means of alleviating the assault of misery in the form of stimulating and moving quality (*rajas*), and who desires to extricate the result yielding virtue, etc., which are rooted in (worldly) welfare because of buoyant and shining quality (*sattva*). Through comprehending the meaning of that (scripture) that (stock of miseries and virtues of a disciple) becomes ripe for fruition (i.e., comes to an end). How can liberation be acquired by the disciple—for this purpose commences this explanation.<sup>21</sup>

19. It refers to the qualities of being intelligent and investigator and his approaching the teacher. Or alternatively the expression *Uttarottaraguṇaviśeṣasāmpadam* may be understood as an object of *vyākhyātavāna*. In this case, it would mean that lord Kapila expounded the peculiar properties of each of the constituents of the cosmic matter successively in the order of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.
20. Though knowledge is a quality or form of the intellect which is composed of the three constituents, yet it is spoken to be of the nature of *sattva* as it arises when the *sattva* dominates in intellect.
21. The earlier statement proposes the removal of misery as the Sāṃkhya purpose of the philosophy. The present statement speaks of liberation. It does not involve contradiction since the liberation in Sāṃkhya is only of the nature of removal of misery.

(Cause of the rise of desire to know)

आह, यदुक्तं जिज्ञासवे व्याख्यानं कर्तव्यमिति तत्र कुतः पुनरियं जिज्ञासा कस्मिन् वार्थे भवतीति ?

Opponent : As regards your statement that the scripture should be explained to a disciple desirous of knowing, (we ask) why and with regard to what object does this desire to know arise ?

उच्यते—यत्तावदुक्तं कुतः पुनरियं जिज्ञासा भवतीत्यत्र ब्रूमः

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा

दुःखं रज इत्यनर्थान्तरम् । दुःखयतीति दुःखं भवतीति । त्रयमिति संख्यापदं सर्वद्रव्यविषयं, दुःखशब्देन विशिष्यते । प्राधान्याच्च व्यतिरिक्त-बुद्ध्या गृह्यमाणं सम्बन्धित्वादाधारस्य भेदनिबन्धनायाः षष्ठ्या निमित्तत्वं प्रतिपद्यते—दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयम् ।

अभिहन्यतेऽनेनेत्यभिघातः ।

Proponent : As regards your question why does this desire to know arise, we reply :

#### ON ACCOUNT OF THE ASSAULT OF THREEFOLD MISERY THERE ARISES THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Misery and *rajas* are synonymous. That which afflicts is misery. The word three denoting number may refer to all the objects, but it is here qualified by the word *duḥkha* (misery). As that word is principal, it is grasped as different and as such as the substratum is related, it makes the genitive which indicates difference as an indicative of instrumentality. The triad of misery means three-fold misery.

An assault is that through which affliction is caused.

कः पुनरयमभिघातो नाम ?

Opponent : What is, again, this assault ?

उच्यते—योऽसावुपर्युक्तदुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणेन चेतनाशक्तेरभिसम्बन्धः । तस्माद्दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा ।

Proponent : It is close contact of the conscious power with the internal organ which is of the above mentioned three-fold misery. Therefore, on account of the assault of three-fold misery there arises the desire to know.

(Object of desire to know)

यदुक्तं कस्मिन्नार्थे भवतीति तत्राह—

तदपघातके हेतौ ।

अपहन्तीत्यपघातकः, तस्यापघातकस्तदपघातकः ।

As regards your question 'with regard to what object does the desire to know arise', the reply is :

WITH REFERENCE TO THE ALLEVIATOR MEANS OF THAT.

An alleviator is that which alleviates. The expression *tadapaghātaka* means the alleviator of that.

आह, तदपघातके इति समासाऽनुपपत्तिः, प्रतिषेधात् । कर्तरि यो तृजको ताभ्यां सह षष्ठी न समस्यते । तस्मात्तस्यापघातक इति वक्तव्यम् ।

Opponent : There is no possibility of compound in *tadapaghātaka* because of prohibition.

(The word ending in) the sixth case affix is not compounded with the (words with) the *tṛc* and *aka* suffixes which are used in the sense of agent <sup>22</sup> Hence, the proper wording should be *tasyāpaghātaka*. <sup>23</sup>

उच्यते—न, शास्त्रे दर्शनात् । “तत्प्रयोजको हेतुश्च” इति शास्त्रे दृष्टः प्रयोगः । पदकारश्चाह—जातिवाचकत्वात् । तथा कदाचिद् गुणो

22. Pāṇini 2.2.15.

32. I.e., the word without compound.



गुणविशेषको भवति, कदाचिद् गुणिना गुणो विशिष्यत इति चूर्णिकारस्य प्रयोगः । तस्मादनवद्यमेतत् ।

Proponent : No, because (this sort of use) is observed in the scriptures.

*Tatprayojako hetuśca*<sup>24</sup> is a use available in the scriptures. The commentator also stated *jātivācakatvāt*<sup>25</sup> (on account of being denoter of a genus). Here is an example of this type of use by the author of the Cūrṇi also. 'Sometimes the quality qualifies the object possessing that quality, sometimes the quality is qualified by the object possessing it'.<sup>26</sup> Hence, this use (of the Sāṃkhyakārikā) is faultless.

अयं तु पिण्डार्थः । त्रिविधेन दुःखेनाभिहतो ब्राह्मणस्तदपघातकं हेतुं जिज्ञासते । को नामासौ हेतुः स्याद्यो दुःखत्रयमभिहत्यादिति ।

The gist is that a brahmin attacked by three-fold misery desires to know the means of alleviating that as to what can be that means which can alleviate the three-fold misery.

(Use of *duḥkha* in the beginning does not involve inauspiciousness)

आह, दुःखशब्दावचनमादावमङ्गलार्थत्वात् । मङ्गलादीनि हि शास्त्राणि प्रथन्ते वीरपुरुषाणि च भवन्ति, अध्येतारश्च मंगलेनाभिहत-संस्काराः शास्त्रार्थानां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । दुःखमित्ययं चाऽमङ्गलार्थः शब्दः, तस्मान्नारब्धव्यः शास्त्रादाविति ।

Opponent : The word *duḥkha* (misery) should not be used in the beginning (of a text) because its meaning is inauspicious. The scriptures having auspicious word in the beginning become famous (lit. spread) and the persons who read them become eminent and with their (past) impressions smitten (through

24. Pāṇini 1.4.55

25. This is a *vārttika* discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya* 4.1.14.

26. It occurs in the *Mahābhāṣya* 5.1.59

benediction) understand the meaning of the scripture quickly,<sup>27</sup> and the world *duḥkha* (misery) means something inauspicious. Hence, the scripture should not be started with this word in the beginning.<sup>28</sup>

उच्यते न, वाक्यस्यार्थे प्रयोगात् पदस्यानर्थक्यादमङ्गलार्थत्वानुपपत्तिः । वाक्यमर्थप्रत्यायनार्थं प्रयुज्यते, विशिष्टार्थाभिधानात् । न पदम् । तथा हि पदार्थव्यतिरेकेण विशिष्ट एव वाक्यार्थः प्रतीयते, केवलं तु पदं सामान्यार्थादप्रच्युतं विशिष्टार्थाभिधानासमर्थम् । अतएव न विवक्षितार्थ-प्रत्यायनयोग्यतयोपादीयते । तद्यथा—देवदत्तेत्ययं शब्दः कर्तृवाचकत्वेनोपात्तः, सर्वक्रियाविषयत्वात्, नान्तरेण कर्मक्रियाशब्दौ विशिष्टार्थः प्रतीयते । तथा गामिति कर्म, सर्वक्रियाकर्त्रभिधाननिमित्तत्वात् । तथा अभ्याजेति क्रिया, सर्वकर्मकर्तृविषयत्वात् । यदा तु देवदत्त गामभ्याज शुक्लामित्युच्यते तदा देवदत्तेन गोशब्देन कर्मान्तरेभ्यो विच्छिद्य स्वात्मन्यवस्थाप्यते । क्रिया च गोशब्दश्च सर्वकर्तृभ्यो देवदत्तकर्मतया व्यवस्थाप्यते । कर्तृकर्मणी चाभ्याजिक्रियायाः साधनभावेनैव नियम्यते । शुक्लशब्दो गोशब्दश्च गोशब्दं सर्वगुणविषयमाधेयान्तरेभ्यो व्यवच्छेद्य स्वात्मन आधारत्वे नियम्य, तद्विषयतां प्रतिपादयतीत्यनेन क्रमेण विशिष्टो वाक्यार्थः । केवलानान्तु पदानां सामान्यार्थात् प्रच्युतानाम्विशेषानभिधानादानर्थक्यम् । आह च—

पृथङ्निविष्टतत्त्वानाम्पृथगर्थभिधातिनाम् ।

इन्द्रियाणां यथा कार्यमृते देहान्न लभ्यते ॥

तथैव सर्वशब्दानाम्पृथगर्थभिधायिनाम् ।

वाक्येभ्यः प्रविभक्तानामर्थवत्ता न लभ्यते ॥ इति

एवं सति कुतोऽयं निश्चयप्रतिलम्भो यदुःखशब्दोऽयममङ्गलार्थो यावता सन्दिह्यत एव अयं किं स्वार्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुपात्तोऽथ हेयत्वायेति ।

27. It is a common belief. A similar idea is found in the *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1.

28. The reading in the text implies the recurrence of beginning.



वाक्यस्य तु मङ्गलार्थत्वम्, दुःखप्रहाणार्थमुपादानात् । यद्धि दुःखप्रहाणार्थं वाक्यमुपादीयते तन्मङ्गलार्थं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा व्याध्यपगमः स्यादलक्ष्मीर्मा भूदिति । दुःखप्रहाणार्थं चेदं वाक्यमुपात्तं तस्मान्मङ्गलार्थमिदम् । तत्र यदुक्तं दुःखशब्दावचनमादावमङ्गलार्थत्वादित्येतदयुक्तम् ।

Proponent : No, it is not proper to say that its meaning is inauspicious because it has been used in the sense of sentence and the independent word as such has hardly any sense. The (complete) sentence is employed to convey some meaning since it conveys a particular meaning. And, independent word does not do so. A particular meaning different from the meaning conveyed by the constituent words is understood through a sentence. An independent word is not capable of conveying a particular meaning as it does not deviate from its general meaning. It is for this reason that it is not considered to be capable of conveying the desired meaning. For example, the word Devadatta is used in the sense of an agent for it can be related to any verb.<sup>29</sup> Without the help of other words—denoting object and verb—any particular meaning is not understood. Similarly, the word gām is denotive of an object because it is instrumental in naming all the agents and verbs. In the same way, abhyāja (you bring) is a verb for it can be put with all the agents and the objects. When it is stated—Devadatta, bring the white cow, Devadatta restricts for himself the activity to (the object conveyed by the word) go (cow) after distinguishing it from the other objects. The verb and the term go (cow) are also restricted to Devadatta as the predicate and all the other agents are eliminated. The agent and the object are restricted in the sense of the accessories only to the act of bringing. Among the words *sukla* (white) and *go* (cow) the words *sukla* restricts the cow which is the locus of all qualities,

29. The sense is that it can be related to all the verbs.

after distinguishing it from other attributes as its own substratum and thus establishing its objectivity. In this order ensues the particular meaning of a sentence. The independent words without deviating from their general meaning<sup>30</sup> are meaningless for they do not convey the particular meaning. It is stated also :

“Just as the operation of the senses which have their individual essential nature of particular objects and their own respective objects (to cognise), is not observed without the body, similarly, the meaningfulness of the individual words which are expressive of their own individual meaning is not observed when isolated from the sentence.”<sup>31</sup>

When such is the position, wherefrom do you ascertain that the meaning conveyed by *duḥkha* (misery) is inauspicious (specially) till you have the doubt whether the word is regarded as used to convey its (own) meaning or its avoidability. The meaning conveyed by the sentence is auspicious for it is employed in the sense of avoiding the misery. The sentence which is employed in the sense of avoiding the misery is observed as conveying auspicious meaning; for example, ‘let the disease vanish’, and ‘let there be no poverty’. And as this sentence is also employed in the sense of avoiding the misery, it conveys auspicious meaning. Your statement that the word *duḥkha* (misery) should not be used in the beginning (of a text) because the sense conveyed by it is inauspicious, is wrong.

(Significance of *traya*)

आह, त्रयग्रहणानर्थक्यं, गुणैकत्वात् । दुःखं रज इति प्रतिपन्नो भवान्, तच्चैकं शास्त्रे पठ्यते । तस्मात्त्रयग्रहणमनर्थकमिति ।

30. We have preferred the following reading given in Poona manuscript and accepted by *Chakravarti-padānām sāmānyārthādapracayutānām*.

31. A similar idea in similar words is found in the *Vākyapadīya* 2.426-7.

निमित्तभेदाद् भेदोपचार इति चेत्, स्यान्मतम् । यद्यपि एकं दुःखं तथापि निमित्तानामध्यात्माऽधिभूताऽधिदैवलक्षणानां भेदादस्य भेदोपचारः करिष्यत इति ।

तच्च नैवम् ।

कस्मात् ?

निमित्तानन्त्येन गुणानन्त्यप्रसङ्गात् । आध्यात्मिकं हि द्विविधं, शारीरं मानसं च । शारीरं तावद्वातपित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तम् । तथा मानसं कामक्रोधलोभमोहविषादभयेष्याऽसूयारत्यविशेषदर्शननिमित्तम् । आधिभौतिकं च मनुष्यपशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावरनिमित्तम् । आधिदैविकं शीतोष्णवातवर्षाशान्यवश्यायावेशनिमित्तम् । तत्र निमित्तभेदात्त्रित्वप्रतिज्ञस्य गुणानन्त्यप्रसङ्गः, स च नेष्टस्तस्मान्न निमित्तभेदात्त्रित्वम् ।

Opponent : The mention of the word *traya* (i.e. *triad*, in the *kārikā*) is useless because the ingredient of the cosmic matter (viz., stimulating and moving quality, *rajas*) is one only. You have ascertained that misery is the stimulating and moving quality, and that is mentioned in the scripture as one. Hence, the mention of the word *traya* (triad) is meaningless.

If it is held that its difference is metaphorical due to the difference of its instruments? It can also be like this. Though the misery is one, yet on account of difference of its causes in the form of bodily elements and will of the Providence, it is also metaphorically differentiated.

That is also not correct.

Why ?

Because there will be undesirable contingency of the infinitude of the ingredient of the cosmic matter (viz., stimulating and moving

quality) on the ground of infinitude of the causes. The bodily misery is twofold : physical and mental. The physical misery is caused by the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm. And, the mental is caused by desire, wrath, avarice, infatuation, depression, fear, envy, displeasure at the happiness of others, repulsion (or anxiety) and the non-obtainment of a particular object. The elemental misery is caused by men, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles and the immovable objects. And, (the misery) arising out of the will of Providence is caused by anger (i.e., excess of) cold, heat, storm, rains, the planet Saturn and the dew drops. There arises the undesirable contingency of admitting the infinitude of the constituents of the cosmic matter (viz., the stimulating and moving quality) in case of the one who admits the triad (of misery) on the ground of difference of causes. This is obviously not desirable and, hence, there is no triad of misery on the ground of the difference of instruments.

उच्यते—यदुक्तं रजस एकत्वात् त्रित्वानुपपत्तिः, तस्य निमित्तभेदात् त्रित्वोपचार इति सत्यमेतत् । यत्तुक्तं निमित्तानन्त्येन गुणानन्त्यप्रसङ्ग इति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? भेदेऽपि सति वर्णसंख्यावद्वचनस्थानोपपत्तेः । तद्यथा चत्वारो वर्णा इत्यस्याः संख्यायाः सति पैप्पलादादिभेदे तेषां ब्राह्मणत्वादि-व्यतिरेकाभावान्न संख्यान्तरहेतुत्वं नो खल्वपि वर्णव्यतिरेकादेकत्वं भवति । एवं त्रीणि दुःखानीत्यस्याः संख्यायाः सति शरीरादिभेदे तेषामाध्यात्मिकादिव्यतिरेकासम्भवान्न संख्यान्तरहेतुत्वं नो खल्वपि दुःखाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वं भवितुमर्हति । किञ्चान्यत्, निमित्तभेदाद् भेदोपचार इति भवानेव प्रतिपन्नः । न चोपचारः परमार्थ इत्यलमस्थाने यत्नेन ।

Proponent : Your statement that there is no propriety of the triad (of misery) because of the oneness of the stimulating and moving quality (*rājas*), but it (misery) is metaphorically stated to be three-fold on the ground of difference of causes, is correct. Your statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting the infinitude of the moving and

stimulating quality (rajas) due to the infinitude of the causes, is wrong.

Why ?

*Because inspite of difference, there is a justification for this sort of arrangement of classification as in the case of the number of castes. For, example, the castes are four and inspite of their difference in the form Paippalāda, etc., that difference does not cause additional number of the castes because of their non-difference from Brāhmaṇa, etc. Nor is there singleness in caste due to their non-difference from caste in general. Similarly, the number of misery is three inspite of their difference in the form of bodily, etc., it does not cause additional number because they are not different from that (misery) arising out of body. Nor does it lead to admit the oneness (of misery) because of its non-difference of misery in general. Moreover, you have yourself, substantiated that the difference is caused by the difference of causes and is metaphorical. And, the metaphorical is not real. (Hence), one should not insist on a wrong issue.*

(Desire to know through assault of Misery)

आह—अभिघाताज्जिज्ञासायामतिप्रसङ्गः, सर्वेषां सम्भवात् । यथासुरे-  
दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा भवतीत्येतदिष्टं तेन सर्वेषामभिघातोऽस्तीति  
सर्वेषां जिज्ञासाप्रसङ्गः । अथ मतं दुःखाभिघाते कस्यचिज्जिज्ञासा भवति  
कस्यचिन्नेति । नन्वेवमिच्छामात्रम् । प्राग्प्रसङ्गाच्च । प्रागप्यासुरेज्जिज्ञा-  
साया दुःखत्रयाभिघातो न चास्यात्यन्तिके हेतौ जिज्ञासा बभूव । तेन किं  
प्राप्तम् ? पश्चादस्य यतो बभूव तद्वक्तव्यम् । यथाऽन्यत्र ब्रह्मणोऽभ्यास-  
निमित्तादधर्मक्षयात् पूर्वधर्मानुग्रहाच्च विविदिषा, तथाऽन्येषां कुशलमूला-  
भ्यासपरिपाकात् । न चापदिष्टमतो लघूक्तमेतत् । किञ्चान्यत्, तदपघ-  
ताच्चाऽनिर्मोक्षोऽकृत्स्नत्वात् । मोक्षो हि कामरूपाऽऽरूप्यधातुत्रयादिष्यते ।

देवमानुष्यतिर्यग्योनित्रयाद्वा । एकदेशश्च संसारस्य दुःखत्रयम् । तस्मात्  
प्रयोजनमप्ययुक्तम् । किञ्च निमित्तान्तरसद्भावाद्दिव्यकामध्यानसुखान-  
पेक्षस्यापि विविदिषा सम्भवति, न केवलं तापोद्विग्नस्यापि । तस्मान्निमित्त-  
मप्ययुक्तम् । किञ्चान्यत् । उभयथा चाऽसम्भवात् । परिकल्प्यमाना खत्वपीयं  
जिज्ञासा पुरुषस्य वा स्याद् गुणानां वा । किंचातः ? तन्न तावत्पुरुषस्य  
सम्भवति । कस्मात् ? नैर्गुण्याभ्युपगमात् । इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखधर्मि-  
धर्मज्ञानसंस्काराणामात्मगुणत्वं न भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यते । न गुणानाम्,  
आचेतन्यात् । न ह्यचेतना घटादयो हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारं जिज्ञासमाना  
दृश्यते । न च चेतना भवतां गुणाः, सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि प्रधानमिति  
(का० ११) वक्ष्यमाणवचनात् । किञ्चान्यत्, तत्त्वान्तरानुपपत्तेः । न च  
गुणपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुतस्तत्त्वान्तरमस्ति यस्य जिज्ञासा परिकल्प्यमाना  
परिकल्प्येत । तस्मादनुपपन्ना जिज्ञासा ।

Opponent : *The (admission of) rise of desire to know through the assault (of misery) involves the undesirable contingency of over pervasion because it could be possible in all. To explain, if the sense intended by you is that there arises the desire to know in Āsuri on account of the assault of threefold misery, there is the assault of misery over all; hence, there arises the undesirable contingency of rise of desire to know in all. If you hold that the assault of misery is common but the desire to know arises in case of some and not in others, it would indeed be a matter of mere sweet will. Moreover, it involves the undesirable contingency of rise (of desire to know) even earlier (in Āsuri). The assault of misery was there over Āsuri even earlier to the rise of desire to know, but there arose no desire to know the means of complete removal of misery.*

What does it prove ?

The cause due to which it arose later only should be explained. As at other places the desire to know arose in a Brāhmaṇa by means of destruction of vice through the (constant) practice and through a favour of virtues acquired earlier and in the case

of others it (the desire to know) arose through full development (fruition) of the practice of virtue and it has not been refuted by you,<sup>32</sup> your surmise is insignificant.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, the assault of misery implies the lack of liberation because of incompleteness. Liberation is desired to be attained from the triad of sensuous activity, material elements and sphere of non-corporeality or from the triad of birth in the form of gods, men and beasts, The triad of misery is a part of the world (while liberation ensues from the world altogether). Hence, the purpose is also wrong.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, because of the existence of some other means (for the rise of desire to know).<sup>35</sup> The desire to know is possible in case of one who does not long for the fulfilment of the divine desire and pleasure of concentration. It is not found only in those tormented by miseries. Hence, your opinion regarding the cause of that (rise of desire to know) is also wrong. Moreover, it is impossible in both ways. The desire to know, even if postulated in this way, may belong either to the conscious entity or to the constituents of the cosmic matter.

So what ?

That is not possible in case of the conscious entity.

Why ?

Because you have admitted that it is devoid of qualities. You do not admit desire, envy, effort, pleasure, pain, virtue, vice,

32. The sense is that it is not clear whether the desire arose out of this assault or the fruition of virtue.

33. Rendered into one sentence following *Chakravartī's* edition.

34. If the purpose is to remove misery which is identical with the word itself, such a purpose is wrong since the removal of the world is not possible.

35. A full stop is desirable after *bhāvāt*.

knowledge and (past) impressions are the qualities of the soul.<sup>36</sup> Nor can it (desire to know) belong to the constituents of the cosmic matter because they are insentient. The insentient objects like the pither, etc., are not observed desiring for attaining beneficial and for avoiding the harmful; And, the constituent of the cosmic matter, as conceived by you, are not sentient because you have stated later on that 'the cosmic matter is common, insentient and productive' (kā 11). Moreover, there is no possibility of another (third) entity.<sup>37</sup> There is indeed no entity additional to the constituents of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity to which the desire to know postulated (by you) may be supposed to belong to. Hence, the desire to know is not possible.

उच्यते । यदुक्तमभिघाताज्जिज्ञासायामतिप्रसङ्गः, सर्वेषां तत्सम्भवादिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, अभिघातत्वेनाऽप्रतिपत्तेः । यद्यप्यविशिष्टोऽभिघातस्तथापि सर्वे नैनमभिघातत्वेन प्रतिपद्यन्ते । तथाहि, सत्त्वाध्यात्मिकादिदुःखे-स्वर्जनरक्षणक्षयसंगर्हिंसासु च प्रीत्यभिष्वङ्गादेषां न विषयेषूद्देशापेक्षैः । न च विषयपरित्यागो भवति । तस्मान्नाऽविशिष्टोऽभिघातः । विशेषेऽभिघात-बुद्धेर्निमित्ताभिधानमिति चेत् ? अथापि स्याद्येयमसति विशेषे सर्वप्राण-भूतामासुरेरेव भगवतो दुःखत्रयाभिघातबुद्धिर्भवति, न पुनरन्येषामित्यत्र निमित्तमभिधानीयम् । न ह्यन्तरेण निमित्तमसौ विशेषोऽवस्थापयितुं शक्यत इति । एतच्चायुवतम् । कस्मात् ? प्रश्नाऽसम्बन्धात् । कुतो जिज्ञासा भवतीत्येवं चोदकेन पूर्वमकारि प्रश्नस्तस्याश्च साक्षात् कारणमभिघातः कारणान्तराणामनभिधानादित्यस्यैव निर्देशः कृतः । यत्तु खल्विदानीं कारणकारणमपि पृच्छ्यते तदनवस्थाप्रसङ्गभयान्नोच्यते । अथ निर्वन्धः क्रियते तेन पूर्वधर्मानुग्रहस्य कुशलमूलाभ्यासपरिपाकस्य

36. This is in contradiction with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems which ascribe them to soul.

37. It is so because there is no ultimate reality other than the two.

कारणकारणत्वमस्माभिर्न प्रतिषिध्यत इति तदेव किं न गृह्यते ? एतेन प्राक्प्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः । यत्तूक्तं तदभिघाते चाऽनिर्मोक्षोऽकृत्स्नत्वादित्येतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? शास्त्रार्थाऽनवबोधात् । अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्-  
तैर्यग्योनिश्च पञ्चधा भवति, मानुष्यश्चैकविधः (का० ५३) इत्येतावान-  
स्माकं संसारः । न तु तद्व्यतिरिक्ताः कामरूपारूप्यधातवः क्वचिदपि  
सिद्धाः । चतुर्दशविधे च संसारे या सुखमात्रा सा दुःखभूयस्त्वात्तच्छब्द-  
वाच्या भवतीति । तथा चोक्तम्—

अत्र जन्मजरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।

लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद् दुःखं समासेन ॥  
(का० ५५)

दृश्यते च लोके भूयसा ग्रहणम् । तद्यथाऽऽम्रवनमिति । तस्मात् कृत्स्न-  
विकल्पप्रतिषेधोऽयम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं दिव्यकामध्यानसुखाऽनपेक्षस्यापि  
विविदिषासम्भवान्निमित्तमयुक्तमिति तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? उत्तरत्र  
प्रतिषेधात् । इष्टमेवैतत्सङ्गृहीतम् । तथा चोत्तरसूत्रेण प्रतिषेत्स्यत्याचार्यः  
“दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः” (का० २) । तस्माद्दि-  
व्यसुखानपेक्षस्यापि युक्ता विविदिषा । ध्यानसुखमपि क्षयातिशयो नाति-  
वर्तते । तदप्यत्रैव सङ्गृहीतम् । तस्मात्प्रतिषेध्य एवायं पक्ष इति न  
किञ्चिदभिधीयते । यदप्युक्तमुभयथाऽसम्भवाज्जिज्ञासाऽनुपपत्तिरिति अस्तु  
गुणानां जिज्ञासा । यत्तूक्तमाचेतन्यादसम्भव इति सत्याचेतन्ये बुद्धेरिच्छादि  
सद्भावमुत्तरत्र प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । तस्मादुपपन्ना जिज्ञासा ।

Proponent : In response to your objection that the rise of desire to know due to the assault of threefold misery involves undesirable contingency of over pervasion because it could be possible in case of all, we say—no, because the others do not understand it as an assault. Though the assault is a like to all, yet all the persons do not understand it as an assault. For example, inspite of the misery like the bodily one, and the (pains in) earning, protecting, decay, attachment and the violence involved in

(case of) the objects of enjoyment, there is no repulsion and repugnance in these (common men) on account of the pleasure (arising out of them) as also attachment to them. And, they do not abandon the objects of enjoyment. Hence, the assault (of misery) is not alike to all.

If someone asks the reason for the understanding of this assault in particular cases only? Let it be that inspite of absence of dissimilarity (in assault), among all the living beings the understanding of assault of three-fold misery arises only in Āsuri and not in others, you should mention the reason here, because without reason such a particularity cannot be mentioned.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the irrelevance of the question. Inspired by the query as to why does the desire to know arise, you have put the question, and the direct cause of that desire to know is the assault (of three-fold misery). It is (clearly) pointed out without mentioning any other reason. Now as the cause of this cause is asked, we do not reply on account of the fear of the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. If you insist upon, we have not rejected the favour of the virtues acquired in past and the full development of the practice of virtue (lit. the cause of happiness) as the cause of this cause, why don't you accept that? By this only the objection regarding the undesirable contingency of the rise of desire to know even earlier (in Āsuri) is also answered.<sup>38</sup> The objection that the removal of misery will involve (the undesirable contingency of) the impossibility of liberation because of incompleteness is also wrong.

Why ?

Because you have not fully understood the meaning of the scripture

38. The desire did not arise earlier in Āsuri in absence of such a preparation.

'the divine beings are of eight sorts, the animal class is five-fold and the human order is of only one kind, etc.' (kā. 54). This is the extent of our world. The elements like activity, material elements or sphere of non-corporeality are not proved as additional to it.<sup>39</sup> In this world of fourteen kinds the quantity of pleasure is also denoted by that word (misery) itself because of the greater quantity of misery.<sup>40</sup> It is stated also : 'here the man experiences misery arising from old age and death up to the time the subtle body retires. Therefore, misery is, in brief (the nature of the worldly objects)' (kā 55). It is also observed in worldly usage that the mention is made through the (object found in) greater quantity. For example, the forest of mangoes.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, this is the rejection of the alternate expression 'complete'. Your statement that the cause of rise of desire to know is because of the possibility of (rise of) desire to know in case of the one who does not long for fulfilment of divine desires and pleasure of concentration, is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because these means are rejected later on.* You have included what we wanted to include. In the next aphorism the author rejects them thus—'the revealed (scriptural) means (of removing misery) is like perceptible means for it is connected with impurity, decay and surpassability' (kā. 2). Hence, the (rise of) desire to know is proper in the one who does not long for the divine pleasure. The pleasure arising of concentration does not transcend destruction and

39. Being non-existent they cannot serve as the cause of the rise of desire.

40. Though there is pleasure also in the world, still the quantity of misery is so much that the world can be held to be full of misery.

41. It is not that there are mango trees only in the forest, but they are more in quantity.

surpassability. That is also included here only. Therefore, since this opinion is to be rejected; nothing is stated in this regard here. As regards your statement that there is no possibility of (rise of) the desire to know because it is impossible in the case of both, (we reply) let the desire to know pertain to the constituents of cosmic matter. As regards your statement that it is impossible on account of their being insentient, we will establish later on the existence of desire, etc., in the intellect, though it is insentient. Hence, the (rise of) desire to know is possible.

(Syntactical Relation of *tat*)

आह—तच्छब्दानर्थक्यं प्रतिपदमसम्बन्धात् । योज्यमाचार्येण तच्छब्दः सूत्रे पठितोऽस्य खलु प्रतिपदमसम्बन्धात् स्वल्पामप्यर्थवत्तां नोपलभामहे । तस्मान्नैनमपुष्कलार्थमध्येष्यामह इति ।

Opponent : *The word tat (that) is meaningless because it cannot be related with all (i.e., any of) the words.* We do not find even a slightest meaning of the word *tat* (that) which is mentioned by the teacher in the aphorism, because it cannot be related to all (i.e., all of) the words. Hence, we will not read it which carries no use.

उच्यते—कथं हि नाम प्रयोक्तृपारतन्त्याच्छब्दस्य शब्दान्तरेण सम्बन्धो न स्यादिति ?

Proponent : Since the word is dependent upon the speaker, how is it that one word is not related to the other ?

आह, न ब्रूमोऽविद्यमानसम्बन्धोऽसम्बन्धः किन्तु ह्ययुक्तसम्बन्धो यः स खल्वसम्बन्धः । तद्यथा अनाचारो माणवक इति द्रव्येण क्रियाशक्तित्वान्न शक्यं किञ्चिदनाचारवता क्षणमप्यवस्थातुम् । अयुक्तं त्वाचरन्ननाचार इत्युच्यते । तथा चास्य तच्छब्दस्य प्रतिपदं सम्बन्धो न युक्तस्तस्मादनर्थकस्तच्छब्दः ।

आनन्तर्याज्जिज्ञासाशब्दस्येति चेत्, स्यान्मतम् । अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा



भवति प्रतिषेधो वेत्यनया युक्त्या जिज्ञासाशब्दस्य तच्छब्देनाभिसम्बन्धः शक्य इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? तदपघाते प्रयोजनासद्भावात् । न हि जिज्ञासाऽपघाते किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमस्तीति सत्यपि सम्बन्धे न तच्छब्देनार्थः ।

अभिघातस्येति चेत् ? अथापि स्याद्यदि जिज्ञासापघातेन किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमस्तीति । अतस्तत्सम्बन्धो नेष्यते । तेन तदर्थमभिघातशब्देनास्याभिसम्बन्धः करिष्यते । तथा चाऽपि तच्छब्दोर्थवान् भविष्यतीति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? निमित्ताऽवस्थाने पुनः पुनरुत्पत्तेः । नैमित्तिकोऽयमभिघातस्तस्य निमित्तवत्त्वादात्यन्तिकोऽपघातो न स्यात् । इतरथा ज्वरनिमित्तको दाह इव शीतद्रव्यसंस्पर्शात्प्रशान्तोऽपि निमित्तावस्थानात्पुनः पुनः प्रवर्तते इत्यफलत्वमस्य व्यायामस्य ।

त्रयशब्दस्येति चेत् न, पारतन्त्र्यात् । आश्रयपरतन्त्रा हि संख्या, तस्या नास्तरेणाश्रयोपघातमपघातः शक्यः कर्तुम् । आनर्थक्यञ्च समानमिति सुतरां तच्छब्देन नार्थः ।

दुःखशब्दस्येति चेत्स्यान्मतम्—यद्येतेषाम्पदानामभिसम्बन्धे यथोक्त दोषोपपत्तिः, दुःखशब्दं तर्हि तत्-शब्देनाभिसम्बन्धस्यामः । तस्मिन्नेष निषेधो विशतीति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकपदव्यवधानात् । कथमनन्तरवृत्तिना सर्वनाम्नाऽनेकपदव्यवहितस्य दुःखशब्दस्याभिसम्बन्धः शक्येत् प्रतिपादयितुम् ? तस्मान्न किञ्चिदेतत् । किञ्चान्यत् । उपसर्जनत्वात् । अयं खल्वपि दुःखशब्दः समास उपसर्जनीभूतः । न चैकस्मिन्काले शब्दस्य प्रधानत्वमुपसर्जनत्वं च युक्तितः सम्भवति । प्रधानस्य च पदान्तरेणाऽभिसम्बन्धः । तस्माद्विवादास्पदमेवैतत्सूत्रम् । किञ्चान्यत् । नित्यानामपघातानुपपत्तेः । इह नित्यानामपघातः कर्तुं न शक्यते । तद्यथा पुरुषाणाम् । अनित्यानाञ्चापघातो दृष्टः । तद्यथा, ज्वरादीनाम् । नित्यञ्च दुःखम् । तस्मात्तदपघातेऽभ्युत्थानानर्थक्यम् । वृत्त्यपघाते तदपघात इति चेत्, स्यात्पुनरेषा बुद्धिः । सत्यं नित्यानामपघातो न युक्तितः सम्भवति । न तु वयं गुणलक्षणस्य दुःखस्यापघातं ब्रूमः, किन्तु वृत्तिरस्याभिभूयत इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? उक्तोत्तरत्वात् । उक्तमत्रोत्तरं निमित्तावस्थाने पुनः पुनरुत्पत्तेरिति । तस्मादयमप्यमार्गः ।

किञ्चान्यत् । अविशेषात्कल्पयित्वाऽपि वृत्त्यपघातं वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरनन्यत्वाद् वृत्त्यपघाते वृत्तिमदपघातः प्राप्त इति नास्ति कश्चिद्विशेषः । तस्मात् कृशोऽयं परिहार इति नार्थस्तच्छब्देन ।

Opponent : We do not consider non-relation as the absence of relation. On the contrary, the non-relation is there where the relation cannot adequately be established. For example, we take the expression 'the disciple does not act'. Here, since the substance is (naturally) endowed with the power of action, no one can remain without action even for a single moment. Hence, not acting is said to be the one acting inadequately (or having bad conduct). Similarly, the relation of the word *tat* with all the words cannot be adequately established. Hence, it is considered to be meaningless.

If it is said that it can be related with the word 'desire to know' because the former follows it ? It may be like this. That which follows can either be an injunction or prohibition. By this reasoning there is the possibility of relation of the word *tat* with the word desire to know.

That is not so.

Why ?

Because there is no purpose served by the alleviation of that (desire to know). There is no purpose served by the alleviation of the desire to know. Hence, in spite of the relation (between *tat* and desire to know), the word *tat* does not serve some purpose (or convey some meaning).

If it is argued that there is relation of the word *tat* with the word *abhighāta* (assault) ? (It is right) it can be as stated above only if the alleviation of desire to know serves some purpose. The relation of *tat* with desire to know is not desirable. In that case its relation with the word *abhighāta* (assault) is established. Thus, the word *tat* will be meaningful.



This suggestion is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because of the repeated rise when the cause remains.* The assault is the result and, hence, when its cause will remain, there would not be its final alleviation. It is like this. The heat caused by fever which is in turn caused by something else, though quenched with the touch of cold substances, takes place again and again because its cause remains. Hence, this kind of (intellectual) exercise is fruitless.

If its relation is established with the word *traya* (triad) ?

*No, because of the dependence (of the word triad).* The number depends upon its substratum<sup>42</sup> and its alleviation is not possible without the alleviation of its substratum.<sup>43</sup> And, the objection of meaninglessness applies here also.<sup>44</sup> Hence, by no means can we attach some meaning to the word *tat*.

If it is argued that its relation can be established with the word *duḥkha* (misery) ? It can be like this. If there is the possibility of the above mentioned faults in establishing the relation (of the word *tat*) with these words, we will relate the word *duḥkha* (misery) with the word *tat*. In this case, the above mentioned objection will come to an end.

It is also not so.

Why ?

*Because of the intervention of many words.* How is it possible to establish the relation of the pronoun occurring afterwards (in the sentence) with the word misery which occurs (before) as intervened by several words ? Hence, it carries no force. *Moreover, because of its being secondary.* The word *duḥkha* is indeed the secondary

42. Since it is a quality, it cannot remain without a substratum.

43. The meaning demands the reading *āṣrayāpaghātam* instead of *āṣrayapoghātam*.

44. It is because its relation is not possible.

member in the compound. And, it is not possible to accept reasonably the principal and the secondary character of a single word at the same time. The principal member (in the compound) is related to other words. Therefore, this aphorism is controversial. *Moreover, there is no possibility of destruction of eternal (objects).* It is not possible here to destroy the eternal objects; for example, the conscious entities. And, the destruction is observed in case of non-eternal objects only; for example, that of fever, etc. And the misery is eternal. Hence, it is useless to go for its destruction.

If the destruction of that (misery) is (understood as) the destruction of the function of misery? This understanding may be like this. It is true that the destruction of the eternal cannot be possible logically. We do not speak of the destruction of misery in the form of the constituents of the cosmic matter (viz., stimulating and the moving quality). On the contrary, (we propose) that the function of misery is alleviated.

That is also not correct.

Why ?

*Because of the answer given earlier.* We have already replied that the effect will arise again and again when the cause remains. Therefore, this is also not a (right) way. (to explain the destruction of misery). *Moreover, it makes no difference.* Even considering the destruction of the function, because of the non-difference of the function from its locus, the destruction of the function implies the destruction of its locus and, hence, this argument is in no way different (from the earlier).<sup>45</sup> Hence, the above mentioned alleviation is very weak and, thus, the word *tat* is *meaningless*.

उच्यते—यदुक्तं तच्छब्दानर्थक्यम्, प्रतिपदसम्बन्धादित्यस्तु दुःख-  
शब्देनाभिसम्बन्धः । तत्सम्बन्धे यथोक्तदोषोपपत्तिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् ।  
यदि तर्हि तच्छब्दस्य दुःखशब्देनैवाऽभिसम्बन्धोऽभ्युपगम्यते तेन येऽस्माभिः

45. Here the reading *kīncānyadaviśāt* is preferable.

पूर्वमभिहिता दोषास्ते प्रसज्यन्ते । तस्मात् प्रतिषिद्धस्य पक्षस्य परिग्रहे साहसमात्रमिति । एतच्च नैवं, कस्मात् ? प्रतिविधानात् । सत्यमसति प्रतिविधाने साहसमात्रं स्यात् । प्रतिविधीयते तु, तस्माददोषोऽयमिति ।

किन्तदिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । उच्यतान्तर्हि किन्तत् प्रतिविधानं यस्यावष्टम्भेनानेकदोषव्याहतोऽप्ययं पक्ष आश्रीयते । न ह्यनुक्तमस्माभिराकारमात्रेण शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुमिति ।

उच्यते—बाढम् । यत्तावदुक्तमनेकपदव्यवधानान्न दुःखशब्दस्य तच्छब्देनाऽभिसम्बन्ध इत्यत्र ब्रूमः न, अनभ्युपगमात् । यो ह्यनन्तरकृतं शब्दस्य शब्दान्तरेण सह सम्बन्धमाचष्टे तम्प्रत्ययमुपालम्भः स्यात् । वयन्त्वर्थकृतं सम्बन्धमाचक्ष्महे । तथा चोक्तम्—

यस्य येनाभिसम्बन्धो दूरस्थस्यापि तस्य सः ।

अर्थतस्त्वसमानामानन्तर्येऽप्यसम्भवः ॥

किञ्चान्यत्—शास्त्रे दर्शनात् । शास्त्रे च व्यवहितानामपि सर्वनाम्नामभिसम्बन्धो दृश्यते “यस्य गुणस्य हि भावाद् द्रव्ये शब्दनिवेशस्तदभिधाने त्वतला” वित्यत्रार्थकृतश्च सम्बन्धः शब्दानामभ्युपगतः । इयाप्रातिपदिकात्, बहुषु बहुवचनम्, सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः, अलुगुत्तरपदे इत्येवमादीनां सम्बन्धाभ्युपगमः । तथा “अनङ्वाहमुदहारिणि भगिनि वहसि या त्वं शिरसि कुम्भमवाचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति वार्तिके दृष्टान्तः । न ह्यत्र सत्यानन्तर्ये शिरसाऽनङ्गो वहनं कुम्भस्य वा सरणमुपपद्यते । यथा चाऽत्र व्यवहितानामभिसम्बन्धस्तथेहाऽपि द्रष्टव्यः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तमुपसर्जनत्वात्पदान्तरेणाऽभिसम्बन्ध इति एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? समासादपोद्धारे बुद्ध्या व्यवस्थितस्य स्वातन्त्र्योपपत्तेः । सत्यमुपसर्जनस्य पदान्तरेणाभिसम्बन्धो नोपपद्यते । न तु वयं समासवृत्तेरेव तच्छब्देनाभिसम्बन्ध इति प्रतिपद्यामहे, किन्तर्हि समासादपोद्धतस्य बुद्धिव्यवस्थितस्योपजनितस्वातन्त्र्यस्य शब्दान्तरेण सम्बन्धमिच्छाम इति । अथैतदनिष्टम् “योगप्रमाणे च तदभावे दर्शनं स्यात्” “अथ शब्दानुशासनं, केषां शब्दानाम्” इति चैवमादीनाम्प्रयोगाणां विरोधः प्राप्नोति । अनिष्टञ्चैतत् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम्—नित्यानामपधाताऽनुपपत्तेर्वृत्त्यपघाते च तदपघातप्रसङ्गादिदि, एतदप्यनुप-

पन्नम् । कस्मात् ? गुणशब्देः प्रयोजनोपरमे सत्यात्मकत्वेन व्यवस्थानाभ्युपगमात् । नैतदभ्युपगम्यते गुणस्योच्छित्तिर्भवति, वृत्तिर्वाऽस्याऽभिभूयते । किन्तर्हि पुरुषार्थनिबन्धना चरितार्था शक्तिरस्य पुरुषार्थप्रवृत्तौ-प्रयोजनासद्भावादात्मकत्वेन व्यवतिष्ठत इत्येतद्विवक्षितम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्तदपघातके हेतौ जिज्ञासा प्रवर्तत इति ।

Proponent : As regards your objection that the word *tat* (that) is meaningless since it cannot be related to all the words (in the aphorism), our reply is that let it be related to the word misery.

If it is argued that there is the possibility of the faults mentioned above in supposing the above relation ? It can be like this. If the relation of the word *tat* (that) with the word *duḥkha* (misery) is accepted, the faults mentioned above by us will surely involve. Therefore, it is mere boldness to accept the opinion which is already rejected.

It is not like this.

Why ?

Because of its refutation. It is true that it would have been a mere boldness to accept without the refutation (of opposing arguments), but the refutation is supplied here. Hence, it is faultless (to accept it).

If it is asked as to what is the refutation ? It may be like this. State what is the point of refutation on the basis of which you are resorting to an opinion even when obstructed by many faults. We cannot understand that merely by gesture without putting in words.

It is right. As regards your objection that the word *tat* cannot be related to the word *duḥkha* on account of intervention of many words, our reply is—no, because of (our) disagreement (over the issue). This reproach applies to the one who establishes the relation of a word with a word occurring afterwards. On the other hand, we speak of the relation based on meaning. It is stated also :

“The relation of one word with the other through meaning exists even when the words occur at a distance. On the other hand, the relation of the words dissimilar to them (i.e., not related through meaning) is impossible even if there is proximity.”<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, because it is observed in the scriptures. In the scriptures also the pronouns are observed to be related (with some noun) with an intervention too. As for example, “the suffixes *tva* and *tal* (*tā*) are added to express that quality the existence of which causes a certain expression for a certain object.”<sup>47</sup> Here also the relation of words as based on meaning is accepted (by all). The same relation is admitted in the following cases : ‘It should be understood as enjoined after what ends in *ni* or *āp* or after a crude form (from here upto the end of book V)<sup>48</sup> : ‘In the expression of similarity the plural case affix is enjoined’ ‘There is the elision of the case suffix when it occurs after the name of a root or a crude form : the phrase that the elision does not take place before the second member of the compound, should be supplied (iii. 6.1)’. Similarly, it is observed in the vārttika ‘O sister, you who are carrying water in a pot on your head, did you see a bull running towards south?’<sup>49</sup> In this case, inspite of proximity, there is no possibility of carrying a bull on the head and the running of the pot. As there is the relation of the words intervened by others, in the present case also it should be understood

46. Cf. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* 1.1.5. The original sources is not found.

47. *Mahābhāṣya* 5.1.119. The example very well proves the point in question. *Tat*, a pronoun, in *tadābhīdhāne* is here related not with the words immediately preceding it, but with the word *guṇaṣya* which is intervened by so many words. The relation is by force of meaning.

48. Pāṇini 4.1.1

49. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.3.57

similarly. Your statement that the word *tat* cannot be related with some other word due to its being secondary member of the compound, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because that is possible in case of a word which is mentally assumed and can be independent when taken out of the compound. It is true that a word which is a secondary member in compound cannot be related with some other word. We do not propound the relation of the word *tat* lying in a compound. On the contrary, we intend (to establish) the relation of a word which is taken out of compound, is mentally assumed and in which (in this way) independent status is established. If it is not desirable, there would be the contradiction with the uses like ‘in case the etymological meaning is held to be authoritative and when such meaning is absent, (the word) should also disappear (P. 1.2.55)’, and ‘here commences the teaching about the words ; of which words ? (M. Bhāṣya 1.1.1). There arises the contingency of contradiction in these usages. And, it is not desirable.

And, again your arguments that because there is no possibility of the destruction of that which is eternal and because the alleviation of the function of that involves destruction of that itself, are wrong.

Why ?

Because we hold that the power related to the constituents of the cosmic matter continues to exist in its own form when its object is fulfilled and there is no purpose to act for the Puruṣa. We do not hold that the constituents of cosmic matter are destroyed or their function is suppressed, but what we intend is that the power of the constituents of cosmic matter which is meant for fulfilling the purpose of the conscious entity has fulfilled its purpose, and continues to exist in its own form for at that time it has no purpose to act for fulfilling the purpose of the conscious entity. Hence, it is

right (to say) that there arises the desire to know the means of alleviation of that (misery).<sup>50</sup>

(Perceptible Means of alleviating Misery)

दृष्टे साऽपार्थं चेत्

स्यादेतत् प्रत्यक्षो दुःखप्रतीकारहेतुरस्ति । तस्य समतिक्रमे किं प्रयोजनम् ? तद्यथा शारीरस्य तावदयमपगमहेतुरनेकद्रव्यरसायनोपभोगः । मानसस्यापि मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानविलेपनभोजनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयसम्प्राप्तिः । आधिभौतिकस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासः, शस्त्रास्त्रकुशलता, विषमस्थानान-  
ध्यासनं च । आधिदैविकस्यापि यथाकालं विविधनिवसनास्तरणगर्भगृह-  
प्रासादजालान्तरचन्दनव्यजनमणिहारादिसेवा विविधौषधमंगलस्तुतिमन्त्र-  
प्रयोगानुष्ठानमिति दृष्टे हेतौ सा जिज्ञासाऽपार्थेति चेत्—

IF IT IS ARGUED THAT THE DESIRE TO KNOW IS SUPER-  
FLUOUS BECAUSE THERE ARE PERCEPTIBLE (MEANS OF  
ALLEVIATING MISERY) ?

It may be argued that the perceptible objects serve as means for alleviating misery. What is the purpose in transgressing that ? For example, the means of alleviating the bodily misery is the use of many medicines and many other things. (The means of alleviation) of mental misery is the attainment of the objects of enjoyment like lovely women, desirable drinks, unguents, food, dress, ornaments, etc. The means of alleviating the misery arising of beings are the practice of politics, proficiency in using weapons and missiles, and not staying in an unsafe place. The means of alleviating misery caused by will of Providence are—to resort to the various kinds of habitations, carpets, houses, mansions and other kinds of nets as

50. Here, it may be observed that the *Y.D.* improves nothing in relating the pronoun *tat* to misery. On the other hand, it has to face the grammatical difficulty as also the problem of reconciliation with the theory of pre-existence of effect. This intellectual exercise could easily be avoided by relating the term *tat* with *abhighāta*.

well as sandal-wood, fanning, jewel and garland of pearls, various kinds of herbs, and the practice of various auspicious panegyric and the sacrificial formulas. What if that (desire to know) is considered to be) superfluous on account of (these) perceptible means (of alleviating misery) ?

(Lack of Invariableness and Finality in Perceptible Means)

नैकान्ताऽत्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥१॥

एतच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? एकान्ताऽत्यन्ततोऽभावात् । एकान्तो नाम नियमेन भावः । अत्यन्तं भूतस्याविनाशः । एकान्तश्च अत्यन्तं च ते एकान्तात्यन्ते तयोरभाव एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावः तस्मात् । षष्ठीस्थाने पञ्चमी । षष्ठ्या एव वा तसिः षष्ठ्या व्याश्रय इति योगविभागात् । असमासकरणं वृत्तपूरणार्थम्, मानसस्य च दुःखस्य प्रतीकारे दोषान्तरोप-  
संग्रहार्थम् । तथा हि, स्त्र्यादीनां सत्येतस्मिन् दोषद्वयेऽशक्यमर्जनं कर्तुम-  
स्वाभाविकत्वात् । सत्यर्जने रक्षणमशक्यं, साधारणत्वात् । सति च रक्षणे  
क्षयः, कृतकत्वात् । सङ्गाच्चापशमो भूतोपघातमन्तरेण चासम्भव इत्येते  
दोषाः ।

NO, BECAUSE (THE ALLEVIATION THROUGH THESE  
MEANS) LACKS IN INVARIABleness AND FINALITY.

It is not so.

Why ?

Because of the lack of invariableness and finality. The word invariable means certainly. Finality means the absolute destruction of something.<sup>51</sup> The words *ekānta* and *atyanta* while compounded result into *ekāntātyanta* and the absence (*abhāva*) of both of them is signified by the compound *ekāntātyantato abhāva*. 'Because of this' (is conveyed through the whole expression *ekāntātyantato abhāvāt*). Here the fifth case is used in the place of sixth case affix. The suffix

51. The reading should be *bhūtasyavināśaḥ* in place of *bhūtasyā-  
vināśaḥ*.

*tasi* is added optionally to a word ending in sixth case. Here it is through splitting the aphorism into two : *ṣaṣṭhyāḥ* and *āśraye*, i. e., *tasi* is optionally added to words ending in sixth case affix and in case of one siding with somebody.<sup>52</sup> The absence of compound is for the purpose of completion of the metre and for including the additional defects in the means of alleviating the mental misery. For example, in spite of these means like lovely women and others, there are two defects (involved in them also) : (1) It is difficult (lit. impossible) to procure them because it is not natural. Even if procured, it is difficult (impossible) to protect them for these are common to all. Even if protected, they are bound to be destroyed because they are produced. (2) And, on account of attachment (towards them) it is impossible to extinguish the desire regarding them and that also without harming other beings. These are the additional defects.

(Proofs for lack of invariableness and finality in Perceptible means)

आह, कथमेतदवगम्यते यद् दृष्टस्य हेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वमनात्यन्तिकत्वं चेति ?

Opponent : How is it known that the perceptible means involve the lack of invariableness and finality ?

उच्यते—प्रत्यक्ष एवैतदुपलभ्यते । यदायुर्वेदविहितस्य क्रियाक्रमस्याभियुक्तमात्मवन्तं भेषजभिषक्परिचारकसम्पन्नं प्रत्यानर्थक्यम् । आह च—

52. Pāṇini 5.4.48. In the present context *tasi* cannot be justified in the sense of genitive case because as per regular rule *tasi* can be used only in the sense of genitive case provided it is a case of somebody siding with somebody. The Y. D., therefore, suggests, that the aphorism be splitted into two, thereby allowing *tast* even where the provision is not fulfilled, i.e., reading the aphorism simply as *ṣaṣṭhyāḥ* as a separate unit in *ṣaṣṭhyāḥ vyāśraye*.

सर्वेषां व्याधिरूपाणां निदानं त्रिविधं स्मृतम् ।  
आहारश्च विहारश्च कर्म पूर्वकृतं तथा ॥  
तत्राहारविहारोत्थान् रोगान् द्रव्यमपोहति ।  
यस्तु कर्मकृतो व्याधिर्मरणात्स निवर्तते ॥

पुनरप्याह—

सोपद्रवः सर्वरूपो बलमांसेन्द्रियापहः ।  
सारिष्ठश्चैव यो व्याधिस्तं भिषक् परिवर्जयेत् ॥

इत्येवमनैकान्तिकत्वम् । अनात्यन्तिकत्वं तु निर्वृत्तानामपि व्याधीनाम्पुनरुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । महता खल्वपि प्रयत्नेन निवर्तिता व्याधयः पुनरुत्पद्यन्ते । तथा चोक्तम्—

पुनर्ज्वरे समुत्पन्ने क्रिया पूर्वज्वरानुगा । इति

तस्माद्यथैवास्यायुर्वेदादेः प्रतीकारहेतुत्वं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमेवमेकान्ताऽत्यन्ततोऽभावोऽपि । तथा मानसस्य च । यथा च शारीरदुःखप्रतीकारहेतवोऽनैकान्तिकाः तथा स्त्र्यादयोऽपि । कस्मात् ? तत्सन्निधाने विषयान्तराभिलाषदर्शनात् । यदि हि स्त्र्यादयो विषयाः सर्वदा दुःखप्रतीकारसमर्था भवेयुः, किमिति तेषु सन्निहितेषु विषयिणो विषयान्तरजिघृक्षा स्यात् ? एवमनैकान्तिकत्वम् । अनात्यन्तिकत्वमपि । निर्वृत्तेच्छानामपि भूयः प्रार्थनासम्भवात् । यदि हि विषयोपभोगोऽत्यन्तमेव मानसं दुःखमपहन्यात् किं प्राप्तं येन भूयस्तं प्रति विषयिणोऽभिलाषः स्यात् ? किं कारणम् ? यस्मान्न ह्यविद्यमाने तमसि देवदत्तस्य प्रदीपं प्रत्यपेक्षा भवति । दृश्यते च निर्वृत्तेच्छानामपि विषयोपभोगाद्विषयिणां भूयो विषयाभिलाषः । तेन मन्यामहे नायं दृष्टो हेतुर्दुःखमपहन्ति । किन्तु हि सुतरां वृद्धिं करोति । आह च—

न जातु कामः कामानामुपभोगेन शाम्यति ।  
हविषा कृष्णवर्त्मव भूय एवाभिवर्धते ॥

अपर आह—

संवेद्यत्वाद् गुरुत्वाच्च निन्दितत्वाच्च साधुभिः ।

सर्वत्रासन्निधानाच्च न दृष्टो हेतुरिष्यते ॥

संवेद्यत्वात् । भोगसाधनविकलानामर्थिनां मध्ये विषयिणोपयुज्यमानास्तैस्संवेद्यन्ते । तेषामप्रदायोपयुज्यमानं नैर्घृण्यमाविष्कुर्यात् । विषयिणा प्रदीयमानो वाऽर्थिभ्यः परिमितत्वादवच्छिद्येतेत्यनुपायोऽयं दुःखापघाते बुद्धिमताम् । किं च गुरुत्वात् । भोगानां विविधनिवसनस्त्रीपानभोजन-विलेपनालंकारादीनां समग्र्ये सुखमुत्पद्यते । नाऽन्यतरवैकल्ये । सामग्र्यं चैषां स्वाभाविकत्वादनूपपन्नम् । आह च—

नाभिजातिं न विज्ञानं न च शौर्यमपेक्षते ।

लक्ष्मी संस्कारयोगाच्च क्वचिदेवावतिष्ठते ॥

इत्येवमनेकार्थाश्रयत्वाद् गुरुविषयभोगः । किं च निन्दितत्वाच्च साधुभिः । निन्दितः खल्वपि साधुभिर्विषयोपभोगः । यस्मादाह—

आयासाच्च विघातश्च विप्रलम्भभयानि च ।

यच्चान्यदशिवं लोके तत्कामेभ्यः प्रवर्तते ॥

पुनरप्याह—

अयं सक्षेत्रियो व्याधिरयमात्यन्तिको ज्वरः ।

इदमास्पदमोतीनामेष योनिः सपाप्मनाम् ॥

अगाधमेतत्पातालमेष पङ्क्तो दुरुत्तरः ।

क्लेशव्याधिभयाकीर्णमेतच्छ्वभ्रं भयावहम् ॥

विविधायासशोकानामेतदायतनं महत् ।

दैव्यश्रमविषादानामेतत्क्षेत्रमपावृतम् ॥

यस्माद्विषयसम्भोगाद्विहगः पञ्जरादिव ।

गतो वनेषु रमते स सुखानि समश्नुते ॥

तस्मात् साधुभिरपाकृतत्वादसाधुविषयोपभोगः । किं च सर्वत्राऽसन्निधानात् । न हि सुप्रतिनिविष्टस्यापि कामिनः सर्वत्र विषयसन्निधानेन भवितव्यम् । नो खल्वपि एकस्मिन् देशेऽवस्थानं सम्भवति, विषयाभाव-प्रसङ्गात् । तस्मादवश्यं वियोगेन भवितव्यम् । वियोगे च सति ध्रुवोऽ-

निष्ठानुबन्ध इति कोऽर्थो विषयपरिग्रहेण ? तत्र यदुक्तं दृष्टस्य हेतोः सद्भावादपार्थका जिज्ञासेति एतदयुक्तम् ॥१॥

*This is known through direct perception. The course of action of medicine prescribed in the science is futile for the one who is prosecuted for his acts, self-controlled as also for the one already having medicine, the doctor and the attendant. It is stated also :*

*"The cause of all kinds of diseases is said to be threefold—food, conduct and the acts done in previous births. The medicinal substance cures the diseases arising out of food and conduct. The diseases arising out of the acts (done in previous births) are removed by death."*

It is further stated :

*"The doctor should avoid treating all kinds of calamitous repelling of power, flesh and organs as also the disease having the symptoms of death."*

Thus is the lack of invariableness.

The lack of finality (is proved) on the ground that the disease once cured is observed to appear again. So it is stated :

*"If the fever takes place again and again, its remedy should be the same adopted in curing its previous (attack)".*

Therefore, just as the instrumentality of curing the disease in case of the science of medicine is proved through perception (i.e., is obvious), similarly the lack of invariableness and finality are also proved through perception (i.e., are obvious).

*In the same way, (the lack of invariableness and finality is observed in the case of means of alleviating) mental misery. Just as the means of alleviating bodily misery lack in invariableness, similarly, the lovely women, etc., (serving as the means of alleviating mental miseries lack in invariableness).*

Why ?



*Because we observe the (existence of the) desire for other objects of enjoyment even in the presence of the former.* If the objects of enjoyment like lovely women are always capable of alleviating misery, why should a wordly person (lit. sensualist) long for other objects of enjoyment even in the presence of them (i.e. lovely women, etc.)? This is the non-invariableness.

It lacks in finality too. *There is possibility of request (for the objects of enjoyment) by those who have (once) satisfied the desire (for those objects).* If the enjoyment of the objects would have finally removed the mental misery, what is that on account of which the worldly (lit. sensualist) person desires for them again and again?

What is the reason?

Because Devadatta does not desire for lamp in absence of darkness. The desire to enjoy the objects of enjoyment again and again is observed in case of the persons who have (once) satisfied this desire, through enjoying these objects of enjoyment. Hence, we hold that the perceptible means does not alleviate the misery. On the contrary, it increases (the desire) still more. It is stated also :

“The desire is never extinguished through the enjoyment of the desired objects. It increases more (through enjoyment) just as fire (increases) with oblation.”<sup>53</sup>

Someone else has also stated :

“The perceptible means (of alleviating misery) are not desirable because they are understood, because they are difficult (to be collected together), because they are criticised by the noble persons, and because they are not available everywhere.”

*Because they are understood.* In the middle of the libiduous persons destitute of the means of enjoyment, a worldly (lit. sensualist) person enjoying them is known by them. The use of these objects (by the worldly person) without sharing with others would have displayed pitilessness. (The objects) if shared with the libiduous

persons by the wordly persons, would have been divided because of their finiteness. Hence, it is not a (proper) means to alleviate the misery for the intelligent persons.

*Moreover, because of its being difficult.* Pleasure arises from the objects of enjoyment like many places for inhabitation, (lovely) women, desirable drinks, food, unguents, dress, etc., only when all of them are collected together and not in the absence of some of them. Their collection is, however, impossible because it is unnatural.<sup>54</sup> It is stated also :

“Riches do not have regard for (noble) descent, skill and bravery. And, it stays somewhere only due to its connection with the (past) impressions.”

Thus, being dependent upon many objects, the enjoyment of the object is very difficult.

*Moreover, because it is censured by the noble persons.* The enjoyment of the objects is criticised by the noble persons also, because it is stated :

“All troubles, all impediments and all sorts of fear of deception and whatever other kinds of inauspicious (acts) are there in the world, all are caused by desire.”

It is stated again :

“It is the incurable disease; it is eternal fever; it is the abode of all distresses; it is the cause of all sinful things.

“It is unfathomable, lowest region or hell, (it is) the dire difficult to cross, it is the dreadful hell full of distresses, diseases and fears.”

54. Chakravarti reads *eṣāmasyābhāvi*.....*Pāndeya* remarks that the reading accepted by *Chakravarti* is not available in the manuscripts. We have, however, rendered the sentence according to *Chakravarti's* reading because of its propriety in the context. In case we accept *Pāndeya's* reading, the sentence would have to be translated in a round about way as follows : these objects cannot be brought together, guided as they are by their own nature (of remaining separate, etc.).



It is the vast abode of various troubles and sorrows. It is the open field of depression, exertion and afflictions. Therefore, one who after (relinquishing) the objects of enjoyment goes to the forest and rejoices (there) obtains happiness, just as a bird (after being released) from a cage (goes to the forest and rejoices.).” Hence, the enjoyment of the objects, being shunned by the noble persons, is not well.

*Moreover, it is not possible to get (these objects) everywhere.* Even a well known libidinous cannot get (all) the objects of enjoyment everywhere. Nor is there the possibility of their presence at one place only because it would involve the undesirable contingency of the non-existence of the objects (after these are consumed). Therefore, the absence of these objects is certain. And, when the absence takes place, the attainment of (connection with) the undesirable is also certain. Hence, what is the use of hoarding the objects of enjoyment? Therefore, it is wrong to say that on account of the existence of the perceptible means (of alleviation of misery) the desire to know is useless.

## KĀRIKĀ 2

### REJECTION OF THE REVEALED MEANS

(Invariableness and Finality in revealed Means)

आह—यद्येकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावाद् दृष्टे हेतावपरितोषस्तेन तर्ह्यस्त्य-  
यमन्यो हेतुरुभयदोषवर्जितः स कस्मान्न परिगृह्यते? कोऽसाविति चेत् उच्यते,  
शास्त्रोक्तः कर्मविधिः । स ह्येकान्तिकः । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—पशुबन्धेन  
सर्वल्लोकान् जयति । न तूक्तं कदाचिज्जयति, कदाचिन्नेति । फलस्य  
प्रत्यक्षानुपलब्धेरनैकान्तिकत्वमिति चेत्, स्यान्मतम् प्रत्यक्षत एवेदं  
विहितस्य कर्मणः फलं नोपलभ्यते । तथा हि पुत्रकाम इष्टि निरूप्य दुहितरं  
अपि न प्राप्नोति । अर्थकामश्च कर्म कृत्वा माषकमपि न लभते । तस्मान्ना-  
यमेकान्तिक इति । एतच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? साधनवैकल्यात्तदनुपपत्तेः ।  
अनेकसाधनसाध्यो हि कर्मविधिः । यत्र फलं नोपलभ्यते तत्र साधनवैकल्य-  
मनुमातव्यम् । कस्मात् ? न ह्येतदिष्टं, सति कारणे कार्यं न भवति । किं  
चान्यत्, संसाराऽभावप्रसङ्गात् । यदि खल्वपि कर्मणः फलवत्त्वं नेष्यते  
तेन तन्निमित्तस्य संसारस्याभावप्रसङ्गः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मात्सिद्ध-  
मस्यैकान्तिकत्वम् ।

आत्यन्तिकत्वमपि सिद्धमेव । यस्मादाह अपाम सोमममृता अभू-  
मेति । अत्र सोमपानादमृतत्वावाप्तिः श्रूयते । तस्मात्तदेवानुष्ठातव्यम् ।  
किमन्येन हेतुना परिकल्पितेनेति जिज्ञासाऽपार्थवेति ।

Opponent : If there is dissatisfaction over the perceptible means on account of lack of invariableness and finality, here is another means which is free from both of these defects. Why don't you resort to that? If you ask what is that, the reply is—ritual prescribed in the scripture. That is endowed with invariableness.

How ?

It is stated : 'one wins over all the worlds by tying the animal (to the sacrificial post),<sup>1</sup> (Here) it is not stated that sometimes one wins and sometimes does not'.

If it is argued that it lacks in invariableness because the fruit is not visible ? It may be like this : the fruit of that ritual prescribed is not directly observed; for example, after performing the ritual the one desirous of son does not get even a daughter. And, after performing the act (prescribed in the scripture) the one desirous of wealth does not get even beans. Hence, it is not invariable.

It is not so.

Why ?

That is not justified *because the non-attainment of that (desired fruit) is due to the deficiency in accessories*. Wherever the (desired) fruit is not attained, (there) the deficiency in the accessories should be inferred.

Why ?

It is not desirable that the effect does not arise when its causes are present. *Moreover, it would involve the undesirable contingency of non-existence of the world*. If the act is not accepted as yielding its fruit, there would be contingency of the non-existence of the world, (since it is) caused by that (fruit of acts).<sup>2</sup> And, it is not desirable. Therefore, its invariableness is established.

Its finality is also established. That is why it is stated : 'I have drunk Soma; I have become immortal,<sup>3</sup> etc.' Here, we hear of the attainment of immortality through drinking Soma. Hence, it should be observed. What is the use of some other imaginary means ?<sup>4</sup>

1. Cf. *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 11.7.11 and *Śābarabhāṣya* 1.2.4
2. According to Indian Philosophy transmigration is caused by the acts the fruit of which is not enjoyed.
3. *Rgveda* 8.48.3.
4. It is because it is not having the support of the Śruti.

Hence, the desire to know is certainly useless.

(Revealed Means are like Perceptible Means)

उच्यते

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः

अनुश्रूयते इत्यनुश्रवः । अनुश्रवे भव आनुश्रविकः । दृष्टेन तुल्यं वर्तते दृष्टवत् । किमसावनभिप्रेत इति वाक्यशेषः ।

Proponent : THE REVEALED (MEANS OF ALLEVIATING MISERY) ARE LIKE THE PERCEPTIBLE.

Revelation is that which is revealed. The *ānuśrāvikaḥ* (revealed) is that which occurs in revelation.<sup>5</sup> The term *dṛṣṭvāt* (like perceptible)<sup>6</sup> means that which is similar to the perceptible. What of this ? (It is) not desirable—is the remaining part of the sentence.

(Nature of Revelation)

आह कः पुनरयमनुश्रवः ?

Opponent : What is the revelation ?

उच्यते—मन्त्रब्राह्मणं यावद्वा पुरातनमनुश्रूयमाणं प्रामाण्येनाभ्युपगम्यते तत्रभवद्भिः । यथाश्रुतिनिबन्धनाः स्मृतयः । अङ्गानि वेदास्तर्का वा । यथाह वेदवेदाङ्गतर्केषु वेदसंज्ञा निरुच्यते । इति ।

Proponent : Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas or as much as you accept as authentic in the ancient revealed literature; for example, the Smṛtis related to the revealed literature (i.e., the Vedas), the ancillaries of the Vedas and (literature relating to) logic. As it is stated : 'The term Veda is applied (lit. spoken with reference to) the Veda, its ancillary literature and the (literature related with) logic, etc.

5. Pāṇini 5.1.115

6. Pāṇini 4.3.53

(Additional defects in revealed Means)

आह, किं पूर्वस्मादेव हेतोरयमानुश्रविको हेतुरनभिप्रेत इति ?

Opponent : Is this revealed means (of alleviating misery) not desirable on the above mentioned grounds only ?

नेत्युच्यते । किन्तहि

स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।

इति । स इत्यानुश्रविकस्य हेतोः प्रतिनिर्देशः । हिशब्दो यस्मादर्थे । अविशुद्धिश्च भयश्चातिशयश्च तैर्युक्तः । एतदुक्तं भवति । यस्मादयमानुश्रविको हेतुरविशुद्धोऽनित्यस्तारतम्यवांश्चातो दृष्ट इवाऽनभिप्रेतः ।

Proponent : No, on the contrary,

BECAUSE THAT IS ENDOWED WITH IMPURITY, DECAY AND SURPASSABILITY.

The term 'that' refers back to the revealed means (of alleviating misery). The term *hi* is used in the sense of *yasmāt* (because). The defects are impurity, decay and surpassability. It is endowed with these. The statement comes to mean this : because this revealed means (of alleviating misery) is impure, temporary and having gradation, it is not desirable like the perceptible (means of alleviating misery).

(Impurity of Revealed Means)

तत्राविशुद्धियुक्तस्तावत् हिंसाविधानात् । यदाह ब्राह्मणे-ब्राह्मणमालभेतेत्यादि । तथा—

षट्शतानि नियुज्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहनि ।

अश्वमेधस्य वचनाद्वनानि पशुभिस्त्रिभिः ॥

इति हिंसा चाविशुद्धिः । प्राणिनामिष्टशरीरव्यापादनात् ।

It is endowed with impurity because it prescribes violence. As

it is stated in the Brāhmaṇas—'one should kill a Brahmin', etc., and

“According to the (sacrificial) injunctions relating to Aśvamedha, six hundred, minimum three, animals are killed at the middle day”.

This is violence and impurity because it destroys the body which is dear to the living beings.

आह, तदनुपपत्तिः । शास्त्रचोदितत्वात् । यदि शास्त्रेण चोदितेयं हिंसा न स्यात् मुक्तसंशयमविशुद्धित्वमस्याः प्रतिपद्यामहे, शास्त्रचोदिता तु । तस्मान्नेयमविशुद्धिः ।

तत्प्रामाण्याऽनभ्युपगमादविशुद्धिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, वेदप्रामाण्यमभ्युपगच्छतामसंशयमेतदेवं स्यात् । हेतुवादकुशलास्तु वयम् । तस्मादधीयतां यदि कश्चिदस्त्युभयपक्षप्रसिद्धो हेतुः यतो निस्संशयः प्रत्ययः स्यादिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभ्युपगमविरोधात् । दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं चेति प्रामाण्यत्रयमभ्युगतं भवद्भिः । इदानीं वेदस्याप्तवचनत्वे सत्यप्रामाण्यं ब्रूवतः स्वमतव्याघातः । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

वेदस्याप्तवचनत्वानुपपत्तेरदोष इति चेत्स्यान्मतम् । आप्तवचनत्वं प्राक्प्रसाध्यास्य वेदस्य पश्चात् अयमुपालम्भो युक्तमभिधातुं स्यात् । तत्त्वसिद्धम् । तस्मादनुपालम्भोऽयमिति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? पुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वे सति रागादियोगाच्छब्दो विचारार्हः स्यात् किमाप्तवचनं न वेति । अपुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वकस्त्वाम्नायः स्वतन्त्रः पुरुषनिश्चयेत्यसार्थं प्रवर्तते । तस्मान्नेवंविधमनिष्टं विचारमर्हति । किं चान्यत् अविशुद्धित्वानुपपत्तिप्रसंगात् । यदि चैतस्मिन्नर्थे भवानपि पर्यनुयुज्येत—कथमिदं निश्चीयते यदुत प्राणिनामिष्टशरीरव्यापादनादविशुद्धिर्हिसेति ? अवश्यमभिधानीयं शास्त्रत इति । तदेव च शास्त्रं क्रतो हिंसामाह । तस्मात् कोऽत्र हेतुः अन्यत्र प्रमाणमिहैवैतदप्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति हिंसातो धर्म इति ?

अनुग्रहोपघातलक्षणत्वादहिंसाहिंसयोः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धिरिति चेत्—  
अथापि स्यात् अहिंसातश्चानुग्रहो भवतीष्टशरीराव्यापादनलक्षणः, हिंसा-  
तश्चोपघातो भवति अभिप्रेतशरीराव्यापादनलक्षणः । क्रियानुरूपं च फल-  
मनुमातुं युक्तमिति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमनयोरिष्टानिष्टफलहेतुत्वम् । तस्मात्  
कोऽत्र शास्त्रव्यापार इति ? एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनिष्टप्रसंगात्  
एवं हि परिकल्प्यमाने गुरुभार्यागमनेऽपि सत्त्वान्तरानुग्रहसामर्थ्यादिष्टफल  
सम्बन्धः स्यात् । माणवकं चोपनीय व्रतादेशशौचब्रह्मचर्य्यस्वाध्यायाभ्यास-  
भैक्षान्निपरिचरणगुरुशुश्रूषादिषु प्रवर्तयतोऽनिष्टफलसम्बन्धः स्यात् ।  
तस्माल्लोकशास्त्रविरुद्धोऽसत्कर्तो नेष्ट इति ।

उभयाभिधानाच्छास्त्रविरोधप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् तदेव-  
शास्त्रमहिंसामाह, तदेव हिंसाम् । एवं सति परस्परविरुद्धयोरर्थयोश्चोदि-  
तत्वादुभयानुग्रहासम्भवे शास्त्रविरोधप्रसङ्ग इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ?  
उत्सर्गपवादयोर्विषयभेदात् । सामान्ये हि शास्त्रमहिंसामुत्सृज्य विशेषे  
क्रतुलक्षणेऽपवादं शास्ति । सामान्यविहितं च विशेषविहितेन बाध्यते ।  
तद्यथा-दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति । तस्मादुत्सर्गपवाद-  
योर्विषयभेदान्नास्ति शास्त्रविरोध इति । किं चान्यत् । कन्यागमनवत्  
पुनर्विधाने दोषाभावात् । यथा खल्वपि शास्त्रे प्रतिषिद्धं कन्यागमनमिति  
नेदानीमभिरूपः प्रतिगृह्य, तामभिगम्याऽधर्मभागभवति ।

गृहस्थः सदृशीं भार्यां विन्देतानन्यपूर्विकाम् ।

इति शास्त्रान्तरसद्भावात् । एवं शास्त्रे प्रतिषिद्धा हिंसा । नेदानीं  
क्रतौ हिंसायां प्रवर्तमानोऽनिष्टफलभाक् स्यात् । पूर्वोक्तादेव शास्त्रान्तर-  
सद्भावात् । तत्र यदुक्तं प्राणिनामिष्टशरीराव्यापादनादविशुद्धिहिंसेत्ये-  
तदयुक्तम् ।

Opponent : That is wrong, because it is prescribed in the scriptures.  
Had the violence not be prescribed in the scriptures, we would  
have undoubtedly propounded its impurity. But, this is

prescribed in the scriptures.<sup>7</sup> Hence, it is not impurity.

If its impurity is (propounded) on the basis of rejecting the  
validity of the scripture ? It may be like this. It would have undoubt-  
edly been the case with those who accept validity of the Vedas. We  
are, however, proficient in reasoning. Therefore, tell us some reason  
well known to the (upholders of) both the views, which would give  
us some definite knowledge.

And, this is wrong.

Why ?

It contradicts your own view. Perception, inference and verbal  
testimony of an authority—these three means of knowledge are  
accepted by you.<sup>8</sup> In spite of (considering the) authority of the Veda,  
if you speak of its non-validity, it will contradict your own opinion.  
Hence, it is wrong.

(If you argue that) it is faultless on account of non-justification  
of considering the Vedas as authoritative ? It may be like this. It  
would have been proper to adduce this reproach after establishing  
the authority of the Vedas. This is, however, not established.  
Therefore, this reasoning is not applicable to us.

It is also wrong.

Why ?

It would have been worth considering as to whether it is  
authoritative statement or not if it would have been produced by a  
human intellect (and consequently associated with attachment, etc.  
However, the Vedas are not produced by a human intellect, and

7. The sense is that the Vedas meant for the welfare of the  
society should not be considered prescribing something impure.

8. Cf. S.K. 4.

therefore, they independently confer (lit. proceed for) the highest welfare to the human beings. Hence, it does not deserve this sort of unnecessary consideration. *Moreover, it will involve the undesirable contingency of impossibility of impurity as well.* If you also make an inquiry in this respect, how is it ascertained that the violence is impure on account of destroying the body which is dear to the living beings? The most probable answer should be (that it is known) through the scriptures. What reason is there to prove invalidity of the assertion that virtue ensues from violence here only while it is valid elsewhere?

*If it is argued that it is proved through perception because violence and non-violence are of the nature of favour and destruction respectively?* The case may be like this. Favour in the form of non-destruction of the desired body ensues from non-violence, and injury in the form of the destruction of the desired body ensues from violence. And, it is proper to infer the result in accordance with action, and thus, the instrumentality for bringing about the desired and undesired result in case of both of these is proved through perception. Therefore, what is the role of scripture in this case?

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because there will be the contingency of (its over pervasion even to the) undesirable cases. In the light of this kind of supposition there would be the possibility of the desired (i.e., favourable) result in case of the illicit relation with the wife of the preceptor on account of capability of favour to the other beings in such an act.<sup>9</sup> There would have been the possibility of the undesired (i.e., unfavourable) result to the one (i.e., the teacher) who after initiating a student induces him to pious observances, (following) the advice, purity, celibacy, practice of studying (the religious texts), begging alms, to wait upon the sacred fire, i.e., to perform sacrifices, and the

9. It refers to a situation when there is the mutual liking for the student and the wife of the preceptor.

service to the preceptor.<sup>10</sup> Hence, your wrong argument which goes against the worldly traditions and the scripture is not possible to us.<sup>11</sup>

If it is argued that it would lead to the undesirable contingency of mutual contradiction in the scriptural statements on account of the mention of both? It may be like this. The very scripture speaks of non-violence and also of the violence. In this condition, because both of these are prescribed in the scripture and because both of these are impossible to be followed at a time, there will arise the undesirable contingency of the mutual contradiction in the scripture itself.

That is not so.

Why?

*Because the scope of the general rule and the exception is different.* After giving a general rule for prohibition of violence the scripture speaks of an exception with reference to the particular violence committed in sacrificial rituals. And, the general statement is overruled by a particular statement; for example, give curds to the brahmins and buttermilk to Kaṇḍinya.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, since the scope of general rule and exception is different, there is no (mutual) contradiction in the scriptures. *Moreover, because there is no fault in prescribing again just as in the case of relation with a virgin.* It is just as the relation with a virgin is indeed prohibited in the scripture, but a good man does not commit sin in going to a virgin after marrying her because there is another scriptural statement that 'a householder should marry a beautiful virgin'. Thus the violence is prohibited in the scripture. No one engaged in the violence in ritual obtains the undesired result because there is the other scriptural injunction mentioned above. Hence, the statement that the violence is impure on account of destroying the desired body of the being, is wrong.

10. The above acts may not be desirable to the student.

11. The first example refers to worldly tradition and the second to the vedic.

12. Kaṇḍinya is a sub-caste of the Brahmins.

उच्यते—न, अभिप्रायानवबोधात् । चित्रमपि बह्वेतदभिधीयमानो नाभिप्रायं वेद भवान् । किं कारणम् ? यस्मान्न वयं वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे । नो खल्वपि ब्रूमः शास्त्रचोदितायां हिंसायां प्रवर्तमानस्या-  
निष्टफलसम्बन्धो भवति । किन्तु हिंसा सति स्वर्गप्राप्तिनिमित्तत्वे वेदविहितस्य कर्मणः समनुष्ठानं प्राणिजमुपघातमन्तरेण न सम्भवति इति हितकामैरभ्यु-  
पेक्ष्यते । यस्मात् न ह्येतदुक्तं यदन्येषामुपघातेनात्मानुग्रहः कार्य इति ।  
आह—

न तत्परस्य सन्दध्यात्प्रतिकूलं यदात्मनः ।

एष सङ्क्षेपती धर्मः कामादन्यः प्रवर्तते ॥

Proponent : (It is) not so, because the sense is not understood by you. You, who speak varied and too much, do not understand the sense.

What is the reason (for this statement) ?

Because we do not reject the validity of the Vedas. Nor do we say that one engaged in the violence prescribed by the scripture is associated with undesired result. On the other hand, in spite of being a means for attaining heaven, the performance of the (ritualistic) acts prescribed by the Vedas is not possible without killing the living beings. Hence, it should be neglected by those who wish well for them because it is not stated that one should act for one's own benefit by killing others. It is stated :

“One should not do that to others which is disagreeable to one's own self. This is dharma in brief. Other than this ensues from lust”.

आह यद्येतन्नाभ्युपगम्यते कथं पूर्वमुक्तं प्राणिनामिष्टशरीरव्यापाद-  
नादविशुद्धिर्हिसेति ?

Opponent : If it is not acceptable, how did you say earlier that the violence is impure because of destroying the desired body of the beings ?

उच्यते कार्ये कारणोपचारात् । योऽसौ हिंसानिमित्तकः कारुण्यान् मनसि नः परिताप उत्पद्यते सा खल्वविशुद्धिरभिप्रेता । तस्यां कारणमुपचर्यो-  
क्तमविशुद्धिर्हिसेति । यथा मुद्गैस्तृप्ताः गोभिः सुखिन इति ।

Proponent : Because the effect is metaphorically stated to be the cause.

That effect of violence which generates grief in our mind through compassion is desired to be the impurity. Superimposing it on the cause, it is stated that the violence is impure just as one who is satisfied in (possessing) beans is said to be happy by (having) cows.

आह कथमेतदवगम्यते हिंसाकार्यं परितापमात्रमविशुद्धिराचार्यस्या-  
भिप्रेता, न पुनर्हिंसैवेति ?

Opponent : How is it known that merely the sorrow which is the effect of violence and not the violence itself is desired by the preceptor as the impurity ?

उच्यते, प्रकर्षप्रत्ययोपलब्धेः । वक्ष्यत्युपरिष्ठात् तद्विपरीतः श्रेया-  
निति (का० २) । समानजातीयं च प्रतियोगिनमपेक्ष्य प्रकर्षप्रत्यय उत्पद्यते  
यदि चानुश्रविकस्य प्रशस्यता नाभिप्रेता स्यात् प्रकर्षप्रत्ययानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गः ।  
तस्मान्नोत्सूत्रमेव ।

Proponent : Because the suffix showing superiority is used. The author speaks later on ‘that which is contrary to that is superior’, etc. And, the suffix showing superiority is used with reference to correlative objects of the same kind. If the eminence (or goodness) of the revealed means would not have been meant, there would arise the undesirable contingency of impropriety of use of the suffix showing superiority. Hence, this does not go against the aphorism.

(Actions are not compulsory)

आह, सन्यासाऽनुपपत्तिः । अवियोगश्रवणात् । न हि कर्मणोऽत्याग-  
सन्यासयोस्त्वमीशिषे । किन्तु हिंसा यदाह तदवश्यं । तच्चामरणात्  
कर्मभिरवियोगं शास्ति । कस्मात् ? एवं ह्याह—“जरामर्यमेतत् सत्रं  
यदग्निहोत्रदार्शपूर्णमासौ, जरया ह एतस्मात् सत्राद्विमुच्यते, मृत्युना च ।”

पुनरप्याह “कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः ।” तस्मादामरणात् कर्मणामत्यागः । तस्मिन् सति हेत्वन्तरकर्मणामानर्थक्यम् ।

Opponent : *There arises the impropriety of renunciation because the scripture prescribes the association with work. Yoy cannot (at a time) teach both - the non-abandoning of the acts and renunciation. On the contrary, that which is mentioned in the scripture must be done. And, that (scripture) teaches the association with action upto death.*

How ?

Because it is stated : ‘this sacrifice, viz., agnihotra and darśa and pūrṇamāsa, continues up to old age and death. One becomes free from this sacrifice in old age and at death.’ Again it is said : ‘performing the acts (prescribed by the scripture) one should desire to live for hundred years.’ Therefore, there is non-abandoning of the acts upto death. This being so, there is no necessity of giving some other reason in favour of the acts.<sup>13</sup>

उच्यते, न साधनानामस्वभाविकत्वात् । पत्नीसंयोगादिभिरनेकैः साधनैरयं कर्मविधिः प्रसाध्यते । तेषां चास्वाभाविकत्वात् अशक्यमर्जनं प्रयोगतः पूर्वं कर्तुमिति प्रतिपादितम् । तस्मादनित्यानि कर्माणि ।

हेतुशास्त्रविप्रतिपत्तौ शास्त्रबलीयस्त्वमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । यत्र हेतुशास्त्रयोर्विप्रतिपत्तिर्भवति तत्र विप्रलम्भभूयिष्ठत्वादनुमानस्य बलीयः शास्त्रमित्यवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति । तच्चानुपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? शक्तितो विनियोगात् शक्तिमपेक्ष्य शास्त्रमग्निहोत्रादीनि कर्माणि विदधत्तेषाम नित्यतां ज्ञापयति । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह, “योऽलं सन्नग्निहोत्रायाग्निहोत्रं न जुहोति तमेषा देवताऽपरुद्धाऽपरुद्धयस्माल्लोकादमुष्माच्चोभाभ्याम् ।” तस्मादनित्यानि कर्माणि । किं चान्यत् । जराग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । त्वदीय एव

13. Here, the author raises one more issue involving the apparent contradiction of the Sāṃkhya line of thought with the vedas. The Sāṃkhya in opposition to ritual prescribes knowledge and renunciation from ritualistic acts.

ज्ञापके जराग्रहणमस्ति । अतोऽनुमीयते शक्यपेक्षम् नित्यं च कर्म । किं चान्यत् शास्त्रहानेः । उभयं हि शास्त्रे निर्दिष्टम् । कर्माणि सन्यासश्च । यदि पुनः कर्माणि नित्यकर्तव्यतयेष्यन्ते तेन सन्यासशास्त्रं हीयते । तस्माद्विषयरागाविष्करणमेतद्वः ।

Proponent : *No, because (the collection of) the means is unnatural.*

This course of action is accomplished with many means like association with wife, etc., and because of their being unnatural, it is established (through experience) that it is impossible to acquire them all before the performance of the acts. Hence, the actions are not compulsory.

If it is argued that in case of contradiction between reasoning and scripture, the latter is stronger ? It can be like this. Where there is contradiction between reasoning and scripture, it should be certainly accepted that the scripture is stronger because the inference is in more cases deceiving.

That is wrong.

Why ?

*Because of (their) application in accordance with the capacity.* (The scripture) while enjoying the performance of Agnihotra, etc., in accordance with the capacity indicates their non-compulsory nature.

How ?

It is stated : ‘One even capable for ritual does not perform Agnihotra sacrifice for the sake of Agnihotra, is driven away from both—this and the other world by the god who wants to drive him out’ Therefore, the actions are not compulsory.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, by the force of inclusion of old age. Old age is included in the statement quoted by you as a proof. Hence, it is inferred that the action is (performed) in accordance with the capacity and is not compulsory. Moreover, on account of abandonment of the scripture. Both of these

14. If it would be natural and unconditional, it would be eternal.



action and renunciation, are mentioned in the scripture. If the actions are desired to be performed compulsorily, it will lead to the abandonment of the scripture prescribing renunciation. Therefore, this statement of yours is the manifestation of the attachment towards the objects of enjoyment.

आह, न, श्रुतिर्बलीयस्त्वात् । तुल्यबलयोर्हि शास्त्रयोरेकविषयसन्निपाते द्वयोर्युगपदनुग्रहासम्भवे विकल्पपर्यायो भवतः । श्रुतिस्मृतिसन्निपाते च श्रुतिर्बलीयसी, स्मृतिविहितश्च सन्यासः । तस्मान्नान्योविकल्पः । न खल्वपि पर्यायो न्याय्यः ।

Opponent : No, because of the fact that the scripture is stronger. When two scriptures of the same strength apply to the same topic (and) because it is impossible to follow both of them simultaneously, there is alternative or some other arrangement. In case of application of śruti and smṛti (on the same topic), the scripture is stronger. And renunciation is prescribed in the smṛti. Hence, there is no alternative in case of them. The other arrangement is also not correct too.

उच्यते—तदितरत्र तुल्यम् । यथैव कर्मणां समनुष्ठानं शास्त्रि शास्त्रं तथा सन्यासमपि । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—

न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेनामृतत्वमानशुः ।

परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विभ्राजते यद्यतयो विशन्ति ॥

न कर्मणा मृत्युमूषयो निषेधुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमिच्छमाणाः ।

अथाऽपरे ऋषयो मनोषिणः परं कर्मभ्योऽमृतत्वमानशुः ॥

ब्राह्मणं चात्र भवति—“तद्य इदं विदुः, ये चेमेऽरण्याः श्रद्धातप इत्युपासते तेऽर्चिषमभिसम्भवन्ति । अर्चिषो हरह्ण आपूर्यमाणपक्षमापूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यन्वडदडडिति मासास्तान्मासेभ्यः संवत्सरं संवत्सरादादित्यमादित्याच्चन्द्रमसं चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोऽस्मानवः स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयति ॥”

पुनरप्याह—“एतमेव विदित्वा मुनिर्भवति, एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रव्रजन्ति । एतद्ध स्म वै । पूर्वं विद्वांसः, प्रजा न कामन्तु । प्रजया किं करिष्यामो येषां नायमात्मा नायं लोक इति ते ह स्म पुन्रैषणायाश्च

वित्तैषणायाश्च लौकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ... भिक्षात्रयं चरन्तीति ।” तस्मादेते त्यागसन्न्यासयोरुभयोलिङ्गम् ।

Proponent : It is similar in both the cases. As the scripture instructs the performance of actions so does it instruct renunciation too.

It is stated :  
“They attained immortality neither by actions nor by progeny and wealth, but only through renunciation. The heaven is placed in the cave (and) shines there where the striver (an ascetic) enters.”

And,

“The seers having progeny and desiring for wealth could not get over death through action. However, the other wise seers attained immortality after rising above actions.”

There is a Brāhmaṇa<sup>15</sup> statement in this sense :

“Those who know this and practise the faith and austerity having resorted to the forest, are connected with light, from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month; from the bright half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves northward, from these months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to the light. He is a man in the non-human state. He sends these (strivers) to Brahman.”

It is said again :

“Knowing this one becomes an ascetic, desiring this (soul) as the world, the monks wander forth; on account of this the earlier knowers did not wish for offspring; what shall we do with the offsprings, who are neither the soul nor that world ? Having risen above the desire for sons, the

desire for wealth, desire for reputation, they led the life of an ascetic.”<sup>16</sup>

Thus, there are the indicatives of both—acts and renunciation.

(Nature of Injunction and Eulogium)

आह—यद्यप्येवं शास्त्रं तथाऽपि समनुष्ठाने विधिरस्ति । विहितं चावश्यं कर्तव्यम् । सन्न्यासे त्वर्थवादमात्रमित्यनयोरयं विशेषः । तस्मिन् सति समनुष्ठानं ज्यायो न त्यागः ।

Opponent ; Even though the scriptural statement goes like this, there is the injunction for performing them. That which is prescribed ought to be done. In case of renunciation there is eulogy only. Here lies the difference between these two. In the light of this, the performance of the acts is superior, not the renunciation.

उच्यते—कोऽयं विधिः, कोऽयमर्थवादः ?

Proponent : What is injunction and what is eulogium.

आह—विधिस्तदर्थत्वेनापूर्वोपदेशः । यो हि विध्यर्थेन लिङ्गा लोटा कृत्यैर्वाऽपूर्वोपदेशः क्रियते स विधिः । यथा—अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः वायव्यं श्वेतमजमालभेत भूतिकाम इति । स्तुतिरर्थवादः । तस्य तु विहितस्य प्ररोचनार्थं या स्तुतिः सोऽर्थवादः । तद्यथा—“वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव तेन भागधेयेनोपधावति, स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति” इति । एवंविधां हि स्तुतिमुपश्रुत्य फलार्थिने हि यजमानाय विधिः प्ररोचते । एतस्मिन् हितकामः प्रवर्तते इति ।

Opponent : Injunction is the instruction which is not conferred for that purpose earlier.<sup>17</sup> The injunction is that which is quite new advice of the acts related through liḍ, loṭ or kṛtya suffixes meaning injunction,<sup>18</sup> for example, ‘the desirous of heaven

should perform Agnihotra’; ‘the desirous of property should offer a white he-goat to wind’, Eulogium is praise. The praise of that which is prescribed (in the scripture) to incite interest for it, is eulogium; for example, ‘Wind is the swiftest deity; verily he who has recourse to him with his own share, verily he makes him attain prosperity’.<sup>19</sup> The injunction incites interest in a patron of sacrifice who longs for the result (of sacrifice) after he has heard the praise of this kind. The one desirous of welfare will start performing it (sacrifice).

उच्यते—न, अत एव सन्न्याससिद्धिः । एवं चेन्मन्यसे यमाम्नायः श्रैयांसमर्थं मन्यते, तं प्ररोचनाय स्तौति तथा सन्न्याससिद्धिः । कस्मात् ? स्तुतत्वात् । बहुलाश्विनां सन्न्यासमाम्नायः स्तौति । स कस्मान्न प्ररोचते ? इतरथा ह्यानर्थक्यम् । यदि खल्वप्यर्थवादः स्तुवन्नपि न प्ररोचयेत् यदुक्तं प्ररोचनार्थोऽर्थवाद इति तद् भवद्भिर्हापितव्यं स्यात् । अनर्थको ह्येवं सत्यर्थवादो न प्ररोचनार्थः । अर्थान्तरवचनं वा । यदि प्ररोचनार्थत्वमस्य नेष्यते तेन तदर्थान्तरं वक्तव्यम् । मा भूदनर्थकत्वं वेदैकदेशस्येति । तस्मान्नानया विभीषिकया वयं शवयाः सन्मार्गादपनेतुम् । किञ्चान्यत् । उभयथा विकल्पेऽनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् । इहायमाम्नायो विधेयत्वेन वा सन्न्यासं स्तूयात् अविधेयत्वेन वा । किञ्चातः ? तद्यदि तावद्विधेयत्वेन स्तौति किमन्यद्विचार्यते ? सिद्धः सन्न्यासः । अथ विधेयत्वेन, स्तुतावस्य प्रयोजनं कर्तव्यम् । यद्वि कर्तव्यतया नेष्टं तदपुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वकः स्वतन्त्रः पुरुषनिश्चयसार्थं प्रवर्तमान आम्नायः किमिति प्ररोचयेत् ? तस्मादेतामपि कल्पनां कृत्वा कृशमेवैतत् । अथवाभथा विकल्प इत्यस्यायमन्योऽर्थः । इहायमाम्नायो भूतार्थेन वा सन्न्यासं प्ररोचयेत् । अभूतार्थेन वा ? किं चातः ? तद्यदि तावद् भूतार्थेन प्ररोचयति तथा सत्यमृतत्वप्रापकस्य सन्न्यासस्यापरिग्रहे विषयारागादन्यो हेतुर्वक्तव्यः । अथाभूतार्थेन, पुरुषो निःश्रेयसाद्भीयते । कस्मात् ? न ह्येतद्युक्तं यदश्रेयसि मार्गे प्रमाणभूत आम्नायो मातृमोदकन्यायेनेहितार्थिनः प्राणिनः प्रतारयेत् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । किञ्चान्यत् अनेकान्तात् । नचायमेकान्तो यद्विहितमेव कर्तव्यम् । तथा च शाबराः

16. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4th Brāhmaṇa.

17. Cf. the Mīmāṃsā definition : *ajñātārthajñāpakō vedabhāgaḥ vidhiḥ*.

18. This refers to *bhāvanā* in Mīmāṃsā terminology.

19. Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1,1

पठन्ति ग्रामगमनं भवतः शोभनमित्यत्रान्तरेण विधिं स्तुतिरेव देवदत्तं ग्रामगमनाय प्ररोचयतीति । किञ्चान्यत्, आशङ्काप्रसंगात् । यदि खल्वपि किञ्चित् सत्यं किञ्चिदनृतं ब्रूयाद्वेदः तथा सति पौरुषेयवाक्यवद्वेदवाक्येऽपि आशंकां प्रसज्येत । तथा च सति यदुक्तमेव प्रसंगः । अनिष्टं चेतत् । किं च विध्यनुमानं वा तत्, एवमेकदेशभूतत्वात् । अथवा विध्येकदेशोऽर्थवाद इत्यतिसृष्टं भवता । तत्र सन्न्यासेऽर्थवादमुपलभ्य विधिरप्यस्तीति अनुमातव्यम् । अनुपलम्भाददोष इति चेत् स्याच्चैवं यद्यसौ विधिरुपलभ्यते । तस्मादनुपलम्भादयं दोषान्वितिरित्यत इति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकभेदत्वात् । उपलब्धौ यत्नः क्रियताम् । अनेकभेदो हि प्रतिवेदमाप्तायः । तत्र यदुक्तं विधिसद्भावात् क्रियाप्राधान्यमित्येतदप्ययुक्तम् । इतिकर्तव्यतानुपदेशात् सन्न्यासानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्-अथापि स्याद् यदि सन्न्यासमप्याप्तायो विधेयं मन्येत । तेन यथा गार्हस्थ्यस्येतिकर्तव्यतां भार्योद्वहनादिकां मन्त्रवदुपदिशति तथा सन्न्यासमप्युपदिशेत् । न तूपदिष्टवान् । तस्मान्नास्ति सन्न्यास इति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभावात् । इतिकर्तव्यतानां हि सर्वासामभावः सन्न्यासः । तत्र किं शास्त्रमुपेक्ष्यति ? यावती खल्वितिकर्तव्यताः सन्न्यासाङ्गं तामुपदिशति शास्त्रम् । कथम् ? एव ह्याह— “तपःश्रद्धे ये ह्युपवसन्ति अरण्ये शान्ता विद्वांसो भैक्षचर्या चरन्तः सूर्यद्वारेण ते विरजसः प्रयान्ति यत्रामृतः स पुरुषोऽव्ययात्मा ।” तत्र तपःश्रद्धे ये ह्युपवसन्तीत्येन श्रद्धयोपेतं यमनियमलक्षणं धर्ममाह । अरण्य इति गृहिभ्यो विनिस्सृतिम् । शान्ता इतीन्द्रियाणामन्तःकरणस्य च विषयाभिलाषाद्विनिवर्तनम् । विद्वांस इति पूर्वरात्रापररात्रादिषु कालेष्वनिर्विण्णस्य योगिनो ज्ञानाभ्यासम् । भैक्षचर्या चरन्त इति शरीरस्थितिनिमित्तं परिमितसम्भवहारनियोगम् । उत्तरार्धेन च फलसाम्रष्टे । तन्निबन्धनञ्च विस्तरः सन्न्यासेतिकर्तव्यतायां मन्वादिभिरभिहितः । श्रुतिनिर्वचनाञ्च स्मृतयो भवतां प्रमाणमिति पक्षः । तत्र यदुक्तमितिकर्तव्यतानुपदेशान्नास्ति सन्न्यास इत्येतदयुक्तम् । एवं च न नित्यानि कर्माणि । यत्त्वेनैतदुक्तमानुश्रविको हेतुरनैकान्तिक इति सत्यमेतत् । अवश्यं हि कर्मणः फलमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । इतरथा हि तन्निमित्तस्य संसारस्याभावादिनिष्टप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादनिष्टमेवैतदाचार्यस्य ।

Proponent : No, by this reason only is the renunciation proved. If you hold that the scripture praises for inciting interest in a man whom it considers capable for highest good, it serves as a proof for renunciation.

How ?

Because it is praised. The scripture praises renunciation for those who desire for much. Why does that not incite interest in it ? Otherwise, it would be meaningless. If the eulogium does not incite interest in it even inspite of praises for it, you would also have to withdraw your statement that eulogium is to incite interest in the act. If this is the case, the eulogium would be meaningless and not meant for inciting interest in the act. Or, its other meaning should be mentioned. If it is not desirable that it incites the interest for the act, its other meaning should be mentioned, (so that) a part of the Veda may not be meaningless. Therefore, we cannot be led away from the right path by this terror.

Moreover, because both the suppositions lead to the contingency of admitting the undesirable. The scripture may praise renunciation either as it should be practised or as not be practised.

So what ?

If the scripture praises it as should be practised, what else is considered ? The (prescription) for renunciation is established. If the scripture praises it as not to be practised, the other purpose for its praise should be mentioned. If it is not desired to be practised, why should the scripture, which is meant for highest good for the men independently and is not a composition of a human being, incite the interest in an act which is not intended to be performed ? Hence, even after making this supposition your argument is weak. Or, its other meaning would be that there is an alternative for both (practice and non-practice).

Does the scripture incite interest in renunciation in the form of something real or in the form of an unreal object.

Why do you ask like this ?

If it incites (in the renunciation) in the form of the real object, you should tell some means (of liberation) other than attachment to the objects, without accepting renunciation which is a means of attaining immortality. If (the scripture incites interest in renunciation) in the form of an unreal object, a man would be deprived of the highest end of life (liberation).

How ?

It is not right (to say) that the scripture which is an authority in prescribing a way for the highest end of life, would dissuade a person wishing for the welfare just as a mother does so with a child by offering him a sweet-meat ball.

*Moreover, on account of lack of invariableness.* It is not invariable that only whatever is prescribed (and not the eulogised) should be done. So say the followers of Śābara 'It is well for you to go to the village'. In this sentence the praise without injunction incites the interest in Devadatta to go to the village. Moreover, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of rise of doubt. If the Veda teaches some true and some wrong things, there would arise the doubt with reference to the veracity of the Veda as is the case with the statement of man. Thus, arises the undesirable contingency stated above. If this is the case, the statement of the other scripture that the devotion of the high-souled (towards Veda) is sudden (i.e., natural), will be contradicted. *Moreover, otherwise (i.e. if the Vedas are not considered as prescribing real), there will be contingency of fun.* If the Veda would mention something real and something unreal, there will arise in this case the contingency of a fun.<sup>20</sup> And, this is not desirable.

*Moreover, that would be an inference of injunction for in the above stated manner it (the eulogium) is a part of injunction.* Or, you have granted in addition that the eulogium is a part of an injunction and finding eulogium in case of renunciation it should be inferred that the injunction is also there.

It if is argued that it is faultless because it is not found ? It may be like this, It may be so if the injunction for it is available; therefore, it will be free from this fault because it is not available.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

20. Additional sentences given by Pandeya from Ahmedabad manuscript, with slight difference.

*Because there are many divisions.* You should try to search for it. The literature of each of the Vedas is of many divisions. The statement that it abounds in (ritualistic) acts on account of the existence of injunction, is also wrong.

If it is argued that renunciation is not possible (to be searched out in the Vedas) for there is no advice regarding its mode of observance ? It may be like this. If the Vedas consider renunciation as worthy to be followed, they would have advised about the mode of renunciation with sacred mantras as they prescribe the observance of domestic (practices) like marriage (with the sacred mantras). The renunciation is, however, not prescribed thus. Hence, there is no (provision for) renunciation.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because of the absence.* The renunciation is (of the nature of) absence of all the modes of observance. What will the scripture advise about it ? The scripture does advise about the possible mode of observance forming the accessories of renunciation.

How ?

It is stated like this :

"Those undisturbed knowers (of truth) who live on alms in the forest practising austerity and faith (in the truth), freed from passion, go through the Sun to the place free from sins, where there is immortal immutable Self which is (called) Puruṣa."<sup>21</sup>

Here, by the clause 'those who practise austerity and faith (in truth)', the author mentioned the dharma of the nature of social and individual restraints and other observances along with belief (in truth). The expression 'in the forest' suggests that they have gone out of their houses. The Term 'undisturbed' indicates the cessation of their desires for the objects of senses and the internal organs. The expression 'knower (of the truth)' suggests the constant practice of

21. Muṇḍakopaniṣad 1.2.11

knowledge by the non-dejected yogin in the first half and the latter half of the night, etc. The expression 'living on alms' suggests that they use to take the limited food and other things only for the maintenance of the body. The author has mentioned the result of it through the second half of the verse. Its explanation is given by Manu and other (authors of the Smṛtis) in context of the mode in renunciation. And, your stand is that the Smṛtis explaining the Sṛutis are the authority for you. Hence, your statement that on account of the absence of the mention of the mode of renunciation there is no (provision for) renunciation, is wrong. In this way also the actions are not compulsory. That which is stated by this (author) that the Vedic means are not invariable, is true. The fruit of the actions is surely to be accepted. Otherwise, there will arise the undesirable contingency of admitting the absence of the world which is caused by that (fruit of the acts).

आह, कथमेतदनुमातव्यमिति ?

Opponent : How is it to be inferred ?

उच्यते, क्षयग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । यदि पूर्वसूत्रोक्तमिहानुवर्तते क्षय-ग्रहणमनर्थकं स्यात् । कस्मात् ? अत्यन्ताभावपर्यायो हि क्षय इति कृत्वा । एवं सिद्धोऽविशुद्धियोगः ।

Proponent : On the force of the mention of the word 'decay'. If that which is stated in the previous aphorism (is considered) to follow here, the mention of the term 'decay' would be meaningless.

Why ?

Decay is understood as a synonym of absolute negation.

Thus, the association with impurity is proved.

(Decay in Revealed Means)

आह, क्षययोग इदानीं कथमनुमातव्य इति ?

Opponent : How is the association with decay inferred ?

उच्यते—क्षययोगोऽङ्गपरिमाणात् । क्षययोगः पुनरस्य हेतोरङ्ग-

परिमाणाद्वेदितव्यः । यानि हि यजेरङ्गानि पशुपुरोडाशादीनि तानि परिमितानि । परिमितानां साधनानां तन्त्वादीनां परिमितं कार्यं पटादि दृष्टम् परिमितं क्षयधर्मि दृष्टम् । तद्वदेव । किञ्चान्यत् । संसारोपलम्भात् । दृश्यते चायं वाग्बुद्धिस्वभावाहारविहारभेदभिन्नकर्मविहारवैचित्र्यनिमित्तः संसारः । यदि पुनः साक्षात् कृतं कर्माक्षयफलं स्यात् स पुनरावृत्त्यभावात् प्राणिनां नोपलभ्येत ।

शब्दसामर्थ्यान्नित्यत्वमिति चेत् स्यादेतत् । “शब्दप्रमाणका वयं, यच्छब्द आहतदस्माकं प्रमाणम् ।” स चास्य हेतोरमृतत्वमाह “तरति मृत्युं, तरति पाप्मानमित्यादि” । तस्मादनिच्छताऽप्येतदवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अनभ्युपगमे वा प्रतिज्ञाहानिर्वेदः प्रमाणमिति । एतच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? शब्दान्तरेण विरोधात् । अनित्यत्वमस्य हेतोः शब्दोऽनुमन्यते । तस्यैवं सति विरोधः प्राप्नोति । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—“अथ ये इमे ग्रामे इष्टापूर्ते दत्तमित्युपासते, अथैतमेवाध्वानं पुनर्निवर्तन्ते । यथैतमाकाशं आकाशाद्वायुम् । ते धूममभिसम्भवन्ति । धूमो भूत्वाऽभ्रं भवति । मेघो भूत्वा प्रवर्षति । त इह ब्रीहियवा ओषधिवनस्पतयस्तिला माषा इति जायन्ते । ततो वै योज्जमन्ति यो रेतः सिञ्चति स भूय एव भवतीति ।” तत्र यदुक्तं शब्दसामर्थ्यान्नित्यत्वमित्येतदयुक्तम् ।

Proponent : The association with decay is inferred through the limited magnitude of the means, The association with decay should be known through the probans in the form of the limited magnitude of the means. Whatever are the means of sacrifice like animal and oblation, all of them are limited in magnitude. The effects like cloth (coming out) of the means like threads which are limited in magnitude, are limited in magnitude. That which is characterised by limited magnitude is also observed to be characterised by decay. It is like that (i.e., the example of cloth and threads cited above).<sup>22</sup> Moreover, because of the transmigration. It is observed that the transmigration is caused

22. In Kārikā 15th the author has used limited magnitude as a probans to prove the eternal and non-limited cause, viz., cosmic matter.

by the variety resulting from different distribution (i.e. allotment) of actions due to (different types of) speech, intellect, nature, food, actions, etc. If the results of the acts performed directly would have been undecaying, the transmigration would not have taken place for the lack of rebirth.

If it is argued through the force of verbal testimony that the world is eternal? It may be like this. We accept the validity of the words uttered by an authority, Whatever is stated in the words uttered by an authority is valid.<sup>23</sup> And that (verbal testimony) speaks of eternity because of the statements like (one) crosses the death; one crosses the unhappiness. Hence, it (the eternity of the world) must be admitted even though unwillingly. The non-acceptance of it would lead to giving up of the proposition that the Veda is Valid.

It is not so.

Why?

*Because it contradicts the other authoritative statements.* The authoritative statement supports the non-eternity of this means. Granting this the contradiction is involved.

How?

It is stated :

“Those who in the village perform sacrifice, work for the public good and give alms, come back through the same course by which they went; from here to the sky, from sky to air; then they are connected with the smoke, after becoming smoke they become mist, then after becoming cloud it rains down; they are born on the earth as rice, barley, medicinal herbs and trees, sesamum plants and beans, thence whoever eats the food and sows the seed, he is born again.”<sup>24</sup>

(Hence,) the statement that the eternity of world is conveyed through the force of the authoritative statement, is wrong.

(Eternity of world in secondary sense)

23. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1

24. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 5.10.3-6

उभयथाभिधानाच्छास्त्रविरोधप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । तदेव शास्त्रं नित्यत्वमाह तदेवानित्यत्वम् । एवं सति परस्परविरोधिनोरर्थयोश्चोदितत्वात् उभयानुग्रहासम्भवे सति शास्त्रविरोधप्रसङ्ग इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? असम्भवे सत्यर्थान्तरकल्पते । यत्र हि प्रमाणभूता श्रुतिरसम्भविनमर्थं चोदयति, तत्रार्थान्तरं कल्पयति । तद्यथा—“स आत्मनो वपामुदखिदत्” “स्तेनं मनः” “अनृतवादिनो वाग्” इत्येवमादिषु । एवमिहापि नास्ति सम्भवः यदेकोऽर्थो नित्यश्च स्यादनित्यश्चेति । तस्मान्नित्यत्ववाचकस्य शास्त्रान्तरस्य भक्त्याऽर्थान्तरं परिकल्पयिष्यामः । तद्वदितरत्रापीति चेत् स्यान्मतम्—यथैव भवता नित्यानित्ययोरेकत्रासम्भवान्नित्यत्वस्य भक्त्या कल्पना कृता तथैवानित्यत्वस्यापि करिष्यत इति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सर्वप्रमाणविरोधप्रसङ्गात् । विनाशे हि भक्त्या कल्प्यमाने सर्वप्रमाणविरोधः प्रसज्येत । कथम् ? प्रत्यक्षविरोधस्तावत् संसारोपलम्भात् । अनुमानविरोधः अङ्गपरिमाणे सत्यङ्गिनो नित्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । शब्दविरोधः ते धूममभिसम्भवन्तीति वचनात् । न तु नित्यत्वे भक्त्या कल्प्यमाने दोषोऽयमुपपद्यते । तस्माद्विषमेतत् ।

If it is argued that it would involve self-contradiction in the statements of the scripture on account of prescribing both? It may be like this. The same scripture has mentioned eternity and non-eternity. In the light of this, since self-contradictory statements occur in the scripture and since the acceptance of both of them (at a time) is impossible, there would arise the undesirable contingency of self-contradiction in the scripture.

That is not so.

Why?

*Because of postulation of some other meaning in case of impossibility.* Wherever the valid scripture incites one for some impossible object, one postulates some other meaning instead. As is the case of the statements like, he drew out a hole in the soul;<sup>25</sup> ‘mind is thief,’<sup>26</sup>

25. Soul is in corporeal and, hence, there is no possibility of making a hole in it.

26. Mind being incorporeal is incapable of seizing and consequently there is no possibility of its stealing something.



'speech tells lie'<sup>27</sup>; etc. Similarly, in the present case also it is not possible that the same object may be eternal or non-eternal (at a time). Hence, through the secondary meaning we shall postulate some other meaning of the scriptural sentences which convey the eternity of the world.

If it is argued that the same argument may be raised with reference to the opposite case ? It may be like this. As you have postulated through secondary sense some other meaning for the statement denoting eternity on the ground that both—eternity and non-eternity are not possible at a single place, in the same way someone would postulate the same about non-eternity.

This is wrong.

Why ?

*Because there would be the undesirable contingency of the contradiction (of the assertion) with all the other means of knowledge.* If the non-destruction<sup>28</sup> is postulated through secondary sense, there would follow the contradiction with all the means of knowledge.

How ?

There would arise the contradiction with perception because the world is attained (again and again by the beings). There would be the contradiction with inference, for if the part is limited in magnitude, there is no possibility of the eternity of the whole. It would contradict the testimony of the verbal authority because it is stated that 'they are connected with smoke.' This defect does not arise if the eternity is postulated as metaphorical. Hence, it is a different case.

(Need of interpreting Śruti in secondary sense)

आह, कथमिदानीं भक्त्या कल्पयितव्यं शास्त्रमिति ?

Opponent : Why should the scripture be postulated in a secondary sense ?

27. Speech being insentient cannot decide to speak lie or truth.

28. The context demands the reading *avināṣe* instead of *vināṣe*.

उच्यते, प्रकृष्टार्थतया । यथा खल्वप्यमृतं वा मृतमतिजीवो मा ते हासिषुरसवः शरीरमित्यभिधीते । न च प्राणिनामत्यन्तायासवो जहति, किन्तहि प्रकृष्टं कालम् । एवमिहाप्युच्यते तरति मृत्युमिति । नात्यन्ताय मृत्युं तरति, किन्तहि प्रकृष्टं कालम् । उपचर्यते हि लोके प्रकृष्टे नित्यशब्दः । तद्यथा नित्यप्रहसितो नित्यप्रजल्पित इति । एवं सिद्धः क्षययोगः ।

Proponent : On account of excellence of meaning. As, when it is stated that 'let your vital airs, surpassing in mode of living, not leave the body—which may be mortal or immortal'. In this case, it is not that the vital airs do not leave the being for ever, but it does not leave for a long time. Similarly, it is stated... crosses the death. (Here) it is not that one crosses the death absolutely but crosses it for a long time. The word eternal is metaphorically used in the worldly behaviour in the sense of 'for a long time'; as in the sentences 'always laughing', and 'always talking'. Thus is established the association with decay' (Surpassability in revealed means)

आह, अतिशययोग इदानीमस्य हेतोः कथमनुमातव्य इति ।

Opponent ; How is the association with surpassability inferred in the case of this means ?

उच्यते—अतिशययोगः क्रियाभ्यासात् । यत्र हि क्रिया सकृत् प्रवर्तते यत्र चासकृदावर्तते तत्रातिशयो दृष्टः । तद्यथा कृष्यादिषु । यज्ञे च द्रव्योपादानशक्त्यपेक्षा । क्वचित् सकृदेव प्रवृत्तिः, क्वचित् पुनःपुनरावृत्तिः । तस्मादतिशयेन भवितव्यम् । किं चान्यत् अङ्गातिशयात् । इहाङ्गानामतिशयादङ्गिनोऽपि घटादेरतिशयो दृष्टः । अस्ति चायं प्रतियोगमङ्गानां दक्षिणादीनामतिशयः ।

तस्मादत्राप्यतिशयेन भवितव्यम् ।

Proponent : The association with surpassability is because of the repetition of activity. Wherever the activity is practised once and also wherever it is repeated, the surpassability is observed there, as it is observed in case of ploughing, etc.<sup>29</sup> The sacrifice

29. If the land is ploughed more, it gives better crop.



also depends upon the power of acquiring the material used. Sometimes the action is practised once and sometimes it is repeated. Hence, there must be surpassability in case of sacrificial ritual. *Moreover, on account of the surpassability in the accessories.* The surpassability in the whole, i. e., a pot is observed to follow the surpassability of each of the parts. And, there is surpassability in the accessories of the sacrifice, like presents given to the brahmins. Therefore, surpassability should be in this case also.

देवताङ्गभावगमनात् क्षयातिशयानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्—अथापि स्यात् यो हि यज्ञे द्रव्यमात्रस्य साधनभावमनुमन्यते तं प्रति क्षयातिशयोक्त्या परिहायौ स्याताम् । वयन्तु द्रव्यसमवायिनीं देवतां कृतावङ्गभावमुपगच्छन्तीं विद्मः । तस्माददोषोऽयमिति । तच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । देवतानामपरिमितत्वं साध्यम् । तदङ्गभावगमनाच्च दोषाभावः । न चात्मक्रियाङ्गत्वमुदासीनत्वात् इति नः सिद्धान्तः । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । उपेत्य वा । क्रतुसमनुष्ठानानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । यदि द्रव्यसमवायिनीं देवतामुपलभ्य तदङ्गभावगमनादक्षयो निरतिशयश्च हेतुरवाप्यते इतीष्टं वः, तेन तर्हि यद्वा तद्वा वेदोक्तं कर्म कृत्वा शक्योऽवाप्तुमर्थः । किं प्राणिविनाशहेतुभिः क्रतुभिः ? कथम् ? न हि किञ्चित्कर्म विद्यते यत्र शरीरस्याङ्गभावो न स्यात् । सर्वदेवतामयं च शरीरं यस्मादाह तस्माद्वै विद्वान्पुरुषमिदं ब्रह्मेति मन्यते । सर्वा ह्यस्मिन् देवताः शरीरेऽधि समाहिताः । तत्र यदुक्तं देवताङ्गभावगमनात् क्षयातिशयानुपपत्तिरित्येतदयुक्तम् । एवमयं हेतुस्त्रिदोषः । तेन यः फलविशेषोऽभिनिर्वर्त्यते सोऽपि तथाजातीयक इति शक्यमनुमातुम् । तस्मान्नास्य जिज्ञासोरत्र समाधिः ।

It may be argued that there can be no surpassability and decay in the accessories (of the sacrifice) because they have become the limbs of the deity (presiding over the sacrifice). This is like this. The defects of decay and surpassability are unavoidable for the one who admits the substance employed in the performance of sacrifice as the only means (of sacrifice). On the other hand, we consider the deity connected with the substance (employed in the sacrifice) as becoming the part of the sacrifice. Hence, it is faultless.

That is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because it is also to be proved.* The unlimited magnitude of the deities is also to be proved. (Similarly, it is also to be proved that) there is no fault because of becoming the part of that. Moreover, our theory is that to become the part is not the activity of the soul because the soul is indifferent.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, it is wrong. Even after accepting your position we argue that it would lead to the undesirable contingency of uselessness of performance of a sacrifice. If your desired meaning is that we know the means as lacking in decay and surpassability because of its becoming the part of the deity connected with the substance (of sacrifice), it would be easy to attain the (desired) object by doing any act prescribed in the Veda; then, what is the use of sacrifice which is the cause of destruction of the living being ?

How ?

There is no act which does not have the body as its part. The body is possessed of all the deities because it is stated that 'by this reason only a knower (of reality) considers about the man as this only is the Brahman'. All the deities are placed in the body. The statement that because of becoming the part of the deity there is no possibility of decay and surpassability, is wrong. In this way, this (i.e. the Vedic) means involves three defects. It can be inferred from this that the result arising of it is also of the same nature. Therefore, there is no eagerness of the one desirous of knowing towards this means.

(Path of Knowledge is superior to the revealed means)

आह, यदि नायं श्रेयानिति कृत्वाऽस्य जिज्ञासोर्नात्र समाधिः तेन तर्हि यः श्रेयान् फलविशेषः स उपदेष्टव्य इति ।

30. Or the term *ātmā* may be interpreted as itself and the sentence will come to mean that the part is not the activity of its own.

Opponent : If the desire for alleviating misery is not satisfied because it is not superior (i.e., efficacious for highest good), the special result which is superior should be mentioned.

उच्यते—

तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्

तदित्यनेन कर्मविधिनिष्पादितस्य स्वर्गप्राप्तिलक्षणस्य फलस्याभिसम्बन्धः । तस्माद्विपरीतः शुद्धोऽक्षयो निरतिशय इत्यर्थः । कोऽसावित्युच्यते मोक्षः श्रेयान् । एतदुक्तं भवति । उभावप्येतौ प्रशस्यौ स्वर्गपवर्गौ, आम्नायविहितत्वात् । मोक्षस्तु प्रशस्यतरः । कस्मात् ? यथोक्तदोषाऽनुपपत्तेः । स ह्यवश्यंभावित्वादैकान्तिकः । अतीन्द्रियत्वादसंवेद्यः । स्वात्मन्यवस्थित्वात्लघुः सर्वत्र सन्निहितश्च । आम्नायस्तुतत्वात्प्रशस्तः । सद्भिरासेवितत्वादनन्दितः । यमनियमवैराग्यज्ञानाभ्युपायशुद्धेर्विशुद्धः । अद्रव्यत्वादक्षयो निरतिशयश्च ।

Proponent : THE ONE (I.E. RESULT) WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THAT IS SUPERIOR.

The pronoun 'that' refers to the result which is of the nature of attainment of heaven and is achieved through ritual. Contrary to that is that which is pure, undecaying and without surpassability. If it is asked what is that, the reply is that it is liberation which is superior.

The statement comes to mean this. Both of these heaven and liberation are good because both of these are prescribed in the scripture. But, liberation is better.<sup>31</sup>

How ?

*Because of the impossibility of the above mentioned defects.* That is invariable because it takes place invariably. It cannot be

31. Through such an interpretation the author tries in a way to alleviate the contradiction of Sāṃkhya with the Vedas, but he gives a more deadly blow to them by putting the Sāṃkhya means over and above the vedic means of alleviating misery.

noticed because it is beyond the senses.<sup>32</sup> It is easy (i.e., accomplished with less means) because it is located in one's own soul and is near everywhere. It is good because it is eulogised in the scriptures. It is irreproachable because it is resorted to by the noble persons. It is pure for its means like social restraints, individual restraints, non-attachment and knowledge are pure. It is not decaying and surpassable for it is non-material.<sup>33</sup>

(Knowledge forms the Path of Liberation)

आह, कथं पुनरयमपवर्गः प्राप्यत इति ?

Opponent : How is this liberation attained ?

उच्यते, संयोगाभावात् । दुःखं च प्रधानम् । तथा च तन्त्रान्तरेष्वप्युक्तम्—दुःखहेतुः कार्यकारणशक्तिरिति । तेन यदा पुरुषस्य संयोगस्तदाऽविशुद्धित्वमस्य । स्वशक्तिविशेषयोगात्तेषु तेषु जात्यन्तरपरिवर्तेषु धर्मादिनिमित्तसामर्थ्यादायासमनुभवति । यदा तु प्रधानसंयोगो विनिवर्तते तदा निमित्ताभावे नैमित्तकस्याप्यभाव इति कृत्वा न पुनर्द्वन्द्वान्यनुभवति ।

Proponent : Through lack of contact.<sup>34</sup> The cosmic matter itself is the misery. It is stated in the other philosophical treatises too—'the capacity of (becoming) cause and effect or attaining a body is the cause of misery'. When the sentient entity comes into its

32. This is mentioned as a contradiction to the nature of worldly enjoyments which are noticed by others. Similar is the case with the characteristics like easiness and omnipresence, etc. Cf. Y.D. 1.

33. It is because the material objects leading to surpassability and decay are not used here.

34. If the means of liberation or removal of pains is the lack of contact between conscious entity and cosmic matter, the cause of misery signified by the term *abhighāta* in the first kārikā should be interpreted as the contact.

contact, the former attains impurity. Due to the association of its own particular power it experiences miseries into various births on account of the capability of the causes like virtue, etc., which also transmigrate in various births. But, when the contact with the cosmic matter comes to an end, one does not experience the pairs of opposite because there is the absence of the effect in the absence of its cause.

आह, किमर्थः पुनरयं प्रधानस्य पुरुषेण सह संयोगः ?

Opponent : What is the purpose of this contact of the cosmic matter with the sentient entity ?

उच्यते, नैतदिहाभिधानीयम् । वक्ष्यत्ययमुरिष्टादाचार्यः “पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थः, कैवल्यार्थस्तथा प्रधानस्य । पङ्गवन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोग इति” (का० २१) ।

Proponent : It is not to be stated here. The authority will speak of it later on as —‘the contact of the two like that of the lame and the blind, is for the purpose of perception of cosmic matter by the sentient entity and for the purpose of the cosmic matter to isolate the sentient entity. Through this contact the evolution is brought about’ (k. 21).

आह, वियोगस्तर्हि कस्मान्निमित्ताद् भवतीति ?

Opponent : By what cause does the separation take place ?

उच्यते—

व्यक्ताऽव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥२॥

व्यक्तं चाव्यक्तं च ज्ञश्च व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः । तेषां विज्ञानं व्यक्ता-  
व्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानं तस्मात् । बहुष्वनियमादल्पाचोऽपि ज्ञशब्दस्य न  
पूर्वनिपातः । अथवा ज्ञानस्य साधकतमं व्यक्तम् । तत्पूर्वकत्वादव्यक्त-  
समधिगमस्येत्यभिहितम् । यद्वा व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ते व्यक्ताव्यक्ते, ते  
विज्ञानाति इति व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञः, तद्विज्ञानात् संयोगो निवर्तते । वक्ष्यति  
चैतत् “दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षत एको दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या” इति (का० ६६) ।

Proponent : FROM THE DISCRIMINATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF  
THE MANIFEST, THE UNMANIFEST AND THE  
KNOWER.

The compound *vyaktāvyaktajñāḥ* denotes the manifest, and the unmanifest and the knower. The knowledge of them is denoted by the expression *vyaktāvyaktajñānam*. ‘From that’ is the meaning of the fifth case. The word ‘jñā’ though having minimum vowels, is not placed in the beginning of the compound since there is no such restriction in (the case of the compound having) many words.<sup>35</sup> Or, the manifest is the most efficient (cause) of knowledge; and because on the basis of the earlier knowledge of the manifest the unmanifest is known, it is stated so. Or, (an alternate) interpretation is that the manifest and the unmanifest are denoted by the term *vyaktāvyakte* and the compound *vyaktāvyaktajña* means the one who knows the two—manifest and the unmanifest. The contact (of the cosmic matter and the sentient entity) comes to an end through the knowledge of that (knower).<sup>36</sup> The author will speak of it as, ‘thinking that (i.e. the cosmic matter) is seen by me, the one (i.e. the sentient entity) becomes indifferent and thinking that I have been seen, the other (i.e. the cosmic matter) desists from its activity’ (k. 66).

तत्र रूपप्रवृत्तिफललक्षणं व्यक्तम् । रूपं पुनः महानहंकारः पञ्च  
तन्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च महाभूतानि । सामान्यतः प्रवृत्ति-  
द्विविधा । हितकामप्रयोजना च, अहितप्रतिषेधप्रयोजना च । विशेषतः पञ्च

35. Grammar prescribes that the word containing minimum vowels should precede in a copulative (*dvandva*) compound. Hence, *jñā* should be placed first. But, the rule does not take place when the compound consists of many words.

36. The alternate interpretation is not happy as it does not correspond to the Sāṃkhya doctrine that liberation ensues from the knowledge of the twenty five categories. This interpretation would turn the knowledge of the rest of the categories secondary bringing Sāṃkhya position nearer to that of Vedānta.

कर्मयोनयो वृत्त्याद्याः प्राणाद्याश्च पञ्च वायवः । फलं द्विविधम् । दृष्टम-  
दृष्टं च । तत्र दृष्टं सिद्धितुष्ट्यशक्तिविपर्ययलक्षणम् । अदृष्टं ब्रह्मादौ  
स्तम्बपर्यन्ते संसारे शरीरप्रतिलम्भ इत्येतद् व्यक्तम् । एषां गुणानां  
सत्त्वरजस्तमसामङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनाद्विशेषगृहीतिः । यदा त्वङ्गभावम-  
गच्छन्तो निर्लिखितविशेषा व्यवतिष्ठन्ते तदाऽव्यक्तमित्युच्यन्ते । चेतना-  
शक्तिरूपत्वाच्चित्रं गुणवृत्तं जानातीति ज्ञः ।

Out of these, the manifest is characterised with (different) kinds, activities and results. The different kinds (of manifest) are intellect, egoism, five subtle elements, eleven senses and the five gross elements. The activity in general is of two kinds—the purpose of which is to desire for the beneficial, and the purpose of which is to ward off the harmful. Particularly speaking the activities are those relating to the five sources of activity, different activities of other things and the five vital airs like the vital airs, etc. The result is of two kinds—perceptible and non-perceptible. Out of these, the perceptible is characterised by attainment (of supernatural powers), continence, disability and wrong knowledge. The imperceptible result is to obtain the body in the form of (the beings) from Brahmā down to the stuff of grass. This particular form is attained by those objects since the constituents of cosmic matter, sattva, rajas and tamas have attained the relation of principal and subordinate.<sup>37</sup> When these constituents of the cosmic matter remain without this particular form and do not stand in relation of principal and subordinate, they are termed unmanifest. The knower is called so since it knows the strange character of the constituents of cosmic matter on account of its being of the nature of the power of consciousness.

एषां त्रयाणां भेदमभेदं च विज्ञाय संयोगनिवृत्तिं लभते । कस्मात् ? संयोगनिमित्तप्रतिद्वन्द्विभूतत्वाद्व्योगनिमित्तस्य । इह यदाऽदर्शननिमित्तः प्रधानपुरुषयोः संयोगः तस्मादस्य प्रतिद्वन्द्विभूतेन ज्ञानेन वियोगहेतुना भवितव्यम् । को दृष्टान्तः ? तमः प्रकाशवत् । यथा तमसा तिरोहितानि द्रव्याणि घटादीनि नोपलभ्यन्ते, तत्प्रतिद्वन्द्विभूतेन तु

**37. This refers to the state of creation.**

प्रदीपेन प्रकाशितानामेषामुपलब्धिर्भवति । तद्वदिहापि द्रष्टव्यमिति सिद्धं  
ज्ञानान्मोक्षः । उक्तं च—

वृक्षाग्राच्चपूतपादो यद्वदनिच्छन्नरः पतत्येव ।

तद्वद् गुणपुरुषज्ञोऽनिच्छन्नपि केवली भवति ॥

किं चान्यत् । आम्नायाभिहितत्वात् । आम्नायनिबन्धनो ह्ययमर्थो ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति, न यादृच्छिकः । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—“सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता ।”

“यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह ।

आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन ॥”

“तमेव विदित्वाऽमृतत्वमेति नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते ।” तथा ब्राह्मणेऽप्युक्तम् — “तरति शोकमात्मवित् ।” “ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवतीति ।” तस्मादात्मनायप्रामाण्यादपि मन्यामहे ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति ।

One attains (for himself) the cessation of the contact (between the cosmic matter and the conscious entity) after knowing the mutual similarity among the three.

## Why ?

*Because the cause of separation is opposite in nature to the cause of contact.* Here, when the contact of the cosmic matter and the sentient entity is caused by non-perception (of the difference stated above), the knowledge which is opposite to that is the cause of the separation (of the cosmic matter and the sentient entity).

**What is the example (in this context) ?**

Like darkness and light. It is just as the objects like pot, etc., when concealed in darkness are not perceived, they are perceived when illumined by the light which is opposite to that (darkness). In the present case also we should understand like this only. Hence, it is established that liberation is attained through knowledge. It is stated also :

“Just as a man with his foot removed from the top of the tree certainly falls, even though unwillingly, similarly, the knower of the (difference between) the constituents of cosmic matter and the sentient entity becomes isolated, even though unwillingly.”

Moreover, because it is stated in the scriptures. The concept that liberation is attained through knowledge is rooted in the scriptures and is not stated at random.

How ?

It is stated :

“He who knows Brahman is the real, is the knowledge and is the infinite, is placed in the secret place of the heart and in the highest heaven (lit. sky) attains all desires along with Brahman, the intelligent.”<sup>38</sup>

“Whence words return along with the mind, without attaining It, he who knows that bliss of Brahman, does not fear at any time.”<sup>39</sup>

“Only by knowing him does one pass over death. There is no other way for going there.”<sup>40</sup>

It is stated in the Brāhmaṇa<sup>41</sup> also :

“One, who knows the soul, crosses over sorrow.” “One, who knows the Brahman, becomes Brahman itself.”<sup>42</sup>

Therefore, on the authority of the scripture also we hold that liberation is attained through knowledge.

(Knowledge and Action)

आह, ज्ञानवाचिनोऽमृतत्वनिमित्ताऽभ्युपगमान्महत आम्नायान्तरस्यानर्थक्यम् । यदि ज्ञानवाचिन आम्नायखण्डकादमृतत्वमवाप्यत इत्येतद-

38. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1

39. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.41

40. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 3.8

41. *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 7.3.1

42. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.9

भ्युपगम्यते, तेन क्रियावाचिनो महत आम्नायान्तरस्यानर्थक्यं प्राप्तम् । किं कारणम् ? न ह्यनायासेनेष्टावाप्तौ सत्याम् आयासभूयिष्ठे कर्मणिः प्रवर्तमानः कृती भवतीति । आह च—

अवके चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।

इष्टस्यार्थस्य संप्राप्तौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत् ॥

Opponent : The acceptance of the belief that the portion prescribing knowledge is the cause of immortality with leads to (suppose) the futility of rest of the huge portion of the scripture. If it is held that the immortality is attained through the part of the scripture which prescribes knowledge, we arrive at the futility of a huge portion (of the scripture) which prescribes ritualistic activity.

For what reason ?

Because an agent does not proceed to the activity involving much effort if his desired object is attained through the easy means. It is stated also :

“When the desired object is attained, which wise man will make (further) effort. When a man can get honey on a clotropis gigantea plant, why should he go to the mountain ?”<sup>43</sup>

उच्यते—यदि पुनः कर्माण्यत्यन्तकर्तव्यतयेष्यन्ते, ज्ञानवाचिन आम्नायस्य कथमर्थवत्ता सिद्धा भवति ?

Proponent : In reply we ask—if the activities are considered to be the final duty (i.e., a must), how can there be proved the meaningfulness of the part of the scripture prescribing knowledge ?

(Combination of Knowledge and Action)

आह, समुच्चये तूभयार्थवत्त्वम् । ज्ञानकर्मणोस्तु समुच्चयेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने द्वयोरप्याम्नायार्थवत्ता सिद्धा भवति । विद्वान् यजेत विद्वान्

43. Quoted in *Śābrabhāṣya* 1.2.4

याजयेदिति वचनात्, तथा सर्वपुरुषाणां ऋतावधिकारः अश्रोत्रियषण्डशूद्र-  
वर्जमितिन्यायात् । तस्माज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयादिष्टप्रसिद्धिः ।

**Opponent :** *If combined, both of them will turn purposeful.* If the combination of knowledge and action is accepted, the purposefulness of both the parts of scripture would be established, because it is prescribed that 'the knower should perform sacrifice', and 'the knower should make others perform sacrifice.' All the persons have the right to perform sacrifice as it is established through the maxim that 'those who are not versed in the veda, an impotent, and a man of the fourth or the lowest of the four castes are prohibited (to perform sacrifice).' Hence, the fulfilment of the desired object through the combination of knowledge and action is a well known fact.

उच्यते—न, पूर्वदोषपरिहारात् । यदि नियमतो विदुषैव कर्माणि कर्तव्यानीत्यभ्युपगम्यते तेन यः पूर्वोक्तो दोषः संसाराभावप्रसङ्गः, तस्या-  
परिहारः । किं च शास्त्रहानेश्च । यश्च शास्त्रमिष्टापूर्त्तं समुपास्यते ते धूममभिसंभवन्तीति तदेतस्यां कल्पनायां हीयते । किं चान्यत्—भिन्न-  
फलत्वात् । इहाभिन्नफलानि द्रव्याणि समुच्चीयन्ते । तद्यथा भुज्यङ्गानि  
सूपादीनि । अभिन्नं तेषां तृप्तिलक्षणं फलमिति । न चैतज्ज्ञानकर्मणोर-  
भिन्नं फलम् । स्वर्गापवर्गहेतुत्वात् । ज्ञानसामर्थ्यात्कैवल्यमभिन्नं फल-  
मिति चेत् पूर्वोणाविशेषः । यदुक्तं संसाराभावप्रसंग इति तदनपहृतमेव  
भवति । किंचान्यत्—श्रूयमाणफलविरोधश्च । यच्च क्रियायाः फलं श्रूयते  
अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामो, राष्ट्रमग्निष्टोमेन जयतीति तद्विरुध्यते ।  
कर्मणश्च शेषभावः । स्वार्थोपसर्जनत्वे सत्यर्थान्तरनिष्पादकत्वात् ।  
यथाऽवहन्तीत्येवमाद्याः क्रियाः स्वं फलमुपसर्जनीकृत्य तद्द्वारेण यजेरुप-  
कुर्वन्त्यस्तच्छेषभूता भवन्ति एवं क्रियापि ज्ञानफलभूतत्वात्तच्छेषभूता  
स्यात् ।

**Proponent :** *No, because it does not alleviate the defect mentioned above.* If it is held as a rule that the actions should be performed by the knower only, it would not alleviate the

defect arising of undesirable contingency of the absence of transmigration.<sup>44</sup> This defect would not be alleviated. *Moreover, because it would lead to abandon the scripture.* When it is said that those, who perform the sacrifices and the work of public good according to the scripture, are related to the smoke, the scripture is given up in your supposition. *Moreover, on account of leading to different results.* Here, the objects leading to the same result are combined together, for example the soup, etc., are the members of food. Their result in the form of satisfying someone is common to all (these members). But, the result of knowledge and of actions is not the same, because the one (the former) leads to liberation while the latter to heaven.

If it is argued that both lead to the same result in the form of liberation because of the capability of knowledge, the argument is not different from the one adduced earlier. The defect that it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the absence of transmigration remains unalleviated. *Moreover, it contradicts the result mentioned in the scripture itself.* It contradicts the result of actions mentioned in the scriptures as 'the desirous of heaven should perform Agnihotra,' and 'one wins over the nation through Agniṣṭoma sacrifice'.<sup>45</sup> *And the action becomes secondary.* It is because (in itself) it becomes secondary to its purpose and accomplishes some other object. As, for example, the act of threshing and the like become secondary to the act of sacrifice, turning their own result secondary and serving as a means to the

44. If the actions are done and still the men are considered to be liberated, the actions would be considered as not leading to the fruits enjoyed, which would consequently mean the absence of transmigration.

45. When the results of actions are mentioned in the scripture itself, to say that they lead to knowledge will oppose them.



act of sacrifice. Similarly, the actions also would have been secondary on account of their leading to knowledge.<sup>46</sup>

विधिसद्भावात् क्रियाप्राधान्यमिति चेन्न—उक्तत्वात् । कथमेतत् ? नास्ति विधिकृतो विशेषः । उपेत्य वा । तत्रापि तदुत्पत्तेः । अस्ति हि ज्ञानस्यापि विधायकं शास्त्रम् । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—“य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजिघत्सो विपिपासो विजरो विमृत्युविशोकः सन्न्यस्तसंकल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स जिज्ञासितव्यः । सर्वाश्च कामानवाप्नोति य आत्मानमनुविद्य विजानातीति” प्रजापतेर्वचनं श्रूयते । पुनरप्याह—“द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये परा चैवापरा च” या । तस्माद्विधिसद्भावात्क्रियाप्राधान्यमिति स्वपक्षानुरागमात्रमेतत् । दृष्टार्थत्वादित्येके ।

If it is argued that the action predominates because there is injunction, we reply, *no, because of the reason already given.*

How is it ?

There is no speciality for injunction only. Even accepting your argument (we argue), *because there also occurs the mention of the (knowledge).* There is the scriptural statement prescribing knowledge too.

How ?

It is stated “That Ātman which is free from evils, hunger, thirst, old age, death, sorrows and desire, that should be searched, that should be an object of the desire to know. He who knows the Ātman after discovering it, attains all the (objects of) desire.”<sup>47</sup> Thus are the scriptural statements of the Lord of the living beings (Prajāpati). Again it is stated

46. The acts of threshing and the like in the sacrifice yield the results which become secondary to that of the whole of the sacrifice and are, therefore, secondary. Similarly, the actions would also turn secondary leading to knowledge which in turn leads to liberation.

47. *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 8.7.

‘two kinds of knowledge is to be acquired—the higher as well as the lower.’<sup>48</sup> Therefore, it is only the (undue) attachment to your own thesis that the action dominates because there is the injunction.

दृष्टार्थत्वादित्येके एके पुनराचार्या मन्यन्ते दृष्टमेव ज्ञानस्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिलक्षणं फलं तस्मान्न शास्त्रेण विधीयते । किं कारणम् ? दृष्टार्थस्य हि कर्मणो न शास्त्रं प्रयोजकम् । स्वयमेवार्थितत्वात्तत्र प्रवृत्तेर्भुज्यादिवत् । तेषां ज्ञानविधायकानि वाक्यानि तान्युपायगुणविधानार्थमनुवादभूतान्याश्रीयन्ते । तद्यथा दध्ना जुहोति, पयसा जुहोतीति ।

*Some hold (that the scripture does not prescribe knowledge (explicitly) because its purpose is known through perception. Some authorities hold that the result of knowledge in the form of removal of ignorance is known through perception; therefore, it is not prescribed (explicitly) in the scriptures.*

What is the reason for it ?

The scripture does not incite someone to the act the result of which is apparent, because the person proceeds to it by himself, just as to the action of taking food since it is desired by oneself. The statements prescribing the knowledge are resorted to as restatement of them in order to prescribe the excellence of these means; for example, ‘he offers an oblation of curds,’ ‘he offers an oblation of milk.’

यत्तु खल्विदमुच्यते विद्वान्यजेत्, विद्वान् याजयेत्, श्रोत्रियस्य च कर्मण्यधिकार इति तस्यायमर्थः—अधीत्य वेदं क्रियाऽनुपूर्वी च ज्ञात्वा कर्मणि प्रवर्तितव्यम् । एवं च सति न कश्चिदोषः । यदि पुनर्नियमत एवात्मविदां कर्मण्यधिकारस्तेन संसारप्रसंगः । स्वाभाविकत्वात् । विज्ञानस्य शास्त्रस्य सर्वाधिकारविरोधः । तस्मान्नास्ति समुच्चयो ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।

48. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.4



The statements as 'the knower should perform sacrifice', 'the knower should incite others to perform sacrifice', and 'a learned in the Vedas is authorised to perform the acts', mean that one should proceed to act after studying the Veda and after knowing the orderly arrangement of the ritualistic acts. And, in this way, there is no fault. If it is understood that the knower of the soul is authorised to act as a rule, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of (continuation in the) world, because it is natural.<sup>49</sup> There is the opposition of the knowledge or the scripture (prescribing knowledge) to all these rights (to act). Therefore, there is no (possibility of the) combination of knowledge and action.

(View that actions are meant for everyone while knowledge for those debarred from action)

अपर आह—सत्यम् । नास्त्यनयोः समुच्चयः किन्तुहि सर्वार्था क्रिया ज्ञानं प्रतिषिद्धार्थम् । ये हि षण्ढान्धवधिरादयः कर्मणोऽत्यन्तं निराकृतास्तेषां ज्ञानादाश्रमान्तरेऽमृतत्वावाप्तिः । इतरेषां तु मूलाश्रमे कर्मण एवेति तस्य नायं वादिनः परिहार इति ।

Other Opponent : (It is) true. There is no combination of these two. On the other hand, the action is meant for everyone while the knowledge is meant for those for whom the action is prohibited. The eunuch, blind, deaf, etc., who are completely debarred from actions, attain immortality through knowledge in the other stage of life. The others, however, get it in the very stage of life through actions only. Hence, it is not the alleviation of (the objection raised by) the opponent.

उच्यते—न, स्वसमयविरोधात् । एवं ब्रुवाणस्यास्य वादिनः स्वसमय एव विरुध्यते । यदुक्तम्—विद्वांसः प्रजां नाकामयन्त, किं प्रजया करिष्यामः ? अथ यदुक्तं पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च व्युत्थाय भैक्षचर्या

49. Here, we prefer the reading *Saṃsārāprasaṅgaḥ* as found in Poona manuscript against *saṃsārābhāvāprasaṅgaḥ* accepted by Pandeya.

चरन्तीति । न च षण्ढानां पुत्रैषणाव्युत्थानमथवद् भवति, देवकृतत्वात् । किं चान्यत्—रहस्यभूतत्वात् । रहस्यभूतं हि वेदानां ज्ञानम् । यस्मादाह—तद्ध स्मैतदारुणिरौद्दालकिर्ज्येष्ठाय पुत्राय प्रोवाच । इदं ज्येष्ठपुत्राय पिता ब्रह्म प्रब्रूयात् । प्रणाय्यायान्तेवासिने नान्यस्मै यस्मै कस्मैचन । य इमामद्भिः परिगृहीतां वसुना वसुमतीं पूर्णां दद्यादेतदेव ततो भूय इति ।

Proponent : No, because it contradicts (their) own theory. The opponent speaking like this contradicts his own theory. The statement "the knower (of truth) not desiring for progeny state 'what will we do with progeny ?' (will be contradicted). As regards the statement "after abandoning the desire for son and the desire for wealth (they) live on alms", the act of abandoning the desire for son is not meaningful for the eunuch because it (the eunuch) is made so by the gods.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, because of its being secret. The knowledge expounded in the Vedas is secret. That is why it is stated "Uddālaka Āruṇi taught Brahman to the eldest son; the father may teach this Brahman to the eldest son, (a teacher) to a worthy disciple and not to anyone else; even if one offers him the whole of this (earth) encompassed by water and filled with treasure; this truly is greater than that."<sup>51</sup>

(Praise of Path of knowledge)

भवति चात्र—

परं रहस्यं वेदानामवसानेषु पठ्यते ।  
पण्डाद्यर्थं तदिष्टं चेद्दिष्ट्या सफलता श्रुते ॥  
विद्वान् कर्माणि कुर्वीत्येतदुक्तं किल श्रुतौ ।  
स च पण्डादिरेवस्याद्योऽत्यन्तं कर्मणश्च्युतः ॥

50. The reading should be *ṣaṇḍānām* as against *paṇḍānām* accepted by Pandeya.

51. *Chāndogyaopanṣad* 3.11.4-6

स एव वर्त्यतां प्राज्ञैः किं न्याय्योऽथ मतिभ्रमः ?  
 इन्द्रियार्थानुरागो वा द्वेषो वा मोक्षवर्त्मनि ॥  
 कैवल्यप्राप्तिहेतुत्वाद्या वेदविहिता स्तुतिः ।  
 प्रशस्ता याज्ञवल्क्याद्यैर्विशिष्टैस्तत्त्वनिश्चयात् ॥  
 सेयं विषयरगान्धैर्विपरीतार्थवादिभिः ।  
 विद्या कन्येव षण्डाय दीयमाना न शोभते ॥  
 तस्माद्रागानुगैरुक्तां कुहेतुपूतनामिमाम् ।  
 अग्रोह्य मतिमान्युवत्या ह्याश्रमादश्रमं व्रजेत् ॥

इति श्रीमदाचार्येश्वरकृष्णविरचितायां सांख्यसप्ततौ युक्तिदीपिका-  
 नाम्नि विवरणे प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥

In this case it is stated :

The highest secret of the Vedas is read at their end (i.e., in the Upaniṣads). If that is intended to be meant for knowledge, fortunately the scripture becomes successful. Of course it is stated in the scripture that a knower should perform the act; one who is completely devoid of actions would be the first amongst the wise; that (way of action) should be followed by the wise; (but) is it right or merely the confusion of intellect? (It is in fact) an attachment to the objects of the senses or hatred towards the way of liberation.

The eulogy of knowledge occurring in the Vedas due to its being the means of attaining isolation is praised (as preferable) by the great men like Yājñavalkya, etc., through deciding the exact nature of the objects.

That knowledge does not look well with (i.e., when acquired by) the men who are as if blind by the attachment towards the objects and are putting forth the wrong

theories, just as it does not look well if a girl is handed over (married) to an eunuch.<sup>52</sup>

Therefore, setting aside the battle of putting forth bad (i.e., invalid) reasoning put forth by those rejoicing the attachment towards the objects, the intelligent person having taken recourse to reasoning should go to the other state of life (renunciation) from one state of life (house holder).

Here ends the first discourse of the commentary  
 Yūktidīpikā by name on the Sāṃkhya-  
 saptati composed by the  
 illustrious preceptor  
 Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

52. The purpose of knowledge is twofold; leading to detachment forming a way to liberation and to know the objects as they are. If a person does not want these two results, the knowledge becomes useless for him. It is indeed just like marrying a daughter to an eunuch.

### KĀRIKĀ 3

(Sections of knowledge of Categories)

आह—सम्यगुपदिष्टं भवता व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानान्मोक्षोऽवाप्यते ।  
इदानीमुपदेष्टव्यम् कथमेतत्त्रयं प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति ।

Opponent : You have rightly advised that the liberation is attained through the discriminative knowledge of manifest, unmanifest and the knower. Now, you should tell how this triad should be known.

उच्यते—त्रयस्यास्य प्रतिपत्तिं द्वेधा समामनन्ति । समासतो विस्तर-  
तश्च । तदेव त्रयं पञ्चभिरधिकरणैर्भिद्यते । कानि पुनरधिकरणानीति ?  
उच्यते—प्रकृतिविकारवृत्तं, कार्यकारणवृत्तं, अतिशयानतिशयवृत्तं, निमित्त-  
नैमित्तिकवृत्तं, विषयविषयिवृत्तमिति । तत्र प्रकृतिविकारवृत्तपूर्वकत्वा-  
दितरेषामधिकरणानां तद्भेदान्वक्ष्यामः । तत्पुनश्चतुर्धा भिद्यते । कि-  
चित्कारणमेव न कार्यम् । किञ्चित्कारणं च कार्यं च । किञ्चित्कार्यमेव न  
कारणम् । किञ्चिन्नैव कारणं न चापि कार्यमिति ।

Proponent : The knowledge of this triad is traditionally stated to be of two kinds—briefly and in detail. This triad is divided into five sections.

What are those sections ?

(i) The character of original and its modification, (ii) the character of cause and effect, (iii) the character of surpassing and the surpassed, (iv) the character of the indicator and the indicated, and (v) the character of the object and the being who uses it. We shall speak of the character of the original and its modification since all of the rest depend upon it and form the different aspects of that only. That (triad) is again divided into four. Someone is cause

only and not the effect, someone is both—the cause as well as the effect, someone is the effect only and not the cause, and someone is neither the cause nor the effect.

(Original cause)

आह—अतिसामान्योपदिष्टमेतन्नास्माकं बुद्धाववतिष्ठते । तस्मा-  
द्विभज्योपदिश्यतां कस्य पदार्थस्य किं वृत्तमिति ?

Opponent : That you have taught to us is too general and, hence, is beyond our comprehension. Therefore, tell us categorically what is the character of which substance.

उच्यते—बाढम् । उपदिश्यते —

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः

मूलमाधारः प्रतिष्ठेत्यनर्थान्तरम् । प्रकरोतीति । प्रकृतिः । मूलं  
चासौ प्रकृतिर्मूलप्रकृतिः । मूलप्रकृतिः कस्य मूलम् ? महदादीनाम् । संज्ञा  
खल्वियं प्रधानस्य मूलप्रकृतिरिति । सा चाविकृतिरविकाराऽनुत्पाद्येत्यर्थः ।

Proponent : All right. Here is the mention (categorically) :

THE COSMIC MATTER, THE ROOT OF ALL, IS NOT A PRODUCT.

The words root (mūlam), support (ādhāra) and the resting place (pratiṣṭhā) are synonymous<sup>1</sup>. The cosmic matter (prakṛti) is that which produces variously (prakaroti). That which is the root and the cosmic matter is the root cosmic matter.

Whose root is this cosmic matter ?

Of the great principle and the rest. The term root cosmic matter is a name of cosmic matter (pradhāna). That is not a product. The meaning is that it is not modified or product,

(Compound in mūlaprakṛti)

1. Through the synonyms the author suggests that the cosmic matter is the starting place of all evolutes at the time of creation as also their resting place at the time of dissolution.

आह—समासाऽनुपपत्तिः विशेषणान्तरोपादानात् । मूलमित्ययं शब्दः प्रकृतिविशेषणार्थमुपात्तो महदादिविशेषणान्तरमुपादत्ते । तत्र सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्नेति समासप्रतिषेधः प्राप्नोति । समासान्तरविधानाद-  
दोष इति चेत्स्यान्मतम्-यद्येतस्मिन् समासे दोषोऽयमुपपद्यते समासान्तर-  
मत्र विधास्यते मूलं प्रकृतीनां मूलप्रकृतिरिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् ।  
कस्मात् ? दोषान्तरोपपत्तेः । एवमप्युपसर्जनं पूर्वं निपततीति षष्ठ्योक्त-  
स्योपसर्जनत्वात्पूर्वनिपातः । तत्रैवं भवितव्यम् मूलं प्रकृतीनां प्रकृतिमूल-  
मिति । तस्मादिदमप्यसारमिति ।

Opponent : There is no possibility of a compound (in the term *mūla-prakṛti*) because it contains another adjective. The term root (*mūla*) is employed as an adjective of the cosmic matter but it includes another adjective, viz., the great principle, etc.<sup>2</sup> A complex formation is not possible in the case of the words having adjective.<sup>3</sup> Hence, there is prohibition of compound (in the present case).

If it is argued that the defect can be alleviated by the provision of some other kind of compound ? It may be like this. If the above mentioned defect arises in the case of this compound, it may be compound in some other kind of compound; 'the root cosmic matter' is 'the root of the causes.'<sup>4</sup>

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the possibility of other defect. Here, by the rule that the secondary member (*upasarjana*) is placed first in a compound,<sup>5</sup> the term with the sixth case affix should be placed first

2. It would be *mūlam mahadādinām prakṛtiḥ* or *mahadādinām prakṛtiḥ*.

3. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 2.2.1

4. The sense is if *karmadhārya* compound is not possible, it would be *tatpuruṣa* as *prakṛtīnām mūlam*.

5. Pāṇini 2.2.30. Thus the resulting word would be *prakṛtimūlam* and not the *mūlaprakṛti*.

in the compound because of its being the secondary member of the compound. Hence, the form should be *prakṛtimūlam* (the root of the causes). Therefore, this solution is also weak.

उच्यते—पूर्वं एव समासोऽस्तु, सम्बन्धिशब्दः सापेक्षो नित्यं वृत्तौ समस्यते । यत्तूक्तं विशेषणान्तरोपादानात्समासानुपपत्तिरिति—तत्र ब्रूमः सम्बन्धिशब्दानां सम्बन्ध्यन्तरमनपेक्ष्य स्वरूपप्रतिलम्भ एव नास्तीत्या-  
कांक्षावतामेव वृत्त्या भवितव्यम् । तद्यथा देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलमिति सम्बन्धिशब्दत्वाद्देवदत्तशब्दमपेक्षमाणोऽपि गुरुशब्दः कुलशब्देन सह वृत्तिं प्रतिपद्यते । एवमिहापि मूलमित्ययं शब्दः सम्बन्धिशब्दत्वान्महदाद्यपेक्षोऽपि प्रकृतिशब्देन सह वृत्तिं प्रतिपद्यत इति । किञ्चान्यत् वाक्यप्रतिपाद्य-  
स्यार्थस्य वृत्तावुपलब्धेः । यत्र हि वाक्यप्रतिपाद्योऽर्थो वृत्त्या न लभ्यते यथा ऋद्धस्य राज्ञः पुरुष इति तत्र सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्नेति व्यवस्थितं शास्त्रे । गम्यते चेह वाक्यप्रतिपाद्योऽर्थो वृत्तावपि सत्याम् । तस्माद-  
दोषोऽयमिति । किं च ज्ञापकात् । ज्ञापकं खल्वपि “कर्मवत्कर्मणा तुल्य-  
क्रियः” । तथा “अकारस्य विवृतोपदेश” इत्यादि । तस्मान्नात्रासूया कर्तव्येति ।

Proponent : Let the form of the compound mentioned earlier 'be accepted. The related word is always needed and is also compounded in a complex formation. With reference to your statement that there is no possibility of compound because of the intervention by some other adjective, we reply that the inter-related do not attain (i.e. are not used in) their natural form without the other relata. In view of this, only the word which requires some other word for the completion of the sense forms the complex formation (*vṛtti*). For example, in the expression like *Devadattasya gurukulam* (the clan of the teacher of Devadatta), the word *guru* (teacher) though requiring the word *Devadatta* for the completion of the sense, because of being a related word, is compounded (lit. attains the complex formation) with the word *kulam* (clan). Similarly,

6. I. e. *karmadhārya*

in the present case also the term *mūla* (root) is compounded with the word *prakṛti* (cosmic matter), though it requires the *mahat* (intellect), etc. for the completion of the sense because of its relation with them.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, because the sense conveyed by a sentence is found in the complex formation. It is established in the scripture that there is no complex formation in the case of words having adjectives attached to them where the sense conveyed by the sentence is not found in the complex formations<sup>8</sup> as in the expression *ṛddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*. In the present case, however, the sense conveyed by the sentence is known even after the formation of the compound (lit. complex formation). Therefore, it is faultless. Moreover, because there are the usages indicating this formation. For example, take the indicative usage 'the agent connected with the action similar to the object is treated as an object.'<sup>9</sup> and 'teaching of *a* is the open sound'<sup>10</sup>, etc. Therefore, there should be no discontentment over this issue.

आह—अवयवस्य प्रत्यवमर्शानुपपत्तिः संज्ञाशब्दत्वात् । संज्ञाशब्देषु हि नावयवस्य परामर्शो भवति । तद्यथा गजकर्णोऽश्वकर्णः । कस्य गजस्य कस्याश्वस्येति ।

Opponent : There is no propriety in reflecting upon the components (of the term) because of its being a name. No thought is given to the components in case of a word denoting a name. For example, the expression *gajakarṇaḥ* (having ears like an elephant), *aśvakarṇaḥ* (having ears like a horse).<sup>11</sup> Of which elephant and of which horse (is not asked in this case).

7. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 2.1.1

8. *Ibid.*

9. Pāṇini 3.1.87. In the sentence '*karmanā*' is the adjective added to the complex formation *tulyakriyāḥ*.

10. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.2. Here *akārasya* is the adjective of the complex formation *vivartopadeśaḥ*.

11. Even a name may be derivative, still there is no point in considering the meaning of the parts.

उच्यते न, अर्थोपपत्तेः । यत्र ह्यर्थ उपपद्यते भवत्येव तत्र संज्ञा-  
शब्देष्वयवपरामर्शः । तद्यथा सप्तपर्णान्यस्य पर्वाणि पर्वणि, अष्टौ पदान्यस्य  
पङ्क्तौ पङ्क्तौ सप्तपर्णोऽष्टापदमिति । उपपद्यते चेहायमर्थः, तस्माद-  
दोषोऽयम् ।

Proponent : No, because of the possibility of meaning. There is the reflecting over the components of a name where there is the possibility of meaning. For example, the expressions *sapta-parṇaḥ* (having seven leaves) and *aṣṭapadam* (where there is the group of eight steps) mean respectively as in every joint of which there are seven leaves, and in whose case there are eight steps in a (straight) line.<sup>12</sup> In the present case also this meaning is possible. Therefore, it is faultless.

(Analysis of the term *mūlaprakṛti*)

आह—मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः, प्रकृतिरिति वक्तव्यम् । यदाह मह-  
दाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सन्तेति ।

Opponent : The statement should be *mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtiḥ* *Prakṛtiḥ* (i. e. the final cause is that which is the root cosmic matter and uncaused)<sup>13</sup> because you have stated that the seven—intellect, etc., are cause as well as effect.

उच्यते—प्रकृतित्वावचनम् । प्रकृतित्वं च मूलप्रकृतेर्न वक्तव्यम् ।  
किं कारणम् ? अर्थादापत्तेः । मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिरित्येव सिद्धम् । उच्यमानं  
हि तदनर्थकं स्यात् ।

Proponent : The additional term *prakṛti* (suggested by you) should not be mentioned. The state of being the cause should not be mentioned with reference to the root cosmic matter.

What is the reason for it ?

12. Even though it may be conventional, still there is a possibility of the sense of the components. In short, it is a case of *yoga-rūḍhi* in which the derivative meaning may also be considered with the conventional meaning.
13. Because the whole expression is the definition of *prakṛti*, the term defined should also be mentioned.

Because it is implied in its meaning itself. It is established through the statement 'the root cosmic matter is uncaused only'. If it is stated again, it would carry no sense.

(Theory of satkārya does not contradict it)

आह—प्रकृतित्वानुपपत्तिः । सत्कार्यवादाभ्युपगमात् । प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिः, तद्भावः प्रकृतित्वम् । तच्च सति कार्ये न घटते । कस्मात् ? न हि सतामात्मादीनां कारणमुपपद्यते इति ।

Opponent : The state of being the cause (of everything in the case of cosmic matter) is improper because of the acceptance of the existence of the effect in the cause. The cosmic matter is that which variously produces and the state of being so is the state of the cosmic matter. It does not hold good if the effect already exists.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of cause of the existent entity like the soul.

उच्यते—तदितरत्रापि तुल्यम् । यथैव हि सतामात्मादीनां कारणं नोपपन्नमेवमसतां शशविषाणादीनामपीति नास्ति कश्चिद्विशेषः । तृतीया तु विषादावल्यैव कोटिः । एवमुभयपक्षव्युदासात्स्वपक्षसिद्धिरिति चेत् अथापि स्यात्—सदसतोः क्रियासम्बन्धं प्रत्यविशेष उपदर्शयते भवता । तेनोभयोरपि पक्षयोर्व्युदासः कृतो भवति । न चोभयपक्षव्युदासात्स्वपक्षसिद्धिरिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? उत्तरत्र प्रतिषेधात् । स खल्वेषवादी सत्कार्यवादं प्रत्याचष्टे तस्मात्स्वक एवैनमधिकारे निवर्तयिष्यामः ।

Proponent : Same is the case with the opposite (of it). As there is no possibility of cause of the existent entities like the soul, etc., similarly there is no possibility of cause of non-existent objects like horns of a hare etc., also<sup>14</sup>. Thus, there is no speciality in this argument. The third alternative is that of indifference itself.<sup>15</sup>

14. The object which did not exist earlier in the cause cannot be brought into existence. Cf. *kārikā* 9.

15. The causal relation can be explained in terms of prior existence or non-existence of effect in the cause. There is no third possibility.

If it is argued that your thesis is proved because both of these are rejected ? It may be like this. You showed that there is no speciality in the case of relation of the existent and the non-existent object with the action. This leads to the rejection of both the theses. Your own thesis, however, is not proved through the rejection of both the theses.

This is also wrong.

How ?

Because the latter (viz., theory of non-existence of the effect in the cause) is rejected. This opponent indeed rejects the theory of pre-existence of the effect in the cause. Therefore, we shall contradict the opponent in his own jurisdiction,<sup>16</sup>

(Mention of avikṛti)

आह—अविकृत्यभिधानानर्थक्यम् । मूलप्रकृतित्वात्तत्सिद्धेः । यदि मूलं सर्वासां प्रकृतीनाम् अविकृत्यैव तया भवितव्यम् । इतरथा हि मूलप्रकृतित्वानुपपत्तिः । यदि खल्वपि प्रधानस्यापि प्रकृत्यन्तरं स्यान्मूलप्रकृतित्वं नोपपन्नं भवेत् । तस्मान्मूलप्रकृतित्ववचनादेव तत्सिद्धेरविकृतिग्रहणमनर्थकमिति ।

Opponent : The mention of the word avikṛti (uncaused) is useless, because it is established through (mention of) 'the root cause'. If it is the root cause of all the other causes, it should invariably be uncaused. Otherwise its nature of being the root cause will not be justified. If there would have been some other cause of the cosmic matter also, its nature of being the root cause would not have been justified. Therefore, that (i.e., its causelessness) being established through the mention of its nature of being the root cause, the use of the term avikṛti (uncaused) is meaningless.

उच्यते—न । अनवस्थाप्रसंगनिवृत्त्यर्थत्वात् । यथा हि मूलादीनां बीजं प्रकृतिस्तस्याप्यन्यत्तस्याप्यन्यदित्यनवस्था एवं महदादीनां प्रधानं

16. The theory of non-existence of effect in the cause will be refuted later on at its proper place.

मूलप्रकृतिः तस्याप्यन्यदित्यनवस्था प्रसज्येत । सा मा भूदित्यतस्तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं तदभिधानम् ।

Proponent : No, because it is meant for avoiding the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. As the seed is the cause of root, etc., it would result into the infinite regress if we postulate some other cause for the seed and then some other cause for that cause and so on. Similarly, the cosmic matter is the root cause of the intellect etc., and there would be undesirable contingency of infinite regress in postulating some other cause for that also. For the purpose that that (infinite regress) should not take place there is the mention of that (avikṛti) to avoid it.<sup>17</sup>

आह, न । हेतुनपदेशात् । असंशयमेतदेवं स्यात्, न तु हेतुरत्रोपदिष्टो भवद्भिः । न चानुपदिष्टहेतुकं विपश्चिद्भिः प्रतिपत्तुं न्याय्यम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : No, because there is no mention of the reason (to prove the uncaused nature). It would have undoubtedly been so. You have (however) not given the reason. And, it is not right for the scholars to understand (or to accept) something the reason for which is not given. Therefore, it is wrong.

उच्यते, कारणान्तरप्रतिषेधात् । पुरुषकर्तृत्वात्प्रधानाख्यानां गुणानां चावस्थान्तरानुपपत्तेरविकृतिवसिद्धिः । इहाराभ्यमाणा प्रकृतिः कारणान्तरैरीश्वरादिभिराभ्यते, पुरुषेण वा, गुणैर्वा । किञ्चातः ? तन्न तावत्कारणान्तरैरीश्वरादिभिरारभ्यते । कस्मात् ? प्रतिषेधात् । यथा कारणान्तराणि न सन्ति तथोत्तरत्र प्रतिषेधः करिष्यते । इदानीं सत्त्वं रजस्तमः पुरुष इति पदार्थचतुष्टयं प्रतिज्ञायते । तत्रापि पुरुषकर्तृत्वं प्रत्याख्यायते । तस्मिन्प्रत्याख्याते गुणानामेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षः कार्यकारणभावः । सूक्ष्माणां मूर्तिलाभः कार्यम् । निवृत्तविशेषाणामविभागात्मनाव-

17. Sometimes it is observed that the cause of so many things is also caused. Hence, to word off the possibility of being caused in case of prakṛti the further expression 'avikṛti' is necessary.

स्थानं कारणमित्ययं सिद्धान्तः । तत्रास्तङ्गतविशेषाणां निवृत्तपरिणामव्यापाराणामङ्गाङ्गिभावमनुपगच्छतामुपसंहृतशक्तीनां सर्वविकारसाम्यं सर्वशक्तिप्रलयं निस्सत्तासत्तं निस्सदसदव्यक्तलक्षणमवस्थान्तरमुपसंप्राप्तानां नास्त्यन्यत्सूक्ष्मतरमवस्थान्तरम्, यस्येदं प्रधानलक्षणमवस्थान्तरम् कार्यं स्यात् । तस्मात्सुष्ठूच्यते मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिरिति ।

Proponent : *Because there is the rejection of other causes.* The state of its being uncaused is established through the fact that the sentient entity is inactive and it is not proper to accept some other state of the constituents of cosmic matter as the cosmic matter itself.<sup>18</sup> The activity of the cosmic matter may be caused by some causes like God (Īśvara) or by the sentient entity or by the constituents of the cosmic matter.

What does it prove ?

That the cosmic matter, however, is not activated by some other cause like God (Īśvara).

Why ?

*Because of rejection.* So as to demonstrate that there are no other causes, the rejection will be done latter on. Now (in the state of dissolution) we admit the four (objects), viz., Sattva, rajas, tamas and the sentient entity. Out of those also the activity with reference to the sentient entity is rejected. That (activity of the sentient entity) being rejected, causality depends upon the (acquisition of) other states by the constituents of the cosmic matter only. The effect is the attainment of some (gross) form by (these) subtle (principles). The established view is that the (ultimate) cause is the state of the constituents of the cosmic matter in their own form without particularity (in modification) and without their division (i. e. intermixture into unequal proportion). In case of the constituents of cosmic

18. I. e. the constituents do not merge into something else in the state of dissolution so that that state could be caused again.



matter which have attained another state, there is no other more subtle state of the three constituents of the cosmic matter than the one in which the particularity (found in the evolutes) disappears, which have desisted from the activity leading to their modification, which do not attain the state of subordinate and the principle, who have withdrawn their power (of transformation), and who have attained the other state which is the state of equilibrium of all the modifications, the dissolution of all their powers, devoid of the existence and the non-existence, which cannot be called sat (existent) and asat (non-existent) and which is unmanifest—of which the cosmic matter may be considered as an effect in the form of some other state.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, it is rightly stated that the cosmic matter which is the root is uncaused.

(Cause and Modifications)

महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।

महानाद्यो यासां ता महदाद्याः । अवयवेन विग्रहः, समुदायः समासार्थः । अन्यथा महानेवात्रापरिगृहीतः स्यात् । प्रकृतयश्च विकृतयश्च प्रकृति विकृतयः । कारणानि कार्याणि चेत्यर्थः । तत्र महानहंकारस्य प्रकृतिः प्रधानस्य विकृतिः । अहंकारोऽपि तन्मात्रेन्द्रियपर्वणोः प्रकृतिविकृतिर्महत् । तन्मात्राणि च भूतपर्वणः प्रकृतिरहंकारस्य विकृतिः ।

THE SEVEN STARTING WITH THE INTELLECT ARE  
BOTH—CAUSE AND MODIFICATION.

The intellect, etc., denote the principles of whom the intellect is the first. The mention through the components is to dissolve (the compound) and the mention through collection (of them) is to form a compound. Otherwise, the intellect would not have been accepted. The term cause and modifications (prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ) is dissolved as both—cause and modifications. The sense is that they are both the causes and the effects. There (in these), the

19. The *Yogabhāṣya* (2.19) also says that it is the final form in which everything is merged, implying that there is no further merging point.

intellect is the cause of the principle of egoism and the modification of cosmic matter. The principle of egoism is the cause of the state of the subtle elements as well as the organs of sense and action, and is the modification of the intellect. The subtle elements also are the cause of the state of the gross elements and the modification of the principle of egoism.

(Purpose of the term seven)

आह—सप्तग्रहणं किमर्थम् ?

Opponent : What is the purpose of using the term seven ?

उच्यते—सप्तग्रहणमवधिपरिच्छेदार्थम् । अक्रियमाणे हि सप्तग्रहणे न ज्ञायते क्रियान्प्रकृतिगणः प्रकृतिविकृतिसंज्ञो भवति । तत्र महाभूतेन्द्रियपर्वणोरपि प्रकृतित्वं प्रसज्येत ।

Proponent : The term seven is used to limit the scope. Without mentioning the term seven, it is not known as to the group of how many causes is termed both the cause and effect. There would have been the undesirable contingency of considering the state of the gross elements and that of the organs of sense and action also as the cause.<sup>20</sup>

आह—नैतदस्ति प्रयोजनम् । परिशेषसिद्धेः । इह भवतां पञ्च-शिखानां पञ्चविंशतिस्तत्त्वानि । तत्र मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिरित्युक्तम्, षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुष इति वक्ष्यति । परिशेषतः सप्तैवावशिष्यन्ते । तस्मान्नार्थस्तदर्थेन सप्तग्रहणेन ।

Opponent : It is not the purpose because this is established by way of elimination. There are twenty five categories accepted by you, the followers of Pañcaśikha.<sup>21</sup> Out of these it is

20. Because all those are in a sense productive of some other element.

21. The importance of the mention of the name of Pañcaśikha in this context is not clear as it may be inferred that the authorities preceding Pañcaśikha also believed in twenty five elements. It may only suggest that among various authorities preceding Īśvarakṛṣṇa some may not be accepting all the categories, e.g., it is mentioned later on that Patañjali did not believe in the existence of egoism.

stated that the root cosmic matter is uncaused. The author will state later on that the sixteen are the products only and the sentient entity is neither the cause nor the modification. By way of elimination only seven remain. Hence, there is no use of the mention of the term seven for that purpose.

उच्यते—अहंकारपरिग्रहार्थम् । एवं तर्हि नैवाहंकारो विद्यत इति पतञ्जलिः । महतोऽस्मिप्रत्ययरूपत्वाभ्युपगमात् । तत्परिहारार्थमेतद् भविष्यति ।

Proponent : (It is) for the purpose of adopting the principle of egoism (as a separate category). According to Patañjali, there is no principle of egoism (as a separate category), because he holds that the principle of egoism is the sense of 'I' and 'mine' in the intellect itself. It (the mention of seven) is to avoid this sort of opinion.

आह, न । उत्तरत्र परिग्रहात् । एतदपि नास्ति प्रयोजनम् । वक्ष्यति हि महता कण्ठेनोपरिष्ठादाचार्यः “प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहंकारः” (का० २२) इति तेनैवेदं सिद्धम् । नार्थस्तदर्थेनापि सप्तग्रहणेन ।

Opponent : It is not so because it (the principle of egoism) is adopted later on. Hence, this is also not the purpose of (the mention of the term seven). The teacher will speak later on with loud voice—“from the cosmic matter issues the intellect and from that the principle of egoism” (kā. 22). It is established through that only. The term seven is meaningless for that purpose also.

उच्यते—रूपभेदेऽपि तत्त्वाभेदज्ञापनार्थम् । एवं तर्हि धर्मादीन्यष्टौ रूपाणि बुद्धेर्वक्ष्यमाणानि, अहंकारश्च वैकारिकतैजसभूतादिरूपत्वात् त्रिलक्षणो वक्ष्यमाणः । तत्र रूपभेदात्तत्त्वभेदो मा भूदित्येवमर्थं सप्तग्रहणं क्रियते ।

Proponent : This (mention of seven) is to suggest that the principle is not divided even though it possesses different forms. In this way, there are eight forms of intellect which will be mentioned later on. The principle of egoism is also of

three forms, viz., vaikārika (sattva dominating), bhūtādi (tamas dominating) and taijas (rajas dominating) which will be mentioned later on. The term seven is mentioned so that there should be considered no division in the substance due to division into form.

आह, हेतुमन्तरेणाप्रतिपत्तेः । कण्ठोक्तमपि युक्तिमन्तरेण न तर्क-शिलाः प्रतिपद्यन्ते किम्पुनः लेशोपपादितम् । तस्मादत्र समाधिर्वाच्यः कथमनेकरूपा बुद्धिरेकैवेति ?

Opponent : It is not ascertained without a reason. Those who are habituated to reasoning do not believe even in an object explicitly declared without reasoning, not to speak of an object touched casually.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, you should supply the solution how the intellect possessed of many forms is one only.

उच्यते न, उत्तरत्र विचारणात् । उत्तरत्रैतद्विचारयिष्यामः किमनेकरूपाविर्भावेऽपि तदेव तद्वस्तु भवति आहोस्विद्रूपभेदात्तत्त्वभेदः ? तस्मादिह तावद् दृश्यतामिति सिद्धं महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सन्तेति ।

Proponent : No, because the problem is considered later on. We shall consider it later on whether in spite of manifesting several forms the object is the same or there is difference in the object due to the division of forms. Therefore, at present you should regard (the reason) as such and it is established that the seven, viz., intellect and the rest are both—cause as well as modification.

(Only Modifications)

षोडशकस्तु विकारः

षोडशपरिमाणमस्य सोऽयं षोडशकः संघः । तस्य परिमाणं संख्यायाः संज्ञासंघसूत्राध्ययनेष्विति कन्प्रत्ययः ।

22. We have preferred *Chakravarti's* reading *leśopapāditam* to *Pandeya's* reading *kleśopapāditam*, because the earlier fits in the flow of the argument.

### THE GROUP OF SIXTEEN IS ONLY THE (UNPRODUCTIVE) MODIFICATION

This group of sixteen consists of the objects sixteen in number. The suffix *kan* is used after a word denoting a numeral in the sense of 'this is its measurement', when the word so formed means a name, a magnitude, a book or a fixed way and mode of study.<sup>23</sup>

आह—कः पुनरयं षोडशक इति ?

Opponent : What forms the group of sixteen ?

उच्यते—पञ्च महाभूतानि, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि ।

Proponent : (These are) five gross elements and eleven organs.  
(Use of the term *tu*)

तुशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः

The term *tu* is for restriction.

आह—शब्दः पुनरयमर्थोऽन्तरेणापि तुशब्दमवाप्तुम् । कथम् ? महदाद्या प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्तेति ह्युपदिष्टं पुरस्तात् । ततोऽहङ्कारतन्मात्रपूर्वकत्वे सिद्धे सति इन्द्रियमहाभूतपर्वणोः पुनः श्रुतेर्नियमो भविष्यति । तद्यथा पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इत्यत्र क्षुत्प्रतीकारसमर्थानां द्रव्याणामर्थ-देव सर्वेषां भक्षणे सम्प्राप्ते पुनः श्रुतेर्नियमो भवति, तद्वदिदं द्रष्टव्यम् । इष्टतोऽवधारणार्थ इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । इष्टतोऽवधारणार्थस्तर्हि तुशब्दो भविष्यति । कथं नाम षोडशको विकार एवेति यथा विज्ञायते, षोडशकस्तु विकार इत्येवं मा ज्ञायीति । यद्येवमस्थाने तर्हि तुशब्दः पठितः । षोडशको विकारस्त्विति वक्तव्यम् । अथ मतं वृत्तपरिपूरणार्थमयमस्मिन्प्रदेशे पठितस्तुशब्दो यत्र निर्दोषस्तत्रैवायं द्रष्टव्य इति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? असन्देहात् । महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्तेत्युपदिष्टे किमिति सांशयिका भविष्यामः । तस्मात्पेलवमस्य पाठे प्रयोजनं पश्यामः । अथायमभिप्रायः स्यात् यद्यप्येतदर्थतः सिद्धं तथाप्ययमाचार्यः स्फुटप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमवधारणं प्रत्याद्वियते । किं कारणम् ? यस्मात् विचित्राः सूत्रकाराणामभिप्रायगतयः । तद्यथा भगवान् पाणिनिः न वये, रात्सस्येत्येवमादिष्वन्तरेण

प्रयत्नमिष्टतोऽवधारणे सिद्धे अन्यत्र अजादी गुणवचनादेव स्तौतिष्योरेव षण्यभ्यासादित्येवमादिषु यत्नं करोति । तद्वदिहापि द्रष्टव्यमिति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अशक्यत्वात् । सति वा पुनरवधारणार्थत्वे तुशब्दस्य कथमिवात्र शक्यमवधारणं प्रतिपत्तुम् ? यावता महाभूतानामपि शरीरादिलक्षणं कार्यमुपलभ्यत इति । तत्र केचित् समाधिमाहुः । शरीरादीनामन्तर्नान्तरभावात्पृथिव्यादीनामप्रकृतित्वम् । यस्मात् किल पृथिव्यादीनां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रं कार्यं मुष्टिग्रन्थिकुण्डलादिवन्नार्थान्तरभूतम् । अत एषामप्रकृतित्वमिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अविशेषात् । सर्वमेव हि सांख्यानां कार्यमन्तर्नान्तरभूतम् । तत्रैतस्यां कल्पनायां सर्वतत्त्वानामप्रकृतित्वं प्रसज्येत । अथैतदनिष्टं, सत्कार्यव्याघातः । अन्ये पुनराहुः—अपरिणामित्वान्महाभूतानां विकारित्वाऽनवधारणमिति । तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धेः । प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्यते महाभूतानां कलिलाङ्कुरक्षीरादिपरिणामः । अनुमानग्राह्यस्तु तत्त्वान्तराणाम् । तदेतदधरोत्तरं भवति । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

न तर्हि इदं प्रतिपत्तव्यं षोडशको विकार एवेति ?

Opponent : This meaning can be conveyed (lit. arrived at) without the word *tu* also.

How ?

It is stated earlier that the intellect, etc., are the seven productive products. There will be the restriction by mentioning again the group of the organs and the gross elements when they are established to be the products of the principle of egoism and the subtle elements respectively. For example, in case of the statement like 'five five-nailed beings are eatable',<sup>24</sup> by implication all the objects which can satisfy the hunger were eatable but hearing the statement again, there ensues the restriction. In the present case also it should be understood like this.

If it is considered to put a restriction to (not the objects excluded but the) desired objects ? It may be like this. The

word *tu* will be meant to put a restriction to convey the objects desired. It is known (through the word *tu*) as to why the sixteen are merely the modifications. Do not understand it as merely the group of sixteen is the modifications.

If this is the case, the word *tu* is put at a wrong place. The statement should run as *ṣoḍaśako vikārastu*.

If it is held that the word *tu* is mentioned at this place for the completion of the metre but it should be regarded as occurring where its mention is faultless.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of lack of doubt. When it is pointed out that the seven are both the cause and the effects, there arises a doubt as to what (are these)

Here, we find that it does not serve a great purpose. The sense may be like this. Though it is proved through the meaning itself but the present author has regards for restriction so that the understanding may be clear.

What is the reason for it ?

There are strange modes of conveying the meaning adopted by the authors of the aphorisms. For example, when the restriction is proved for desirables in 'the word-form ending in *na* only and followed by *kya* (i.e., affix *kyac*, *kam*, and *kyas*) is called a *pada*.<sup>25</sup> 'Of a word ending in conjunct consonant, *s* (only) is elided when it follows *r*'.<sup>26</sup> At other places lord Pāṇini makes efforts for the purpose in the two affixes beginning with a vowel (i. e., *īyas* and *iṣṭha*) are added (only) after words denoting attributes',<sup>27</sup> and in 'ṣ is

25. Pāṇini 1.4.5

26. Pāṇini 8.2.24

27. Pāṇini 5.3.58.

substituted for *m* after *i* or *u* in the reduplication of a desideratum if the *sa* of *san* is changed to ṣ and not otherwise and when only in *stu* and in the causative of roots, which begin with ṣ in the dhātupāṭha.<sup>28</sup> This should also be understood in the same way.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is impossible. If it is considered to denote restriction, how is it possible to understand the word *tu* in the sense of restriction as long as we get the effect of the gross elements in the form of the body and the like ?<sup>29</sup> In order to justify the above statement, some have offered the solution that the earth, etc., are not cause (productive) because the body, etc., are not different (from them in essence), because the (so called) effects of the earth, etc., are merely the particular arrangement (of them only) and, hence, not different from them like the first, a knot and a ear-ring, etc. Hence, these are not the cause (productive).

This is also wrong.<sup>30</sup>

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28. Pāṇini 8.3.61. In the first two rules *eva* is not used even though the sense of restriction is present, whereas the term *eva* is used in the last two rules to indicate restriction, suggesting that the author is independent to use or not to use a word indicating restriction.
29. The sense is that the gross elements also serve as the cause of the body, etc., and hence there should be no restriction in their being an effect only.
30. The author means to say that the productive in Sāṃkhya means that which gives rise to something dissimilar in nature. The earth, etc., do not give rise to something essentially different from them. Hence, the modifications of the gross elements are not termed products. Nor are the gross elements the productive.

Why ?

*Because of the lack of speciality.* All the effects in the theory of the Sāṃkhyas are not different (in essence) from their cause. Hence, this supposition would lead to the undesirable contingency of supposing all the categories as non-cause (unproductive). If it is not desirable, it contradicts the theory of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

Others have stated that on account of the non-modifiable nature of the gross elements, their modification is not determined.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it (i.e. their nature of being modifiable) is known through perception itself. The modification of the gross elements into heap, sprout and the milk, etc., are directly observed. (The modifications) of the gross elements are known through inference. Therefore, it is a perverted reply. Hence, it is wrong.

In that case, it should not be understood that the group of sixteen is merely the modifications.

उच्यते—प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । किं कारणम् ? तत्त्वान्तराऽनुपपत्तेः । इह पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना साम्यात्प्रच्युतानां गुणानां योज्यं महदादिविशेषान्तो विपरिणामः स तत्त्वान्तरोत्पत्तिनियमेन व्यवतिष्ठते । न तु पृथिव्यादिभ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरोत्पत्तिरस्ति । तस्मादेतेषां विकारत्वमेवेति । किं चान्यत् । ग्राहकान्तराभावात् । यथा तन्मात्रैरारब्धेषु पृथिव्यादिषु अहंकारात्तद्योग्यं ग्राहकान्तरमिन्द्रियलक्षणमुत्पद्यते, नैवं पृथिव्यादिविकाराणां घटादीनां ग्राहकान्तरमस्ति । तस्मान्न तत्त्वान्तरम् । अतश्च पृथिव्यादयो विकारा एवेति । किं चान्यत् । प्रधाने प्रकृतिभावप्रत्यस्तमयवत्तेषु विकारभावप्रत्यस्तमयात् । यथा प्रधानात्सूक्ष्मतरमवस्थान्तरं नास्तीति तत्र प्रकृतिभावस्य प्रत्यस्तमयस्तथा तेषु विकारभावप्रत्यस्तमयः । तस्माद्युक्तमुच्यते षोडशकोऽयं विकार एवेति ।

Proponent : It should be understood so.

What is the reason for it ?

Because it does not give rise to some other object (essentially different from itself). The evolutes beginning with the intellect and ending with the specified categories (i.e., the gross element), which are the modifications of the constituents of the cosmic matter which have lost their state of equilibrium for the purpose of the sentient entity, abide by the rule of production of an essentially different object. From the earth, etc., however, there is no production of some essentially different object. Hence, these are merely the modifications. *Moreover, there is no different means (organ) of perceiving them.* To explain, there is no organ other than that which perceives the earth, etc., to perceive the modifications of earth like pot, etc., as there arise from the principle of egoism the different senses capable of perceiving the earth, etc., arising from the subtle elements. There is, however, no organ separate from the one cognising the earth, etc., to cognise their modifications like pot, etc. Hence, they are not the essentially different objects. And, from this reason also the earth, etc., are merely the modifications. *Moreover, as the nature of being the cause only culminates in the case of cosmic matter, similarly, the nature of being the modification only culminates in case of the (unproductive) modifications.* Since there is no more subtle state than the cosmic matter, there is the culmination of the original cause in it. Similarly, there is the culmination of the modifications only in them. Hence, it is rightly stated that the group of sixteen is merely the modifications.

(Conscious entity)

आह—पुरुषे तर्हि का प्रतिपत्तिरिति ?

Opponent ; What is (your) ascertainment regarding (the nature of) the conscious entity ?

उच्यते

न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥

पुरुषो न ह्ययमवस्थान्तरं प्रतिपद्यते । नो खल्वप्यवस्थान्तरस्यावस्थान्तरं भवतीति ।

**Proponent : THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY IS NEITHER A CAUSE NOR A MODIFICATION.**

The conscious entity does not attain (i. e., transform itself into) some other state. There is, indeed another different state of another different state with reference to us (i.e., the body).

आह—नैतद्युक्तिमन्तरेण श्रद्धीयते, तस्मादुपपाद्यतां कथमस्या-प्रकृतित्वमविकृतित्वं चेति ।

**Opponent : It cannot be believed in without some reason. Hence, its nature of being neither a cause nor a modification should be established (through reasoning) by you.**

उच्यते—प्रकृतित्वानुपपत्तिः । उत्तरत्र प्रतिविधानात् । तस्माच्च विपर्यासादित्यत्र (का० १६) युक्तिमुपदेक्ष्यामः । तस्मात्तावदस्याप्रकृतित्वम् । अविकृतित्वं प्रधानवत् । यथा प्रधानमेवमयमपि पुरुषः क्रियमाणः कारणान्तरैरीश्वरादिभिर्नारभ्यते । कस्मात् ? प्रतिषेधात् । यथा कारणान्तराणि न सन्ति तथोत्तरत्र प्रतिषेधः करिष्यते । पुरुषान्तरैः समत्वात् । समाः सर्वे पुरुषाः । न च समानां कार्यकारणभावो दृष्टः । किं च निष्क्रियत्वात् शुद्धत्वाच्चैषां विपरिणामलक्षणा परिस्पन्दलक्षणा वा क्रिया विभुत्वादानुपपन्ना । कस्मात् ? एषामितरेतरानारम्भकत्वात् । न गुणैर्भन्नजातीयकत्वात् । इहाचेतना गुणा इत्येतत्प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । यच्च येनारभ्यते तच्च तन्मयं भवति । यदि गुणैः पुरुषाणामारम्भः तदा तेषामप्यचेतनत्वं स्यात्, चेतनास्तु ते । तस्मान्न गुणैरारभ्यन्त इति सिद्धमेतत् ।

**Proponent : There is no possibility of its being a cause because it (i.e. causality) is rejected later on in this text. We shall mention the reason (for it) in 'and because of that contrast' (kā. 19). Hence, (you accept) its nature of not being a cause now.**

Its nature of non-effect is like (that of) the cosmic matter. As is the case with the cosmic matter, the conscious entity, even supposed to be created, is also not created by some other cause like Īśvara, etc.

Why ?

Because of its being negated. It will be demonstrated later on that there is no cause of the conscious entity. Moreover, *because of equality among the conscious entities*. All the conscious entities are equal. The relation of cause and effect is not observed in case of equal objects. Moreover, *there is no possibility of the activity of modification in case of the conscious entity because of its being inactive and pure and there is no possibility of the activity of movement because of its being all pervasive.*

Why ?

Because they do not create one another. Nor are they created by the constituents of cosmic matter because they are different in genus. We shall propound that the constituents of cosmic matter are insentient. An object attains the nature of the object which produces it. If the conscious entities would be produced by the constituents of cosmic matter, they (the conscious entities) would have been insentient in nature. On the other hand, they are sentient in nature. Hence, it is proved that the conscious entities are not produced by the constituents of cosmic matter.

(Four Kinds of Character of Cause and Effect)

किञ्चित्कारणमेव न कार्यम् । किञ्चित्कारणं कार्यं च । किञ्चित्कार्यमेव । किञ्चिन्नैव कारणं नैव कार्यमिति चतुर्विधं कारणवृत्तं प्रतिपादितम् । एतत्प्रतिज्ञापिण्डसूत्रम् । अत्र यदपदिष्टं भवद्भिरस्मिन् शास्त्रे प्रमेयमित्यवगन्तव्यम् ॥३॥

Someone is only the cause and not the modification. Someone is both—the cause and the modification. Someone is merely the modification. Someone is neither cause nor modification. This four kinds of character of cause and effect is propounded. This is brief aphorism conveying the object to be dealt with. That what is mentioned here should be considered by you as the object of knowledge in the present scripture.



## KĀRIKĀ 4

(Purpose and Meaning of Pramāṇa)

आह—अथास्य प्रमेयस्य कुतः सिद्धिरिति ?

Opponent : Through what is this object of knowledge known ?

उच्यते—

प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥४॥

प्रमीयते तदिति प्रमेयम् । प्रमेयस्य सिद्धिः प्रमेयसिद्धिः । सिद्धिरधि-  
गमोऽवबोध इत्यर्थः । प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति प्रमाणम् । करणसाधनो ल्युट् । तदेक-  
मेव, बुद्धेरेकत्वाभ्युपगमात्; उपाधिवशात् भिन्नमाश्रीयते प्रत्यक्षमनुमान-  
मित्यादि । तस्य योऽसावुपाधिकृतो भेदस्तमनाश्रित्य प्रमेयपरिच्छेदकत्व-  
सामान्यमङ्गीकृत्यैकवचननिर्देशः क्रियते प्रमाणादिति । एतस्मात्प्रमेयसिद्धि-  
रित्यवगन्तव्यम् । कथम् ? ब्रीह्यादिवत् । यथा ब्रीह्यादि प्रमेयं प्रस्थादिना  
प्रमाणेन परिच्छिद्यते एवमिहाऽपि व्यक्तादिप्रमेयं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन परि-  
च्छिद्यते इति ।

Proponent : THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE COGNISED  
THROUGH THE MEANS OF COGNITION.

That which is cognised is the object of cognition. The expres-  
sion *prameyasiddhi* stands for the cognition of the objects of cogni-  
tion. The term *siddhi* means cognition or knowledge. That by  
means of which something is cognised is a means of knowledge.  
The suffix *lyuṭ* is used to form (i.e., denote) instrumentality. That  
(means of cognition) is one only since the intellect is held to be  
one.<sup>1</sup> Due to its limiting adjuncts it becomes manifold as  
perception, inference, etc. Here, it (means of knowledge) is  
referred to in singular number as 'through a means of cognition'

1. As that serving as a means of cognition is one, the means of  
cognition is one only.

accepting its general character of ascertaining the object of  
cognition and not taking into consideration the difference caused  
by the limiting adjuncts. It should be understood that the object of  
cognition is cognised through this.

How ?

Like barley, etc. As the objects to be measured like barley,  
etc., are measured through the means of measuring like *prastha*,  
similarly, here also the objects of cognition like manifest objects, etc.,  
are cognised (measured) through the means of cognition like per-  
ception.<sup>2</sup>

(Purpose of the term *hi*)

इह हिशब्द इदानीं किमर्थः स्यात् ?

Opponent : What would be the purpose of the term *hi* ?

अवधारणार्थ इति ।

Proponent : It is for restriction.

आह—यद्येवं हिशब्दावचनम् । अवधारणानुपपत्तेः । न ह्येतस्मिन्-  
सूत्रे कथंचिदवधारणमुपपद्यते । तस्मादवचनमेव हिशब्दस्य न्याय्यम् ।  
प्रमेयस्यैवेति चेत्—न । अन्यस्यासम्भवात् । सति हि व्यभिचारसम्भवे  
वस्त्वधार्यते - तद्यथा गौरेवायं नाश्वः, देवदत्त एवायं न यज्ञदत्त इति । न  
च प्रमेयाप्रमेययोः प्रमाणपरिच्छेद्यत्वेऽस्ति प्रसंगः यन्निवृत्त्यर्थं प्रमेयस्यैवेत्य-  
वधार्यते । प्रमाणेभ्य एवेति चेन्न—आर्षज्ञानविरोधप्रसंगात् । परमर्षेहि  
भगवतः ज्ञानं सांसिद्धिकमप्रमाणपूर्वकमिति वः पक्षः । सांसिद्धिकाश्च  
भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृताश्च धर्माद्या (का० ४३) इति वचनात् । तदेवं  
सति विरुध्येत । उभयावधारणमिति चेन्न उभयदोषप्रसंगात् । उभयाव-  
धारणे सति उभयोरपि पक्षयोर्ये दोषास्ते प्रसज्यन्ते । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।  
सिद्धिरेवेति चेन्न अनेकान्तात् । कदाचिद्धयं प्रमाता सन्निहितेऽप्या-  
दित्यादौ लिङ्गे दिङ्निश्चयादिष्वर्थेषु प्रतिहन्यते । तस्मादनेकान्तात्  
सिद्धिरेवेत्येतदयुक्तमवधारणम् ।

2. Literally *pramāṇa* is derived from *pra mā* (to measure). As  
the barley, etc., are known to have a specific measure through  
some means, the means ascertaining the nature of objects are  
also called *pramāṇa*. It seems, however, better to understand  
*mā* in the sense of to know.



Opponent : If it is so, the word *hi* need not be mentioned. *There is no propriety of restriction (in the present case)*. No restriction is proper in this aphorism. Hence, it is proper not to mention the word *hi*.

If it is considered for a restriction to the objects of cognition ?<sup>3</sup>

No, *because there is no possibility of some other (object)*. Something is restricted when there is possibility of over-pervasion; for example, 'this is cow only and not a horse'; 'this is Devadatta only and not Yajñadatta'. There is no possibility of undesirable contingency of over-pervasion over both the objects of cognition as also the objects to be cognised for avoiding which it (the means of knowledge) may have been restricted only to the objects of cognition only.

If it is considered for a restriction as 'only through the means of knowledge' ?<sup>4</sup>

No, *because it would go against the (supposition of) supra-sensuous cognition of the seers*. You hold that the cognition in the illustrious supreme seer was innate and, thus, not caused by some means of cognition, because it is stated that 'the dispositions like virtue, etc., are innate, natural and acquired' (kā. 43). In this situation your own statement would contradict it.

If it (the word *hi*) is considered for a restriction to both (the object of cognition and the means of cognition) ?

No, *because it would lead to the undesirable contingency of involving the faults of both the cases put together*. In case it (the word *hi*) is taken to restrict both, there would be the undesirable contingency of involving the faults of both the positions (stated above). Hence, it is wrong.

3. I.e. the word *hi* in the sense of restriction is related to *prameya*.

4. I.e. if the word *hi* is related to *pramāṇa*.

If (the word *hi* is considered to mean that) it is the cognition only (which arises through the means of cognition only) ?

No, *because it is not invariable*. Sometimes the cogniser fails to decide the objects like directions even in presence of the probans like the sun, etc., Hence, on account of lack of invariableness it is wrong to say that it (the word *hi*) puts restriction to the cognition only.

उच्यते—यदुक्तं हि शब्दावचनमवधारणानुपपत्तेरिति अस्तु प्रमाणेभ्य एवेत्यवधारणम् । यत्तूक्तमार्षज्ञानविरोधप्रसंग इति अयमदोषः । कस्मात् ? सिद्धरूपत्वात् । साध्यमानरूपाणि हि वस्तूनि नान्तरीयकत्वात् स्वरूप-निष्पत्तये साधनसम्बन्धं प्रत्याकांक्षावन्ति भवन्ति, सिद्धरूपं तु भगवतः परमर्षेज्ञानम् । तस्मादस्य साधनसम्बन्धं प्रत्याकाङ्क्षा नोपपद्यत इति । अथवा पुनरस्तु सिद्धिरेवेत्यवधारणम् । यत्तूक्तमनेकान्तादिति तदनुप-पन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सत्त्वादीनामङ्गाङ्गिभावानियमात् । तमःप्रकर्षसाम-ग्र्यात्प्रमाणवैकल्योपपत्तेः । इह सत्त्वादीनामनियतोऽङ्गाङ्गिभावः । देश-कालनिमित्तसामर्थ्याद्धि कदाचित्सत्त्वं प्रकृष्यते, कदाचिद्रजः, कदाचित्तमः । सत्त्वप्रकर्षश्च प्रकाशरूपत्वात्प्रमाणम् । तत्र यदा तमः प्रकृष्यते तदा तेनाभि-भूतत्वात् सत्त्वस्य तत्कार्यमनुमानं त्रिकालाङ्गमुत्तिष्ठते । इत्यतः सत्या-मप्यादित्यादिलिङ्गप्रवृत्तौ दिङ्निश्चयादिष्वर्थेषु प्रतिहन्यते । इतरथा तु न स्वरूपहानम् । यस्य तु निष्पत्तिवैकल्यात्प्रमाणप्रतिबन्धो नेष्टः तस्य स्वरूप-हानं प्रमाणानां प्राप्तम् । कथम् ? एतावद्धि तेषां स्वरूपं यदुत प्रमेय-परिच्छेदः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतदवधारणार्थो हि शब्दः ।

Proponent : As regards your argument that the word *hi* should not be mentioned on account of impropriety of restriction, (our reply is) let there be restriction as to by the means of cognition only. As regards your objection that it would involve the undesirable contingency of its contradiction with the (supra-sensuous) cognition of the seers, (we reply that) it is not a fault.

Why ?

*Because of its being accomplished*. The objects which are yet to be accomplished require some means to bring about their form or

existence because there is no other way out.<sup>5</sup> The knowledge of the illustrious supreme seer is accomplished. Hence, there is no propriety in its requiring some other means. Or again, the restriction may be (understood) as to 'the cognition only'. Your objection that it is not invariable is not correct.

Why ?

Because there is no fixed rule in connection with the mutual relation of the constituents like *sattva* as to how they acquire the principle and subordinate position. Because there is possibility of defect in the means of cognition due to the dominance of *tamas* in the totality of the means. The relation of principal and subordinate is not fixed with reference to these three constituents. In accordance with the capacity of place, time and cause sometimes the *sattva* dominates, sometimes the *rajas* and sometimes the *tamas*. The dominance of the *sattva* is (i.e., leads to) the valid cognition on account of *sattva*'s nature of brightness. wherever the *tamas* dominates, the inference arising of it will apply only to some part of the three periods (viz., past, present and future and not to all times) since the *sattva* is dominated by that.<sup>6</sup> Hence, in spite of the application of the probans<sup>7</sup> like the sun, the inference is obstructed to decide the directions. Otherwise they (i.e., the means) do not deviate from their nature of leading to the valid cognition. The means of knowledge deviate from their essential nature in case of him who does not accept the obstruction to the means of knowledge caused by the defects in rise of knowledge.

How ?

It is their nature to ascertain the objects of knowledge. Therefore, it is correct that the term *hi* is used for the purpose of restriction.

(Number of Means of Knowledge)

5. The unaccomplished objects cannot be produced without means.
6. The meaning is that some lacuna is must in the means of knowledge if *rajas* or *Tamas* dominates the *Sattva*, and the inference in that case would be partially true.

आह—बहूनि प्रमाणान्याचार्यैरभ्युपगम्यन्ते तानि सर्वाणि किं भवाननुमन्यते ?

Opponent : The (other) authorities have accepted many means of knowledge.<sup>7</sup> Do you approve all of them ?

नेत्युच्यते ।

त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टम्

किं हि विधानं विधा, तिस्रो विधा अस्य तत्त्रिविधं त्रिप्रकार-मित्यर्थः । अनेनैतदाचष्टे—एकमेव बुद्धिलक्षणं सत्त्वं निमित्तान्तरानुग्रहोप-जनिताभिः कार्यविशेषपरिच्छिन्नरूपभेदाभिः शक्तिभिरुपकाराद् भिन्नमिव प्रत्यवभासमानं दृष्टादिशब्दवाच्यं भवति । न तु यथा तन्त्रान्तरीयाणां विषयोपनिपातिभिरिन्द्रियैरुपजनितावध्यो बुद्धयस्तथेह विद्यन्ते याः परिकल्प्यमानाः स्वतन्त्राणि त्रीणि प्रमाणानि स्युः ।

Proponent : No,

THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE APPROVED IS OF THREE KINDS.

*Vidhā* denotes kinds and the compound *trividham* is dissolved as the one of three kinds which means that which is of three kinds.

7. Cf. *Y.D.* on the present *kārikā*. The Cārvākas recognise perception only, the Vaiśeṣikas recognise perception and inference, the Sāṃkhya, Yoga and the Viśiṭādvaita, Dvaita, Śādhādvaita and the Dvaitādvaita schools of Uttaramīmāṃsā recognise perception, inference and verbal testimony. The Naiyāyikas recognise Upamāna in addition, the Prābhākara school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā adds arthāpatti to them. The Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Advaita school of Uttaramīmāṃsā recognise the above with the addition of anupalabdhi. The Paurāṇikas admit the above with the addition of *sambhava*, *aitihya* and *pratibhā*. The *Yuktidīpikā* establishes the independence of verbal testimony under *kārikā* 5. It includes the additional *pramāṇas* into those accepted by the Sāṃkhyas here.

This is what is to be meant—the single *sattva* in the form of the intellect is described differently by the words like perception, etc., when it appears to be different through the help rendered by the powers which have come to be differentiated in nature due to their form limited by the particular act and which are caused by the other causes (leading to different means). In this scripture there are not the (different) inviolable knowledges caused by the senses which have come in contact with the objects (of knowledge) as they are so in other philosophical systems. If these (different knowledges) are admitted, there will be three independent means of knowledge.<sup>8</sup>

स्यान्मतम्, कथं पुनः प्रमाणलक्षणानां शक्तीनामकवस्तुसन्निवेश-  
रूपभेदा भवन्तीति ?

Opponent : It may be asked how there are the differentiations in the means of knowledge due to the differentiation in the form of a particular arrangement in an object called power.<sup>9</sup>

उच्यते—सत्त्वादिवत् । यथा सत्त्वादीनां गुणानामेकशब्दादिवस्तु-  
सन्निवेशेऽपि प्रकाशादिकार्यभेदाद्रूपसंकरो न भवति, यथा वा शब्दस्पर्श-  
रूपरसगन्धानामेकद्रव्यसन्निवेशेऽपि ग्राहकान्तरगम्यकत्वात्, यथा वा  
कर्तृकरणाधिकरणसम्प्रदानापादानकर्मलक्षणानां शक्तीनामेकद्रव्यसन्निवेशे-  
ऽपि कार्यविशेषपरिच्छिन्नानि स्वरूपाणि न संकीर्यन्ते, तद्वदिदं द्रष्टव्यम् ।  
शक्त्यन्तरोपजनने वस्त्वन्तरोपपत्तिरिति चेन् न, अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि

8. The Sāṃkhyas unlike the Naiyāyikas do not believe that perception, inference, etc., are independent means of knowledge. On the contrary, the means of knowledge in the form of intellect is one and the knowledge is metaphorically said to be of different kinds when the other factors which do not form the means of knowledge directly are different.

9. The meaning is that if the power is itself the *pramāṇa*, how can the non-material object like power be differentiated through the difference in other factors particularly when it is essentially non-different from that located into a single object.

क्षणभङ्गसाहसं युक्तिमन्तरेण दण्डभयादपि प्रतिपद्यामहे, न तु तस्यामवसर  
इति स्थीयतां तावत् ।

Proponent : *Like the sattva, etc.* Just as there is no inter-mixture of form among the three constituents due to the differentiation of functions like illumination, etc., though they are located in a single substance like word, etc., or just as the qualities like word, touch, form, taste and smell though located in the same object, are not intermixed because of being apprehended through different means (i.e., organs of knowledge)<sup>10</sup>, or as—though the powers characterised by nominative, instrumental, locative, dative, ablative and accusative are located in the same object, yet their forms circumscribed by particular action (of denoting different cases) are not inter-mixed. In the same way it (the case of power relating to different means of knowledge) should be understood.

If it is argued that the production of different types of power leads to the production of objects ?

We reply—no, because it is not accepted (by us). We do not accept baseless boldness of the theory of momentariness without solid reason even with the fear of punishment, and there is no scope for that (type of reason) in the present case. Hence, you should stop (arguing here).

(Other Means of Knowledge included into the three)

आह, कथं पुनरेतद् गम्यते यथा त्रिविधमेव प्रमाणं न पुनरनेक-  
विधमपीति ?

Opponent : Then, how is it known that the means of knowledge is threefold only and not of many varieties ?

उच्यते—

सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।

सर्वाणि च तानि प्रमाणानि सर्वप्रमाणानि । सिद्धस्य भावः सिद्धत्वम् ।  
सर्वप्रमाणानां सिद्धत्वं सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वम् । सिद्धत्वमन्तर्भावि इत्यर्थः ।

10. To be cognised through different organs is the test of differentiation in objects,

तस्मात् सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मिन्नेव त्रिविधे प्रमाण इति वाक्यशेषः । सर्वेषां परपरिकल्पितानां प्रमाणानामस्मिन्नेव त्रिविधे प्रमाणेऽन्तर्भावादिति यावदुक्तं स्यात्तावदिदमुच्यते सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वादिति । अथवा सर्वप्रमाणेषु सिद्धं सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धं—सप्तमी सिद्धशुष्कपक्वबन्धैरिति समासः, यथा सांकाश्यसिद्धः पाटलिपुत्रसिद्ध इति । तद्भावः प्रमाणसिद्धत्वं तस्मात् सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । कस्य त्रिविधस्य प्रमाणस्येति वाक्यशेषः ।

Proponent : BECAUSE ALL THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE INCLUDED (IN THIS THREEFOLD MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE).

The expression sarvapramāṇāni denotes all the means of knowledge. The state of inclusion is denoted by the term siddhatvam. The expression sarvapramāṇasiddhatva means the state of inclusion of all the means of knowledge. The expression siddhatva means inclusion. Adding fifth case termination in the sense of reason we get sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt. 'In this threefold means of knowledge' is the remaining expression. It is stated as above because of the inclusion of all the means of knowledge, so that it may be (understood) that all the means of knowledge posited (by the other authorities) may be included in this threefold means of knowledge only. Or, the compound sarvapramāṇasiddha may be dissolved as sarvapramāṇeṣu siddham and these words are compounded by the rule that a word ending in seventh case affix is compounded with the words siddha (born or known), śuṣka (dried), pakva (cooked)<sup>11</sup> and bandha (bound) as the expression like Sāṃkāśyasiddhaḥ (born or known in Sāṃkāśyā) and Pāṭaliputrasiddhaḥ (born or known in Pataliputra). The state of it is denoted by the expression sarvapramāṇasiddhatvam and adding fifth case affix we get sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt. Of which ? Of three kinds 'of means of knowledge' is the remaining expression.

केन पुनराकारेण त्रिविधं प्रमाणं सिद्धमिति ?

Opponent : In what way the threefold means is established ?

उच्यते—परस्पराविशेषात् । अन्यानि पुनरस्मात् त्रयात् यथाऽभिन्नानि तथा प्रतिपादयिष्यामः ।

Proponent : Because of lack of mutual distinction. How the others are not distinct from these three, we will propound later on.

(Means of Knowledge accepted in Sāṃkhya)

आह, किम्पुनस्तत् त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिति ?

Opponent : Of What sub-varieties is that threefold means of knowledge ?

उच्यते—

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च

इति । तत्र दृष्टं नाम उपात्तविषयेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपाती योऽध्यवसायः । अनुमानं द्वयोरविनाभाविनोरेकं प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाय तत्पूर्वकं सम्बन्ध्यन्तरे यत् पश्चान्मानं भवति । आप्तवचनं तु प्रमाणभूतद्वारकोऽत्यन्तपरोक्षेऽर्थे निश्चयः । इत्युद्देशमात्रमिदम् । मूललक्षणं तु आचार्यो वक्ष्यति स्वयमेव प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टमित्यादि ।

proponent ; PERCEPTION, INFERENCE AND VERBAL TESTIMONY.

Out of them, the perception is the definite cognition resulting from (lit. following the) function of the senses which have come in contact with the object. After knowing through perception one of the two invariably associated objects and taking this knowledge as preceding when there is the ascertainment of one of the associated, it is called inference.<sup>12</sup> The verbal testimony is the ascertainment of the extremely invisible object through (someone whose words are) valid.<sup>13</sup> It is merely the enunciation (of the means of knowledge). The basic definition will be given by the authority himself as perception is the definite cognition of an object through the senses (kā. 5), and the like.

(Means of Knowledge accepted by others)

12. This is the explanation based upon the derivation of the term.

13. Cf. Sāṃkhyakārikā 6.

आह, त्रैविध्याऽनुपपत्तिः, न्यूनाधिकश्रवणात् । तन्त्रान्तरीयाः केचित् चत्वारि प्रयाणानीच्छन्ति । प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति वचनात् । तथा षडित्यन्ये ।

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शब्दं चोपमया सह ।

अर्थापत्तिरभावश्च हेतवः साध्यसाधकाः ॥

इत्यभिधानात् । एतानि सम्भवैतिह्यचेष्टासहितानि नवेत्यपरे । प्रत्यक्षानुमाने एवेति वैशेषिकबौद्धाः । तत्र कथमिदं निश्चीयते त्रिविधमेव प्रमाणं, न पुनर्न्यूनमधिकं वेति ?

Opponent : There is no propriety of threefold-ness (of the means of knowledge), because we hear less or more number (of the means of knowledge). Out of the followers of the other systems, some accept four means of knowledge. (It is on the authority of the statement) 'perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony are the means of knowledge.'<sup>14</sup> Similarly, some accept six because of the following statement :

"Perception and inference and verbal testimony along with analogy, and presumption and absence are the means of establishing the object to be established."

The others hold that these are nine with the addition of probability, tradition and gesture to the above six. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists hold that there are two means of knowledge, viz., perception and inference.<sup>15</sup> Then, how it is ascertained that the means of knowledge is of three kinds only and not of less or more than them ?

(Analogy and tradition included under verbal testimony)

उच्यते—किम्पुनरिदमुपमानं नाम ?

Proponent : (As a reply to it first of all we ask) what is, then, the analogy ?

14. N. S. 1.1.3

15. Cf. Note 8 above.

आह, प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् । प्रसिद्धः प्रज्ञातः, तेन साधर्म्यात् साध्यस्याऽप्रसिद्धस्य साधनमधिगमो यस्तदुपमानम् । अवबोध-विधिस्तु येनाऽनुपलब्धो गवयः स तस्योपलब्ध्यर्थमधिगतगवयं पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते-किरूपो गवय इति । स तस्मा आचष्टे—यथा गौरेवं गवय इति । तत्र प्रति-पत्त्याऽत्यन्ताऽनुपलक्षितगवयस्वरूपो व्याख्यातृप्रतिपादितप्रसिद्धवस्तु-साधर्म्यज्ञानाहितसंस्कारः प्रतिपद्यते—नूनमेवंरूपो गवय इति । अपर आह—प्रतिराप्तवचनोपजनितप्रसिद्धवस्तुसाधर्म्यज्ञानाहितसंस्कारस्योत्तर-कालं प्रत्यक्षेण तमुपलभ्य या समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिः—अयमसावर्थोऽस्य शब्दस्य समाख्या इति—तदुपमानमुच्यते ।

Opponent : Analogy is the cognition of an object by means of its resemblance to something well known.<sup>16</sup> Prasiddha means well known and by means of resemblance to that sādhanam, i.e., knowledge of that which is not well known, is the analogy. The process of knowing (in analogy) is thus – one who has not yet known the gavaya asks for the sake of knowing it the other who has known it 'of what form is the gavaya'. He tells him 'as the cow, so the gavaya'. By means of this knowledge one who has not observed the form of the gavaya and who is endowed with the impression of the knowledge of similarity with the well known object propounded by the expounder, comes to know 'the gavaya, of course, is of this form'. Some other states (about the process of analogy) as when there is the knowledge of relation of name and its denotation in the form 'this object is denoted by this name', in the one who is endowed with the impression of the knowledge of similarity with the well known object through the statement of an authority and (again) one observes through perception afterwards that object, it is the analogy.<sup>17</sup>

यद्येवमुपमैतिह्यावचनम्, आप्तोपदेशसिद्धेः । यथा गौरेवं गवय इति चाप्तोपदेशबलात् प्रतिपत्ता अप्रसिद्धं गवयमुपलभते न साधर्म्य-

16. N. S. 1.1.6.

17. In the first explanation the resultant knowledge refers to the form of gavaya and in the second, to the denotative relation.

मात्रात् । तस्मान्न शब्दात् पृथगुपमा । यत्तु खल्विति ह उवाच याज्ञवल्क्य इत्येतदैतिह्यं नाम प्रमाणान्तरमुपकल्प्यते तदपि वक्तृविशेषापेक्षत्वान्न शब्दादर्थान्तरम् ।

**Proponent:** If it is so, the analogy and tradition should not be mentioned (as distinct means of knowledge) since these are included in the verbal testimony. The person engaged in knowing knows the gavaya, which is not well known, by the force of the statement of an authority and not merely through the similarity.<sup>18</sup> Hence, the analogy is not different from verbal testimony.

Some different means of knowledge, viz., tradition, is posited in (expounding the statements like) 'that which is certainly, etc., said Yājñavalkya'. That also is not something other than the verbal testimony because it depends upon a particular speaker.<sup>19</sup>

आह, न । साधर्म्यपेक्षत्वात् । यदि ह्याप्तोपदेश उपमा स्यात्तेन यथा स्वर्गोऽप्सरसः, उत्तराः कुरव इत्येवमादिष्वन्तरेण साधर्म्योपादानं प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति एवमिहापि स्यात् । गवयन्तु अयमाख्याता प्रतिपादयिष्यन् प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यगर्भं शब्दमुपादत्ते न केवलम् । प्रतिपत्तापि तस्मादेव प्रतिपद्यते न शब्दमात्रात्, तस्मात्पृथगेवाप्तोपदेशः कर्तव्यः । शब्दव्यापारात्तदन्तर्भाव इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् शब्दव्यापारसहितोऽयं प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यलक्षणार्थो गवयप्रतिपत्तौ न केवलः, तस्मादस्य तत्रान्तर्भाव इति तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? वीतावीतयोरपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । वीतावीतावपि हेतू परप्रतिपादनार्थमुपादीयमानौ शब्दव्यापारमपेक्षेते । तयोरप्याप्तवचनत्वप्रसंगः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मान्नोपमानमाप्तोपदेशः ।

18. It means that the *karana* in this case is the authoritative statement and not the similarity.

19. The sense is that the validity of a verbal testimony depends upon the authority of the speaker. The same is the case with the upamāna and tradition.

**Opponent :** No, because it requires the similarity. If the analogy would be verbal testimony, there would arise the knowledge, in case of analogy also without the mention of similarity as is the case of the statements like 'there is the land of the Uttarakurus' 'there are nymphs in heaven' (which serve as the examples of verbal testimony). While propounding (the knowledge of gavaya) the person who communicates takes recourse to the words containing the well-known similarity and not to the words only. The knower also understands through that only and not merely through words. Hence, it (analogy) should be mentioned separately (i.e., as a separate means of knowledge). If it is argued that it is included in verbal testimony because of the operation through words ? It may be like this. In the act of knowing the gavaya, the meaning characterised by the well-known similarity accompanies the verbal operation and it is not merely the similarity to well known. Hence, it is included in verbal testimony.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it will lead to the undesirable contingency of inclusion of direct inference and the inference-by-elimination<sup>20</sup> into verbal testimony. The direct and the implied reasons (in inference) while reported to for propounding something to the others, stand in need of the verbal operation. There will be the undesirable contingency of their inclusion in verbal testimony. This is undesirable. Hence, the analogy is not verbal testimony.

उच्यते, साधर्म्याऽव्यतिरेकः, उपायभूतत्वात् । आख्यातृप्रामाण्यादव प्रतिपत्तुर्गवयविज्ञानमुपपद्यते । स तु कौशलाद्दुरुपपादोऽयमर्थ इति कृत्वा प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यमुपादत्ते । तस्मादाख्यातुर्गवयप्रतिपादनार्थमुपायभूतं साधर्म्यमुपाददानस्य शब्दादर्थान्तरमुद्भवति । अथैवंजातीयकानामपि प्रमाणान्त-

20. Cf. *kārikā* 5.



रत्वमिष्यते तेनात्यल्पमिदमुच्यते चत्वारि प्रमाणानीति । किं तर्हि पाणि-  
विहाराक्षिनिकोचप्रभृतीनामप्युपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम् । किंच वक्तृविशेषा-  
पेक्षत्वात् । यत्र ह्यर्थवशात्प्रतिपत्तिरुत्पद्यते न तत्र प्रतिपत्ता वक्तृविशेषम-  
पेक्षते दृष्टार्थोऽयमदृष्टार्थोऽयमिति । तद्यथाऽनुमाने । अस्ति चोपमाने वक्तृ-  
विशेषापेक्षा । तस्मान्न शब्दादर्थान्तरं तत् । अवश्यं चैतदेवं विज्ञेयम् । यो  
हि मन्यते प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादेव गवयप्रतिपत्तिरिति यथाश्वस्तथा गवय इत्ये-  
तस्मादपि तस्य सम्प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । न चार्हति भवितुं, मिथ्याज्ञानत्वात् ।  
यत्तु खल्विदमुच्यते यतः समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरिति तदुपमानमिति ।  
एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । तद् यथा बहुषु निषण्णेषु  
कोऽत्र देवदत्त इत्युक्ते यो मुकुटी कुंडली व्यूढोरस्कस्ताम्रायताक्ष इति  
प्रत्याह । ततश्च समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरिति प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसङ्ग इत्येव-  
मनवस्था प्रमाणानां स्यात् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । एवं हि न तावत्परत उपमानं  
प्रमाणान्तरम् । यदा स्वयमेव गां गवयं चोपलभ्य विकल्पयति यथाऽयं  
तथाऽयमिति तदा तस्यार्थस्य प्रमाणान्तरेणाधिगतत्वात् प्रमाणमेव तन्न  
भवतीति । तस्मात् सुष्ठूक्तमयमेतिह्यावचनमाप्तोपदेशात् सिद्धेरिति ।

Proponent : *Similarity is not distinct because it serves only as an aid.*

The knowledge of gavaya arises in the knower only through the validity of the person who explains. Thinking that the object is difficult to be established he skillfully uses the well known similarity. Consequently, the similarity which serves as an aid for explaining the gavaya adopted by person who is engaged in explaining, is not something different from verbal testimony.<sup>21</sup> If the property of being separate means of knowledge is desired in case of this sort of means, it is too less to say that there are four means of knowledge, (In that case) stepping of the foot and closing of the eye, etc., should also be mentioned (as separate means of knowledge). Moreover, (it is not different (from verbal authority) because it depends upon a particular speaker. Wherever the knowledge arises due to (the nature of)

21. Here, we have preferred *Chakravarti's* reading as : *śabdāda-rthāntram*.

an object, the knower does not require the particular speaker as to whether the person has perceived the object or not, as it is the case of inference. And, there is the requirement of a particular speaker in case of analogy. Hence, it is not different from the verbal testimony. It should certainly be understood in this way only.<sup>22</sup> One who holds that the knowledge is attained merely through the well known similarity, to him the knowledge (of gavaya) would arise through the statement 'as the horse, so the gavaya'.<sup>23</sup> And, it cannot take place because it would be erroneous knowledge. The statement that the analogy is that from which arises the knowledge of relation of name with the object denoted, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it leads to the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. When it is asked out of the many persons sitting here, who is Devadatta, the reply is given that a man who is wearing a diadem, decorated with ear-ring, with broad chest, and with red and large eyes, is Devadatta. The knowledge of the relation of name with the object denoted arises out of that and it would lead to the undesirable contingency of its being a distinct means of knowledge and, thus, there would arise the infinite regress with reference to the number of the means of knowledge. And, this is undesirable. In this way, the analogy meant for the knowledge of others is not a separate means of knowledge, when one at the sight of both the cow and the gavaya reflects upon for himself that as this (cow) so is this (gavaya), here the object being cognised by some other means of knowledge, it is not a case of (distinct) means of knowledge at all.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, it is rightly stated that this (analogy) and tradition should not be

22. This is to stress the fact of difference between verbal testimony and the other means of knowledge.

23. It is because in this case the similarity is not conveyed through an authoritative person.

24. Since it is cognised through perception, there is no point in accepting upamāna as an independent means of knowledge.

mentioned (as separate means of knowledge) because of their being verbal testimony itself (and consequently) being included (in that).

(Presumption included in Inference)

किञ्चान्यत्—अर्थापत्तिसंभवाभावचेष्टानामनुमानसिद्धेः । अवचन-  
मित्यनुवर्तते । तत्रार्थापत्तिर्नाम यत्रार्थयोः पूर्वमव्यभिचारमुपलभ्य पश्चा-  
दन्यतरस्य दर्शनाच्छ्रवणाद्वान्यतरस्मिन्प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति । दर्शनाद्यथा गुड-  
मुपलभ्य माधुर्यमिन्द्रियान्तरविषयं प्रतिपद्यते । श्रवणाद्यथा गुडशब्दं श्रुत्वा  
माधुर्यमशब्दकं प्रतिपद्यते इति । अपरा खल्वार्थापत्तिः । यत्र धर्मयोरव्यभि-  
चारमुपलभ्य तत्प्रतिद्वन्द्विनोरपि साहचर्यकल्पना । सा तु द्विविधा, व्यभि-  
चारिणी चाव्यभिचारिणी च । तत्र व्यभिचारिणी यथा सावयवमनित्य-  
मित्युक्तेऽर्थादापन्नं निरवयवं नित्यमिति । तच्च कर्मादिष्वदृष्टमित्येषाऽ-  
नैकान्तिकत्वात्प्रमाणमेव न भवतीति । या त्वविनाभाविनी अव्यभिचारिणी  
यथा केसरिवराहयोरुपगच्छरे सन्निपातमुपलभ्योत्तरकालं केवलं केसरिणं  
वराहव्रणंकितशरीरं प्रयान्तमुपलभ्य प्रतिपद्यते जितो वराह इति तदनु-  
मानम् । कथम् ? यस्मात्केसरिवराहयोरौ जयपराजयौ तयोरव्यभिचारी  
सम्बन्धः । तत्र यदा केसरिणो जयमुपलभ्याव्यभिचारिणमितरस्य पराजयं  
प्रतिपद्यते किमन्यत्स्यादृतेऽनुमानात् ? अधिगतोभयसम्बन्धिसमुदायस्य हि  
प्रतिपत्तुः प्रत्यक्षीभूतान्यतरसम्बन्धिनो या सम्बन्ध्यन्तरप्रतिपत्तिस्तद-  
नुमानम् । इत्थं चार्थापत्तिरतो न तस्मात्पृथग्भवितुमर्हति ।

Moreover, because presumption, probability, negation and gesture are included in inference. 'Should not be mentioned (as distinct means of knowledge)' follows here also. The presumption is (a means of knowledge) where after observing the invariable concomitance between two objects and on seeing or hearing of one of them later on, one gets the knowledge of the other (of the two). (The example of knowing) through seeing is as after observing the treacle one comprehends its sweetness, which is the object of the sense other than that perceiving it. (The example of presumption) after hearing is as—after hearing the word treacle one comprehends its sweetness which is not denoted by words. There is the other kind of presumption also. (It is found) when after observing the invariable association between two properties, there is the postulation of association between the (objects of) opposite character also. It is twofold : with

exception and without exception. Out of these, that with exception is exemplified as when it is stated that the conjunct object is non-eternal, it follows by implication that the object which is not conjunct is eternal. It is not observed in the case of action, etc.,<sup>25</sup> Hence, on account of being non-decisive it is not a valid means of knowledge at all.<sup>26</sup> That which is invariable and without exception is exemplified as—after observing a lion and a boar together near the cave and on observing afterwards the lion walking alone with its body stained with the blood of the boar, one comes to know that the boar is won. It is (however) a case of inference.

How ?

Because there is the invariable association between the victory and the defeat of the lion and the boar respectively. In that case, when after observing the victory of the lion one comprehends the defeat of the other which is invariably associated with the former; what is that other than inference ? The knowledge of the other relata<sup>27</sup> in case of one who has observed the group of relata and also observed the one of them through perception,<sup>28</sup> is the inference only. The presumption is of the foresaid nature. (Hence) it cannot be distinct from that (inference).

(Probability included in inference)

सम्भवो नाम द्रोणः प्रस्थ इत्युक्तेऽर्धद्रोणादीनां सन्निधानमवसीयते ।  
इत्ययमपि साहचर्यकल्पनयाऽर्थापत्तिरेव । कथम् ? यस्मादुक्तपरिमाणे द्रव्ये  
द्रोणशब्दो वर्तते, न न्यूनं नाधिके । तत्र द्रोण इत्युक्ते यदत्यन्तसहभुवां तदव-  
यवानामन्यशब्दवाच्यानामपि सन्निधानम् तदर्थार्थापत्तिरेव । स चाऽनुमान-  
मित्युक्तम् ।

25. Action is not with components, still it is non-eternal.

26. It is a means leading to erroneous knowledge and, hence, cannot be called a means of valid knowledge.

27. It may suggest the *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance).

28. This may be a reference to *līnga*. The *Vyāpti* and *līnga* are the important factors in inference.

Probability is explained as—when the words *drona*<sup>29</sup> and *prastha*<sup>30</sup> are uttered, one comes to know the presence of half *drona*, etc. The postulation of presence is presumption only.

How ?

Because the word *drona* is used with reference to the object of above mentioned measure, neither less nor more. In that case, when the term *drona* is uttered, (the knowledge of) the presence (lit. association) of its components which are found invariably associated with it and which are denoted by other words, is the presumption only, and it is already stated that the presumption is the inference only.

(Negation included in Inference)

अभावो नाम तद्यथा धूमस्य भावादग्नेर्भावः प्रतीयते एवं धूमाभावा-  
दग्न्यभाव इत्ययं प्रतिद्वन्द्विसाहचर्यकल्पनयार्थापत्तिरभिहितः । तत्र यदा  
व्यभिचारसाहचर्यकल्पना तदा प्रमाणाभाव एव । तद्यथाऽयोगुडाङ्गारादिषु  
धूमाभावो नाग्न्यभावः । यत्र तु क्वचिदेकान्तः स्यात् यथाऽकृतकत्वान्नित्य  
इति तत्राऽनुमानम् । कथम् ? साहचर्योपपत्तेः । कृतकत्वान्नित्यत्ववत् ।

The negation is exemplified as—the presence of fire is known through the presence of smoke, so through the absence of smoke (is known) the absence of fire. It is already stated that this postulation of the association of the objects of opposite nature is the presumption. In this case, where is the postulation of association with exception ? That is no valid means of knowledge at all. As in the case of iron ball, treacle or the charcoal, there is the absence of smoke but not that of fire. In some cases where there is invariableness—as in the example that which is not created is eternal, that is the case of inference.

How ?

Because there is the possibility of invariable association as in the case of createdness and non-eternity.

29. An ancient Indian measure for measuring grains or field.

30. An ancient Indian measure for measuring grains or field. 1/16 part of a *drona*.

अन्ये तु अभावमन्यथा वर्णयन्ति । तद्यथा गेहे नास्ति चैत्र इत्युक्ते  
वहिरस्तीति सम्प्रत्ययो भवति, तत्र गेहाभावो वहिर्भावसम्प्रतिपत्तिहेतुरर्था-  
न्तरापत्तिरेव प्रतिद्वन्द्विसाहचर्यकल्पनया । कथम् ? यथैव हि दिवा न  
भुङ्क्ते देवदत्तः पीन इत्यत्राऽभोजनप्रतियोगिनो मेदुरत्वस्योपलम्भाद्वा-  
प्रतियोगिनि काले रात्रौ भूजिरवसीयते एवमिहापि गेहाभावाभिधान-  
सामर्थ्यात्प्रतियोगिनि विपर्ययः कल्प्यते । अन्यथा तु यद्यभाव एवाभिप्रेतः  
स्यान्नास्ति चैत्र एवेति ब्रूयात् । अर्थापत्तिश्चानुमानम् ।

Others explain negation in a different way—when it is told that Caitra is not in the house, it is deduced that he is somewhere outside the house.<sup>31</sup> In this case, the absence in the house is the reason for the knowledge of his being present somewhere outside and it is the case of presumption only because there is the postulation of association of the objects of opposite nature.

How ?

As in the statement 'Devadatta does not eat by day and yet is fat'. Here, due to the observation of fatness which is opposite to non-eating, his eating at night, which is opposite to that at day, is deduced. Similarly, in the present case also through the mention of his absence in the house, the opposite is postulated in the case of the one whose absence is referred to. If only the absence would have been intended, it would have been stated as Caitra is not present. And, the postulation is the inference.

(Gesture included in Inference)

चेष्टा नाम अभिप्रायसूचकः कश्चिदेवोदरताडनाञ्जलिकरणादिः  
शरीरव्यापारः । स हि बुभुक्षादीन्यप्रतीयमानानि प्रतिपादयतीति प्रमाण-  
मित्युच्यते । स चानुमानमेव । कस्मात् ? यस्माद् भोजनेच्छादिसहचरो हि  
व्यापारोऽनुष्ठीयमानो यदि सहचारिणं गमयति तदा नानुमानात्पृथगिति  
शक्यं प्रतिज्ञातुम् ।

Gesture is explained as the operation of the (limbs of the) body like beating the belly and placing the hands side by side and slightly

31. It is not clear how it would be an example of negation and different from implication according to the *pūrvapakṣa*.



hollowed which is indicative of some intention. That conveys hunger and the like which are not (otherwise) known, and hence, is said to be a means of knowledge. That is inference only.

Why ?

Because if the performance of (bodily) operation, which is associated with the desire for meals, etc., gives rise to the knowledge of its associate, it cannot be declared to be different from inference.

(Imagination is not an independent means of Knowledge)

आह—प्रतिभा तर्हि प्रमाणान्तरं भविष्यति ।

Opponent : Imagination, then, will be a separate means of knowledge.

उच्यते—केयं प्रतिभा नाम ?

Proponent : What is the nature of this imagination ?

आह, योऽमनादौ संसारे देवमनुष्यतिरश्चामभिन्नेऽर्थे बाह्ये स्त्र्यादौ प्रत्यये पूर्वाभ्यासवासनापेक्षः कुणपकामिनीभक्ष्याद्याकारभेदभिन्नप्रत्यय इतिकर्तव्यताङ्गमुत्पद्यते सा हि प्रतिभा । तथा चोक्तम्—

यथाभ्यासं हि वाक्येभ्यो विनाप्यर्थेन जायते ।

स्वप्रत्ययाऽनुकारेण प्रतिपत्तिरनेकधा ॥

येन हि योऽर्थोऽभ्यस्तस्सुखादित्वेन तस्य विनाऽपि तेनार्थेन शब्दमात्रात् प्रतिपत्तिरुत्पद्यते । तद्यथा व्याघ्रोऽत्र प्रतिवसतीत्युक्ते विनाऽपि

बाह्येनाऽर्थेनाभ्यासवशादेव स्वेदवेपथुप्रभृतयो भवन्ति । तस्मात् प्रतिभैव देवमनुष्यतिरश्चामितिकर्तव्यताङ्गत्वात्प्रमाणमिति । आह च—

प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुगच्छति ।

व्यवहाराः प्रवर्तन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ॥

Opponent : In this beginningless world there arises the sense of what to do in the presence of knowledge differentiated by the form of the objects like dead body, desired lady or an eatable object in gods men or insects, etc., due to the past impression

of the common external objects like women. That is called imagination. So, it is stated :

“In accordance with one’s experience, there follow different sorts of understanding (in different persons) in accordance with their own knowledge, through the sentences without (knowing) their meaning.”

In the one who has repeatedly experienced the particular objects as giving rise to pleasure, etc., the knowledge of that object arises merely through the utterance of the word (denoting that object) even without the presence of that object. For example, when it is stated that a tiger lives here, the actions as sweating and trembling of the body take place even without the external object merely through the earlier practice. Therefore, being a part of (means giving rise to the) sense of what to do with reference to gods, men and insects, imagination is a means of knowledge. It is stated also :

“The entire world understands it in the form of the means of knowledge and the worldly activities of even the insects become possible through that.”<sup>33</sup>

उच्यते प्रतिभाया दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण रूपान्तरानुपपत्तेः । अवचनमित्यनुवर्तते । यदि पूर्वाभ्यासवासनापेक्षः प्रत्ययः प्रतिभेत्यभ्युपगम्यते तेन तर्हि असौ प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमाप्तवचनं चेत्येतदापन्नम् । कस्मात् ? यतो न हि दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण प्रत्यक्षरूपं कदाचिदप्युपलभामहे । तस्मान्न तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं प्रतिभा । आर्षप्रत्ययसम्भवादयुक्तमिति चेत्—स्यादेतत्, अस्त्यार्षो हि दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण सर्वपदार्थेषु सांसिद्धिकः प्रत्ययः । स प्रातिभो भविष्यतीति । एतच्चाप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । उक्तमेतत् सिद्धरूपं भगवतः परमर्षेर्ज्ञानम् । अतो न प्रमाणापेक्षमिति । योगिनामिति चेन्न, अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि योगिनामप्रमाणपूर्वकं ज्ञानमिति यथा तथा वक्ष्यामः । स लौकिक इति चेत् न । अनिश्चितत्वात् । स्यादेतत्—अस्ति लौकिकः प्रत्ययो दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण । तद्यथा सन्तमसे व्रजतो द्रागिति विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते—अस्ति मे प्रतीघाति द्रव्यं पुरस्ताद्धर्मवस्थितमिति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? अनिश्चितत्वात् । न हि तत्र निश्चय उत्पद्यते

इदं तद् ब्रव्यमस्ति पुरतो वा व्यवतमस्तीति । न चानिश्चितं प्रमाण-  
ज्ञानमिष्यते । किंचान्यत्—अनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । यदि चैवंजातीयकोऽपि  
प्रत्ययः प्रमाणमभ्युपगम्यते तेनानवस्था प्राप्नोति । किं कारणम् ?  
अनवस्थानाद्विकरणस्य । कामक्रोधलोभभयविषादद्वारको विकल्पः  
सम्यङ् मिथ्या वा यस्मादनेक उत्पद्यते तस्मान्न लौकिकः प्रत्ययः  
प्रतिभा । यत्तु खल्विदमुच्यते—अभ्यासवासनापेक्षाऽसत्स्वपि व्याघ्रादिषु  
प्रतिपत्तिरुत्पद्यते । इति । सत्यमेतत् । सा तु मिथ्याज्ञानत्वात्प्रमाणत्वेन न  
परिगृह्यते इत्यमदोषः । तस्मात् सिद्धं दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण रूपान्तराऽनु-  
पपत्तेः प्रतिभायाः पृथगनभिधानम् । ततश्च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् त्रिविधं  
प्रमाणमिष्टमिति स्थितमेतत् ॥४॥

Proponent : *Because there is no possibility of some form other than perception, etc., in case of imagination.* The phrase 'should not be mentioned' follows from above. If the knowledge caused by the impression of past experience is admitted to be imagination, it comes to be (either of) perception, inference and verbal testimony,<sup>34</sup>

Why ?

Because we do not get some sort of knowledge through the means other than perception and the rest. Hence, imagination is not something different from those.

If it is argued that the above argument is wrong because there is the possibility of the archaic knowledge ? It may be like this : there is the archaic (knowledge) of every object which is innate and, hence, without perception and the like. That (archaic knowledge) will be caused by imagination.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because of the statement made above.* It is stated (earlier) that the knowledge of the illustrious supreme seer is of accomplished

34. I.e. is included in them only.

nature. Therefore, it does not stand in need of some means of knowledge.<sup>35</sup>

If it is argued that it may be the knowledge of the yogins ?

*No, because it is not held (accepted).* We shall establish later on how the knowledge of the yogins is not without some means of knowledge.

If it is argued that is the worldly knowledge ?

*No, because it is not ascertained.* It may be like this : there is some worldly knowledge without perception, etc., for example, while going in dense darkness there arises the knowledge immediately that there is some obstructing substance standing erect before me. It is, however, not like this.

How ?

*Because it is not ascertained.* There arises no ascertainment as to whether the substance standing before me is manifest or not. The knowledge which is not ascertained is not accepted to be a valid knowledge. *Moreover, it would lead to undesirable contingency of infinite regress.* If this sort of knowledge also is accepted as valid (knowledge), there arises the undesirable contingency.

What is the reason ?

Because there are infinite defects (in the mind), because uncertainty as whether right or wrong caused by desire, anger, avarice, fear and infatuation gives rise to various alternatives (in the same knowledge.)<sup>36</sup> Hence, the imagination is not the wordly knowledge.

35. The sense is that the knowledge was already in him at the time of birth and, hence he did not acquire it through means of knowledge.

36. The knowledge in that is not purely objective but is caused by these defects and, hence, imaginary. If this kind of knowledge is accepted as caused by some means of knowledge, the means of knowledge would be infinite.

Your statement that due to the past impression of earlier experience there arises the knowledge of tiger, etc., even in their absence, is true. That is not accepted as a valid knowledge because that is the wrong knowledge.<sup>37</sup> Hence, it is not a fault. Hence, it is proved that because of the lack of possibility of some form of knowledge by means other than perception, etc., the imagination should not be mentioned (as a separate means of knowledge). Hence, because of inclusion of all the other means of knowledge (into these three), it is established that the means of knowledge approved is threefold.

## KĀRIKĀ 5

(Definition of Perception)

आह—अस्त्वेवमेतत् । लक्षणानभिधानात्तदप्रतिपत्तिः । तस्मात्तदभिधानम् । अनवस्थितं हि दृष्टादीनां लक्षणम्, दृष्टिवैचित्र्यात् । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षमिति केचित् । तथाऽऽत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षाद्यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यदित्येके । सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमित्यपरे । श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरिति वार्षगणाः । कल्पनापोढमित्यन्ये । इत्थमनवस्थितं लक्षणम् । इति दृष्टादीनामप्रतिपत्तिः । तस्माल्लक्षणमभिधानीयम् ।

Opponent : Let it be so.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be understood without mentioning the definition. Therefore, that (definition) should be mentioned. The definition of perception, etc., is not settled because there is the difference of opinion. Some define it as—‘perception is the knowledge arising from sense-object contact (and which is) not caused by words, non-erroneous and is of a definite character.’<sup>2</sup> The others define it as—‘the other (perception) is that which arises from the contact of the soul, sense, mind and the object’<sup>3</sup>. The others define it as ‘the knowledge which arises due to the contact of man’s senses with something which is present.’<sup>4</sup> The followers of Vārṣaganya define it as ‘the function of the ear and the rest.’<sup>5</sup> The others (define it as) ‘the non-conceptual knowledge’.<sup>6</sup> In this way, the definition of

1. I.e. even after admitting the foregoing that there are only three means of knowledge.
2. N.S. 1.1.4
3. Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.1.18.
4. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.4
5. See note on kārikā 1
6. Cf. *Pratyakṣama kalpanāpoḍham*, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dinnāga.

37. Because it arises with reference to an object which is not present that at time.



perception is unsettled. Therefore, follows the non-understanding (i.e. difficulty in understanding) of the perception, etc. Hence, the definition should be mentioned.

उच्यते—

### प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्

विषिष्वन्तीति विषयाः शब्दादयः । अथवा विषीयन्ते उपलभ्यन्ते इत्यर्थः । ते च द्विविधाः । विशिष्टा अविशिष्टाश्च । विशिष्टाः पृथिव्यादिलक्षणा अस्मदादिगम्याः । अविशिष्टाश्च तन्मात्रलक्षणा योगिनामूर्ध्वस्रोतसां च गम्याः । वक्ष्यति चैतदुपरिष्ठात् “बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि” (का० ३४), अध्यवसायो बुद्धिरिति (का० २३) च वक्ष्यति । विषयं प्रति वर्तत इति प्रतिविषयम् । किन्तु ? इन्द्रियम् । तस्मिन् योऽध्यवसायः स प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः । उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्युपनिपाति सत्त्वोद्रेकादरजस्तमस्कं यत्प्रकाशरूपं तद् दृष्टमिति यावत् । तद् दृष्टं प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः । एतत्प्रमाणम् । अनेन यश्चेतनाशक्तेरनुग्रहस्तत्फलम् । प्रमेयाः शब्दादयः । एवमुत्तरत्रापि प्रमाणफलभावो द्रष्टव्यः ।

Proponent : PERCEPTION IS THE DETERMINATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OBJECTS THROUGH THE CONTACT OF THE SENSES.<sup>7</sup>

The objects are those which bear upon or impress their form upon the cognition, for example, word, etc. Or their derivative

7. This is the interpretation according to the commentators. However, when the *kārikā* is interpreted independently of the commentaries, it seems plausible that the *kārikā* has no reference to the sense-object contact to distinguish perception from other means. However, if the term *pratiṣaya* is interpreted as of each or individual object it may be distinguished from other *pramāṇas* which give rise to the knowledge of objects in generality. Further, the perception is defined here in the sense of resultant knowledge and not as a means thereof. The position is similar in early definitions of perception in other systems also. The definition quoted against the name of Vārṣaganya is an exception to it.

meaning is as those which are attained (by the senses). Those (objects) are of two kinds—specific and non-specific. The specific are the earth, etc., which are cognisable by (ordinary) persons like us. The non-specific are the subtle elements which are cognisable by the yogins and the divine beings.<sup>8</sup> The author will (himself) speak later on ‘of these organs, the senses have as their objects the things specific as well as non-specific’ (Kā. 34). and the author will also speak ‘intellect is the determinative knowledge’ (Kā. 23).<sup>9</sup> The term *pratiṣaya* means that which bears upon (or comes into contact with) each particular object.

What is that ?

The sense. The determinative knowledge in (through) the senses is denoted by the term *pratiṣayādhyavasāya*. The perception is the light (pure form of *sattva*)<sup>10</sup> without (mixed with) *rajas* and *tamas* which results from the exuberance of *sattva* which follows (or is caused by) the function of the senses in contact with other objects. That is *dr̥ṣṭa* which means perception. This is the means of knowledge. The assistance rendered by it to the sentient power is the resultant.<sup>11</sup> The objects of knowledge are the word<sup>12</sup>, etc. Similarly,

8. The cause as to why the subtle elements are called non-specific as also the gross elements the specific, is given in 38th *kārikā*.
9. The purpose of such a statement is that the *pramāṇa* as a means according to Sāṃkhya is the function of intellect. It is stated to be intellect itself when the act and the agent are taken to be identical. The condition of sense-object contact distinguishes perception from other means of knowledge.
10. This indicates the state of intellect when *Sattva* dominates in it.
11. The favour should be interpreted as the false attribution of knowledge, etc., to the sentient entity. In fact, there is no change in the essential nature of conscious entity after the rise of knowledge. The knowledge actually arises in the intellect but is falsely attributed to the sentient entity.
12. I.e. the objects of the cognitive organs. The cognitive organs—ear, skin, eyes, tongue and nose cognise word, touch, form, taste and smell. Cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 28.

the nature of means of knowledge and the resultant thereof should be understood in case of other means of knowledge also.

(Means of knowledge and resultant)

आह—किं पुनरिदं प्रमाणात्फलमर्थान्तरमाहोस्विदनर्थान्तरम् ?

Opponent : Is this resultant different from the means of knowledge or is identical with it ?

कथं तावत् भवितुमर्हति अनर्थान्तरमिति ?

Proponent : How can it be identical ?

आह—कस्मात् ? अधिगमरूपत्वात् । अधिगमरूपं हि ज्ञानं, तस्योत्पत्त्यैवाऽधिगतोऽर्थ इति कुतः फलभेद इति ?

Opponent : Do you ask why so ? Because it is of the form of knowledge. The knowledge is the result in (the process of) knowing. The object is known through the rise of that (knowledge) only. Hence, how can the resultant be different (from the process).

उच्यते—करणभाव इदानीं कथं स्यात् ?

Proponent : How can, in that case, the means be the instrument in knowing ?<sup>13</sup>

आह—करणभावस्तु प्रसिद्धिवशात् । विषयनिर्भासा हि ज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिः अधिगमरूपापि लोके सव्यापारेव प्रतीतेति कल्पनया करणभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते न परमार्थतः ।

Opponent : The idea of instrumentality is due to the well known character. The illumination of the object characterises the rise of knowledge. The knowledge is experienced as accompanied with action. Through this postulation only the idea of instrumentality is accepted. It (the idea of instrumentality) is not real.<sup>14</sup>

13. Means is that which gives rise to something. If the result itself is taken to be the means, how can there be the instrumentality in the means ?

14. What the opponent means is that the intellect which is an instrument of knowledge is the locus of knowledge as well. Hence, the difference between intellect as an instrument of knowledge and the intellect as a locus of knowledge is metaphorical.

उच्यते—फलस्यार्थान्तरभावः । अधिकरणभेदात् । बुद्ध्याश्रयं हि प्रमाणमध्यवसायाख्यम्, पुरुषाश्रयं फलमनुग्रहलक्षणम् । न च भिन्नाधिकरणयोरेकत्वमर्हति भवितुम् । यत्तूक्तमधिगमरूपत्वात् ज्ञानमेव फलमिति तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? असिद्धत्वात् । यथैव हि घटादयोऽर्था ज्ञानमन्तरेण न तद्रूपा नातद्रूपा इति न शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम्, एवं ज्ञानमपि पुरुषप्रत्ययमन्तरेण न विषयरूपं नाविषयरूपम् । तथा च शास्त्रम्—“तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गमिति” (का० २०) वचनात् । अतः पुरुषप्रत्ययमन्तरेण ज्ञानमधिगमरूपमिति साख्यं प्रत्यसिद्धमेतत् । उभयपक्षप्रसिद्धेन च व्यवहारः । पुरुषाभावादयुक्तमिति चेन्न उत्तरत्र प्रतिपादनात् । संघातपरार्थत्वादित्यत्र पुरुषास्तित्वं प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । तस्मात् सिद्धमध्यवसायप्रमाणवादिनः प्रमाणात्फलमर्थान्तरमिति ।

Proponent : *The resultant is different because of the difference in substratum.* The means of knowledge known as determinative knowledge is located in the intellect. The resultant as the favour to the conscious entity is located in the conscious entity. There is no possibility of identity in case of objects having different substrata. The statement that the knowledge being identical with understanding is itself the resultant, is wrong.

Why ?

*Because it is not established.* As it is not possible to propound without the knowledge that the objects like pot, etc., are of their own form or otherwise, similarly, the knowledge also without the understanding by the conscious entity<sup>15</sup> is neither of the nature of an object of knowledge nor that of the non-object of knowledge. This is (in accordance with) the scripture because it is stated ‘thus, due to that association (of the two) the internal organ though insentient seems as if possessed of consciousness’ (kā 20). Hence, it

15. The understanding of conscious entity means here the knowledge metaphorically imposed upon the conscious entity.

is not established for (or acceptable to) the Sāṃkhya that the knowledge is of the form of understanding without the understanding by the conscious entity. The investigation into a case (or argumentation) is based upon the maxim accepted by both the parties.

If it is argued that it is not established on account of the non-existence of the conscious entity ?

No, because (the existence of the conscious entity) is propounded later on. We shall propound the existence of the conscious entity by the statement like 'the composite objects exist for other', etc. Thus, it is established that the means of knowledge and their resultant are different for the upholders of the theory that the determinative knowledge is the means of knowledge.

आह—यदि ह्यध्यवसायः प्रमाणं कथं लौकिकः प्रयोगोऽर्थवान् भवति प्रत्यक्षं वस्तु इति ?

Opponent : If the determinative knowledge is the means of knowledge, how is the worldly statement that the object is *pratyakṣa*, meaningful ?

उच्यते—विषये प्रत्यक्षशब्दः तत्प्रमितत्वात् तत्कारणत्वाच्च । यथा प्रस्थप्रमितो ब्रीहिराशिः प्रस्थशब्दवाच्यो भवति एवं प्रत्यक्षप्रमितोऽर्थः प्रत्यक्षशब्दवाच्यः स्यात् ।

Proponent - The term *pratyakṣa* is used with reference to an object because the object is (already) measured (known) through it. Or, it is the cause of knowledge (of that object).<sup>16</sup> Just as the heap of barley which is one *prastha* in measure is denoted by the term *prastha*, in the same way the object known through perception may be denoted by the term *pratyakṣa*.

आह, न । अन्यत्रापि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । यदि प्रत्यक्षप्रमितत्वाद्विषये प्रत्यक्षशब्दस्तेन तर्हि अनुमानप्रमितोऽर्थोऽनुमानमिति स्यात् । शब्दप्रमितोऽर्थः

16. (i) The object of knowledge, (ii) the sense-organ and the (iii) internal organs, being the cause of *pratyakṣa*—all of these may be termed *pratyakṣa*.

शब्द इति । न चाग्निस्वर्गादयः प्रमाणशब्दवाच्या भवन्ति । तस्माद्विषममेतत् । एतेन तत्कारणभावः प्रत्युक्तः । योऽपि हि मन्यते प्रत्यक्षोपदेशस्तत्कारणेष्वप्रतिषेध्य इति अतो विषये प्रत्यक्षशब्दस्तस्याप्यनुमानप्रसङ्गोऽसाववस्थित इति ।

Opponent : *It is not so, because it will lead to the undesirable contingency of such a case in other places (i.e., in case of other means of knowledge also).* If the term *pratyakṣa* is used with reference to an object since the object is known through it, the object known through inference would be called *anumāna* (and) the object known through word would be called *śabda*. However, the fire (known through inference) and heaven (known through verbal testimony) are never denoted by the word *pramāṇa*. Hence, the argument is not applicable in all the cases. It refutes (the reason based upon) object's being the cause of that. In your admittance that the word *pratyakṣa* is not disallowed with reference to its means and, hence, the word *pratyakṣa* is used with reference to the object, the undesirable contingency raised regarding the use of the term *anumāna* still persists.

उच्यते—कारणतुल्यत्वात् शब्दतुल्यत्वम् । एवं तर्हि अक्षमक्षं प्रति वर्तते इति प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । द्वयं चाक्षं प्रति वर्तते विषयोऽध्यवसायश्च । विषयोऽनुग्राहकत्वेनानुग्राह्यत्वेनेतरः । तेनोभयोरपि तुल्यं निमित्तमिति कृत्वा तुल्यशब्दवाच्यता भविष्यति ।

Proponent : The same word is used with reference to the objects because of having the same cause. The term *pratyakṣa* is derived as that which bears upon the sense, and both the object as well as determinative knowledge bear upon the sense. The object (bears upon the sense) as the favouring thing and the other (determinative knowledge) as the favoured. Thus, the same serves as the cause for both, and by dint of this they will be denoted by the same term.

आह—इतरत्र कथम् ?

Opponent : How is (it not applicable) in other cases ?

उच्यते—तदभावादितरत्राप्रवृत्तिः । प्रमाणान्तरे तु नास्ति सामान्यं निमित्तम् । कथम् ? अनुमीयतेऽनेनेत्यनुमानम् । न चाग्न्यादिभिः कश्चिदनुमीयत इत्यतस्तुल्यशब्दवाच्यता न भवति ।

Proponent : *In absence of that it is not applicable to other cases.*

There is no common cause in case of the other means of knowledge.

How ?

The anumāna means that through which something is inferred. Nothing is inferred through fire, etc. Hence, they are not subjected to the same denotation.

(Use of the term determinative knowledge)

आह—अध्यवसायग्रहणं किमर्थम् ?

Opponent : Why is the term determinative knowledge mentioned ?

उच्यते—अतिप्रसंगनिवृत्त्यर्थम् । प्रतिविषयं दृष्टमितीयत्युच्यमाने यावत्किञ्चित् प्रतिविषयं वर्ततेऽनुग्राहकत्वेनोपघातकत्वेन वा तत् सर्वं दृष्टमित्येतदापद्यते । अध्यवसायग्रहणे पुनः क्रियमाणे न दोषो भवति ।

Proponent : *(It is mentioned) to prevent over pervasion.* If it is stated that perception is the object related to the senses, whatever is related to the senses, in the form of a favouring or obstructing object would (undesirably) come to be denoted by the term perception. If the determinative knowledge (adhyavasāya) is mentioned, this defect will not arise.

आह—न, प्रमाणाधिकारात् । नाध्यवसायशब्दस्य प्रयोजनम् । कुतः ? प्रमाणाधिकारोऽयम् । न चाध्यवसायादृते यत्किञ्चिद्विषयं प्रतिपद्यते तेन किञ्चित् प्रमीयते । तेन वयं सामर्थ्यादध्यवसायमेवाभिसंभन्त्यस्यामः । तद्यथा—अध्ययनाधिकारे ब्राह्मणा आनीयन्तामित्युक्ते य एवाधीयन्ते त एवानीयन्ते ।

Opponent : *It is not so because of the jurisdiction of the means of knowledge.* There is no purpose served by the mention of the term determinative knowledge.

Why ?

This is the jurisdiction of the means of knowledge. Except the determinative knowledge no object is known through which the object is cognised. Hence, by the force (of the context of means of knowledge) we can do without the term determinative knowledge. As for example, in the jurisdiction of adhyayana (study of the sacred texts), when it is asked that the brahmins should be brought, only those brahmins who are learned are brought.<sup>17</sup>

उच्यते—करणान्तराणां तु सन्देहनिवृत्त्यर्थम् । एवं तर्हि श्रोत्रादीनामन्यतममन्तःकरणं चेत्येतद् द्वारद्वारिभावेन चतुष्टयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते । तस्मादध्यवसायग्रहणं क्रियते सन्देहो माभूदिति ।

Proponent ; *(The term determinative knowledge is mentioned) to dispel the doubt regarding the other organs.* The four, viz., one of the ear, etc., and the (others) inner organs are related to the object in the form of the gates and the gatekeepers.<sup>18</sup> Hence, the term determinative knowledge is mentioned so that there should be no doubt.<sup>19</sup>

आह—अस्त्वत्र सन्देहः, नैकेन केनचित् कश्चिद्विषय उपादीयते । तेन वयं सर्वेषां प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्रतिपत्स्यामहे ।

Opponent : Let there be doubt. No object is cognised through a single organ only. Therefore, we shall recognise all of them as perception.

17. It appears that Pandey's reading *adhiyate* in place of *Chakravarti's* reading *adhiyante* is a misprint.

18. Cf. *Sāmkhyakārikā* 35.

19. The sense is that any of the four viz., one of the external and the three internal organs could be called *pratyakṣa* if the definition would be as 'that related to the object'. With the use of the term *adhyavasāya* the *pratyakṣa* is restricted to the intellect only which is both the determinative knowledge and the instrument of that when the difference between the function and the agent is overlooked.

उच्यते—सर्वाभ्युपगमे हि शास्त्रहानिः । यदि पुनः सर्वेषामेव प्रमाणत्वमभ्युपगम्यते तेन यच्छास्त्रमेकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनमिति तद्धीयते । वक्ष्यति चाचार्यः “एते प्रदीपकल्पाः” (का० ३६), “सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिरिति” (का० ३७) तद्विरुध्यते । तस्मादध्यवसायग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । सन्देहो मा भूदिति ।

Proponent : If all of them are recognised as perception, that will imply that we do not follow the scripture. If all of them are recognised as means of knowledge, the scripture stating that ‘the knowledge is one and that is intellect only’,<sup>20</sup> will have to be abandoned. The authority himself states ‘these (organs) resembling a lamp’, etc. (Kā. 30); ‘in as much as it is the intellect that accomplishes all the experiences of the conscious entity’, etc. (Kā 37).<sup>21</sup> (This position) is contradicted. Hence,

20. The line is quoted as a *sūtra* (aphorism) by Vyāsa in his *bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra* (1.4). Vācaspati explains it as the function (modification) of the intellect in the form of the objects like sound and that in the form of the discrimination between cosmic matter and the conscious entity is the same. Though the above two forms of knowledge seem to be apparently contradictory and different, yet actually they are one, i.e., form the function or the modification of the intellect. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, interprets the aphorism as to show that there prevails the false knowledge in the world that both the intellect and the conscious entity are identical. The *Yuktidīpikā* seems to take it in the sense accepted by Vācaspati and stresses the fact that even though the forms of knowledge may differ, the knowledge as a *pramāṇa* is one i.e., the modification of the intellect or the intellect itself. There is no difference between the above two for the Sāṃkhya because the function and the agent are the same.

21. The two quotations show that in knowledge or experience, intellect serves as an instrument and is allotted chief position in both the cases.

the term determinative knowledge should be mentioned so that there may not be any doubt.

आह—न, सन्देहभात्रमेतद् भवति । सर्वसन्देहेषु चैतदुपतिष्ठते—व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि सन्देहादलक्षणम् । तत्राध्यवसायो दृष्टमिति व्याख्यास्यामः ।

Opponent : It is not so. It is merely a doubt. In case of all the doubts the instruction remains as the particular meaning of a term (in case of alternate meanings) is ascertained from interpretation because a rule must teach something definite even though it contains ambiguous terms. Hence, we will interpret the expression as ‘perception is the determinate knowledge’.<sup>23</sup>

उच्यते—मुक्तसंशयं चेन्द्रियवृत्तिप्रतिपत्तेः । स्यादेतत्, यद्यत्र सन्देहः स्यात् । नैवात्र सन्देहः प्राप्तः, किन्तु हि श्रोत्रातिवृत्तेरेव ग्रहणम् ।

Proponent : Because it is beyond doubt that the operation of the senses comes to be known (as perception). It would be so if there would be a doubt (in this case also) but no doubt is attained here.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, only the operation of the senses is known (or mentioned) to be the perception.

आह—किं पुनः कारणं येन निमित्ताविशेषेऽपि श्रोत्रादिवृत्तेरेवात्र ग्रहणं प्राप्नोति, नान्तःकरणस्यैव प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ?

22. The sense is that the *Śāstra* itself need not clear the doubts. The doubts are to be dispelled by the commentators. It is taken for granted that the *śāstra* does teach something definite. If the *śāstra* intends to convey such a meaning, we, the commentators, will interpret it as such. Hence, there is no need of employing the term *adhyavasāya* by the *sūtrakāra* to remove our doubts.

23. It is not that its interpretation was doubtful and there was a need of clarification, but Īśvarakṛṣṇa uses the term *adhyavasāya* to ward off the wrong conception positively prevailing in the people that perception is the function of the ear, etc. Thus could be the meaning of the statement of Īśvarakṛṣṇa also.

Opponent : What is the reason for the fact that inspite of non-speciality in the causes the operation of the senses like ear and not the operation of the internal organs comes to be cognised as perception.

उच्यते—तत्र च मुख्या श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः । कस्मात् ? साक्षाद्विषय-ग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । नान्तःकरणम्, तद्द्वारेण प्रतिपत्तेः । गौणमुख्ययोश्च मुख्ये सम्प्रतिपत्तिः । तद्यथा—गौरनुबन्धयः अजोऽग्नीषोमीय इति वाहीको नाऽनुबध्यते ।

Proponent : *The operation of the ear, etc., is principal in this case.*

Why ?

Because of their capability of cognising the objects directly and (this is) not (the case with) the internal organs for the knowledge is acquired through the internal organ (and not mainly from it). Among the principal and the secondary the former is admitted (and not the latter). As, in the injunction like 'the cow (and) the goat related to the deity agni and soma, should be immolated', the vāhika (which is the secondary meaning of cow) is not immolated.

आह—यदीयं श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरेव प्रत्यक्षमित्यभ्युपेयते क एवं सति दोषः स्यात् ?

Opponent : If this operation of the ear, etc., is considered to be the perception, what would be the fault ?

उच्यते—रागादिविषयं यद्विज्ञानं लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्, योगिनां च ध्यानभूमिकासु विहरतामनुमानागमातीतं प्रातिभं यद्विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदुप-संख्येयं स्यात् । कुतः ? न हि सुखादयः श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिग्राह्याः, योगिनां चातीन्द्रियं ज्ञानमिति । यथान्यासं तु क्रियमाणे तेऽपि विषयाः, तेषां योऽध्यवसायस्तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं केन वार्यते ?

Proponent : (In that case) the knowledge regarding attachment, etc., inferred from the sign and the signate and the intuitive knowledge arising in the yogins who have attained various degrees in meditation and which is beyond inference and verbal testimony would have been mentioned (separately).

Why ?

Because the pleasure, etc., are not cognised through the operation of the ear, etc., and the knowledge of the yogins is supra sensuous. And, when it is expressed as it is done (in the text), the above mentioned (viz., the pleasure, etc., and the objects known to the yogins) also become the object of knowledge. What obstructs the character of perception in the case of the determinate knowledge of these ?

(Use of the term *prativīṣaya*)

आह—प्रतिविषयग्रहणं तर्हि किमर्थम् ?

Opponent : What is, then, the purpose of mentioning the term *prativīṣaya* ?

उच्यते—प्रतिविषयग्रहणमसद्व्युदासार्थम् । अध्यवसायो दृष्टमिती-यत्युच्यमाने मृगतृष्णिकाऽलातचक्रगन्धर्वनगरादिषु 'अपि योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमिति । प्रतिविषयग्रहणात् तेषां व्युदासः कृतो भवति ।

Proponent : The term *prativīṣaya* is mentioned to exclude the (absolutely) non-existent objects (from the domain of perception). If it stated that the determinate knowledge is the perception, the determinate knowledge regarding the mirage, the circle of the fire brand and the city of Gandharvas, would be the cases of perception. They are excluded by the mention of the term *prativīṣaya*.

(Use of the term *prati*)

आह—यद्येवं विषयाध्यवसाय इत्येव चोच्यताम् । किमप्रति-ग्रहणेन ?

Opponent : If it is so, you should state as determinate knowledge of an object only. What is the use of the mention of the term *prati* ?

उच्यते—प्रतिग्रहणं सन्निकर्षार्थम् । विषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टमिती-यत्युच्यमाने विषयमात्रे सम्प्रत्ययः स्यात् । प्रतिग्रहणे पुनः क्रियमाणे प्रति-राभिमुख्ये वर्तते । तेन सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपातो योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमित्युपलभ्यते ।



Proponent : The term prati is mentioned to denote contact. If it is said that the perception is the determinate knowledge of the object, there would have been the ascertainment only with reference to the object. When the term prati is mentioned, it denotes going near the object (i.e., contact). The meaning arrived at is that the perception is the determinative knowledge following the operation of the senses in contact with the object.

आह—कस्य पुनरतीन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्राप्नोति ?

Opponent : If the perception is regarded as (resulting from) the contact with the object which does not come in the range of the senses, which other (means of knowledge) comes to be the perception ?

उच्यते—अनुमानस्य । कस्मात् ? तद्धि लिङ्गदर्शनादसन्निकृष्टे विषये भवति ।<sup>24</sup>

Proponent : The inference.

Why ?

Because the inference takes place through observing the sign with reference to the object which is not near.

आह—अनुमानस्याप्रसङ्गः । सामान्यविहितस्य विशेषविहितेन बाधनात् । सामान्ये हि विषयमात्रेऽध्यवसायस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं विधाय विशेषे लिङ्गलिङ्गपूर्वकेऽनुमानं शास्ति । सामान्यविहितं च विशेषविहितेन बाध्यते, यथा तद्धि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति ।

Opponent ; *There is no undesirable contingency (of the inclusion) of the inference (into perception) because there is the obstruction of a general statement by a particular one.* After assigning the character of perception to the ascertainment of an object in general the author teaches the inference through probans and the probandum in particular cases. And, the general statement is obstructed (overruled) by a particular statement, as in the statement—give curds to all the brahmins, (but) butter milk to Kaundinya.

उच्यते—स्मृतेस्तर्हि प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्राप्नोति । तत्रायमपवादो नाभिनिविशत इति ।

Proponent : The memory comes to be perception. The above exception does not apply there.

आह न, स्मृतेः, प्रमाणाधिकारात् । प्रमाणाधिकारोऽयम् । न च स्मृत्या किञ्चित् प्रमीयते । स्मृतेः प्रमितेऽर्थे प्रादुर्भावात् ।

Opponent : *No, to the memory also there is no scope (of the application of the character of perception), because of the justification of the means of valid knowledge.* And, nothing is cognised by memory because the memory arises with reference to the object which is already cognised.<sup>24</sup>

उच्यते—संशयस्य तर्हि प्राप्नोति ।

Proponent : The doubt comes to be perception.

न संशयस्य, अध्यवसायग्रहणात् । अध्यवसायो हि दृष्टमित्युच्यते । न च संशयोऽध्यवसायोऽनिश्चितत्वात् ।

Opponent : *No, the doubt does not come to be perception, because of the mention of the term 'determinative knowledge'.* It is stated that only the determinative knowledge is the perception. Doubt is not a determinative knowledge because it lacks in certainly.

उच्यते—इन्द्रियान्तराकूतविषये तु प्रसङ्गः । एवं तर्हीन्द्रियार्थसन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपातीति दोषो न भवति ।

Proponent : *There will be the undesirable contingency of the over-pervasion of the (understanding of the) mutual intention by the senses.* If the perception is (accepted) as arising through the operation of the senses which are in contact with the (respective) object, the aforesaid discrepancy does not arise.

24. It suggests that novelty is also a criterion for valid means of knowledge.

आह—रागाद्युपसंख्यानम् । यदि सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपाती योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमित्यभ्युपेयते, तेन रागादिविषयं विज्ञानमतीन्द्रियत्वात्प्रत्यक्षं न प्राप्नोति । तस्योपसंख्यानम् कर्तव्यम् ।

Opponent : (In that case) attachment, etc., should be mentioned. If the perception is admitted to be the determinative knowledge arising through the operation of the sense which is in contact with the object, the knowledge of the objects like attachment,<sup>25</sup> etc., do not come to be regarded as perception because of their being beyond the senses. It should be mentioned separately.

उच्यते—न तर्हीदं प्रतिग्रहणमिन्द्रियविशेषणं विषयं विषयं प्रति यो वर्तते तस्मिन् योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमिति । किन्तर्हि—अध्यवसायविशेषणं विषयं विषयं प्रति योऽध्यवसाय इति ।

Proponent : The term prati is not an adjective of the sense. In that case it amounts to the perception being the determinative knowledge through that (i.e., the sense) which is in contact with every object. On the contrary, it is an adjective of determinative knowledge, which comes to mean that the perception is the determinative knowledge in respect of every object.

आह—अध्यवसायविशेषणमिति चेत्, शब्दाद्युपसंख्यानम् । शब्दादीनामेव तेन प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्राप्नोति । तेषामुपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यं प्राप्नोति । किं कारणम् ? अन्तःकरणस्य तैः सन्निकर्षाज्जुपपत्तेः । प्रतिग्रहणं सन्निकर्षार्थमिति पूर्वमतिसृष्टं भवता । तच्चेदानीमन्तःकरणविशेषणम् । न चान्तःकरणस्य शब्दादिभिः सन्निकर्ष उपपद्यते, श्रोत्रादिवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । द्वारि-द्वारभावस्यापघातप्रसंगाच्च । तस्मात्सुदूरमपि गत्वा प्रतिग्रहणं प्रत्याख्यानान्नमुच्यते । रागाद्युपसंख्यानाद्वेति ।

Opponent : If it is considered to be the adjective of determinative knowledge, the word, etc., should be mentioned. In that case

25. This refers to the internal objects. Attachment, according to the Sāmkhyas, is a form or quality of intellect and, hence, beyond the reach of the external senses.

one attains the perceptual knowledge of only the word, etc. They should be mentioned.

What is the reason here ?

Because of the impossibility of the contact of the internal organ with them. This is already granted by you that the term prati is mentioned in the sense of contact. Now it is the adjective of the internal organ. There is no possibility of contact of the internal organs with the words, etc., because it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the uselessness of the (senses like) ear and the rest. And, it would further lead to the undesirable contingency of cutting the very root of the relation of the gate and the gatekeeper (found in the senses and the internal organs).<sup>26</sup> Hence, even by this far fetched interpretation (lit. by going too far) also the mention of the term prati is not set free from reproach. Or, it is not set free from the mention of the attachment, etc.

उच्यते—अस्तु तर्हीन्द्रियाणां प्रति विषयग्रहणं विशेषणम् । यत्तूक्तं रागादीनामुपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यमिति तत्र ब्रूमः । एकशेषनिर्देशात् सिद्धम् । एवं तर्हि प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायश्च प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायश्च प्रतिविषयाध्यवसाय इति सरूपाणामेकशेषः करिष्यते । तत्रैकेन बहिरङ्गस्यैन्द्रियस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य परिग्रहः । द्वितीयेनान्तरङ्गस्य प्रातिभस्येति रागादिविषयं योगिनां च यद्विज्ञानं तत् संगृहीतं भवतीति व्याख्यातं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

Proponent : Let the mention of the term prativīṣaya, then, be the adjective of the senses.<sup>27</sup> As regards your statement that attachment, etc., should be mentioned, we reply that it is included in this only through the indication of ekaśeṣa compound. Thus, the identical statements as the determinative knowledge arising of the sense in contact with objects and the determinative knowledge arising of the sense in contact with the object are equal to the determinative knowledge arising

26. Cf. Sāmkhyakārikā 35

27. The meaning would be that perception is the knowledge arising of the senses which have come into contact with the objects.

of the sense in contact with the object through the compound in the sense of ekaśeṣa compound. Out of these, by one of them there is the acceptance of the perception arising of the external organs. By the second is included the perception arising of intuition and the knowledge of the attachment, etc., and the knowledge of the yogins. Thus, the perception is explained.

(Three kinds of Inference)

आह—अनुमानमिदानीं वक्तव्यम् ।

Opponent : Now the inference should be explained.

उच्यते—

त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।

अनुमानं त्रिप्रकारमाचार्यैराख्यातम् । पूर्ववत्, शेषवत्, सामान्यतो-  
दृष्टं च । तत्र पूर्वमिति कारणमुच्यते । यस्य हि यत् कारणं स लोके  
तत्पूर्वक इत्युच्यते । यथा तन्तुपूर्वकः पटो, देवदत्तपूर्वको यज्ञदत्त इति ।  
पूर्वमस्यास्तीति पूर्ववत् । शेष इति विकारनाम, शिष्यत इति कृत्वा । तथा  
चोक्तम्—न शेषोऽनेरन्यस्य जातमित्यस्ति । नापत्यमन्येन जातं सम्भव-  
तीत्यर्थः । शेषोऽस्यास्तीति शेषवत् ।

Proponent : INFERENCE IS DECLARED TO BE THREEFOLD.

The inference is declared by the authorities as threefold—  
apriori, aposteriori and based on general observation. That which  
precedes is said to be the cause. In the worldly behaviour also an  
object having another particular object as cause is called to be  
having it as the preceding one. As the cloth is (said as) having  
threads as precedent; Yajñadatta is (said to have) Devadatta as his  
precedent. The term apriori (pūrvavat) means that which has cause  
(mentioned as a sign). The effect is called posteriori, because it is  
derived as that what remains. It is stated also—the remainder of  
the fire is not produced from anything else which means that the  
son cannot be born of someone else (than the father). Aposteriori is  
that which has the remainder.

(Apriori)

तत्र पूर्ववत् यदा कारणमभ्युदितं दृष्ट्वा भविष्यत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रति-  
पद्यते । तद् यथा मेघोदये भविष्यत्त्वं वृष्टेः ।

Out of these apriori is explained as—when after observing  
that the cause is ready (has come to sight), one comes to know the  
futuraity of the effect. As for example, (one comes to know the)  
futuraity of rains (after observing) the rising of the clouds.

आह—नैतदस्त्युदाहरणमनेकान्तात् । न हि मेघोदयोऽवश्यं वृष्टेः  
कारणं भवति, वाय्वादिनिमित्तप्रतिबन्धसम्भवात् ।

Opponent : This is not a (proper) example because it is non-conclu-  
sive. The rising of the clouds does not necessarily becomes the  
cause of rains because there is the possibility of obstruction by  
the causes of it (i.e. obstruction), like the wind.

उच्यते—यदि तर्हि कारणशक्ति सहकारिशक्त्यन्तराऽनुगृहीताम-  
प्रतियोगिनीं दृष्ट्वा कार्यस्य व्यक्ति प्रतिपद्यते । तद्यथा यदा लौहदंडादि-  
साधनसम्पन्ने व्यापारवता कुम्भकारेणाधिष्ठितां मृदमुपलभ्य घटस्य, तदा  
पूर्ववत् ।

Proponent : Apriori is that when after observing the causal power  
seized amongst the assisting powers and free from obstructing  
element, one comes to know the (future) manifestation of the  
effect, just as after seeing the clay possessed by the potter who  
is active and having the instruments like the iron rod, (one  
comes to know the future manifestation) of the pot.

(Aposteriori)

शेषवत्—यदा कार्यनिवृत्ति दृष्ट्वा कारणसद्भावं प्रतिपद्यते ।  
तद्यथा कुमारकं दृष्ट्वा द्वयसमापत्तिम् ।

Aposteriori is that when after observing the accomplishment of  
the effect, one comes to know the existence of the cause; for  
example, one comes to know the meeting of the couple after  
seeing a boy.

आह—नैतदस्त्युदाहरणम् । अनेकान्तात् । न हि द्वयसमापत्तिपूर्वक एव प्राणभृतां प्रादुर्भावो, द्रोणादीनामन्यथोत्पत्तिविशेषश्रवणात् ।

Opponent : This is not a (proper) example because it is non-conclusive. It is not that the birth of a living being is caused by the meeting of the couple only because we hear of the special birth of Droṇa, etc., without it.

उच्यते - यदा तर्हि प्रभानुरजितमन्तरिक्षं दृष्ट्वा चन्द्रार्कयोरुदयं प्रतिपद्यते तदा शेषवत् ।

Proponent : The aposteriori is that when after seeing the sky as red with the radiance, one comes to know the rising of the moon or the sun.

आह—एतदपि नास्त्युदाहरणम् । अनेकान्तात् । न हि प्रभाऽनुरागोऽन्तरिक्षे चन्द्रार्कनिमित्त एव भवति । किन्तर्हि दिग्दाहादि-निमित्तोऽपि ।

Opponent : This is also not a (proper) example because it is non-conclusive. The radiance of the light in the sky is not caused only through the moon and the sun. On the contrary, it is caused by the conflagration of the quarters, etc., also.

उच्यते—यदा तु नदीपूरं दृष्ट्वा वृष्टिं प्रतिपद्यते तदा शेषवत् ।

Proponent : The aposteriori is that when after seeing the flood in the river, one comes to know the past rains.

आह—एतदपि नास्त्युदाहरणम् । अनेकान्तात् । नदीपूरस्य हि निमित्तमनेकविधं भवतीति हिमविलयनसेतुभंगगजक्रीडादि । तस्मादयुक्त-मेतत् ।

Opponent : This is also not a (proper) example because it is non-conclusive. There are various causes of the flood in river as the melting of the snow, break of the dam and the play of the elephants. Therefore, it is wrong.

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि पर्णं दृष्ट्वा शालूकं प्रतिपद्यतेः अंकुरं वा दृष्ट्वा बीजमिति तदा शेषवत् ।

Proponent : The aposteriori is that when after observing the leaf, one comes to know the root of the water lily or when after observing the sprout one comes to know the seed.

(Direct Inference and Inference-by-elimination)

अथवा पुनरस्तु पूर्वकमेवोदाहरणम् । यत्तूक्तं—अनेकान्तादिति अत्र ब्रूमः—वीतावीतसामर्थ्यात् । वीतावीताभ्यां हेतुभूताभ्यामभिप्रेतार्थसिद्धि-रितिवक्ष्यामः । प्रसंगिधर्मान्तरनिवृत्तिमुखेन चावीतप्रयोगः । तत्र यदा प्रसंगिनां हिमविलयनादीनां देशकाललिङ्गैः प्रतिषेधः क्रियते तदा मुक्त-संशयं प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति । देशतस्तावत्तद् यथा—दक्षिणापथे नास्ति हिम-विलयनसम्भवः । कालतो यथा प्रावृट्काले । लिङ्गतोऽपि यस्मान्मुद्गगवेधु-कश्यामाककाष्ठतुणसूत्रशकृत्प्रभृतीनामनुपलम्भस्तथोष्मकलुषत्वादीनामुप-लम्भः । तस्मात् परिशेषतो मेध्या एवाप इति । तस्मान्नाऽनेकान्तः । एवं कृत्वा पूर्वाण्यप्युदाहरणानि उपपन्नानि भवन्ति । देशादिविचार-सामर्थ्यात् ।

Or let the above mentioned be (accepted as) examples. As regards your statement that it is non-conclusive, we reply that (it is possible) due to the capacity of the direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. We shall state later on that the desired object is established through direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. The inference-by-elimination is used through eliminating the other qualities of the objects (undesirably) involved. When the undesirably involved objects like melting of the snow, etc., are negated through place, time and the distinguishing marks, there arises the valid knowledge without doubt. Through place as—there is no possibility of melting of the snow in Deccan. Through time as in the rainy season. Through distinguishing marks as—because the mudga (a kind of sea bird) gavedhuka (a kind of grass eaten by cattle), śyāmāka (a kind of grain), piece of wood, reed, fibre and the urine and dung are not observed and the warmth and turbidness, etc., are observed. Therefore, through elimination it is ascertained that the water is due to rains only. Therefore, it is not non-conclusive. In this way, the foregoing examples become correct



because (of the possibility) of the capacity of the consideration of the place, etc.

(Inference based on general observation)

सामान्यतोदृष्टं नाम यत्रैकदार्थयोरव्यभिचारमुपलभ्य देशान्तरे कालान्तरे च तज्जातीययोरव्यभिचारं प्रतिपद्यते । तद्यथा क्वचिद्धमाग्निसम्बन्धं दृष्ट्वा क्वचिद्धमान्तरेणाग्न्यन्तरस्यास्तित्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।

The inference based on general observation is explained as—where after once observing the invariable association of two objects, one comes to know the invariable association of the objects of some groups at some other place and at some other time.<sup>28</sup> For example, after observing sometimes the relation of smoke and fire, one comes to know at some other time the existence of some other fire through some other smoke.

आह—नैतदस्त्युदाहरणम् । अविशेषप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वत्रैव ह्यनुमाने क्वचिदर्थयोरव्यभिचारमुपलभ्यान्यत्र तज्जातीययोरर्थयोरव्यभिचारं प्रतिपद्यते । तद्यथा क्वचित् साधनवतो मृत्पिण्डाद् घटनिष्पत्तिमुपलभ्यान्यत्र साधनवतः पिण्डान्तराद् घटान्तरनिष्पत्तिं प्रतिपद्यते, तथैकत्र नदीपूराद् वृष्टिमुपलभ्यान्यत्र नदीपूरान्तराद् वृष्ट्यन्तरमवसीयते । तथा च सति त्रयाणामविशेषप्रसंगः ।

Opponent : It is not a (proper) example because it involves the undesirable contingency of lack of differentiation. Everywhere in the case of inference it happens that after observing somewhere the invariable association of the two objects, one comes to know the invariable association of the object of that genus at some other place. For example, after observing the production of pot from the lump of clay accompanied with the instruments at some place, one comes to know production of some other pot from some other lump of clay accompanied with the instruments. Similarly, after observing at one place the rains through

28. Briefly, it is the inference through analogy.

flood in river, one deduces the other rains at some other place through some other flood in river. In this case there will arise the undesirable contingency of lack of differentia among the three (above mentioned kinds of inference).

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि सहभुवामेकस्य विशिष्टगुणमुपलभ्य शेषाणामपि तद्वत्त्वमनुमीयते तदा सामान्यतोदृष्टम् । तद्यथा वृक्षादेकस्य फलस्य पाकमुपलभ्य शेषाणां वृक्षान्तराणां च पाकोऽनुमीयते ।

Proponent : The inference through general observation is found when after observing the distinguishing characteristics of one of the objects taking place simultaneously, the same characteristic is inferred as possessed by the rest. For example, after observing the ripeness of one fruit from a tree, the ripeness (of fruits) of other trees is inferred.<sup>29</sup>

आह—एतदपि नास्त्युदाहरणम् । अनेकान्तात् । न हि सवषां फलानां तुल्यकालं पाको भवति । पूर्वापरकालनिष्पन्नत्वात्, निमित्तभेदाच्च ।

Opponent : This is also not (proper example) because of non-conclusiveness. The ripeness of all the fruits does not take place simultaneously in all the trees because they are sprung up at different times and because of the differentiation of the (other) causes (of fruition).

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि समुद्रादेकमुदबिन्दुं प्राश्य शेषस्य लवणताऽनुमीयते । स्थाल्यां वैकं पुलाकमुपलभ्य शेषाणां पाकोऽनुमीयते तदा सामान्यतोदृष्टम् ।

Proponent : The inference through general observation is when after tasting one drop from the ocean the saltiness of rest of the

29. Here we have followed Pandeya's reading based on Manuscripts. Chakravarti reads *phalāntarāṇām* in place of *ṛkṣāntarāṇām*. The benefit of Chakravarti's reading could also be included in Pandeya's reading if we interpret it as *śeṣāṇām* (*phalānāmīti śeṣa*) *ṛkṣāntarāṇām ca*. The word within parenthesis is justified by the force of the word *ca* which implies that there are two objects connected together.

water is inferred. Or, when after observing one boiled grain in the cooking pot, the boiling of rest of the grains is inferred.

आह—नैतदस्त्युदाहरणम् । अकृत्स्नसङ्ग्रहात् वक्ष्यत्युपरिष्ठादाचार्यः 'सामान्यस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानादिति' (का० ६) । तत्रैवं प्रमाणे परिकल्प्यमाने कार्यकारणयोस्तत्संघातानां च सुखदुःखमोह-स्वभावोपलम्भात्तन्मात्राहङ्कारप्रधानानां समधिगमः स्यात् । न पुरुषस्य, तज्जातीयार्थानुपलम्भात् ।

Opponent : This is not a (proper) example because it does not comprehend all the objects. The authority himself states afterwards, "the knowledge of the supra sensuous objects is obtained through the inference based on general observation (kā. 6). If it is supposed to be the nature of this means of knowledge, there may arise the knowledge of the subtle elements, the principle of egoism and the cosmic matter through the observation that the cause, its effects and the composite objects are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, but the knowledge of the conscious entity will not arise because no object similar to it is available.<sup>30</sup>

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि क्वचिद्धर्मेण धर्मान्तरस्याव्यभिचारमुपलभ्यैक-धर्मोपलम्भाद् भिन्नजातीयेत्यन्तानुपलब्धस्य धर्मान्तरस्य प्रतिपत्तिस्तदा सामान्यतोदृष्टम् । तद्यथा—देवदत्ते गमनादेशान्तरप्राप्तिमुपलभ्यात्यन्ता-दृष्टज्योतिषां देशान्तरप्राप्तेर्गमनमनुमीयते । तथा प्रासादादीनां वृद्धिपूर्वकं दीर्घत्वमुपलभ्यौषधिवनस्पतीनां दीर्घत्वदर्शनाद् वृद्धिरनुमीयते ।

30. The sense is that in case of the above interpretation, this kind of inference would give rise to the knowledge of the objects of its own genus (or similar to itself). The conscious entity is stated to be an object of inference by the Sāmkhyas.

However, this means would not lead to the knowledge of conscious entity. There is no object similar to conscious entity the knowledge of which would lead one to the knowledge of conscious entity.

Proponent : The inference based on general observation is that when after observing the invariable association of the characteristic with some characteristic, later on observing the one characteristic, there arises the knowledge of some other unobserved characteristic in some dissimilar case. For example, after observing Devadatta's attaining to some different place through movement, the movement is inferred in case of the invisible planets through their attaining to some different place. Similarly, after observing that the length in case of the castle, etc., is caused by growth, the growth is inferred in case of the medicines and trees by observing their length.

आह—नैतदप्यस्त्युदाहरणम् । पूर्वोणाविशेषात् । कार्यात् कारणस्याधिगमः शेषवदिति पूर्वमतिसृष्टं भवता । अत्रापि च देशान्तरप्राप्तिलक्षणात् कार्याद् गतिलक्षणस्य कारणस्याधिगमः । तस्मात् शेषवत्सामान्यतोदृष्टयोरभेदप्रसंगः ।

Opponent ; This is also not a (proper) example because there is no differentia from the former. You have admitted earlier that the knowledge of cause from the effect is a posteriori inference. In the present case also the cause in the form of movement is known from the effect in the form of attaining to some other place. Hence, there arises the undesirable contingency of the non-difference of a posteriori inference and the inference based on general observation.

उच्यते—न, अनियमात् । यत्र हि नियमतः कार्येण कारणमधिगम्यते तच्छेषवदिति अयमस्मदभिसन्धिः । न तु तदस्ति सामान्यतोदृष्टे । कस्मात्? संघातत्वसामान्यात् । पारार्थ्यसामान्यसाधनमपि दृश्यते । यथाह—अव्यभिचाराद्विशेषास्तु प्रतीताः प्रतिपादकाः इति । साध्यसाधनसामान्ययोरपि दृश्यते, यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वादिति । तत्रैवं सति नियमवादिनः प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । एतेनासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकसाधनाभासाः प्रत्युक्ताः । ते हि संशयविपर्ययाज्ञानहेतुकत्वादगमका इति व्याख्यातमनुमानम् ।



Proponent : *No because there is no fixed rule.* The sense intended by us is that the *a posteriori* inference is there where the cause as a rule is inferred from an effect. This does not hold good in case of the inference based on general observation.

Why ?

The establishment of the objective nature (lit. common quality of being meant for other) is observed to be proved from the common quality of being composite. As it is stated also—the particular renowned objects are effective in proving on account of constancy (lit. their virtue of being free from exception). (The constancy) is observed in case of the object to be proved and the general means of establishing it. For example, the word is non-eternal because it is produced. This being the case; the original position of the upholder of the fixed rule is abandoned. By this only are rejected the apparent probans which are non-established, contradictory and non-conclusive. Since they are the cause of doubt, perverted knowledge and absence of knowledge respectively, they cannot lead to the valid knowledge. Thus is explained the inference.<sup>31</sup>

(Verbal Testimony)

आह—आप्तवचनस्य किं लक्षणमिति ?

Opponent : What is the definition of verbal testimony ?

उच्यते—

आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनन्तु ॥५॥

आप्ता नाम रागादिविद्युक्तस्यागृह्यमाणकारणपरार्थाः व्याहृतिः । श्रवणं श्रुतिः । आप्ता चाऽसौ श्रुतिराप्तश्रुतिः । अथवा आप्ताऽस्यास्तीत्याप्तः । अकारो मत्वर्थीयः । तद्यथा तुन्दो घट इति । आप्तेभ्यः श्रुतिराप्तश्रुतिः । आप्तश्रुतिश्चाप्तश्रुतिः । सरूपाणिमित्येकशेषः । तत्र पूर्वणाप्त-

31. The portion of the *kārikā-tallīngalīṅgipūrvakam* is not commented upon by the *Yuktidīpikā* perhaps under the impression that it is easy to understand.

श्रुतिग्रहणेनैवं प्रतिपादयति अपुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वक आम्नायः, स्वतन्त्रः पुरुषनिः— श्रेयसार्थं प्रवर्तमानो निःसंशयं प्रमाणमिति । द्वितीयेन मन्वादिनिबन्धनानां च स्मृतीनां वेदाङ्गतर्कतिहासपुराणानां शिष्टानां नानाशिल्पाभियुक्तानां चादुष्टमनसां यद्वचस्तत्प्रमाणमित्येतत्सिद्धं भवति । तुशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः । आप्तश्रुतिरेवाप्तवचनं न शब्दमात्रम् ।

Proponent : VERBAL TESTIMONY IS THE RELIABLE STATEMENT.

The verbal testimony is the statement of the one who is free from attachment, etc., made in respect of the objects the cause of which is not known. Śruti means revelation. The compound *āptaśruti* is dissolved as the śruti which is *āpta*. Or, the *āpta* is he who has got reliability. The *a* is in the sense of possession, just as a bulky pot.<sup>32</sup> The statement by the reliable man is the reliable statement. It is the residual of the words used three times, through the rule that one remains when there are many words of the same form. Through the mention of the first *āptaśruti* the author propounds as the veda is not composed by human intellect, and inciting for the highest aim of life, it is undoubtedly the means of valid knowledge independently. Through the second (*āptaśruti*) it is proved that the statement of the *smṛtis* composed by Manu, etc., the *Vedāṅgas*, treatises on logic, history and *Purāṇas* as also of the cultured persons engaged in various arts and unwicked in mind are also the valid means of knowledge. The word *tu* is for restriction. The verbal testimony is the reliable words only and not the words in general.

(Verbal Testimony cannot be included in Inference)

एवं सति यदुक्तं तन्त्रान्तरीये शिष्यादिशब्दानां निर्विकल्पमनुमानेऽन्तर्भावस्त्रिलक्षणत्वादिति तदयत्नन्तः प्रतिक्षिप्तं भवतीति व्याख्यातानि प्रमाणानि । एतैः पूर्वोक्तं प्रमेयं यथास्वं प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति ॥५॥

32. *Tuṇḍa* means bulk and *tuṇḍaḥ* is that which is possessed of bulk.

It, being so, automatically refutes the view stated by those belonging to the other school (i.e., Buddhists) that the word śinśipā (balbergia sisso), etc., are included in determinate inference because they are possessed of three characteristics.<sup>33</sup> Thus are explained the means of knowledge. By these the objects of knowledge should be known in a befitting way.

33. The idea is that the Buddhists refute the independence of verbal testimony as an independent means of knowledge trying to include it in inference. While doing so they try to show that the meaning of the words can be understood by means of inference. In this process they obliterate the subtle distinction between the words in general which do not constitute verbal testimony and the words of the authorities which constitute the proper verbal testimony.

## KĀRIKĀ 6 AND 7

(Scope of the inference based on general observation)

आह—अस्तु तावदक्षरान्निकर्षभाजामर्थानां प्रत्यक्षेणोपलब्धिः । असन्निकर्षभाजामपि चोपलब्धसम्बन्धानामनुमानेन । ये त्वतीन्द्रिया भावास्तेषामुभयवैलक्षण्यान्नास्ति प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामुपलब्धिः । आगमिकत्वे सर्ववादसिद्धिप्रसंगः । इत्यतोऽत्यन्तमेवाग्रहणं प्राप्तम् । तत्र यदुक्तमेतावद्भिः प्रमाणैः सकलपदार्थावबोध इति एतदयुक्तम् ।

Opponent : Let there be the cognition of the objects liable to the contact with the senses through perception, and that of those which are not liable to the sense-object contact, but in whose case the invariable association between the sign and the signate is observed, through inference. The objects, which are supra sensuous and as such are different from the two (kinds of objects) mentioned above, are not known through perception and inference. If they are supposed to be known through (revealed) scriptures, it leads to the undesirable contingency of establishment of all the theories (of opposite nature). Therefore, it is deduced that they are not cognised at all.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, it is wrong to say that through these means of knowledge only there ensues the knowledge of all the objects.

उच्यते—स्यादेतदेवं यद्येकरूपमेवानुमानमधीतं स्यात्, किं तर्हि त्रिविधम् । तत्र सत्यमेव पूर्ववच्छेषवती प्रागनुभूतसम्बन्धविषयफले इति कृत्वा न ताभ्यामशेषपदार्थाधिगमोऽभ्युपगम्यते ।

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात् ।

1. If the scripture is rejected, there remains no source to know them.

यत्त्वेतत्सामान्यतोदृष्टमनुमानमेतस्मादतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां समधि-  
गमः प्रत्यवगन्तव्यः । कथम् ? यथा हि कृतकत्वानित्यत्वयोर्घटे सहभाव-  
मुपलभ्यान्यत्र शब्दादौ कृतकत्वदर्शनादनित्यत्वमनुमीयते । एवं शकलादीनां  
तज्जातीयतया चन्दनादिपूर्वकत्वसिद्धेः, कार्यकारणस्य सुखादिजातीयतया  
तत्पूर्वकत्वसिद्धेः, शयनादीनां च संघातत्वात्पारार्थ्यसिद्धेः, कार्यकारण-  
स्यापि संघातत्वात्पारार्थ्यसिद्धिरिति सर्वमिष्टं सङ्गृहीतं भवतीति । येषां  
तु शेषवदेव सामान्यतोदृष्टं तेषां तस्य कार्यद्वारेण समधिगमहेतुत्वात्  
पुरुषस्याग्रहणप्रसंगः । वृत्तौ कार्योपचाराददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यद्यपि  
पुरुषस्य कार्याभावस्तथापि पुरुषव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारविशेषाणां साम्प्रते काले  
स्ववृत्तिभ्यस्तेषां ग्रहणमित्युक्तम् । कस्मात् ? वृत्तिशक्तिरेषां कार्यत्वे-  
नोपचरिता स्वमात्मानं युनक्तीति । तच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? हेत्वन्तरा-  
भिधानात् । यदि वृत्त्या ग्रहणं पुरुषस्य सूपपादमभविष्यत् संहतपारार्थ्य-  
माचार्यो हेतुत्वेन नावक्ष्यत् । तच्चावृत्तिभूतमित्यवश्यं शेषवत्सामान्यतो-  
दृष्टयोरर्थान्तरभावोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तस्मात् सिद्धं सामान्यतोदृष्टादती-  
न्द्रियाणामर्थानां समधिगमः ।

**Proponent :** It would have been the case if the inference would have been taught as of one kind only. On the contrary, it is threefold. It is right to say that the apriori and the aposteriori inference are having as their objects the things about which the relation of sign and signate is already cognised. Consequently, the cognition of all the objects is not admitted through them.

**THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OBJECTS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES ARISES THROUGH THE INFERENCE BASED ON GENERAL OBSERVATION.**

It should be granted that through the inference which is based on general observation the objects which are beyond the reach of the senses, are cognised.

**How ?**

For example, after cognising the invariability of production and non-eternity in the pot, the non-eternity is inferred in case of word, etc., through observing their production. Similarly,

it is cognised that the fragrance is caused through sandal wood because the former is of the nature of the latter. Since both the cause and the effect are of the nature of pleasure, etc., the effects are cognised as arising from the pleasure, etc. Through the composite nature of bed, etc., their nature of serving the purpose of others is cognised; the nature of serving the purpose of others is established in case of the conglomeration of cause and effect because of their composite nature.<sup>2</sup> In this way, all that is desired to be established is included. There will arise the undesirable contingency of non-cognition of the conscious entity in case of those who hold that the inference based on general observation is identical with the aposteriori inference, for the latter serves as the means in the cognition through the effect (and there is no effect of the conscious entity).

If it is argued that it can be rendered faultless by taking vṛtti (functioning) as an effect metaphorically ? It can be like this. Though there is no effect from the conscious entity, yet it is stated that the specific objects like conscious entity, the unmanifest, intellect and egoism are known through their function occurring at present.

**Why ?**

When their power of functioning is metaphorically taken as effect, it relates to the conscious entity.

That is also wrong.

**Why ?**

*Because of the mention of some other reason.* If the knowledge of the conscious entity could be well attained through its function, the author would not have spoken of the nature of composite as serving the purpose of some other as the reason

2. For finite nature and homogeneity cf. the arguments to prove the existence of cosmic matter (kā. 15), and for the nature of serving others' purpose by the composite objects cf. the arguments to prove the existence of the conscious entity. (kā. 17).

(to establish the existence of the conscious entity). That statement is not that of function. Hence, the difference between the aposteriori inference and the inference based on general observation should be certainly admitted. Therefore, it is established that the knowledge of the objects beyond the reach of the senses arises through the inference based on general observation.

(Direct Inference and Inference-by-elimination)

तस्य प्रयोगमात्रभेदाद् द्वैविध्यम् । वीतः अवीत इति । तयो-  
लक्षणमामनन्ति—

यदा हेतुः स्वरूपेण साध्यसिद्धौ प्रयुज्यते ।

स वीतोऽर्थान्तराक्षेपादितरः परिशेषितः ॥

स्वरूपं हि साधनस्य द्विविधम्—साधारणमसाधारणं च । तत्र साधारणं साध्यसहभावी तत्प्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वेन यथावदाश्रीयमाणोऽर्थात्मा । असाधारणं पुनः परिमाणमन्वयः संघातपरार्थत्वमित्यादि । तत्र यदा हेतुः परपक्षमपेक्ष्य यथार्थेन स्वरूपेण साध्यसिद्धावुपदिश्यते तदा वीताख्यो भवति । यदा तु स्वसाध्यादर्थान्तरभूतानां प्रसंगिनां क्षेपमपोहं कृत्वा परिशेषतः साध्यसिद्धावुपदिश्यते तदाऽवीताख्यो भवति । तद्यथा न चेत् परमाणुपुरुषेश्वरकर्मदैवकालस्वभावयदृच्छाभ्यो जगदुत्पत्तिः सम्भवति परिशेषतः प्रधानादिति तदा पुनरवीताख्यो भवति । तत्र यदा वीतो हेतुः स्वबुद्धावहितविज्ञानसरूपं विज्ञानान्तरमादधानेन वक्त्रा प्रतिपाद्यादौ वाक्यभावमुपनीयते वाक्यमन्तरेणार्थस्य बुद्ध्यन्तरे संक्रामयितुमशक्यत्वात्, तदाऽवयविवाक्यं परिकल्प्यते ।

Only through the difference of application it is twofold—direct and the inference-by-elimination. The authorities record their definition thus :

The direct inference is that when a reason is employed in its very form, and the other (i. e., the inference-by-elimination) is that when another is implied through elimination of other objects.

The form of the sign is of two kinds—general and particular. Out of these, the general sign is that which consists with the signate and is employed (resorted to) in its essential form as a probans for cognising the probandum. The particular sign is exemplified as—finite nature, homogeneity and the nature of serving others object in case of an assemblage. The direct inference is that when the sign is employed for the establishment in the very form of the signate without eliminating the other stands. The inference-by-elimination is when the sign is employed to prove the signate through exclusion after eliminating the topics of discourse which are other than the object to be proved. For example, if there arises the possibility of the origination of the universe by atoms, the conscious entity (without cosmic matter), god, (previous) works, fate, time, nature (of the universe itself to grow), accident, and then by way of elimination it is deduced that it arises of the cosmic matter only. When the direct sign is put in the form of a sentence with reference to probandum, etc., by introducing some other knowledge similar to the one held in his own mind, the sentence containing the component parts of syllogism is contrived because the meaning cannot be communicated to others without sentence.<sup>3</sup>

(Component parts of Inference)

तस्य पुनरवयवाः जिज्ञासासंशयप्रयोजनशक्यप्राप्तिसंशयव्युदास-  
लक्षणाश्च व्याख्याङ्गम् । प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तोपसंहारनिगमनानि परप्रति-  
पादनाङ्गमिति ।

The component parts are as follows—inquisitiveness, doubt, purpose, conjecturing the (other) possible (alternative) and to throw aside the doubt. These are the components of explanation. Proposi-

3. We prefer the punctuation of Chakravarti who does not give any punctuation after *upaniyate* to *Pandeya's* punctuation who inserts full stop, because *yadā* in the first part and *tadā* in the last part make it one sentence rather than two.

tion, probans, example, application and the conclusion are the components of propounding something for others.

(Inquisitiveness)

तत्र ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । कश्चित् कंचिदुपसद्याह—पुरुषं ज्ञातुमिच्छामि । किमस्ति नास्तीति ? कुतः संशय इति पर्यनुयुक्तः प्रत्याह—अनुपलभ्यमानस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वात् । इहानुपलभ्यमानमुभयथा दृष्टम्—सद्भूतमसद्भूतं चेति । सद्भूतं चार्केन्दुमण्डलापरभागादि, असद्भूतं च शशविषाणादि । अयमपि चात्मा नोपलभ्यते । अतः संशयः किमस्ति नास्तीति ? किमस्याश्चिन्तायाः प्रयोजनमिति पृष्ठो—शास्त्रसतत्त्वाधिगमः, ततश्च मोक्षावाप्तिः । कथमिति ? यदि तावदयमात्माऽस्ति ततोऽस्य अप्रकृतिवैदासीन्यविभुत्वादिसतत्त्वविज्ञानान्नैरात्म्यभ्रान्तिविपक्षभूतादपवर्गप्राप्तिरवश्यंभाविनीति यदुक्तम् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानान्मोक्षोऽवाप्यत इति तच्छास्त्रमर्थवद् भवतीति । अथ नास्तीति निश्चीयते तेन सामान्यतो-दृष्टादनुमानात्तद्वदन्येऽपि पदार्था न सन्तीति विप्रलम्भभूयिष्ठमार्षं दर्शनमपहायात्मग्रहदृष्टविगमाल्लोकोत्तरमनवलम्बनं शून्यं ध्यानविषयमुपसम्प्राप्तस्त्रैधानुकुलेशनिरोधलक्षणमात्यन्तिकं निर्वाणमवाप्स्यसीति । शक्यश्चायमर्थो निश्चेतुम्, प्रमाणत्रयपरिग्रहादिति व्यवस्थिते, व्युदास्य संशयं साध्यावधारणं प्रतिज्ञा । साध्यस्य यदवधारणमस्ति पुरुष इति सा प्रतिज्ञा ।

The inquisitiveness is the desire to know. After approaching someone one says—I want to know the conscious entity as whether it exists or not. When (with an object to contradict his statement) he is asked how does the doubt arise, he replies both the alternatives are observed in case of the object not perceived. The object not perceived is found in both the ways : existence as well as non-existence. The (imperceptible objects like the) other part of the disc of the sun and the moon are existent and the horn of the hare, etc., are non-existent. The soul is also not perceived. Hence, arises the doubt as to whether it exists or does not. While asked as to what is the purpose of the reflection, he replies—the knowledge of the

scripture with its sum and substance and the attainment of liberation thereby.

How ?

If the soul exists, through the knowledge of the soul with its essential nature, viz, its difference from the cosmic matter, indifference, all-pervasiveness, etc., which goes against the wrong notion of the non-existence of the soul, the attainment of liberation is certain, and consequently the statement of the scripture that the liberation is attained through the discriminative knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest and the conscious entity becomes meaningful. If it is ascertained that the soul does not exist, through the inference based on general observation (it is ascertained that) the other similar objects also do not exist and, thus, after foresaking the theory handed down (to us) by the sages and mostly deceitful in nature due to the cessation of the notion of knowing the soul, the person who has attained the void which does not depend upon anything else as an object of meditation, will get the final release which is of the form of suppression of the suffering arising of the three substances.<sup>4</sup> It is possible to ascertain the meaning because it is grasped through the threefold means of knowledge. When this (position) is ascertained, the affirmation of the probandum after throwing aside the doubt is proposition. That which is the ascertainment of the probandum is the proposition as 'the conscious entity exists'.

(Probans)

साधनसमासवचनं हेतुः । साध्यतेऽनेनेति साधनं लिङ्गम् । समासः संक्षेपः । साधनस्य समासवचनं साधनसमासवचनम् । साधनग्रहणं तदा-भासप्रतिषेधार्थम् । न हि तानि साधनं, संशयविपर्ययहेतुत्वात् । समास-

4. It brings out the basic difference between the Buddhists and the Brahmanical schools of Indian philosophy. The Buddhists vehemently criticise the existence of the soul while the doctrines of Brahmanical systems are centred around the existence of soul.

ग्रहणमवयवान्तरावकाशप्रदानार्थम् । लिङ्गनिर्देशमात्रं हेतुः । यस्तु तस्य साध्यसहभावित्वलक्षणः प्रपञ्चः सोऽवयवान्तराणीत्युक्तं भवति ।

The probans is the brief statement of the middle term. It (derivatively) means that through which something is proved. It comes to mean the distinguishing mark. The term *samāsa* means brief. The expression *sādhanasamāsavacanam* means the brief statement of the probans. The term *sādhana* is mentioned to negate (exclude) the fallacious reasons (or those appearing like reasons).<sup>5</sup> They are not the probans because they cause the doubt and misapprehension. The term *samāsa* is mentioned to provide scope for the other members (of syllogism). The probans is merely the specific mention of the middle term. That which is its elucidation in the form of its invariable association with the probandum is stated to be the other members (of syllogism).

(Example)

उदाहरणन्वत्र निदर्शनं दृष्टान्तः । तस्य साधनस्य साध्येन सह-  
भावित्वनिदर्शनं यदसौ दृष्टान्तः । तद्यथा संहत्यकारिणां परार्थत्वं दृष्टं,  
यथा शयनासनरथशरणानाम् । व्यतिरेकस्त्ववीतस्य प्रसङ्गिधर्मान्तर-  
निवृत्तिरूपत्वात्तदन्तर्भूत इति न तदर्थं वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्त उच्यते ।

An example is the illustration (or) parable That which is the illustration of invariable association of the probans with the probandum is the example. For example, the objects functioning collectively are observed to be of the nature of serving the purpose of another, as it is observed in the case of bed, chair, chariot and the house. The counter example is included in that only because it is of the form of the inference-by-elimination which excludes the (other) possible qualities

5. Since *sādhana* means that which proves something, that which does not prove something, cannot be a *sādhana*. Thus, the fallacious reasons are excluded.

undesirably coming in it. Therefore, the counter example is not mentioned (here).<sup>6</sup>

(Application)

साध्यदृष्टान्तयोरेकक्रियोपसंहार उपनयः । साध्यस्य चक्षुरादिपारा-  
र्थ्यलक्षणस्य, दृष्टान्तस्य च शयनादेरेकक्रियोपसंहारः । तत्रार्थान्तरभूत-  
त्वात् साध्यदृष्टान्तयोरञ्जसा नैकक्रियोपपद्यते । तेनैव तस्याऽनिदर्शनादि-  
त्यतो धर्मसामान्याद्यथेदं तथेदमित्येकक्रियोपचर्यते । यथा शयनादयः  
संहतत्वात्परार्था एवं चक्षुरादिभिरपि परार्थैर्भवितव्यम् । योऽसौ परः स  
पुरुषः ।

The application is to draw together the probandum and the example into the same action. For example, drawing together into the same action of the probandum (which at present is) in the form of nature of serving others object by eye, etc., and the example like bed, etc. The same action is not possible instantly in case of the probandum and the example because of their being different objects. Hence, on account of the non-visibility of that action the action is applied to the two on the basis of the similarity of the characteristics in the terms like 'as is this, so is that also'. For example, just as the bed, etc., serve the purpose of another because they are composite in nature, similarly the eye, etc., should also be of the nature of serving the purpose of another. That which is mentioned as other is the conscious entity.

(Conclusion)

तद्वशात्प्रतिज्ञाभ्यासो निगमनम् । हेतुदृष्टान्तोपसंहारापेक्षया यः  
पुनरभ्यासः तन्निगमनम् । तद्यथा—तस्मादस्ति पुरुष इत्येषामवयवानां  
परस्परसम्बन्धाद् विशिष्टार्थः समुदायो वाक्यमित्युपदिश्यते । वाक्यमप्य-  
नेकं यदा गुणीभूतस्वार्थमर्थान्तरपकारित्वादितरेण संसृज्यते तदा शास्त्र-  
मप्येकं वाक्यमित्यवसीयते ।

6. The example is of two kinds : showing positive concomitance and the negative concomitance. The former is based upon *vita* while the latter, on *avita*.



The repetition of the proposition through the above mentioned process is the conclusion. The repetition requiring (i. e., through) probans, example and drawing together (of the probans and the probandum) is the conclusion. The collection of these members of syllogism carrying a special meaning due to their mutual relation is stated as the single sentence (vākya) as 'therefore, the conscious entity exists'. When many sentences with their own sense secondary (to the whole) are combined due to their service which they render to the other meaning (of the whole), the scripture is also resolved to be one sentence.

आह—जिज्ञासाद्यनभिधानम् । तद्व्यतिरेकेणापि स्वयमर्थगतेः । स्वनिश्चयवच्च परप्रतिपादनात् । यथा हि स्वयमुत्पद्यते निश्चेतुः प्रत्यय-स्तथैवान्यः प्रत्याय्य इत्येतन्न्याय्यम् । न च स्वयमेवार्थं प्रतिपद्यमानस्य जिज्ञासादीनां तत्र व्यापारः । तस्मात् परार्थमप्येषामुपादानं न कल्प्यते । संशयवचनानर्थक्यम् च, प्रतीतार्थत्वात् । निश्चितौ हि वादिप्रतिवादिनौ स्वपक्षयोः, तयोरितरेतरसंशयपर्यनुयोगे नास्ति प्रयोजनम् । किञ्चान्यत्—प्रयोजनशक्यप्राप्त्यवचनं च । साधनाभ्युपगमादेव तत्प्रतीतेः । न हि महतां निष्प्रयोजना प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते । न चाशक्येऽर्थे हिमवत्समीकरणादिषु प्रवृत्तेः । तस्मादनर्थकं तदभिधानम् । तद्भावे भावादिति चेत् स्यादेतत् सत्सु जिज्ञासादिषु तत्त्वाधिगमं प्रति प्रवृत्तिर्भवति, असत्सु न भवति । तस्मादेतान्यपि साधनं भविष्यन्तीति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अतिप्रसंगात् । सत्स्वात्मान्तः—करणेन्द्रियालोकविषयेषु प्रवृत्तिदर्शना-त्तेषामपि साधनत्वं स्यात् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्माज्जिज्ञासादयोऽनर्थकाः । प्रतिज्ञादयो दुर्विहिताः । कथम् ? साध्याभिधायिनः प्रतिज्ञाभ्युपगमाद् हेतुदृष्टान्तयोरपि तत्प्रसङ्गः साध्यावधारणस्यावयवान्तरेष्वप्युपपत्तेः । यदि साध्यावधारणं प्रतिज्ञेत्युच्यते तेन साध्यस्य हेतोर्दृष्टान्तस्य वा यदवधारणं तदपि प्रतिज्ञा प्राप्नोति, निमित्ताविशेषात् । साध्यशब्दो ह्ययं सामान्यवृत्तिः । न यत्नमन्तरेण विशेषेऽवस्थापयितुं शक्यत इति । किं च हेतुलक्षणानुपपत्तिश्च, साधनानुपपत्तिश्च । यो हि साधनसमास-वचनं हेतुरित्येतल्लक्षणमाचष्टे तेन प्राक्साधनमभिधेयं स्यात् । ततो वक्तव्यममुष्य समासवचनं हेतुरिति न चैवमुक्तम् । तस्मादलक्षणमेतत् । किञ्चान्यत्, समासवचनं च विस्तरनिषेधप्रसङ्गात् । यदि हि समासग्रहणं

क्रियते किं प्राप्तं योऽयमाध्यात्मिकानां भेदानां कार्यकारणात्मिकानां चैक-जातिसमन्वयो दृष्ट इत्येवमादिः साधनप्रपञ्चः सोऽहेतुरित्युक्तं भवति । तस्मात् समासग्रहणमनिष्टम् । लिङ्गाभिधानाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, लिङ्गं हि नः साधनम् । तस्यात्र निर्देशः कृतः । तस्मात्स्वमतिजाड्यादि-दमनिष्टमध्यारोप्यते, न त्वस्मत्प्रमादादिति । एतदप्युक्तम् । कस्मात् ? तस्य द्विधा भिन्नस्य पञ्चधा साधनभावात् । तद्धि लिङ्गं वीतावीतत्वे-नेष्टम् । तेन द्विधा भिन्नम् । तत्रापि वीतः पञ्चप्रभेदः इत्यतः समुदाया-न्निष्कृष्टस्यैकस्य लिङ्गत्वमशक्यं वक्तुमिति । किञ्चान्यत्, दृष्टान्त-लक्षणायोगश्च, शब्दार्थलक्षणेऽनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् । तन्निदर्शनं दृष्टान्त इति । अत्र शब्दो वा येन साध्यसाधने निदर्श्यते स दृष्टान्तः स्यात् ? अर्थो वा यत्र निदर्श्यते ? किञ्चातः ? तद्यदि तावच्छब्दः परिगृह्यते तत् उपनय-लक्षणं बाध्यते । कस्मात् ? न हि यथाऽभिधानं तथा साध्यमित्येकक्रिया युज्यते इति । अथार्थः परिगृह्यते तेनाभिधेयस्य वाक्यानवयवत्वात्पञ्चा-वयवत्वविरोधः । किञ्चान्यत्—दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनाऽभेदश्च हेतुप्रतिज्ञा-र्थाभिधानात् । साधनत्वमेव साध्याविनाभावित्वलक्षणं दृष्टान्तोपनययोः प्रत्यायय (य्य ?) ते । प्रतिज्ञार्थं च निगमनस्य नावयवान्तरत्वं युज्यते ।

Opponent : *The inquisitiveness, etc., should not be mentioned because one can know the object for himself without those also and because expounding of the object for others is also like the ascertainment for oneself.* The propriety demands that 'as the knowledge has originated in the knower, the other should be made known in the same way'. There is no role played by the inquisitiveness, etc., in the case of one who is engaged in knowing the object for himself. Hence, their mention is not proper for the knowledge of others also, *And, the mention of doubt is purposeless because the object is already known.* The proponent and the opponent are firm with regard to their stands. They have no purpose to enquire into the doubt of the other with an intention of contradicting it.

*Moreover, (the components like) purpose and conjecturing the other possible alternatives should not be mentioned. They are*

understood through the admittance of the probans itself. No purposeless activity arises in case of the great men, and their activity is not directed to the impossible object like the levelling of the Himalaya. Therefore, the mention of these is meaningless.

If it is argued that the activity (to know the truth) is found in the presence of them only? It may be like this. There is the activity towards knowing the reality in the presence of inquisitiveness, etc., and it is not (found) in their absence. Therefore, they will serve as the means.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because of over-pervasion.* Since the activity (towards knowledge) is observed in the presence of soul, internal organ, senses, light and the object, these would also be the means. This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the mention of inquisitiveness, etc., is purposeless.<sup>7</sup> *The proposition, etc., are not properly defined.*

How?

Since the proposition is admitted to be a statement of the probandum, there will be undesirable contingency of its application to the probans and the example, because the ascertainment of probandum holds good in the case of other members (of syllogism) as well. If the proposition is said to be the ascertainment of the probandum, the ascertainment of the probans and the example of that probandum would come to be proposition, because there is no difference in reason (i. e., causality). It cannot be restricted to a particular (object)

7. The meaning is that though there are several things serving as causes, yet the mention should be made of those which are most necessary. The inquisitiveness, etc., are also not that necessary in inference to mention separately.

without (making) efforts (in this case).<sup>8</sup> *Moreover, the definition of probans is improper because there is no mention of definition of middle term (sādhana).* One who gives the definition of probans as the brief statement of the middle term, would have stated the nature of middle term earlier. After that only it should be stated that the probans is the brief statement of this. And, it is not stated so. Therefore, it is not a (proper) definition. *Moreover, the mention of brief involves the undesirable contingency of negation of detailed mention.* If the term brief is mentioned, what is gained? (On the contrary) the middle term in details like 'the inclusion into one class is observed in case of the composite objects like the components of the body which are of the nature of cause of the effect', comes to be stated as the non-probans.<sup>9</sup> Hence, the mention of the term brief is undesirable.

If it is argued that it is faultless on account of the mention of the probans? It may be like this, The probans is the middle term according to us. This is mentioned here. Therefore, though the dulness of your intellect that which is undesirable is imposed upon us; it is not through our mistake.<sup>10</sup>

It is also wrong.

Why?

This, which is divided into two, is the middle term of five kinds. The probans is desired to be of the form of direct sign

8. The sense is that if the proposition is taken to be an ascertainment of the probandum, there should be other statement speaking of the ascertainment of probans and example as they are also equally the components of inference and all the components should be ascertained.
9. Since it is in detail, it cannot be included under the present definition.
10. We prefer *Chakravarti's* reading *pramādāt* to *prasādāt* of *Pāndeya*.

and that by elimination. It is, in this way, divided into two. Out of these, the direct is sub-divided into five.<sup>11</sup> It is, therefore, impossible to speak of the nature of probans as applicable to one taken out of the group. *Moreover the definition of example is not proper (lit. inapplicable) because it involves contingency of pervasion over undesirable (objects) whether it may be understood with reference to the words or the objects denoted.* The example is the instance. In this case (it may be asked) whether the instance refers to word through which the probandum and the probans are exemplified or the object where they are exemplified.

What is the use of this consideration ?

If the word is accepted (as referred to), the definition of application is contradicted.

Why ?

No single action is applicable here in the form 'as the statement of the object, so the probandum'.<sup>12</sup> If the object denoted is accepted (as referred to), it will contradict the fivefold components because the object referred to is not included into them. *Moreover, there would be non-difference of the example, application and the conclusion because they also refer to the sense denoted by probans and the proposition.* The nature of a middle term conveys invariable association which forms the character of example and application. The conclusion denotes the proposition and it is not proper to take it as an independent component.

उच्यते—यदुच्यते स्वनिश्चयेनाङ्गभावगमनात्परप्रत्यायनार्थं जिज्ञासाद्यनभिधानमिति अत्र ब्रूमः—न, उक्तत्वात् । उक्तमेतत् पुरस्ताद्वाख्याङ्गं जिज्ञासादयः । सर्वस्य चानुग्रहः कर्तव्य इत्येवमर्थं शास्त्र-

11. We have not been able to locate the names of five sub-divisions of direct inference.
12. We prefer to omit na hi as done in Poona Manuscript and accepted by Chakravarti.

व्याख्यानं विपरिचिद्भिः प्रतायते, न स्वार्थं स्वसदृशबुद्ध्यर्थं वा । तत्रैवं कल्प्यमाने ये व्युत्पाद्यास्तान्प्रति नैवैषामानर्थक्यम् । अथैतदनिष्टम्—यदुक्तं सन्दिग्धविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नबुद्धचनुग्रहार्थं हि सतां विनिश्चयः शास्त्रकथेत्यस्य व्याघातः । किं च नियमाऽनभ्युपगमात् । न हि वयमेषामवश्यकमभिधानमाचक्ष्महे, किन्तु हि यदा प्रतिवादी पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते—किं जिज्ञासस इति अवश्यमभिधानीयं शब्दमिति । केन धर्मेण, किं नित्योऽनित्य इति ? कुतः संशयः ? मूर्तत्वात् । यस्तु न पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते न तं प्रत्येते वाच्याः । क्वचिदानर्थक्यात् सर्वत्र प्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न इतरेषामपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । प्रतिज्ञादीनामपि तर्हि क्वचिदनभिधानमतस्तेषामपि सर्वत्रावचनं प्रसज्यते । तथा च भवतोक्तं कस्यचित्तु किञ्चित् प्रसिद्धमेव भवतीत्यन्यतरोक्तिरपि साधनं भवति, शब्द इवार्थद्वयप्रतीतत्वादुभयानभिधानमिति । यदप्युक्तं निश्चितत्वात् संशयावचनमिति असदेतत् । कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । उक्तमेतत् सति पर्यनुयोगे तद्वचनमिति । एतेन प्रयोजनशक्यप्राप्ती प्रत्युक्ते । यो हि पर्यनुयुञ्जीत किं प्रयोजनोऽयं शक्यो वाऽयमर्थ इति तं प्रति वाच्यमेतत् । यदप्युक्तं तद्भावे भावादिति—न, अनभ्युपगमात् । न ब्रूमो यस्मात् सत्सु जिज्ञासादिषु तत्त्वाधिगमसद्भावस्तस्मादेषामवयवत्वमिति । किन्तु हि यं प्रत्येषां प्रतिपत्तावङ्गभावगमनं तं प्रत्येतानि साधनमिति । यदप्युक्तं साध्याभिधायिनः प्रतिज्ञाभ्युपगमाद्धेतुदृष्टान्तयोरपि तत्प्रसङ्ग इति अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? जिज्ञासादेः सद्भावे सति तत्प्रतीतेः । यद्यपि साध्यशब्दोऽयमविशेषेण सिद्धत्वादर्थान्तरमाचष्टे तथापि यं प्रति जिज्ञासासंशयप्रयोजनशक्यप्राप्त्यस्तस्य व्युदस्य संशयं साध्यस्यावधारणं प्रतिज्ञा, न हेतुदृष्टान्तयोस्तदस्तीत्यसदेतत् । किंचान्यत् तद्भावेऽविरोधात् । यदा तु जिज्ञासादयो हेतौ दृष्टान्ते वा भवन्ति तदा किं कृतकः शब्दोऽथ न कृतकोऽथ बुद्धिर्नित्या क्षणिका वेति भवत्येव तदवधारणं प्रतिज्ञा । यदप्युक्तम् साधनानुपदेशाद्धेतुलक्षणायोग इति असदेतत् । कस्मात् ? लोकप्रसिद्धत्वात् । यथा साध्यवत्त्वेनेप्सितः पक्ष इति प्रतिज्ञालक्षणमाचक्षाणो भवान्न साध्यलक्षणमाचष्टे, कस्मात् ? साधनीयं साध्यमिति लोके सिद्धत्वात्, एवं साधनसमासवचनं हेतुलक्षणमाचक्षाणा वयं न साधनमाचक्ष्महे । कस्मात् ?

साध्यतेऽनेनेति कृत्वा साधनमिति लोके सिद्धत्वात् । उपेत्य वाऽनुमान-  
निर्देशात् । लिङ्गं हि नः साधनं, तच्च निर्दिष्टमिति । यत्तूक्तं वीता-  
वीतभेदे सति पञ्चधा साधनभावादिति, अत्र ब्रूमः, अयुक्तमेतत् ।  
कस्मात् ? समासग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । अतएव समासग्रहणं क्रियते, साधन-  
स्वरूपाभिधानमात्रं हेतुरिति यथा विज्ञायते । प्रपञ्चस्त्ववयवान्तराणीति ।  
एतेन विस्तरप्रतिषेधप्रसङ्गः प्रयुक्तः । कथम् ? न हि समासशब्दस्यायमर्थः  
इति कृत्वा । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं शब्दार्थकल्पनेऽनिष्टप्रसङ्गाद् दृष्टान्तलक्षणयोग  
इति, अस्तु तावच्छब्दो दृष्टान्तः । यत्तूक्तं उपनयलक्षणं बाध्यत इति  
अनुपपन्नमेतत् । कस्मात् ? असम्भवे सति सम्बन्ध्यन्तरे कार्यविज्ञानात् ।  
शब्देऽसम्भवादर्थे कार्यं विज्ञास्यामः अथवा पुनरस्त्वर्थो दृष्टान्तः ।  
यत्तूक्तमभिधेयस्य वाक्यानवयवत्वात्पञ्चावयवत्वविरोध इति अर्थे-  
ऽसम्भवाच्छब्दे कार्यं विज्ञास्यामः । यदप्युक्तम् प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वर्थाभिधानादं  
दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनानां नावयवान्तरत्वमिति अयमदोषः । कस्मात् ?  
अप्रतिज्ञानात् । न ह्येतदस्माभिः प्रतिज्ञायते । किं तर्हि प्रमेयवचनं प्रतिज्ञा ।  
प्रमाणरूपमात्रवचनं हेतुः । तस्य प्रमेयसहभावित्वनिर्दर्शनं दृष्टान्तः ।  
साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मसामान्यादेकक्रियोपसंहार उपनयः । समुदायस्य  
साध्यसिद्धये व्यापारनिर्देशो निगमनम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । किञ्चान्यत् ।  
एकस्य साधनभावपरिकल्पनावत्तत्परिकल्पने दोषाभावात् । यथा वाक्यम्  
एवं च तदर्थश्च मुख्यौ शब्दार्थौ, तयोरभिन्नार्थत्वादित्यभ्युपगमादेक-  
मेवार्थमभागमक्रमं च बुद्धाववस्थाप्य श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वानित्यत्वकृतकत्वप्रमेय-  
त्वादिलक्षणानां शक्तीनामपोद्धारात्साध्यसाधनसंशयरूपापन्नं वक्तारो  
भिन्नमाचक्षते, न चैकार्थधर्मत्वात्साध्यसाधनसंशयाभिधानानामेकत्व-  
मनुष्यते । तथैकस्य साधनस्य साध्यधर्मतत्सहभावित्वलक्षणानां शक्ती-  
नामभिधानं हेतुदृष्टान्तादिनाऽवयवान्तरं नः स्यात् । तत्र यदुक्तं प्रति-  
ज्ञाहेत्वर्थाभिधानाद् दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनानां नावयवान्तरत्वमिति एतद-  
युक्तम् । तस्मात्सूक्तं दशावयवो वीतः ।

**Proponent :** As regards your statement that the inquisitiveness, etc.,  
should not be mentioned for making the others know since they  
form the components of determination for oneself, we reply  
that it is not so, because of the reply given above. It is already  
stated that the inquisitiveness, etc., form the components of

explaining something. All should be favoured; it is for this  
that the explanation of scripture is preserved by the wise; not  
for themselves or for those who possess a similar intellect.  
When it is conjectured so, there is no uselessness of these for  
those who are learning (the scripture). Hence, the statement  
that 'the ascertainment of the wise in the form of the account  
found in the scripture is for the favour of those who are  
confused, possessing wrong knowledge and are not wise,' be-  
comes contradictory and is not desirable. *Moreover, because  
no rule is admitted.* We do not prescribe that they should be  
mentioned necessarily. On the other hand, when the opponent  
asks as to what do you want to know, he should necessarily be  
replied as 'the words'. In what form? 'It is eternal or non-  
eternal?' How does the doubt arise? Because of their having  
a form. These are not to be stated to the one who does  
not ask.

If it is argued that the uselessness is applicable everywhere  
because of their uselessness in some cases, the reply is that *it  
cannot be held so because it would apply to the other cases like  
proposition as well.* In some cases the proposition, etc., are  
not mentioned. This would lead to the undesirable contin-  
gency of their non-mention in all the cases. In this way, you  
have stated that some object is surely familiar to someone. This  
another statement also serves as a proof. Since both the  
objects are conveyed, both should not be mentioned as is the  
case with the word.

Your statement that the doubt should not be mentioned  
because of the certainty, is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because we have already replied.* It is already stated that it  
should be mentioned when it is asked. By this only the  
(objection regarding the mention of) purpose and conjecturing  
the possible (alternatives) is answered. One who asks as to  
what is the purpose or is this object possible, to him it should  
be mentioned. As regards the statement that the inference takes

place in presence of those only, we reply—it is not so, because it is not accepted by us. We do not say that the knowledge of reality takes place only in the presence of proposition, etc., (and) hence, they form the components. On the other hand, they serve as the means for one to whom they are the components in the process of knowing. Your statement that on account of admitting the proposition as the statement of probandum, probans and the example would be the proposition only, is wrong.

Why ?

Because the knowledge arises only in the presence of desire to know, etc. Although the term probandum denotes the other objects also as it is proved to denote something unspecific, yet the proposition is the ascertainment of the probandum after dispelling the doubt in case of the object about which there are the desire to know, doubt, purpose, conjecturing the other possible alternative, etc. It does not hold good in case of reason and example. Hence, it is wrong. *Moreover, because of non-contradiction (i.e., non-obstruction) in their presence,* When the desire to know, etc., are present in case of reason and example, their ascertainment is surely the proposition as in case of 'whether the word is a product or not'; 'whether the intellect is eternal or momentary'. Your statement that the definition of probans is proper because there is no exposition of the middle term (earlier), is wrong.

Why ?

*Because it is well established in the world.* Defining the proposition as the subject which is desired to be proved you also do not mention the definition of that which is desired to be (i.e., probandum),

Why is it so ?

The reply is obvious that because it is well established in the wordly behaviour that the probandum is that which is to be proved. Similarly, defining probans as the brief statement of

the middle term we also do not explain the middle term first.

Why ?

Because it is well established in the wordly behaviour that the term sādhanā means that by means of which something is proved. *Or, even after accepting your position, because there is the indication to the inference in vicinity.* The characteristic feature (liṅga) is a probans in our theory and it is mentioned with reference to your argument that (the mention of brief is wrong) because the probans is of five kinds in spite of its division in direct and inference-by-elimination; we say, it is wrong.

*Because of the force of the mention of the term brief (samāsa).* For this reason only the term brief (samāsa) is mentioned so that it is understood that the probans is merely the mention of the form of the middle term. Its explanation is the other components. By this only the undesirable contingency of negating the detailed description, is answered.

How ?

*Because it is not the meaning of the term brief (samāsa).* As regards your statement that the definition of example is not applicable because it involves the undesirable contingency of its pervasion over undesired objects when postulated to be applicable to either of the word or the meaning, (we reply), let it refer to the words as example. Your objection that the definition of application is contradicted in this case, is wrong.

Why ?

*Because in the case of impossibility, the operation is understood with reference to the other relata.* In case of the impossibility with reference to the words we understand the operation with reference to the meaning. *Or, let the object be denoted by the example.* As regards your argument that it contradicts the

idea of fivefold component because the object denoted is not the component of the sentence, (we reply) we understand the operation with reference to the word when it is not possible in case of the object denoted. As regards your argument that the example, application and conclusion cease to be distinct component as they expound the meaning of the proposition and the probans only, we reply that is not a defect at all.

Why ?

*Because it is not admitted.* It is not admitted by us. On the contrary, the proposition is the mention of the object to be known. The probans is the statement of the means of knowledge. Showing of the invariable association of that with the object of knowledge is the example. Drawing together of the object to be proved and the example into a single action on account of the similarity of qualities is the application. The indication of the function of the collection (of these) for the establishment of the object to be established is the conclusion. Therefore, it is wrong. *Moreover, because there is not a fault in that kind of posulation as is the case of (i.e., there is no fault in) postulating the instrumentality of one.* As the sentence, so is the meaning. Both the word and its denotation are prominent because both refer to the same object. This being admitted, after having in mind the single object which is complete and devoid of sequence (in the process of knowledge) and which has attained the form of the probandum, the probans and the doubt on account of imposing upon it the powers in the form of audibility, non-eternity and productivity, is expressed as separate (i.e., separate ways) by the speaker. There follows identity of probandum, probans and doubt due to their being the qualities of a single object. In this way, in our theory the probans and the example, etc., will be different components of a single probans, which stand for the powers denoting the quality of the probandum and its invariable association. Hence, the statement that the example, application and conclusion will not be different components because of denoting only the

meaning of proposition and probans only, is wrong. Therefore, it is rightly stated that the direct inference has ten components.<sup>13</sup>

(Direct Inference should be mentioned first)

तस्य पुरस्तात्प्रयोगं न्याय्यमाचार्या मन्यन्ते । किं कारणम् ? अवीतलक्षणाविरोधात् । अवीतस्य हि लक्षणं परिशेषतः साध्यानुग्रहः । तत्रान्वयादिना स्वरूपेणाधिगते प्रधानलक्षणे धर्मिणि परपक्षप्रतिषेधमात्रेणोपसंहारे क्रियमाणे परिशेषलक्षणं बाध्यते । कस्मात् ? इह प्रतिषेधमात्रमादावुच्यते । तेन यथा हेतुविरोधात्परमाण्वादिभ्यो न व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते तथा हेत्वभावात् प्रधानादपि नोत्पद्यते इति शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । अतस्तद्व्यवच्छेदोपि चावीताद् गम्यते । तथा सति कः परिशेषः स्यात् ? स्वरूपेण तु परिच्छिन्ने धर्मिणि उपसंहारो यथावदवकल्प्यते । न चेत्परमाण्वादिभ्यो व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते परिशेषतः प्रधानादेव व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते इति यथोक्तेभ्योज्ज्वलादिभ्य इत्युक्तं भवति । तस्मात्प्राग्वीतप्रयोग इति सिद्धं सामान्यतोदृष्टादनुमानादतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां समधिगम इति ।

The authorities consider its use earlier (to the avita) to be right.

Why ?

Because (in this way) the definition of inference-by-elimination is not contradicted.<sup>14</sup> The inference-by-elimination is defined as that which favours the probandum through elimination. When the nature of the probandum like cosmic matter is known through the probans like homogeneity, etc., and the conclusion is drawn through negating the opponent's stand, the definition of elimination is not contradicted.<sup>15</sup>

13. These are inquisitiveness, doubt, purpose, conjecturing the (other) possible alternative, throwing aside the doubt, proposition, probans, example, application and conclusion.
14. We prefer *lakṣaṇāvirodhāt* as found in poona manuscript and accepted by *Chakravarti* in comparison to *Pandeya's* reading. *lakṣaṇāvirodhāt*.
15. The text demands *na* before *bādhyate*.



Why ?

In the inference-by-elimination only the elimination is mentioned in the beginning. Consequently, it can be posited that as the manifest cannot come out of atom, etc., because of being contradicted by reasoning, similarly, it cannot come out of the cosmic matter also because of the lack of reason (in the favour). Therefore, the exclusion also is known through the inference-by-elimination.

This being the case, what may be the elimination ?

when the object is ascertained in its very nature, the right conclusion is drawn. (Otherwise) it will have to be stated that from the reason like homogeneity, etc., stated above it is concluded through eliminating (the others) that if the manifest does not come out of atom, etc., it comes out of the cosmic matter.<sup>16</sup> Hence, the direct inference is used first, and this being the case it is established that the supra sensuous objects are known through the inference based on general observation.

(Causes of non-perception of existing objects)

आह—न, वारणान्तरतोऽनुपलभ्यमानानामग्रहणात् । यदि सामान्य-  
तोदृष्टादनुमानात्सर्वं परोक्षमधिगम्यते इत्यभ्युपगम्यते प्राप्तमिदं येषा-  
मप्यर्थानां कारणान्तरतोऽनुपलब्धिस्तेषामपि तस्मादेव ग्रहणम् । तद्यथा—

अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात्समानाभिहाराच्च ॥७॥

तत्रातिदूरात्तावत् तद्यथा प्रोङ्डीनस्य शकुनेः । अतिसामीप्याद-  
ञ्जनप्रभृतीनाम् । इन्द्रियघाताच्छब्दादीनाम् । मनोऽनवस्थानाच्छकटा-  
दीनाम् । सौक्ष्म्यात्त्रुट्यादीनाम् । व्यवधानाद्विरण्यादीनाम् । अभिभवा-  
त्सूर्यप्रकाशाद् ग्रहादीनाम् । समानाभिहारादनेकप्रदीपप्रभाणां । चशब्दा-  
दैश्वर्ययोगाद्देवादीनाम् । न चार्हति भवितुं धर्मसामान्यानुपपत्तेः । तस्माद-  
युक्तं सर्वमतीन्द्रियमनुमानग्राह्यमिति ।

16. The sense is that if the *avāta* is not employed, one will have to eliminate the other things even after proving one thing.

Opponent : No, because the objects which are not known on account of some other reason are not known (through the inference based on general observation). If it is admitted that all the objects beyond the reach of the senses are known through the inference based on general observation, it comes to mean that the objects which are not cognised due to some other cause also are known through that (type of inference) only. To explain.

(THE NON-PERCEPTION OF EVEN EXISTING OBJECTS IS CAUSED) BY EXCESSIVE DISTANCE, (EXTREME), PROXIMITY, DEFECT OF THE SENSES, UNSTEADINESS OF MIND, SUBTLETY, INTERVENTION, SUPPRESSION AND MIXTURE WITH OTHER SIMILAR THINGS.

Out of these, by excessive distance is explained as—the non-perception of the bird soaring very high. By extreme proximity—just as non-perception of the collyrium, etc. By the defect of the senses—just as non-perception of the word, etc.<sup>17</sup> By unsteadiness of the mind—just as the non-perception of the cart, etc.<sup>18</sup> By subtlety—just as the non-perception of the atom, etc. By intervention—just as the non-perception of the (hidden) gold, etc.<sup>19</sup> By suppression—just as the non-perception of the planets due to the suppression by the light of the sun. By intermixture with other similar things—just as the non-perception of the lights of many lamps. By the word *ca* is intended the non-perception of the supernatural powers in the objects as in the case of the non-perception of gods, etc. The knowledge of them cannot take place (through the inference based upon general observation) because of the absence of any

17. Even though sometimes the word is uttered, it is not heard due to the defect in ear.  
18. Sometimes it happens that the cart passes nearby, but is not perceived as the mind does not come in contact with the eyes at that time.  
19. The gold exists in mines but is not perceived as there is the layer of earth obstructing the vision.

similar characteristic. Hence, it is wrong to say that all the objects beyond the reach of the senses are liable to be cognised through inference.

उच्यते—शक्यं तावत्कारणान्तरतोऽनुपलभ्यमानं किञ्चित्सामान्यतो-  
दृष्टादनुमानादधिगन्तुम् । तद्यथा समीपावस्थितस्य शकुनेरयत्नेन चक्षुषा  
ग्रहणं, यथा यथा तु विप्रकर्षं प्रतिपद्यते प्रणिधाय चक्षुर्गृह्यते तावद्याव-  
त्क्रमेणादर्शनमुपसंप्राप्तः । तत्र देशविप्रकर्षे प्रचीयमानेऽदर्शनमुपचीयमान-  
मवगम्यात्यन्तादर्शनमपि पश्चात्तद्वेतुकमनुमीयते । तथा नातिसमीपा-  
वस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्यास्फुटमाकारमवधार्य पश्चाद्यथा यथारादुपसंपद्यते तथा  
तथा प्रतिपद्यमानदर्शनशक्तयोऽनुमातारः कृष्णसाराञ्जनप्रभृतीनाम-  
ग्रहणमतिसामीप्यादनुमिमते । तथा गिरिसरित्समुद्रसमीपवर्तिनं श्रवण-  
प्रतिघातिनं प्राक् शब्दमुपलभ्य पश्चात्तस्मिन्नेव देशे शब्दमगृह्णानाः  
श्रवणोपघातमनुमिमते ।

Proponent : Some objects not cognised due to some other cause can be cognised through the inference based on general observation.

To explain, there is the cognition of the bird near the eye without effort; as it gets away it is cognised through the application of eyes with much effort as long as it disappears gradually. Thus, knowing the increase in disappearance due to the increase in distance, the total disappearance afterwards also is inferred to be caused by the same reason. Similarly, after observing the indistinct form of the object placed in extreme proximity as the person engaged in inferring gets away, he acquires the capacity prompting the appearance and infers that the non-perception of the black antelope and the collyrium is caused by extreme proximity. Similarly, after perceiving earlier the sound near the mountain, the river or the ocean, which troubles the ear, and not perceiving it afterwards the sound at the same place, one infers the defect in his sense of hearing.

(Scope of Valid revelation)

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात्साध्यम् ॥६॥

तस्मादपि चासिद्धमित्यनेनागमविषये सामान्यतोदृष्टस्यानवतार-

माचष्टे । परोक्षमिति विषयं प्रति निर्दिशति । आप्तागमात्साध्यमिति विषयिणमाह । एतदुक्तं भवति—तस्मादपि सामान्यतोदृष्टादनुमानाद्यन्न सिद्धयति प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यमपि स्वयमदृष्टं कारणान्तरप्रतिबद्धविषयभाव-  
मत्यन्तपरोक्षं वा स्वर्गपवर्गदेवतादि धर्मसामान्यरहितं तदाप्तागमा-  
त्साध्यम् ।

AND THE IMPERCEPTIBLE OBJECT WHICH IS NOT ESTABLISHED THROUGH THAT ALSO IS ESTABLISHED THROUGH VALID REVELATION.

Through the expression 'and the object which is not established through that' the author speaks of the non-application of the inference based on general observation to the object to be known through valid revelation.<sup>20</sup> The term 'imperceptible' refers to the object. The expression 'is proved through valid revelation' refers to the knowledge (of the object). The statement comes to mean that the object which is not proved through the inference based on general observation and the perceptibility of which is also not experienced and of which the nature of being object of knowledge is obstructed by some other reason or the object like heaven, liberation and gods, etc., which are absolutely beyond the reach of the senses, and are devoid of common characteristic, are established through valid testimony.<sup>21</sup>

(Valid Testimony does not imply justification of all theories)

20. It suggests that the Sāṃkhyaś favour the theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* according to which the scope of each *pramāṇa* is limited. Or, in other words, each means of knowledge has specific object to be cognised through it. It is in opposition to the theory of *pramāṇasamplava* according to which the scope of the *pramāṇas* is not restricted; many *pramāṇas* may be simultaneously applied to cognise the same object.
21. It shows that the objects of valid revelation are of two kinds : *parokṣa*, i.e., not cognised by other *pramāṇas* because of the obstruction through some cause mentioned above; and the *atyantaparokṣa* which are not at all cognisable through any of the other *pramāṇas*.

सर्ववादसिद्धिप्रसङ्गादप्रामाण्यमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यदि तर्ह्यगमः प्रमाणीक्रियते तेन प्रतिशास्त्रं येऽभियुक्तास्तेषां प्रामाण्यमित्यवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । एवं सति सर्वाचार्यप्रामाण्यादनेकविकल्पविचित्रा तर्कवृत्तिरित्यपरिनिश्चितत्वाद् भ्रान्तिः प्रसज्येत । तथा च सति जिज्ञासूनामपवर्गप्राप्तिविघातः स्यात् । तस्माद् भिषजेव भवता परोपदेशः प्रयुक्तो नास्मानयं प्रीणाति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? आप्तलक्षणस्यानवधारितत्वात् । व्यपगतरागादिदोषाणामसन्दिग्धमतीनामतीन्द्रियार्थदृश्वनामीश्वरमहर्षीणामाप्तत्वमाचक्ष्महे, न सर्वेषाम् । यदि चान्योप्येवंधर्मोऽस्ति भवतु प्रमाणम् । किंचान्यत् । स्वविषये च तत्प्रामाण्यस्यादोषवत्त्वात् । यस्य खल्वपि यो विषयस्तस्य तस्मिन्विषये वचोऽन्तरेणापि साधनं प्रामाण्यमित्यवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । इतरथा प्रतिशास्त्रमाचारस्थितिनियमानामदृष्टार्थानामप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । एतेनाखिललिङ्गादागमोऽर्थान्तरम् । यस्मान्महताभिधानेन युक्तिरन्विष्यते तस्माद्युक्त्यपेक्षाल् लिङ्गादागमोऽर्थान्तरमिति ।

If it is argued that it is not valid because it involves the undesirable contingency of the proof for all the theories (right or wrong)? It may be like this. If the revelation is held to be an authority, the authority of the persons proficient in each scripture should necessarily be admitted. In this case, because of the authority of all the teachers and due to the varied function of reasoning<sup>22</sup> on account of many alternatives, there arises the undesirable contingency of propriety because nothing will be absolutely ascertained. This being the case, the attainment of liberation by the aspirants would be obstructed.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, just like a physician you have followed the advice given by others only. It does not satisfy us.

22. Logic is such a method through which anything right or wrong can be proved. Even one thing proved by one logician can be disproved by some other more powerful logician.

23. Since the nature of the objects would be uncertain, one will be confused and would not attain the knowledge leading to liberation.

It is also wrong.  
Why ?

Because of the non-ascertainment of the (nature of) validity (by you). We speak of validity with reference to the great seers devoid of the vices like attachment, etc., who are of doubtless intellect and who have visualised the objects beyond the reach of the senses, and not of every body. If some other has these characteristics, let him be reliable. Moreover, there is no defect in accepting the authority in one's own field. It should surely be admitted that it goes without saying that the statement of one in his own field is valid without some other reason. Otherwise, there would be the non-acceptance of the rules, for the maintenance of the ethical code, which are not perceptible and are propounded by works on different branches of learning. This proves that the scripture is different from all logical process. Since reason is investigated by powerful statement, the revelation is different from the probans, which requires the reasoning.<sup>24</sup>

(Revelation cannot be included under inference)

आह न, अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामधिगमहेतुत्वात् । यथा कृतकत्वादिधर्मोऽनित्यत्वादौ विषये दृष्टस्तदभावे चादृष्ट इत्यनित्येऽर्थे निश्चयमादधाति एवं शब्दोपि स्वार्थे दृष्टोन्यत्र तज्जातीये न दृष्टः प्रतिपत्तिहेतुर्भवति । तस्मादनुमानादभिन्न एवायमिति ।

Opponent : No, because it (the word) is the means of understanding through positive and negative (examples). Just as the quality like productivity brings about the ascertainment of the non-eternity of the object because it is observed in case of the non-eternal and is not observed in its absence, the word also which is observed to be used in its own sense and not in other similar meanings is the cause of understanding. Therefore, it is not different from inference.

उच्यते—चन्द्रादिष्विदानीमसाधारणविषयेषु का प्रतिपत्तिः स्यादिति ?

24. The scripture does not require reasoning for its validity. It is valid in itself. The probans, however, depends upon reasoning for its validity.

Proponent : Now, how could we understand the word Candra, etc., in the sense of unique object ?

आह—अवयवापेक्षत्वाच्चन्द्रशब्दो ह्यनेकेषु वचनेषु वर्तते, जातिद्रव्यगुणक्रियासु च, तथा डित्थादिशब्दः, तस्मादेवंजातीयकानामपि चानुमानादभेदः ।

Opponent : The term candra is also used from the point of view of many components in many numbers<sup>25</sup> (i. e., singular, plural, etc.) as also generality, substance, quality and action. Similar is the case with the words like Dīṭha, etc. Therefore, these kinds of words also are not different from inference.

उच्यते—स्वर्गादीनां तर्हि कथमनुमानत्वमिति ?

Proponent : How can there be the inference in case of heaven, etc. ?<sup>26</sup>

आह—आप्तवचोऽविसंवादसामर्थ्यात् । यथा हैरण्यकप्रभृतीनामाप्तानां वाक्यमव्यभिचारि एवमीश्वरमहर्षयोपि चाप्ताः । तस्मादेवामपि वाक्यमव्यभिचारीति शक्यमत्रापि सामान्यविषयत्वं कल्पयितुम् । एवमनुमानमेवागम इति ।

Opponent : It (the heaven) is inferred because of its capacity of non-contradiction with authoritative statement. As the statement of the authoritative persons like Hairanyaka is true, so the lord great seers are also authority. Therefore, the statement of these also is true. Thus, commonness of objects can be postulated in this case also. In this way, the valid testimony is inference only.<sup>27</sup>

25. We prefer *Chakravarti's* reading *vacaneṣu* instead of *Pandeya's* reading *avayuveṣu*.

26. No object similar to heaven is observed, and hence, there is no inferential criterion to apply a particular word in that sense.

27. The sense is that when the word uttered by a worldly person is considered to be authoritative, the words of the great seer like Kapila talking of supra sensuous objects should be considered as authority.

उच्यते—यदुक्तमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामधिगमहेतुत्वाच्छब्दोऽनुमानमिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, अप्रतिज्ञानात् । न हि ययं व्यवहारानुपातिनां वृक्षादीनामागमत्वमाचक्ष्महे, किं तर्हि स्वर्गादीनामत्यन्तपरोक्षविषयाणाम् । तस्मादप्रतिज्ञानादनुपालम्भोऽयमिति । उपेत्य वा वक्त्रपेक्षत्वात् । अथवोपेत्यापि सर्वशब्दानामागमत्वमनुमानादर्थान्तरभावं ब्रूमः । तथा हि कृतकत्वादिति लिङ्गं चण्डालकापालिकैरपि प्रयुज्यमानं साहचर्यापेक्षं निश्चयमादधाति । न वक्तृविशेषमपेक्षते । वक्तृविशेषापेक्षस्तु शब्दः । तस्मान्न लिङ्गम् । किं चान्यत् विपर्ययात् । न हि लिङ्गं देशान्तरे विपर्येति । शब्दस्य तु दृष्टो विपर्ययः । स एव हि शब्दो देशान्तरे, कालान्तरे तु स्वार्थं न प्रत्याययति अर्थान्तरं च प्रशंसति ।

Proponent : As regards your statement that the word is inference only because it serves as a means of understanding through negative and positive instances, we reply, *it is not so because use of it is not admitted by us*. We do not speak of valid testimony with reference to the objects like tree which are experienced in our day-to-day life. On the contrary, we admit so in case, of the absolutely non-perceptible objects like heaven. Hence because of our non-acceptance it is not a defect (lit. censure).<sup>28</sup> Or, even after we accept it on account of the requirement of particular speaker. Or, (even) after accepting the position of taking the nature of testimony in case of all the words, we speak of its distinction from inference. (To explain) the probans like productivity, etc., used even by a *kāpālika* of wicked deeds, bring about the ascertainment due to the requirement of the invariable concomitance. It does not stand in need of a particular speaker. The valid testimony, on the

28. The sense is that the *Sāṃkhya*s accept *pramāṇavyavasthā* and, hence, the objects to be cognised through verbal testimony are not the objects of daily experience but those which are *atiparokṣa* (absolutely beyond the reach of the senses) like heaven.

other hand, requires the particular speaker.<sup>29</sup> Hence, it does not serve as a probans. Moreover, on account of inversion. The sign does not change in some other places. The change is certainly observed in case of word. The same word in some other place or at some other time does not convey its own sense and refers to some other object.

सम्बन्धानुपलब्धेरिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, सम्बन्धान्तरं देशान्तरेऽनुपलक्षितम् । तस्माच्छब्दार्थविपर्यय इति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । लिङ्गवैधर्म्यम् । न हि प्रत्यक्षाभिमतस्य लिङ्गिन उपलब्धौ गवादेर्लिङ्गं नोपलभ्यते । शब्दस्तूपलभ्यमानो गवादौ नोपलभ्यते । तस्मान्न लिङ्गम् । किंचान्यत् । देशनियमात् । न हि लिङ्गस्य देशनियमो दृष्टः । अस्ति तु शब्दस्य देशनियमः । तद्यथा शवतिर्गतिकर्मा काम्बोजेष्वेव भाष्यते । रंहतिः प्राच्येषु, तथा दातिर्लवनार्थः, दात्रमुदीच्येषु नान्यत्र । तस्मान्न शब्दो लिङ्गम् । किंचान्यत्, इष्टतो विनियोगात् । स्वाभाविकं लिङ्गम् । न हि धूमोर्नेरपकृष्य शक्यतेऽप्सु वायावाकाशेऽन्यत्र वा निवेशयितुम् । शब्दस्तु यत्र वक्तुरभिप्रायस्तत्र तत्र विनिवेश्यते । यथा वृद्धादयः शब्दाः स्वार्थाभ्युच्चयादिषु प्रसिद्धा आदैक्षु विनिवेश्यन्ते । तस्मान्न ते लिङ्गम् ।

If it is argued that it is due to the non-cognition of the relation between the two ? It may be like this. The other relation (of a word with some means) is not observed in some other place. Hence, arises the change in the meaning.

This is wrong because of dissimilarity from sign. It is not that when the signate like cow established through perception is observed, the sign is not perceived. The word, on the contrary, is present but is not found used in the sense of cow, etc. Therefore, it is not the sign. Moreover, on account of the restriction with reference to the place. The restriction with reference to the place

29. The inference depends upon the validity of probans irrespective of the man putting forth the probans because it can be verified through other means. The object of verbal testimony, however, cannot be verified through other means and, hence, depends upon the authority of the speaker only.

is not observed in case of sign. There is certainly the restriction with reference to the place in case of word. To explain, the verb *savati* meaning to go, is prevalent in the residents of Kamboj only. By the eastern people *rainhati* is used (in the same sense); *dāti*, in the sense of cutting is prevalent in the residents of the east only. Among the residents of north it is prevalent as *dātram* and not anywhere else.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the word is not the sign. Moreover, because of its use in accordance with the intention of the speaker. The sign is natural (in case of the signate). It is not possible to locate smoke in water, air, sky or somewhere else after drawing it away from fire. The word is used where there is the intention of the speaker. For example, the words like *vṛddhi* though well known in the sense of increase, etc., are used in the sense of *āt* and *aic*.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, they are not the sign.

सर्वाभिधानशक्तित्वाच्छब्दस्यादोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतं सर्वाभिधानशक्तिः शब्दः सर्वाभिधेयशक्तिश्चार्थस्तयोः पुरुषव्यापारेण शक्त्यवच्छेदः क्रियते । कथम् ? अयमेव शब्दोऽस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यायको भवतु । अयमेव चार्थोऽनेन शब्देनाभिधीयताम् । एतावति पुरुषव्यापारः । तस्माच्छब्दस्य स्वाभाविकः सम्बन्धो वक्त्रपेक्षया व्यज्यत इति । एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सुतरामनुमानादर्थान्तरत्वप्रसंगात् । एवमपि कल्पयित्वाऽनुमानात्सुतरां शब्दस्यार्थान्तरत्वमापद्यते । कस्मात् ? न हि यथा वक्त्रपेक्षया सर्वास्त सतः शब्दस्य शक्त्यवच्छेदस्तथा सर्वार्थं लिङ्गं वक्त्रपेक्षयार्थान्तरादवच्छिद्यते । यथा चैकः शब्दो जगत्येवमुदितः पुरुषविनियोगापेक्षः सर्वमर्थमभिधातुं समर्थस्तथैकं लिङ्गं कयाचिदुक्त्या सर्वार्थप्रत्यायनसमर्थम् । तस्मान्न शब्दो लिङ्गम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम् चन्द्रादीनामवयवापेक्षं सामान्यमभ्युपगम्यते । तदयुक्तम् । असाधारणत्वात् । अनुमानाभावे शब्दप्रसिद्धोऽर्थ इति व्याघातः । किं चान्यत् । जात्यादिसाध्यत्वात् जातिगुणद्रव्यक्रियाणां च परस्परतोऽर्थान्तरत्वं, समुदायश्च साध्यः । तस्मादयुक्तमेषां तदपेक्षया सामान्यविषयत्वम् । यदप्युक्तमाप्तवादाविसंवाद-

30. A similar idea is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1

31. Cf. Pāṇini 1.1.1

सामान्यास्वर्गादिशब्दानामनुमानत्वमिति, अत्र ब्रूमः—एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? प्रमाणविषयत्वात् । सत्यमस्त्येषां सामान्यपरिकल्पना, सा तु प्रमाणविषया न तु प्रमेयविषया । प्रमेयं तु सामान्यमनुमानस्येत्ययमभ्युपगमो वः । तच्चासाधारणत्वास्वर्गादीनां प्रतिषिद्धम् । तस्मात्त्यज्यतामियमाशङ्कानुमानमेवागम इति ।

If it is argued that it is not a fault because of the capacity of word to denote every object ? It may be like this. The word is capable of denoting every object and the object is also capable of being denoted by every word. Their power of denotation is limited through the effort of the man.

How ?

This word should be the conveyer of this object only. And, this object should be meant by this word. The effort of the man is in this direction. Therefore, the natural relation found in the word is manifested by the intention of the speaker.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because it easily implies the undesirable contingency of its distinction from inference.* After postulating this also the distinction of the word from the inference easily follows.

Why ?

It is not that the sign is (capable of being) used to prove everything and is distinguished from other objects (limited with a particular object) through the intention of the speaker as the power of the word, which can be used in all the senses, is restricted through the intention of the speaker. For example, the single word uttered in this way and standing in need of being restricted (to a certain meaning) by the person, is capable of denoting all the objects, in the same way, (it is not that) the single sign through some reasoning is capable of conveying all the objects. Therefore, the word is

not a sign. *The statement that the commonness is accepted in case of moon, etc., from the point of view of its components (to be understood), is wrong because of the uncommon character (of the word).* This is contradictory to (the maxim) that the object is established through the word in the absense of inference (i. e., where the inference is not applicable). *Moreover, because commonness, etc., are to be established.* The mutual distinction in genus, quality, substance and action, and the combination of all is to be established. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the commonness stands in need of them. As regards your statement that there is the inferential nature in words like heaven, etc., because of the common quality of non-contradiction found in the valid statement, we reply that it is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because it (i.e., common quality) is with reference to the means of knowledge.* It is true that there is some postulation of common quality in case of them, but that is with reference to the means of knowledge and not with reference to the object of knowledge. Your first opinion is that in the case of inference the object cognised is general. This is negated in case of heaven, etc., because of their being unique. Hence, abandon the doubt that the valid testimony is only the inference.<sup>32</sup>

अन्यः पुनरनुमानागमयोरभेदप्रतिज्ञ इदमाह । स्वर्गादयः शब्दा न प्रमाणम् । कस्मात् ? प्रमाणान्तरेण तदर्थानुपलब्धेः । यस्य हि शब्दस्यार्थः प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानतो वा नोपलभ्यते स न प्रमाणम् । इतरस्तु प्रमाणम् । तद्यथा नद्यास्तीरे पक्वमाम्रवनं, पथि गुडशकटं विपर्यस्तमिति । न च स्वर्गादिशब्दानामर्थः प्रमाणान्तरेणोपलभ्यते । तस्माद्यथा विभुरात्मा सर्वत्र सुखादिसम्भवादित्येवमादयो बौद्धं प्रति धर्म्यसिद्धत्वादयो यथार्थास्तथा वेदशब्दा अपि प्रायेणेति । एतत्तु न युक्तरूपम् । कस्मात् ?

32. The sense is that the inference always gives rise to the knowledge of generality only while the verbal testimony gives rise to the knowledge of unique objects also.



अन्यायेन सर्वशब्दापवादात् । का ह्यत्र युक्तियंदस्मदादिभिरनुपलभ्यमानार्थं प्रमाणभूतानामपि वाक्यमयार्थं स्यात् ? सर्वेण चावश्यं कश्चिदाप्तस्तस्य च वाक्यमदृष्टार्थमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अतोयं तवात्रापि समानः प्रसंगः । न च प्रमाणं स्वार्थसिद्धये प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षते । तत्र यदि शब्दस्य प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षं यथार्थत्वमाश्रीयते तेन न केवलं स्वर्गादयः किं तर्हि शब्दा एवाऽप्रमाणमिति प्राप्तम् । अनुमानस्य च प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षस्य गमकत्वाभ्युपगमादागमस्य ततोऽर्थान्तरत्वं सुतरां प्रसज्यते । तस्माद्युक्तागमविरोधिन एवविधा नास्तिकवादाः श्रेयोऽर्थभिर्दूरादपोह्या इति स्थितमेतत्—अनुमानादसिद्धं वस्तु यत्तदाप्तागमात्साध्यमिति ।

एवमस्य त्रिविधस्य प्रमाणस्यैन्द्रियिकं कारणान्तरतोऽनुपलभ्यमानं च प्रमेयं व्याख्यातम् । एतस्मात्तु यदन्यत्तदसदिति प्रत्यवगन्तव्यम् ॥६-७॥

Someone else, who asserts the non-difference between valid testimony and inference states as follows. The words like heaven are not the means of valid knowledge.

Why ?

*Because the object denoted by them is not cognised through some other means of knowledge.* The word, the object denoted by which is not cognised through perception or inference, is not a means of valid knowledge. However, the other word (i.e. object denoted by which is cognised through some other means of knowledge) is a means of valid knowledge. For example, (the mangoes in the) grove of mango-trees on the bank of the river are ripen, the cart loaded with treacle is riverted (are the words leading to valid knowledge). And, the object denoted by the words like heaven is not cognised through some other means of knowledge. For example, as the object conveyed through the expressions like 'the soul is all-pervasive because of the possibility of pleasure, etc., everywhere', are not valid for the Buddhists because the suabstratum of the qualities is not proved for them. Similar are generally the vedic words.

It is, however, not correct.

Why ?

*Because of the exclusion of all the words without logic;* What is the logic here that the sentences, the objects denoted by which are not cognised by the persons like us, are not valid even when they come from the authoritative persons ? It should be admitted by all that someone is trustworthy and his statement pertains to the supra sensuous object. Therefore, in this case your (theory) also involves the undesirable contingency. It is also not that the means of knowledge requires the other means for establishing their objects. If the validity of words is held to depend upon some other means of knowledge, not only the heaven, etc., but all the words would be invalid. And, due to the admittance of the nature of establishing all the objects without depending upon any other means of knowledge in the case of inference, the nature of being a distinct means of knowledge is well applicable to the valid testimony. Therefore, it is right for the person desirous of felicity to avoid from a distance this kind of theories of the non-believers in the vedas, which go in contradiction with the sacred texts. Hence, it is well established that the objects not established through inference are to be established through the valid testimony.

In this way, the objects of the threefold means of knowledge, liable to be cognised through the sense-organs and those not cognised due to some other cause, are explained. The object, different from this, should be understood as non-existent.

## KĀRIKĀ 8

(Cause of non-perception of the cosmic matter)

आह, यद्येवं प्रधानस्यासत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । अनुपलब्धौ कारणान्तरत्वा-  
नुपलब्धेः । तद्धि प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वे सत्यतिदूरादिभिरनुपलब्धिकारणैर्नोप-  
लभ्यते । तन्न तावत् अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादव्यवधानाच्चास्याऽग्रहणम् ।  
कस्मात् ? विभुत्वात् । नेन्द्रियघातात्, अविकलेन्द्रियैरग्रहणात् । न मनो-  
ऽनवस्थानात्, अवस्थितमनोभिरग्रहणात् । न सौक्ष्म्यात्, शशविषाणादीनां  
सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । नाभिभवात्, असम्भवात् । न समानाभिहारादेकत्वात् ।  
तस्मात् कारणान्तराभावतोऽनुपलभ्यमानस्यासत्त्वमिच्छतः प्रधानस्यापि  
शशविषाणादीनामपि सत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । अथैतन्नेष्यते कारणान्तरं तर्ह्यनुप-  
लब्धौ वक्तव्यमिति ।

**Opponent :** If it is so, there arises the undesirable contingency of the non-existence of the cosmic matter because no other cause<sup>1</sup> (than non-existence) is observed for its non-perception. It is not the subject of perception and it is not perceived due to the causes of non-perception like excessive distance, etc. It is not that its non-perception is due to excessive distance, extreme proximity and intervention.

Why ?

Because of its being all pervasive.<sup>2</sup> Nor is it not perceived due to defect of the senses because of its being non-perceptible (even) to those possessed of perfect (lit. defectless) senses. Nor is it due to unsteadiness of mind because of its non-perception (even) by persons of steady mind. Nor is it

1. It refers to the cases listed in the 7th kārīkā. The objector further alleviates the application of all these causes of non-perception to cosmic matter.
2. As it is all-pervasive, it is neither extremely distant nor extremely near. Nor is there any intervention between it and the senses.

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due to its subtlety; otherwise it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the existence of the hare's horns, etc.<sup>1</sup> Nor is it due to suppression because it is not possible (in case of cosmic matter). Nor due to its intermixture with other similar things because it is single. Therefore, for those who intend (to establish) the non-existence of the object which is not perceived in the absence of some other cause (obstructing the perception), there arises the undesirable contingency of the absolute non-existence of cosmic matter just like that of hare's horns. If it is not acceptable to you, some other cause for its non-perception should be stated.

(Subtlety causes the non-perception of cosmic matter)

उच्यते—यत्तावदुक्तं अनुपलब्धौ कारणान्तरानुपपत्तेः प्रधानस्या-  
सत्त्वप्रसङ्ग इति, अत्राऽस्तु ।

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात् ।

यत्तूक्तं शशविषाणादीनामपिसत्त्वप्रसङ्ग इति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ?  
साधनोपपत्तेः । अस्ति हि प्रधानस्य सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धौ साधनं, न शश-  
विषाणादीनाम् । किं तत् ? उच्यते ।

कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिः ।

प्रधानस्य हि कार्यत उपलब्धिरित्येतदुपरिष्ठात्प्रतिपादयिष्यामः ।  
न तु शशविषाणादीनां कार्यमस्ति । तस्माद्विषमोऽयमुपन्यासः ।

**Proponent :** As regards your statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of the non-existence of the cosmic matter due to impossibility of some other cause of non-perception. let it be like this :

1. If it is argued that whatever is not perceived exists but is not perceived due to the subtlety, it would imply that the horns of hare also exist, but are not perceived due to subtlety. Here, we prefer the reading *viṣṇādināmapi sattvapra*...as found in Poona manuscript in place of *viṣṇānavadasattvapra* as accepted by Pandeya, because the earlier fits better in the flow of the argument.

THE NON-PERCEPTION OF THAT (COSMIC MATTER) IS DUE TO ITS SUBTLETY AND NOT DUE TO ITS NON-EXISTENCE.

Your contention that it will give rise to the undesirable contingency of existence of hare's horn, etc., also is wrong.<sup>1</sup>

Why ?

*Because of possibility of some cause (of its non-perception). Even though it is not perceived on account of its subtlety, there is some reason for its existence which is not found in case of hare's horn.*

What is that reason ?

The answer is :

SINCE IT IS APPREHENDED THROUGH ITS EFFECTS.

We shall propound later on how the cosmic matter is apprehended through its effects. There is, however, no effect of the hare's horn etc. Therefore the arguments are dissimilar.

आह—एवमपि प्रतिज्ञान्तरानर्थक्यम्, एकेन कृतत्वात् । सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिरित्युक्ते गम्यत एतन्नाभावादिति । तस्मात्तद्वचनमनर्थकमिति ।

Opponent : In this case also the other proposition becomes meaningless because the purpose is served by one only. When it is stated that it is not perceived due to subtlety, it is implied that it is not due to its non-existence. Therefore, its mention is meaningless.

उच्यते—न, वीतावीतपरिग्रहार्थत्वात् । एवं सिद्धे यत्प्रतिज्ञाद्वयं करोति तत् ज्ञापयत्याचार्यः वीतावीताभ्यामभिप्रेतार्थसिद्धिः । प्राक्च सौक्ष्म्यातिशयात्तदनुपलब्धिरित्याचक्षाणः प्रतिपादयति पुरस्ताद्वीतः प्रयोक्तव्य इति । एकस्मिन्च विषये द्वौ प्रयुजानः समुच्चयेन सिद्धिं द्योतयति । किं सिद्धं भवति ? यदुक्तं तन्त्रान्तरीयैः न पृथक्प्रतिपत्तिहेतू वीतावीताविति

1. Here also we prefer the reading *viṣāṇānāmapi sattvapra...* in place of *viṣāṇavadasattvapra...*

तदिष्टमेवं संगृहीतं भवति । तत्र वीतस्य प्रतिज्ञा सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः । तस्य चावीतस्य प्रसङ्गधर्मान्तरनिवृत्तिरूपेण, नाभावात् हेतुरुभययोगी । कथम् ? यस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलभ्यमानस्य कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिस्तस्य सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथेन्द्रियाणि । यदि पुनरस्याभावादनुपलब्धिस्स्यात्, कार्यतोऽनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः । अस्ति चेयं कार्यत उपलब्धिः । तस्मान्नाभावात् । न चेदभावात्, परिशेषतः सौक्ष्म्यात् तदनुपलब्धिरिति ॥

Proponent : No, because it is meant for the acceptance of direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. This being the case, by making two propositions the authority suggests that the object intended is established through the direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. And, stating earlier (to other proposition) that it is not perceived due to excessive subtlety the authority propounds that the direct inference should be used first. And, applying the both to the same object the authority suggests that both of them establish the object collectively.

What is proved ?

What is stated by the other systems that the direct inference and the inference-by-elimination are not the reason of knowing some object separately is desired (by us also) and is treated here. Here, the proposition of direct inference is that it is not perceived due to its subtlety, and that of the inference-by-elimination is in the form of negating the qualities of the object undesirably involved as 'not due to its non-existence', the probans here is related to both (the types of inference).<sup>1</sup>

How ?

The non-perception of the object, which is not directly perceived but is apprehended through the effect, is due to its

1. Viz., the non-perception is due to its subtlety and it is apprehended through its effects.

subtlety as it is in the case of the senses. If its non-perception would have been due to its non-existence, it would involve the undesirable contingency of its non-perception through the effects also. And, its apprehension through the effect is surely there. Therefore, it is not due to its non-existence. If it is not due to non-existence, it comes to mean through elimination that it is not perceived due to its subtlety.

(The Existence of the cosmic matter inferred through its effects)

आह—किं पुनस्तत्कार्यं यद् भवान्प्रधानस्यास्तित्वे लिङ्गमाचष्ट इति ?

Opponent : What is that effect which you adduce as a sign for the existence of the cosmic matter ?

उच्यते—

महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च ॥८॥

तद्धि महदहंकारेन्द्रियविशेषाविशेषलक्षणं कार्यं प्रधानेन विसदृशं सदृशं चेत्युपरिष्ठात्प्रवेदयिष्यामः ।

Proponent : AND ITS EFFECTS LIKE INTELLECT AND THE REST ARE SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR TO THE COSMIC MATTER.

We shall come to know later on that the intellect, egoism, senses, the non-specific (subtle) elements<sup>6</sup> and the specific (gross) elements are dissimilar as well as similar to the cosmic matter.

(Relevance of mention of dissimilarity and similarity)

आह—प्रस्तावाभावादयुक्तमेतत् । किं पुनरधिकृत्येदमुच्यते प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च महदादि कार्यमिति ?

Opponent : It is not right because of the lack of relevance. Taking recourse to what is it stated that the effects like intellect, etc., are similar and dissimilar to the cosmic matter ?

1. In Sāṃkhya the term non-specific denotes the subtle elements and the term specific, the gross elements. The reason is given in kārikā 38.

उच्यते—व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानान्मोक्षोऽवाप्यत इत्येतत्प्रकृतम् । एतानि च परस्परवैधर्म्यसाधर्म्यप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण न शक्यानि विज्ञातुमित्येवमर्थमिदं प्रस्तूयते । तस्मान्नाकस्मिको वैरूप्यसारूप्योपन्यास इति ॥८॥

Proponent : That the liberation is attained through the discriminative knowledge of the manifest, unmanifest and the soul forms the subject matter. These cannot be known without the knowledge of the mutual dissimilarity and similarity, for this purpose it is mentioned. Therefore, the mention of dissimilarity and similarity is not without reason.

॥ इति श्री युक्तिदीपिकायां सप्ततिपद्धतौ द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥

Here ends the second discourse of the Commentary  
Yuktidipikā on the Sāṃkhyakārikā

## KĀRIKĀ-9

(objections against pre-existence of effect in the cause)

आह- आस्तां तावद्वैरूप्यसारूप्यचिन्ता । कार्यमिदमेव तावन्महदादि परीक्षिष्यामहे । किं प्रागुत्पत्तेरस्ति नास्तीति ? कुतः संशय इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्- असङ्गतार्थं प्रकरणान्तरमुप-क्षिप्यते भवता । न चाविद्यमानसम्बन्धस्य संशयस्य प्रकरणान्तरेऽभिधीयमानस्य निर्णीतिं साध्वीमाचार्या मन्यन्ते । अवकाशाऽसम्भवादिति ।

opponent : Let us stop for the time being the consideration of dissimilarity and similarity. We shall first examine the effects like intellect and the rest as to whether the effect exists earlier to its manifestation or not.

If it is asked why does the doubt arise? It may be like this. You are introducing another irrelevant topic. The authorities do not consider it right to consider a doubt which is not connected and is stated indirectly in connection with some other topic because there is no possibility of its scope.

उच्यते- अस्ति संशयावकाशः । कस्मात् ? आचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः । प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यमसदित्याचार्याः कणादाक्षपादप्रभृतयो मन्यन्ते । सदसदिति बौद्धाः । नैव सत्रासदित्यन्ये । तस्मादुपपन्नः संशयः ।

Proponent : There is certainly the scope for the doubt.

Why?

*Because there is the difference of opinion among the authorities.* The authorities Like Kaṇāda and Gautama hold that the effect is non-existent before its origination. The Buddhists hold that it is both existent and non-existent. The others hold that it is neither existent nor non-existent. Therefore, the doubt is justified.

तत्रेदानीं भवतः का प्रतिपत्तिरिति ?

Opponent : In that case, what is your opinion?

उच्यते ।

नाऽविद्यमानस्य महदादेर्विकारस्य प्रधानादाविर्भाव इति प्रतिजानीमहे ।

कस्मात् ? सन्निवेशविशेषमात्राभ्युपगमात् । न हि नः कारणादर्थान्तरभूतं कार्यमुत्पद्यत इत्यभ्युपगमः ? किं तर्हि विश्वात्मकानां सत्त्वजस्तमसामगतविशेषविशेषाः सम्मात्रलक्षणोपचयाः प्रतिनिवृत्तपरिणामव्यापाराः परमविभागमुपसंप्राप्ताः सूक्ष्माः शक्तयः । तासामधिकारसामर्थ्यादुपजातपरिणामव्यापाराणां सम्मात्रानुक्रमेण प्रचयमुपसंपद्यमानानां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रं व्यक्तम् । एतस्यां कल्पनायामसत उत्पत्तौ कः प्रसङ्ग इति ? एतेनैव बाह्यानां तन्त्वादिकार्याणां पटादीनां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रत्वादसत उत्पत्तिः प्रतिषिद्धा बोद्धव्या ।

Proponent: We accept that the effects like intellect which would not exist in the cosmic matter, would not arise.

Why?

*Because we accept only a particular arrangement (to be the effect). We do not hold that there originates an effect which is altogether different from its cause. On the contrary, the sattva, rajas and tamas which form the essential nature of the world are endowed with the subtle potencies (in the state of unmanifest) which are devoid of similar or the dissimilar differentia, in an accumulated form having the characteristics of existence only, desist from the activity of modifying themselves (into the universe)<sup>1</sup> and in their entirety (lit. unpartitioned in the form of various effects).<sup>2</sup> The manifest is merely the particular arrangement of the potencies in whom the activity leading to modification has arisen due to their being entitled for it<sup>3</sup> (or due to the acts of living beings) and which have attained a collected<sup>4</sup> form in the orderly succession of their mere existence.<sup>5</sup> When this sort of supposition is accepted, where is the occasion for the origination of the non-existent? By this only the origination of non-existent should be understood to be refuted in the case of the external objects like cloth, etc., the effects of the threads, etc., because of their being merely the particular arrangement (of their respective material cause).*

आह—अविद्यमानमेतत् । कस्मात् ? असिद्धे, नार्थान्तरसिद्धेः । यदि हि सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रत्वं कार्यस्य सिद्धं स्यादत एतद्युज्यते वक्तुम्—तदभ्युपगमादसदुत्पत्तेरप्रसङ्ग इति । तत्त्वसिद्धम् । द्रव्यान्तरभूतस्यावयविनो निष्पत्तिर्प्रतिज्ञानात् । तस्मात् काकविषाणात् शशविषाणसिद्धिवदयुक्तं सन्निवेशविशेषमात्राभ्युपगमात्सत्कार्यसिद्धिरिति ।

Opponent : The reason is false (lit. non-applicable).

Why?

Because it is not established. The object cannot be established (through the other unestablished object). Had it been established that the effect is the mere particular arrangement (of the cause), only

then it would have been proper to say that because of the acceptance of this position there is no occasion for the origination of the non-existent. This is, however, not established because we have declared the origination of the composite as different from the components. Therefore, the establishment of the prior existence of the effect through the acceptance of the particular arrangement (in case of the effect) is improper like the establishment of the horn of the hare through the horn of the crow.<sup>7</sup>

इतश्चासत् कार्यम्, अग्रहणात् । इह श्रोत्रादीनां विषयभूतस्य तत्सन्निधानादवश्यं ग्रहणेन भवितव्यम् । यदि च प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्कार्यं स्यात् तदपि श्रोत्रादिसन्निधानात् गृह्येत । न तु गृह्यते । तस्मादसत्कार्यम् ।

*Moreover, the effect is non-existent (in the cause) because it is not perceived. There must arise the knowledge of the object of the senses like ear, etc., as it (the object) is into the contact of the senses. If the effect were existent before its origination, it would also be perceived as it comes into the contact with the senses like the ear, etc. However, it is not perceived and, therefore, the effect is non-existent (before its origination).*

अनुपलब्धिकारणसद्भावादिति चेत्, तत्रैतत्स्यात्, अस्ति प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्यानुपलब्धिकारणं तस्मादस्य सतोऽप्यग्रहणं भवति । उत्तरकालं तद्विगमात् ग्रहणमिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनुपलब्धिसम्भवात् । तद्धि प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वे सत्यतित्वादभिरनुपलब्धिकारणैर्नोपलभ्यते । न चैषां तत्र सम्भवः । तस्मादसदेतत् । कारणान्तरमधीधे यतोऽस्याग्रहणं स्यात् । अतश्चासदेव । किं चान्यत् कारणानुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । अनुपलब्धिकारणासद्भावात्कार्यस्याग्रहणमिच्छतः कारणाग्रहणप्रसङ्गः । कस्मात् ? अभिन्नदेशत्वात् । एकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् स्थूलत्वाच्च । तत्त्वनिष्ठम् । तस्मादयुक्तमनुपलब्धिकारणसद्भावात्सतः कार्यस्याग्रहणमिति । प्रमाणान्तरनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गादयुक्तमिति चेत्, स्यादेतत् यदि तर्हि प्रत्यक्षविषयमेवास्ति । ततोऽन्यत्रास्तीत्येदुपगम्यते । तेनातीन्द्रियविषयस्यानुमानस्य निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मान्नुपलब्धेरसत्कार्यमिति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? क्रियागुणव्यपदेशासम्भवात् । यद्धि प्रत्यक्षतो नोपलभ्यते तत्क्रियास्तीति संसूच्यते । यथा हर्म्यावस्थितानां तृणानामुद्बहनाद्वायुः गुणेन, यथा मालतीलतागन्धेन व्यपदेशेन वा, कार्यादिना यथेन्द्रियाणि । न तु प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य क्रियागुणव्यपदेशसम्भवः तस्मादसत्कार्यम् ।

It may be argued that it is so (not perceived) on account of the (other) causes of its non-perception? It may be like this. There is the cause of the non-perception of the effect before its origination. Therefore, it is not perceived even though it exists. Later on it is perceived on account of the removal of that (cause of non-perception).



It is also not proper.

Why?

Because there is no possibility.<sup>8</sup> It may be like this. That kind of object is not perceived, but still, its non-perception is caused by the causes of non-perception like extreme distance, etc. There is (however,) no possibility of these in that case.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the effect is non-existent. Moreover, because of the non-mention of some other cause, you have not recognised some cause other than extreme distance, etc., due to which it may not be perceived. Hence, it is non-existent. Moreover, due to the undesirable contingency of non-perception of the cause. In case of the one who intends the absence of the knowledge of the effect on account of the presence of the cause of non-perception, there arises the undesirable contingency of non-perception of the cause.

Why?

Because they are located at the same place, are perceived through the same sense and are gross (i.e., not subtle or minute). This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, it is not proper to say that the effect is not perceived due to the cause of non-perception even though it exists.

If it is argued that the argument is wrong because it involves the undesirable contingency of refusal of the other means of knowledge? It may be if it is held to be the object of perception only; it is admitted (through it) that there is no other means (to cognise). This involves the undesirable contingency of the refusal of inference which is the means of cognising the non-perceptible objects. This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the effect is not non-existent because of its non-perception.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because there is no possibility of activity, property or name. The objects not cognised through perception are inferred through their activity just as the air is indicated by its activity of lifting up of the straws lying in the court-yard; through property—just as the jasmine creeper is indicated by its smell;<sup>10</sup> or through the name. It is indicated through result as the sense, etc. There is no possibility of activity, property and name in case of the effect before its origination. Therefore, the effect is non-existent.

इतश्चासत्कार्यम् । कर्तृप्रयाससाफल्यत् । इह प्राग् व्यापारोपक्रमात् कर्तारस्तस्मात्फ-

लमुपलिप्समानाः कार्यविशेषनियतसामर्थ्यं साधनमुपादाय व्याप्रियन्ते । तच्चेत्प्रागपि व्यापारात् स्यात्तदर्थस्य परिस्पन्दस्यानर्थक्यं प्राप्तम् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मात् कर्तृप्रयाससाफल्यत् असत्कार्यम् । परिणामाद्युपपत्तेर्न दोष इति चेत् स्यान्मन्तं कारणस्य परिणामव्यूहसंश्लेषव्यक्तिप्रचयलक्षणान्धर्मान् यस्मात् कर्त्रादीनि कुर्वन्ति नानर्थकानि स्युः । सत्त्वं च कार्यस्य न निरुन्ते । क एवं सति दोषः स्यादिति ? उच्यते—न शक्यमेवं कल्पयितुम् । कस्मात् ? मार्गान्तरानुपपत्तेः । परिणामो हि नामावस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य धर्मान्तरनिवृत्तिः धर्मान्तरप्रवृत्तिश्च । तत्र सतो धर्मान्तरस्य निरोधाभ्युपगमादसत्त्वोत्पत्तिप्रतिज्ञानान्नेदमर्थान्तरमारभ्यते । एवं व्यूहादयोऽप्युपसंहर्तव्याः । तस्मात् परिणामादिभिरभिभवात् कर्त्रादीनामर्थवत्त्वादसत्कार्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—

जहद् धर्मान्तरं पूर्वमुपादत्ते यदा परम् ।

तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो धर्मो परिणामः स उच्यते ॥

Moreover, because of the success in the effort of the agent. Here, it is observed that the agents with the desire of getting the fruit with that (cause) acquire before the commencement of the operation the particular means having the capability of producing a particular effect and employ them in operation. If that (fruit) would exist even before the causal operation, the operation meant for that purpose will serve no purpose. This is, however, not desirable. Therefore, because of the success of the operation of the agent the effect is non-existent.

If it is argued that this defect does not arise because of the possibility of the transformation, etc.? It may be like this. The agent, etc., would not be useless because they bring about the characteristics of the cause like transformation, structure, joining together, manifestation (or visibility) and increase in the cause. The existence of the effect is not contradicted. When this is the position, what would be the fault?

It is not possible to postulate like this.

Why?

Because of the impropriety of some other way out. The transformation is, in fact, the giving up of some qualities and introduction of some new qualities in the already existing object. In that case, because of the giving up of some existing qualities and the origination of some other non-existing qualities there is (no) production of some different object. Similarly, the structure, etc.,<sup>11</sup> should also be summed up. Therefore, on account of the dominance by the transformation, etc., and the significance of agent, etc., the effect is held to be non-existent. It is stated also:

When an object takes over new properties giving up the earlier but without deviating from its essential nature, that is called transformation.

कुतश्च न सत्कार्यम् ? आरम्भोपरमयोरान्ताविशेषप्रसंगात् । यदि सत्कार्यं स्यात् तेन यः क्रियार्थः साधनानामादौ परिस्पन्दः सोऽन्तेऽपि स्यात् । वा योऽन्ते विरामः स आदावपि स्यात् । कस्मात् ? सदविशेषात् । न तु तदस्ति । तस्मादसत्कार्यम् ।

And, why does the effect not exist?

Because there would arise the undesirable contingency of the non-difference between the beginning and the stopping of the commencement and the cessation. If the effect would be existent, the operation of the instruments employed for the activity at the commencement would be found at the end also. Or, the cessation (of the operation) found at the end would be present at the commencement as well.

Why?

Because there is no differentiation with regard to the existence of the effect (at both the stages). This is not the case. Therefore, the effect does not exist.

इतश्चासत्कार्यम् उत्पत्तिधर्मस्याद्यन्तयोरविशेषप्रसङ्गात् । यदि सत्कार्यं स्यात् तेन यथा निष्पन्नस्योत्पत्तिधर्मेणाभिसम्बन्धः तथा आदावपि स्यात् । यथैवादावभिसम्बन्धः तथाऽन्तेऽपि स्यात् । दृष्टस्त्वभिसम्बन्धो नाभिसम्बन्धश्चाद्यन्तयोः । तस्मादसत्कार्यम् ।

Here is another reason for the non-existence of the effect. There would arise the undesirable contingency of the non-difference between the states of commencement and that of the stopping in the case of (the relation of) the quality of origination. If the effect would be existent, the quality of origination would be related to the object in the beginning also in a way it is related to the accomplished state. The type of relation with the origination found in the beginning would be found at the end also. The relation and the non-relation (of the quality of origination) is, however, experienced at the state of commencement and the end respectively. Therefore, the effect does not exist.

इतश्चतासत्कार्यम् । जन्मसच्छब्दयोर्विरोधात् । इह जन्मशब्दः प्रागभूतस्यार्थस्य भावक्रममाह । सच्छब्दस्तु क्रियान्तरहेतुत्वमाह । यदि सतो जन्म स्यादैकार्थ्यमनयोः स्यात् । न त्वेतदस्ति । तस्मादयुक्तं सज्जायत इति ।

Here is another reason for the non-existence of the effect. Because there is the contradiction between the two terms-origination

and the existent. The word origination (janana) denotes the coming into existence of an object which does not exist earlier. The term existent (sat) denotes the instrumentation of some other action. If the existent would be subject to origination, both the terms would become synonymous. It is, however, not the case. Therefore, it is improper to say that the existent originates.

(Non-difference between a composite and the components)

उच्यते-यदुक्तं द्रव्यान्तरभूतस्यावयविनो निष्पत्तिप्रतिज्ञानात्र सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रत्वात् सत्कार्यमित्यत्र ब्रूमः-तदसिद्धिः, भेदेनाऽग्रहणात् । यदि तन्त्वादिभ्यो द्रव्यान्तरभूतस्यावयविनो निष्पत्तिः स्यात् तेन यथा तन्तुकलापे पटस्तत्रैव वा पदान्तरमाहितं भेदेनोपलभ्यते तथैवोपलभ्येत । न तूपलभ्यते । तस्मात् न द्रव्यान्तरम् ।

Proponent : As regards your argument that since we have declared that the composite is produced as different from the components, the effect does not pre-exist on account of its being different from the particular arrangement of the cause, we reply as follows. The reason does not hold good at all because it is not known as different. If there would have been the origination of some altogether different composite out of the threads, the cloth would be observed as different just as it is observed so when it is placed in the collection of threads or just like another cloth placed there. It is, however, not observed thus. Hence, it is not something different.<sup>12</sup>

समवायादग्रहणमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, संयोगिनोर्द्रव्ययोः सत्याधाराधेयभावे भेदेन ग्रहणं भवति । समवायलक्षणा तु प्राप्तिस्तन्तुपटयोः । तस्मान्नास्ति भेदेन ग्रहणमिति ।

If it is argued that it is not found (as different) due to the relation of inherence? It may be like this. The two substances related through conjunction (samyoga) and consequently there being the relation of located and the location, are cognised as different. The relation between the threads and the cloth, however, is that of inherence (samavaya). Therefore, they are not cognised as different.

तच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? असिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धे सत्यर्थान्तरभावेऽवयविनस्तत्प्राप्तौ च समवाये सर्वमेतत्स्यात् । तत्त्वसिद्धमुभयम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । किंचान्यत् दृष्टान्ताभावात् । महापरिमाणं द्रव्यमन्यत्राहितं समवायात् भेदेन नोपलभ्यते इत्येतस्मिन्नर्थे पर्यनुयुक्तस्य कस्ते दृष्टान्तः ? न चास्त्यनुदाहृतो वादः ।

This argument is, however, improper.

Why?

Because it is not proved. Only after proving the composite as different object (than the components) and the relation of inherence between them, all this would be said. Both of these are, however, unproved.<sup>13</sup> Hence, your argument is wrong. Moreover, it is wrong on account of the lack of example also. To prove that substance of big magnitude put at some other substance is not cognised to be different due to the relation of inherence, what example can be cited by you in case an enquiry is made from you? The discussion without an example is not discussion at all.

व्याप्ते न ग्रहणमिति चेत् स्यान्मतमकार्यकारणभूतं द्रव्यं सत्यपि सम्बन्धे न द्रव्यान्तरं व्यश्नुत इत्यतो भेदेन गृह्यते। तन्तुपटयोस्तु कार्यकारणभूतत्वात् व्याप्तिः। तस्मान्नास्ति भेदेन ग्रहणमिति।

If it is argued that the difference is not cognised between the composite and the components on account of their pervasion? It may be like this. The substance is cognised as different from the substance which is neither its cause nor its effect because one does not pervade the other even though they are mutually related. There is the mutual pervasion between the threads and the cloth because they are related through causality (or because there is the cause-effect relation between them). Therefore, they are not cognised as different.

एतदप्युक्तम्। कस्मात्? साध्यत्वात्। सत्यर्थान्तरभावेऽवयवविद्रव्यान्तरवत् कार्यकारणभावः साध्यः समवायश्च। अत इयं व्याप्तिः स्यात्। सा चाप्रसिद्धा इत्यतो न सम्यगेतत्।

This is also improper.

Why?

Because this is to be established. Here, the causal relation and the inherence are yet to be established just as it was to be proved that the composite is different substance. Then only there can be the mutual pervasion. This is, however, not well known. Therefore, your argument is not proper.

वेमादिवत् इति चेत् स्यादेतत्—यथा सत्यर्थान्तरभावे वेमादयोऽवयविनः कारणम् एवं तन्तवोऽपि।

If it is argued that it may be like loom, etc.? Just as the loom, etc., are the cause of the composite even though they are different, similar may be the case with threads, etc.

एतदनपपन्नम्। कस्मात्? अनभ्युपगमात्। कारणं वेमादयः पटस्य न कारणमित्यय-

मभ्युपगमो नः। तस्मात् विषमोऽयं दृष्टान्तः। किं चान्यत्। तद्वद्व्याप्तिप्रसङ्गात्। वेमादिवदर्थान्तरं पटात्तन्तव इत्येवं ब्रुवतस्तद्वद्व्याप्तिप्रसङ्गः। किं चान्यत्। स्पर्शक्रियामूर्तिगुरुत्वान्तरवत्तद्वति प्रतीघातादिति। इह स्पर्शान्तरवति स्पर्शान्तरवत्प्रतीघातो दृष्टः। तद्यथा घटस्याश्मनि। स्पर्शान्तरवांश्च ते पटस्तन्तुभ्य इत्यतोऽस्य तद्व्यापित्वमयुक्तम्। एवं च क्रियादयो वक्तव्याः। तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् भेदानां ग्रहणान्नावयवी द्रव्यान्तरमिति।

This is wrong?

Why?

Because it is not accepted by us. Our theory is that the loom, etc., are the instruments for the cloth and not the material causes. Hence, the illustration is odd.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, there would be the undesirable contingency of absence of mutual pervasion as in the case of those (loom, etc.).<sup>15</sup> There would arise the undesirable contingency of absence of pervasion between the threads and the cloth as it is in the case of loom and the cloth, in case of those who hold that the threads are different from the cloth, like loom, etc. Moreover, because the object is obstructed by the other object having different type of touch, activity, form and a weight. It is experienced that the object having different type of touch is obstructed by the other just as the pot is obstructed in the presence of a stone. The cloth is of a touch different from the threads. Hence, their mutual pervasion does not hold good. In this way activity, etc., should be explained. Hence, it is proper to say that the composite is not a different substance because differences are not cognised.<sup>16</sup>

इतश्च नावयवी द्रव्यान्तरम्। कृत्स्नैकदेशवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। स ह्यवयवेषु वर्तमानः कृत्स्नेषु वा वर्तते प्रत्यवयवं वा? किं चातः? तन्न तावत् कृत्स्नेषु वर्तते। कस्मात्? एकदेशग्रहणे ग्रहणाभावप्रसङ्गात्। यदनेकेषु वर्तते तस्य कृत्स्नाधारग्रहणे सति ग्रहणं दृष्टम्। तद्यथा द्वित्वादीनाम्। एवं च सति विषाणादिग्रहणे गोऽग्रहणप्रसङ्गः। किं चावयवानवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। स ह्यवयवान् व्याप्नुवंस्तद्वयतिरेकेणावयवान्तराभावात् केन व्याप्नुयात्? अवयवान्तराभ्युपगमे चानवस्थाप्रसङ्गः। कृत्स्नैकदेशवृत्तिप्रसङ्गश्च समानः। तस्मान्न सर्वेषु परिसमाप्यते, न प्रत्येकमनेकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अनेकाधारपरिसमाप्तं ह्यनेकं रूपादि दृष्टमिति। किंचान्यत् शास्त्रहानेः। प्रत्यवयवं परिसमाप्तोऽवयवीत्येतदिच्छतो मूर्तिमताऽवयवेन समानदेशः स्यात्। ततश्च यच्छास्त्रं मूर्तिमतामसमानदेशत्वमिति तस्य व्याघातोऽवयवपरिमाणं च प्राप्नोति। न महत्त्वादपरिसमाप्तत्वादेकद्रव्यं च प्राप्नोति। ततश्च यच्छास्त्रं द्रव्यमनेकद्रव्यमद्रव्यं वा तस्य हानिरेतावता चास्य वृत्तिर्भवन्ती भवेत्। सर्वथा च दोषः। तस्मान्नावयवी द्रव्यान्तरम्।

Due to this reason also the composite is not a different substance. Because it is improper to hold their existence either in all the components or in every component part (separately). If it is present

in the components, it may be present in all the components or in the individual component (separately).

What does it prove?

It does not exist in all parts.

Why?

Because it will involve the undesirable contingency of its non-perception through the perception of a part. It is observed that whatever exists in many is cognised through cognising all of substrata; for example, the two-ness (*dvaitva*), etc.<sup>17</sup> In this case, there will arise the undesirable contingency of non-perception of cow through the perception of the horns, etc.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, it would lead to the infinite regress in the case of the components. The composite pervades the components, but by whom the components will be pervaded because the (supposed) pervasiveness is not something different from the components? If the pervasive is admitted to be different, it will involve the undesirable contingency. The undesirable contingency in case of its existence in the composite and the parts is the same. Hence, it does not pervade all. Nor does it pervade each component because in that case it will involve the undesirable contingency of its being manifold.<sup>19</sup> It is observed that the colour, etc., which pervade many substrata are many. Moreover, the scripture would be violated. The composite would have the same substratum as the components which is corporeal in nature, in the theory of one who intends (to establish) that the composite pervades each component. It will contradict the scriptural statement that the objects possessed of form do not have the same substrata.<sup>20</sup> And, it would also imply the magnitude of the component as that of the composite. It will not hold good with the idea that the composite is a single substance because it pervades the large magnitude. If this sort of existence is admitted in its case, the scriptural statement regarding substance, manifold or absence of substance will be violated because it involves the fault in all circumstances. Therefore, the composite is not a different substance.

अर्थान्तरावस्थानेऽर्थान्तरोत्पत्तिविनाशदर्शनादन्यत्वमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्-विद्यमानेषु तन्तुषु पटो न भवति संयोगलक्षणस्य कारणान्तरस्यानुत्पत्तेः। संयोगोत्तरकालं तु भवति। कारणसामग्र्या विद्यमानेष्वेव च तन्तुषु विनाशमुपयाति। विभागादर्थान्तरावस्थाने चार्थान्तरोत्पत्तिविनाशौ दृष्टौ। तद्यथा हिमवदवस्थाने दवाग्नेः। तस्मादर्थान्तरं पटस्तन्तुभ्य इति।

If it is argued that the two (composite and components) are different because the one is observed as being produced and

destroyed in the presence of the other? It may be like this. The cloth does not exist in the presence of the threads because the contact, the cause of the cloth, is not produced. And, the cloth comes into existence after the contact is produced (in the presence of the threads). The cloth gets destroyed even in the presence of the threads by the totality of causal conditions (of destruction). The origination and destruction of an object are differently observed in the presence of the other object on account of their difference. As for example, the forest conflagration (originates and gets destroyed) while the Himalaya (covered with snow which is opposed to fire) is present. Hence, the cloth is different from threads.

एतदप्ययुक्तम्। कस्मात्? साध्यत्वात्। साध्यं तावदेतत्-किमत्रार्थान्तरमुत्पद्यते विनश्यति वा? आहोस्वित्तन्तुष्वेव समवस्थानविशेषापेक्षस्य पटाभिधानस्य प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती सेनावनवद् भवतः? तस्मादेतदपि नावयविनो द्रव्यान्तरभावे लिंगम्।

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is still to be proved. Whether that which originates and is destroyed is the different object or the activity (leading to origination) and withdrawal from activity (leading to destruction) belong to the cloth which is based upon the particular arrangement of the threads, as is the case with army (which is the collection of the soldiers) or the forest (which is the collection of the trees). This also does not serve as a probans in proving that the composite is a different object..

तत्पुरुषबहुब्रीहिद्वन्द्वसमासोपपत्तेरन्य इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, इहार्थान्तरत्वे सति तत्पुरुषो दृष्टः। तद्यथा राज्ञः पुरुषो राजपुरुष इति। बहुब्रीहिश्च चित्रगुः शबलगुः। द्वन्द्वश्च प्लक्षन्त्यग्रोधाविति। अस्ति चेहापि तत्पुरुषस्तन्तूनां पटः। बहुब्रीहिश्च दृढतन्तुः शुक्लतन्तुः। द्वन्द्वश्च तन्तुपटाविति। तस्माच्चावयव्यर्थान्तरम्।

If it is argued that it should be held to be different for the propriety of the compounds like tatpuruṣa, bahubīhi and dvandva? It may be like this. It is observed that the tatpuruṣa is used in case of different objects just as the sense of the 'Man of the king' is conveyed through the term rājapuruṣa. Same is the case with the bahubīhi as found in the case of expression 'Who has spotted cows' or 'Who has brindled cows'. The similar is the case with dvandva as in plakṣa and nyagrodha (both meaning the fig tree). These compounds are observed to take place in the case of threads and the cloth also, tatpuruṣa - as in the expression cloth (made) of threads, bahubīhi - as in the expression (the cloth) 'that has strong threads' or the cloth '

that has white threads', the dvandva - as in the expression 'threads not the cloth'. Therefore, the composite is different (from the components).

एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्तात् । अनन्यत्वेऽपि हि तत्पुरुषो दृष्टः । तद्यथा सेनागजः काननवृक्ष इति । बहुव्रीहिश्च वीरपुरुषा मत्तगजा सेना इति । द्वन्द्वस्तु यदि स्यात्सत्यमेवार्थान्तरमवयवी स्यात् । न तु कश्चित्पटावस्थायामेवं प्रयुङ्क्ते-तन्तुपटावानयेति । तस्मान्ननोरथमात्रमेतत् । एतेन समाख्यासामर्थ्यभेदाः प्रत्युक्ताः । ते चापि चानर्थान्ते सति सेनादिषु दृष्टाः । तस्मान्नाऽवयवी द्रव्यान्तरम् । द्रव्यानतरभूतस्याऽवयविनो निष्पत्तिप्रतिज्ञानात्, न सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रत्वात् सत्कार्यमित्येतदयुक्तम् ।

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is non-conclusive. The tatpuruṣa is observed even when there is no difference in the expression like the elephant of the army and the tree of the forest.<sup>21</sup> The bahubhīhi also (takes place) as in the expression an army which has brave men, and the army which has intoxicated elephants. If there would be the dvandva compound, the composite would really be different, (but) no one uses the expression bring the threads and the cloth in the state of the cloth. Therefore, it is only a wishful thinking. By this only the differences in the capacity of denotation are refuted. These also are observed in the case of (components of) army, etc., though there is no difference.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the composite is not different substance. Hence, it is wrong to argue that since the origination is observed in case of the composite which is different, the theory of pre-existence of effect cannot be proved on the basis of considering the composite as a particular arrangement (of the causes).

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तमनुपलब्धेरसत्कार्यमिति, अत्र ब्रूमः । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? संशयकारणत्वात् । स च सद्विषयाऽनुपलब्धिः । इत्येतस्मादेव हेतोस्सांशयिका वयम् । तामेव तु निश्चयार्थमवलम्बमानो न युक्तिमार्गमनुयाति ।

As regards your statement that the effect does not exist because it is not perceived (to be existent in the causes), we reply that it is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is doubtful. The non-perception in this case pertains to the already existent object. Because of this reason only we doubt. The argument taking that (non-perception of the non-existent) as certain does not stand before logic.<sup>23</sup>

यत् पुनरेतदुक्तं कारणान्तराऽनभिधानादिति-एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अभिप्रायाऽनवबोधात् । यो हि यथा कुण्डे बदराण्यर्थान्तरभूतान्याहितानि तथा कारणे कार्यमस्तीत्येतदाचष्टे तं प्रत्ययमुपालम्भः स्यात् । वयन्तु अनेकशक्तधर्मिणः सहकारिशक्त्यनतरानुगृहीतस्य पूर्वस्याशक्तेस्तिरोभावमुत्तरस्याश्चाविर्भावमुपादधानाः कारणमेव कार्यमित्यनुमन्यामहे । तयोस्तु शक्त्योर्युगपदग्रहणम् । इतरेतरप्रतिबन्धहेतुत्वात् । वस्त्रस्यायामविस्तारवत्, कूर्माङ्गमिव द्रष्टव्यम् । यथा वस्त्रस्योपसंहारप्रतिबन्धादायामविस्तारो न ग्रहणविषयतां प्रतिपद्येते, सत्तां वा न जिहीतः कूर्मस्येवाङ्गानि, तथा तन्त्वादीनामपि भावानां कारणाभिमतता कार्याभिमतता चावस्था क्रमेण वा स्थिरश्च भवत् तन्निमित्तस्तदग्रहणाऽग्रहणविकल्पः ।

Your argument that the effect does not exist because you have not put forward some other reason of non-perception (other than extreme distance, etc.) is also wrong.

Why?

Because you have not understood the import of our statement. This censure is applicable to those who speak of the effect as placed in the cause just as the jujube fruit placed in a vessel (bowl-shaped). We hold that the effect is the cause itself which is endowed with various potencies and through the assistance of the other assisting potencies the earlier potencies of whom disappear and the later potencies manifest. Those potencies are not perceived simultaneously because they obstruct each other. It should be understood just as the stretching and expansion of the cloth or like the limbs of a tortoise. The stretching or the expansion of a cloth are not subjected to perception due to the obstruction of contracting and they do not deviate from the existence. The same is the case with the limbs of a tortoise. Similarly, the state of the threads, etc., called the cause or the effect comes to be fixed in sequence serving as the cause of that (object) and serves as the cause for the perception or the non-perception of that object.

एतेन कारणग्रहणं प्रत्युक्तम् । यदप्युक्तं प्रमाणान्तरनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गादिति सत्यमेतत् । यत्तुक्तं क्रियागुणव्यपदेशासम्भवादनुमानाभाव इति तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? पृथक्त्वाऽनभ्युपगमात् । कार्यकारणपृथक्त्ववादिनस्तत्क्रियागुणानां पृथक्त्वमनुमातुं युक्तमित्यतस्तन्ववस्थाने पटक्रियागुणग्रहणादनुमानाभाव इत्ययमुपालम्भः सावकाशः स्यात् । अस्माकन्तु कारणमात्रस्यैव संघातादाकारान्तरपरिग्रहाद् वा क्रियागुणानां प्रचितित्व्यक्तिविशेषो भवतीति ब्रुवतामदोषः । व्यपदेशस्तु कार्यकारणपर्यायः । सोऽयुक्तः । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्तात् । द्रव्यगुणत्वकर्मत्वादीनां क्रियागुणकार्यकारणभावोऽथ च सत्त्वमिष्यते ऽथ लिङ्गपर्यायः । न तर्हि वयं पर्यनुयोज्या व्यपदेशाभावादसत्कार्यमिति । किं कारणम् ? प्रकरणात् । विप्रतिपत्तौ हि सत्यां लिङ्गतः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य समाधिगमं करिष्याम इति प्रकृतमेवैतत् । अनैकान्तिकत्वं च



समानम् । निष्पत्त्यनन्तरं द्रव्यस्यास्तित्वाभ्युपगमादगुणवतो द्रव्यस्य गुणारम्भः । कर्मगुणा अगुणा इति वचनादुत्पन्नमात्रं द्रव्यं निष्क्रियं निर्गुणमवतिष्ठते इति वः पक्षः । न चास्य तथाभू-  
तस्य लिङ्गमस्ति । अथ चास्तित्वं भवदभिरभ्युपगम्यते । सिद्धेर्यहणात्सद्भाव इति चेन्न । सर्व-  
विवादसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । दृष्टान्तविरुद्धमर्थं प्रतिज्ञाय पतिषिध्यमानेन सिद्धबुद्धिविषयता स्मर्त-  
व्येत्येतस्यां कल्पनायां सर्वविवादसिद्धिप्रसंगः स्यात् । किं चान्यत् । प्रतिपक्षे समानत्वात् ।  
अस्मत्पक्षेऽपि तर्हि भगवत्पञ्चशिखादीनां प्रत्यक्षत्वात्सत्कार्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तस्मान्न  
क्रियागुणव्यपदेशासम्भवादसत्कार्यम् ।

This only refutes the argument based on the acceptance of the instrumental causes. The statement that your argument involves the undesirable contingency of non-applicability of the other means of knowledge, is true or correct. Your statement that there is no inference because there is no possibility of action, property and name is not proper.

Why?

Because we do not accept the difference in case of them. It is proper to infer the difference of action and property in case of those who maintain the difference between the effect and the cause, and in that case only the censure that there is no inference for the action and property of the cloth are not perceived at the state of the threads would find scope. On the other hand, this fault does not arise in our case because we hold that the effect is the composite or the attainment of the other form of cause only and, hence, the action and property are the accumulation or the particular manifestation. The denotation is the same in case of effect and the cause. This is improper.

Why?

Because it is not conclusive. The substance, property-ness and action-ness are related as property or activity, cause and effect and, hence, they are considered to be the existing elements and, therefore, serve as probans. Hence, we should not be questioned (for the purpose of refuting us) that the effect does not exist because there is no probans.

What is the reason?

Because of the context. In case there is controversy we apprehend through probans the existence of the effect earlier to its origination; this is the subject at hand. And, the non-conclusiveness is common. You maintain that the substance exists just after the origination (but without properties), and hence, the properties originate in the substance devoid of properties. Your position is that

just after its origination the substance persists without property and activity because you have stated that the object is devoid of property or action in the initial state just after origination. There is, however, no probans in case of that kind of substance (because the supposed probans do not exist). But still, its existence is admitted by you.<sup>24</sup> If you argue for its existence on the ground of the perception of its accomplishment or existence, it would not be right because there would arise the undesirable contingency of the establishment of all the subjects of controversy. After recognising the object which goes against the example, if you postulate that one should remember its objectivity to the knowledge of accomplished object even though it is objected to by others, it would involve the undesirable contingency of establishment of all the subjects of controversy. Moreover, it is similar in the case of the opponents also. Our position is that the effect in its causal state is perceived by lord pañcaśikha, etc.,. Hence, the existence of the effect (before its origination) should be accepted. Therefore, it is not that the effect does not exist (in the cause) because of the impossibility of action, property and name in it.

(Argument of success of the effort of agent refuted).

यत्तु नरेतदुक्तं- कर्तृप्रयाससाफल्यवादसत्कार्यमिति, अत्र ब्रूम- एतदप्युक्तम् ।  
कस्मात् ?

### असदकरणात्

यद्युभयपक्षप्रसिद्धस्यासतः क्रियायोगः स्यात् अत एतद्युज्यते वक्तुम् कार्ये सति कर्तुः प्रयासोऽनर्थक इति । तत्त्वसतः करणमनुपपन्नम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । हेत्वभिधानादसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत्- यथा निष्पन्नत्वान्मध्वादीनां धारणसमर्थो घटो न क्रियत इत्ययमपदिष्टो हेतुरस्माभिः एवमित्यं कार्यस्यासतः कारणं नोपपन्नमिति नोक्तं भवता । तस्मादसिद्धिरिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सत्यसति वा सम्बन्धे दोषप्रसङ्गात् । तद्धि क्रियमाणं सति वा सम्बन्धे कारकैः क्रियतेऽसति वा ? सम्बन्धश्चास्य भवन्नवृत्तिकाले वा कारणानां स्यात्, निष्पत्तिकाले वा ? किं चातः ? तन्न तावत्प्रवृत्तिकाले सम्बन्धो युक्तः । कस्मात् ? अद्रव्यत्वात् । प्रवृत्तिकाले कर्त्रादीनां क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावादवस्तुभूतं शशविषाणस्थानीयं वः कार्यम् । न चास्ति तथाभूतस्य वस्तुभूतेन सम्बन्धः । अथ निष्पत्तिकालेऽभिसम्बध्यते यदुक्तं सतो निष्पन्नत्वात्क्रियानुत्पत्तिरिति तस्य व्याघातः । अथ मतमसत्यपि सम्बन्धे निष्पत्तिर्भवतीति तेन कारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यप्रसंगः । प्रागपि च कारकोपादानात्कार्यनिष्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति । उक्तं च

असत्त्वान्नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारकैः सत्त्वसंगिभिः ।

असम्बन्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः ॥

इति ।



As regards your statement that the effect is non-existent because of the success of the effort of an agent, we reply that this is also wrong.

Why?

### THAT WHICH IS NON-EXISTENT CANNOT BE PRODUCED;

If that which is related to the operation would have been admitted to be non-existent by both the parties, it would be right to say that the effort of the agent is purposeless when the effect (to be produced) is already present. But (the idea of) the production of the non-existent is not proper. Hence, it is improper.

If one argues that it is not proved because of the absence of forwarding some reason? It may be like this. The pot which is capable of retaining honey, etc., is not subject to production because it is already accomplished. This is the argument adduced by us. You have, however, not explained how it is improper to speak of the production of the non-existent.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, it amounts to the non-existence of the reason (or therefore, the reason adduced by you is non-conclusive).

This is also improper.

Why?

Because it involves the undesirable contingency of defect in admitting or not admitting the relation of the effect (with the cause). Is the object to be produced related to the instruments or not (while being produced)? The aforesaid relation with cause, if admitted, may be in the state of causal operation or in the accomplished state.

What is the use of this consideration?

This kind of relation is not possible in the state of causal operation.

Why?

Because it is not a substance. The effect at the time of operation of the agent, etc., in your theory is just like the horn of the hare because it is devoid of activity, quality and name, and consequently is not a substance. This kind of object cannot be related with some substance. If you say that it is related in the accomplished state, it will contradict your statement that the already existent object is already accomplished and there is no propriety of operation in that state. If

you hold that the origination takes place without the aforesaid relation, it will involve the undesirable contingency of the uselessness of the operation of the instruments.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, it will involve the undesirable contingency of the production of the effect even earlier to the employment of the instruments. It is stated also:

Because of the non-existence there is no relation (of the effect) with the instruments which are always related to the existing things only. There is no ground for those who believe in the origination of the unrelated effect.

आह, ननु च मध्यमे काले कर्त्रादिभिः कार्यं क्रियते ।

Opponent: The effect is created by the agent, etc., in the intermediary time.

कः पुनरसौ मध्यमः काल इति ?

Proponent: What is this intermediary time?

आह—

आरम्भाय प्रसृता यस्मिन्काले भवन्ति कर्तारः ।

कार्यस्यानिष्ठादात्तं मध्यमं कालमिच्छन्ति ॥ इति ।

यदा हेतवः प्रवृत्तारम्भा भवन्त्युद्दिश्य कार्यं न च तावन्नैमित्तिकस्यात्मलाभः संवर्तते स मध्यमः कालः । तस्मिन्क्रियते कारकैः कार्यमिति ।

Opponent: At the time in which the agents are engaged in activity after commencing it, is said to be intermediary because the effect is not yet accomplished.

When the instrumental causes are in some activity with the purpose of accomplishing some effect and until the form of the effect is not accomplished, that is the intermediary time. During that period the effect is created by the instruments.

उच्यते, न, अवस्थान्तरानुपपत्तेः । प्राङ्निष्पत्तेरसत्ता । निष्पन्नस्य सत्तेत्यवस्थाद्वयम् । सदसद्रूपा चावस्था नास्ति यो मध्यमः स्यात् । अतो न युक्तमेतदिति । किंचान्यत् । पूर्वदोषापरिहारादुद्दिश्य कार्यं तस्यात्मनो लाभात्केन सह सम्बन्ध इति ? अत्राप्ययं पर्यनुयोगो नैव निवर्तत इति । तस्माच्चित्रमपि वाक्यं प्रसार्य न किञ्चित्परिहृतं भवता । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् सत्यसति वा सम्बन्धे दोषप्रसंगादसन्न क्रियत इति ।

Proponent: No, because there is no reasonable ground for some other (third) state. There is the state of non-existence before origina-

tion. There is the state of existence for the originated effect. These are the two states. There is no state in the form of existence-non-existence which can be termed as intermediary time. Therefore, this is not proper. *Moreover, because the inaccuracy pointed out earlier is not alleviated.* With what object will the proposed effect be related because it is already in its accomplished form? This objection also does not cease to apply.

Hence, even after adducing such an interesting statement you could not alleviate something. Therefore, it is right to say that since the supposition of the presence or the absence of the relation involves inaccuracy, the non-existence is not brought into existence.

(Relation of effect with cause proves pre-existence of effect)

यस्य पुनः सत्कार्यं तस्य दोषो नास्ति । कस्मात् ?

उपादानग्रहणात्

उपादानमिति कारणं तन्वाद्याचक्ष्महे । तद्धि तस्य कारकैर्गृह्यते अभिसम्बध्यत इत्यर्थः । तस्माच्च नार्थान्तरं कार्यम् इत्यतः कारणेनाभिसम्बद्धानां कारककाणां कार्येणैव सम्बन्धो भवतीत्यदोषः ।

The defect does not arise in case of them who believe in the pre-existence of the effect.

Why?

**BECAUSE THERE IS RELATION OF THE CAUSES (WITH THE EFFECT).**

We state that the term upādāna denotes the material cause like threads, ect. That is grasped by, i.e. related to its instruments. Therefore, the effect is something else (than the cause); hence, the instruments related to the cause are related to the effect itself. Hence, there is no inaccuracy.

आह-ननु च यस्यापि सत्कार्यं तस्योपादानादर्थान्तरं तत्कार्यं स्यात् । कस्मात् ? कार्याधिभिरुपादानात् । यद्यदर्थमुपादीयते तत्तस्मादर्थान्तरं यथा वेमादिभ्यः पटः । तन्तवश्च पटादिभिरुपादीयन्ते । तस्मात्तेभ्योऽप्यर्थान्तरं पट इति । एतेन सत्त्वं प्रत्युक्तम् । यद्यदर्थमुपादीयते तत्तस्मिन्नसत् । यथा वेमादिषु पट इति ।

Opponent: The effect arising of a particular material cause would be different from the material cause in case of those also who

believe in the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

Why?

Because it (the material cause) is taken by those who desire to get that effect. The object is different from that for which it is selected; just as the cloth is different from the loom, etc. The threads are also selected by the desirous of the cloth. Hence, the cloth is different from them also. By this only their pre-existence is rejected. The object does not exist in the other which is selected for the former just as the cloth does not exist in the loom, etc.

उच्यते, न अवयविप्रतिषेधात् । प्रतिषिद्धस्तावदवयवो द्रव्यान्तरभूतस्तस्मादनुपपन्नार्थमेतत् । किं चान्यत् ।

**सर्वसम्भवाऽभावात् ।**

उपादानसामान्याद्वेमादिवदर्थान्तरं पटस्तन्तुभ्य इति ब्रूवतोऽर्थान्तरत्वसामान्यात्तन्तुवत्सर्वस्मात्कारणात्कार्यस्य सम्भवः स्यात् । न त्वेवमस्ति । तस्मात्सर्वसम्भवाभावादसम्यगेतत् । किंचान्यत्, जातिभेदप्रसंगादर्थान्तरारम्भप्रसङ्गाच्च उपादानसामान्याद्वेमादिवदर्थान्तरं पटस्तन्तुभ्य इति ब्रूवतो यथा वेमादिभ्यो भिन्नजातीयो भिन्नदेशश्च, तथा तन्तुभ्यः पटः स्यात् यथा चाऽवस्थिते पटे वेमादयः पटान्तरं कुर्वन्ति तथा ह्यवस्थिते पटे तन्तवोऽपि पटान्तरमारभेन् । न चैतददृष्टम् । न तर्ह्युपादानसामान्याद्वेमादिवत्तन्तुभ्यः पटस्यार्थान्तरत्वम् ।

Proponent: No, because we have rejected the composite as a different substance. We have rejected the composite as a different substance. Hence, the objection is not appropriate. Moreover,

**BECAUSE EVERYTHING IS NOT POSSIBLE (EVERYTHING).**

You hold that the cloth differs from threads as it differs from loom, etc. because of the similarity of selection.<sup>28</sup> In the case, however, there would be the possibility of the origination of the effect from every cause as there is the possibility from the threads because the characteristic of being a different object is common in all the cases.<sup>29</sup> It is, however, not so. Hence, your argument is not proper on account of the absence of possibility of production of everything from everything. *Moreover, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the distinction of genus, as well as of the origination of a completely different object.*<sup>30</sup> In case of them who speak of the cloth as different from the threads as it is different from the loom, etc., on the ground of the similarity of selection, the cloth would be different in

genus from threads and would occupy different space just as is the case with the loom, etc. And, the same threads would produce another cloth when the one is already accomplished just as the same loom produces another cloth when the one is already accomplished. This is, however, not desirable. Thus, on the basis of the similarity of selection, the cloth, however, cannot be established as different from threads as it differs from loom, etc.

(Non-existence of the effect in the selected cause refuted)

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं यद्यदर्थमुपादीयते न तत् तत्रास्तीति, अत्र ब्रूमः—अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? आधाराधेयभावानभ्युपगमात् । असकृदुक्तमस्माभिर्न तन्तुषु पटो नाम कश्चिदस्ति । किं तर्हि तन्तव एव पटः । तत्तु सन्मार्गविद्वेषाद् भवता न गृह्यते । किं चान्यत् । अनेकान्तात् । उपेत्य वा ब्रूमः कथं तावत्तिलास्तैलार्थमुपादीयन्ते, भवति चात्र तैलम् । मृद्विका रसार्थमुपादीयते, भवति चास्यां रसः । गोधुक्च पयोऽर्थं गामादत्ते, भवति च तस्यां क्षीरम् । शालिकलापश्च तण्डुलार्थमुपादीयते, सन्ति चात्र तण्डुला इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः ।

As regards your statement that the object does not exist in the one selected for the purpose of producing it, we reply that it is wrong.

Why?

Because we do not admit the relation of the substratum and the object located (in the case of the cloth and the threads). We have repeatedly stated that there is nothing like cloth in the threads. On the contrary, the threads themselves are the cloth. That is, however, not acceptable to you because of your hatred towards the right way. Moreover, because of the non-decisiveness of your argument. Or, having accepted your opinion why the sesam seeds are selected for oil, the oil does exist in them. The vine is selected for juice; the juice does exist in it. The milkman selects cow for milk; the cow does exist in it. The bundle of paddy is selected for rice, the rice does exist there; hence, the reason is non-decisive.<sup>31</sup>

आह—आवरणोपलब्धेरयुक्तम् । तिलादिष्वारणं प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते । तत्प्रतिबन्धा-  
त्तैलादीनामग्रहणम् । व्यापारश्च कर्तुस्तद्विगमार्थो न तु कार्यस्यावरणमस्ति । तस्माद्विषमो  
दृष्टान्तः ।

Opponent: your argument is wrong because of the cognition of covering. The covering is directly perceived in case of the sesam seed, etc. Obstructed by that the oil, etc., are not cognised. And, the operation by the agent is to destroy (remove) that, and there is no covering of the effect there (in case of cloth).

Hence, the analogy provided is dissimilar.<sup>32</sup>

उच्यते न, मार्गान्तरत्वात् । यद्यत्रास्ति तत्र तदर्थमुपादीयते इति पूर्वं भवताऽतिसृष्टम् । इदानीं त्वगमविगमार्थं सतोप्युपादानमिति ब्रूवतो मार्गान्तरगमनं पूर्ववादत्यागोऽनैकान्तिकस्य चापरिहार इति । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं परिणामाद्युपपत्तेरदोष इति तथा तदस्तु । यत्तुक्तं मार्गान्तरानुपपत्तेरिति अत्र ब्रूमः—एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? परिणामाधर्मानवबोधात् । सतो धर्मान्तरस्य निरोधमसत्तत्त्वोत्पत्तिं परिणाममभिदधतो व्यक्तमयमुपालम्भः स्यात् । न त्वनयानुसृत्या प्रतिष्ठाहमे । किं तर्हि साधनानुगृहीतस्य धर्मिणो धर्मान्तरस्याविर्भावः पूर्वस्य च तिरोभावः परिणामः । न चाविर्भावतिरोभावावुत्पत्तिनिरोधौ । व्यूहसंश्लेषव्यक्तिप्रचयास्तु किमसतो धर्मा उत स्वतो सन्त इति विचार्यम् । किं चातः ? यदि तावदसतो धर्माः यथा कस्येति वाच्यम् । अथ स्वयमसन्तः पश्चाद् भवन्ति तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनर्थान्तरत्वात् । सत्यर्थान्तरभावे प्रागसन्तः पश्चादुपलभ्यमानाः सत्कार्यवादं निराकुर्युः । स चैवमर्थान्तरभावो न प्रसिद्धः । तस्मात्किमत्रोतपन्नम् ? ग्रहणाग्रहणविकल्पे चोक्तः परिहारः । किं चान्यत् । द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिव्याघातात् । उपेत्य वैषामुत्पत्तिं ब्रूमः—यदि हि परिणामव्यूहसंश्लेषव्यक्तिप्रचयमात्रं कार्यमिष्यते यदुक्तं द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्त इति तस्य व्याघातः । कस्मात् ? न ह्येते भावा द्रव्यान्तरम् । तस्माद् दिनकरकिरणप्रतापमूर्छितस्येव दावाग्न्युपसर्पणदोषोनुतापायैव भवतः प्रतिपत्तिः ।

Proponent: No, because the way adopted by you here is different from the earlier one. Earlier you granted that the object is not selected for the production of the other which already exists in it. And, now speaking of selection of even the existing effect for the sake of the appearance and the disappearance you are not free from the defects of going out of the way, abandoning the theory held earlier and not alleviating the non-decisiveness. As regards the statement that it is faultless because of the possibility of justification of modification, etc., we say, let it be so.<sup>33</sup> As regards your argument that there is no impossibility of some other way out, we reply that this is also wrong.

Why?

Because you have not fully understood the characteristic of modification. This would explicitly be an objection against the one who speaks of modification as the destruction of existent characteristic and the production of the non-existent one. We do not, however, establish our theory following this maxim. On the contrary, modification is the disappearance of the earlier qualities and the appearance of other qualities in the objects affected by the instruments. And, the

appearance and the disappearance do not mean production and destruction. It should be considered whether the formation, joining together, manifestation and collecting together are the qualities, of some non-existent entity or they are non-existent in himself (earlier).

What is the use of it?

If they are the qualities of some non-existent, to whom will they belong? If they are the qualities of some non-existent earlier and come into existence (afterwards), it would also be wrong.

Why?

Because they are not different (independent) objects. They could set aside the theory of pre-existence of the effect if they would have been independent objects and would have been non-existent earlier and would have come into existence afterwards. Their nature of being independent object is not established. What, then, is produced? As regards the objection based upon the alternatives regarding their cognition and absence of cognition, the alleviation has been already put forward. *Moreover, it would contradict the maxim of production of the different substance.* Or, granting their production, we repeat if formation, joining together, manifestation and collecting the earlier statement that substance gives rise to other substance.<sup>34</sup>

Why?

Because the states are not the independent substance. Hence, your (defective) understanding leads you to trouble just as the fault of resorting to the forest conflagration by a person who is deluded (or fainted) by the radiance of the rays of the sun, is certainly to lead him to trouble.

(usage of 'born' does not go against pre-existence of effect)

एतेनारम्भोपरमोत्वत्यविशेषप्रसङ्गो जन्मसच्छब्दः प्रत्युक्तः । कथम् ? आत्मभूतं हि तूनां पटाख्यं व्यूहस्थानीयं सन्निवेशविशेष यदा कारकाणि स्वेन स्वेन व्यापारेणाविष्कुर्वन्ति तदा क्रियते उत्पद्यते जायत इत्येवमादिलोकस्य व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । यदा तु कारकाणि शक्त्यन्तराविर्भावात्संस्थानान्तरेणौत्सुक्यवर्तितामवस्थामुपसंहरन्ति तदा प्रागुपलब्धं संस्थानं विनाशशब्दवाच्यात् प्रतिपद्यते । परमार्थतस्तु न कस्यचिदुत्पादोऽस्ति न विनाशः यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं जन्मशब्दः प्रागभूतस्यार्थस्य भावोपक्रममाहेति तदपीच्छामात्रम् । कस्मात् ? विवादात् । सदसद्विषयं जन्मेति विवादेऽनुषक्ते जन्मशब्दः प्रागभूतस्य सद्भावमाचष्ट इति ब्रूतोऽनुक्तसमम् । पुरुषादावदृष्टत्वादसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत् यदि तर्हि क्रियते उत्पद्यते जायत इत्येवार्थः सद्विषयः कल्प्यते, प्रधानपुरुषयोरेपि तत्त्वसंगः, सदसदविशेषादिति । अतश्च विवादावस्थमेवैतत्प्रकरणमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? संस्थानविषयत्वात् । यदा भावः स्वतोऽनर्थान्तर-

भूतं संस्थानं भजते तदैते शब्दाः प्रवर्तन्त इत्युक्तम् । दृष्टं च लोके तद्यथा मुष्टिग्रन्थिकुण्डलानि करोति जनयत्युत्पादयति, अभिव्यक्तात्मसु च मूलोदकादिषु भवत्युत्पन्नं जातमिति । उभयपक्षप्रसिद्धे तु शशविषाणादौ नैते शब्दाः प्रवर्तन्ते । तस्माद् भवत एवानिष्टप्रसङ्ग इति । उक्तं च

यद्यसत्त्वं घटादीनाममुत्पत्तौ हेतुरिष्यते ।

शशशृङ्गेऽपि तुल्यत्वादुत्पत्तिस्ते प्रसज्यते ॥

इति सिद्धं सत्कार्यम् ।

By this only it is also refuted that the term 'birth' or 'existence' involves the undesirable contingency of beginning, cessation from existence and a particular production.

How?

When the instruments bring forth through their activity the particular arrangement of the kind of particular form which is the very form of threads and is called cloth, people start the worldly usage as (the cloth) 'is made', or 'is produced' or 'is born'. And when the instrument takes away through the other arrangement brought out by the manifestation of other capacity the (earlier) state presented through curiosity, then the arrangement available earlier comes to be conveyed by the term destruction. In reality, there is neither origination nor destruction of anything. That what is stated earlier that the word origination means commencement for coming into existence of the object which was not in existence earlier, is also a mere wishful thinking.

Why?

*Because there is the controversy.* When the controversy is attached with (centred around) the fact that the origination refers to existence or non-existence, the statement that origination denotes coming into existence of the non-existent object is equal to a non-statement. If it is argued that it is non-established because it is not observed in case of conscious entity, etc.? It may be like this. If the object which 'is created', 'is produced' and 'originates' is postulated to be the existent object, it would involve the undesirable contingency of application of them to the cosmic matter and the conscious entity as well, because they do not fall outside the domain of existent and non-existent categories of objects. Therefore, the topic is controversial.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because they refer to the particular arrangement.* It is already stated when some object attains the arrangement which is not dif-

ferent form, itself, then only these words apply. It is observed in the wordly dealings also as he makes, brings forth or produces first (clenched hand), knot or the ear ring; in case of water or root which are manifested, it is used 'becomes,' 'is produced' or 'is born'. These words are not used in case of horns of the hare, etc., well known to both the parties. Therefore, the undesirable contingency arises in your case only. It is stated also.

If non-existence is desired to be the cause in the production of the pot, etc., it involves the undesirable contingency of production of horn of the hare in your theory because it (non-existence) is common in both the cases.<sup>35</sup>

Hence is proved the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

(Efficient cause gives rise to efficient effect)

इतश्च सत्कार्यम् ।

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्

शक्यमिदमस्य, शक्तश्चायमस्येत्ययं नियमः सतां दृष्टः । तद्यथा चक्षुषो रूपस्य । अस्ति चायं पटस्य वेमादीनां च नियमः । तस्माच्च सत्कार्यम् । सहकारिवत्तन्नियम इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् यथापो बीजाङ्कुरस्योपतौ समर्था भवन्ति न काष्ठादग्नेर्वा । उभयं च तत्तासु च विद्यते । बीजादपां विच्छिन्नत्वात् । यथा च सूर्यः सूर्यकान्तादग्निमुत्पादयितुं समर्थो न चन्द्रकान्ताच्च पानीयम् । उभयं तत्तत्र न विद्यते । तथा च तत्त्वादीनां पटस्यैव शक्तिनियमः स्यात् । न च पटस्य तन्तुषु सत्त्वं स्यादिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । अङ्कुरादयोऽपि कार्यमबादीनाम् । अतः साध्यम् । किमङ्कुरोस्त्यथ नास्त्येव । तथा सूर्यकान्तेऽग्निः । तदर्थमेव चायं विवादोऽनुषक्तः । यत्तुक्तमपां विच्छिन्नत्वान्न तास्वङ्कुरोस्तीति तत्रापि यासामपां बीजानुप्रवेशदङ्कुरभावेन विपरिणामस्ताभ्यस्तस्यानन्यत्वं साध्यम् । अतो न किञ्चिदेतत् । किञ्चान्यत् । रूपव्यवस्थानाच्च । तद्यथा रूपं विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वे सति न रूपं दृष्टमिति नेदानीं तत्सामान्यात् रूपमप्यरूपं भवति । एवं पटकारणत्वाद्वेमादयो न पट इति नेदानीं तन्तवोप्यपटः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतच्छक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्सत्कार्यम् ।

The theory of the pre-existence of effect is proved through the following reason also.

**BECAUSE THE EFFICIENT CAUSE CAN GIVE RISE TO EFFICIENT (EFFECT) ONLY.**

The rule that this is efficient to be produced from it or this is efficient to produce is observed in case of the existent objects only. For example, the restriction of the eye to the form. This rule does

exist in case of cloth and the loom, etc. Therefore, the effect pre-exists in the cause. If it is argued that the rule can be explained on the analogy of assisting causes? It may be like this. The water, for example, is capable in producing sprout from the seed only and not from the wood or the fire. Both of them do not exist in water, because the water is different from seed. And, just as the sun is capable to produce fire from sun-stone and not the water from moon-stone. Both of them (fire and water) do not exist there. In the same way, there could be the restriction of the efficiency of the threads for the cloth only. There may not be the existence of the cloth in the threads.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because these (example) are still to be proved. The sprout, etc., are also the effect of water, etc. Therefore, it is still to be proved whether the sprout pre-exists or not (in the water). Similarly, whether the fire pre-exists in the sun-stone or not (is yet to be proved). For that purpose only the controversy is raised. As regards your statement that the sprout does not exist in water because they are different, there also the difference of the sprout from the water which modify in the form of the sprout by entering into the seed is yet to be proved.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, this argument is nothing. *Moreover, because of the settled rule regarding the form.* For example, even though the form is the cause of the rise of knowledge, when the form is not perceived, then because of the commonness (of the non-perception) the form does not cease to be the form. Similarly, the fact that the loom, etc., are the cause of the cloth but not the cloth itself,<sup>37</sup> does not prove that the threads also are not the cloth. Therefore, it is right that the effect pre-exists because of the rise of an efficient effect from the efficient cause.

(Usage of cause proves pre-existence of effect)

कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥९॥

इहासति कार्ये कारणभावो नास्ति । तद्यथा वन्ध्यायाः । अस्ति चेह कारणभावस्तन्तुपटयोस्तस्मात्सत्कार्यम् । कारणान्तरात्कार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनादन्यत्र तदुद्भिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतं प्राक्कारणान्तरात्कार्यान्तरस्यासत् उत्पत्तिमुपलभ्य पश्चात्कारणान्तरे कारणबुद्धिर्भवतीति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनभ्युपगमात् । असत्ः कार्यस्योत्पत्तिरेव न सिद्धा शशविषाणादिष्वसिद्धत्वात् । कुतः पुनस्तन्निमित्ताकारबुद्धिः ? कारणभावादिति चेत्- स्यादेतत्, असत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि पटस्य कारणं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तलक्षणमस्ति । तस्मात्पट उच्यते, न शशविषाणस्येति ।



एतच्चायुक्तम् । कुतः हेत्वभावात् । असत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि पटस्य कारणमस्ति न शशविषाण-  
स्येत्यत्र हेतुरनुक्तः । पुरुषवदिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यथा तुल्यत्वे सत्त्वे पटस्य कारणमस्ति न पुरु-  
षस्य, एवमसत्त्वे पटस्य संस्थानं न शशविषाणस्येत्येतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । सं-  
स्थानं कार्यं पटस्य । संस्थानं न पुरुषस्येत्युक्तं प्राक् । संस्थानवत्तद्विशेष इति चेत् स्यान्मतं  
यथा सत्त्वाविशेषे पटः संस्थानं न पुरुष एवमसत्त्वाविशेषे पटः कार्यं न शशविषाणमिति ।  
एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सामान्यविशेषभावात् । सामान्यस्य हि विशेषपरिग्रहः संस्थानम् ।  
न त्वयमस्ति चेतनाशक्तौ विकल्पः । तस्मान्न पुरुषः संस्थानम् । असतस्तु निरात्मकत्वाद्वि-  
शेषो दुरुपपादः । तदुपपत्तौ वा सत्त्वप्रसंग इति । आह च-

निरात्मकत्वादसतां सर्वेषामविशिष्टता ।

विशेषणं चेद् भिन्नं ते सत्त्वमभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥

तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् । एवं तावद्वैशेषिकमतेनासत्कार्यवादो न  
विमर्दसहः ।

### AND BECAUSE OF ITS (CAUSE'S) BEING THE CAUSE, THE EFFECT PRE-EXISTS.

In the word, the state of being a cause is not found in the ab-  
sence of the effect. For example, there is no state of cause in case of a  
barron woman. There is the state of cause for the cloth in case of the  
threads. Hence, the pre-existence of the effect.

It may be argued that the sense of being a cause arises in case  
of other cause after observing the production of effect from some  
other causes (i.e., another similar cause elsewhere). After observing  
the production of a non-existent and non-identical effect from  
another cause there arises the sense of cause in case of another cause  
afterwards.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because it is not accepted.* The production itself of a non-exis-  
tent effect is not established because it is disproved in case of hare's  
horn, etc. How can, then, there arise the notion of their cause?

It may be argued that it is on account of being the cause. To ex-  
plain, even though the non-existence is common, the cloth has got in-  
timate, non-intimate and efficient causes. Therefore, it is called cloth  
and they are not in case of the horn of hare.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because of the absence of reason.* The reason as even though  
the non-existence is common, why the cloth has the cause and the  
horn of the hare does not—is not stated.

If it is argued that it may be like the Purusa ? It may be like this.  
Just as the cloth has the cause but not the conscious entity even  
though the existence is common to both; similarly, the cloth has got  
the cause but not the horn of the hare even though the non-existence  
is common to both.

This is also wrong.

why ?

Because of the reason already stated. The effect in the case of  
cloth is the arrangement. The arrangement is not found in the con-  
scious entity.

If it is argued that the difference may be like arrangement ? It  
may be like this. Just as even though the existence is common, the  
cloth is the particular arrangement and not the conscious entity;  
similarly, even though non-existence is common, the cloth is an effect  
and not the horn of the hare.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because there is the absence of generality and particularity (in the  
conscious entity).* The arrangement is the assuming of a particular  
form by the general form. This alternative is not found in the case of  
conscious entity. Therefore, the conscious entity is not subjected to  
particular arrangement. The particularity is impossible to be estab-  
lished in case of the non-existent object which has no nature at all.  
The establishment of that would lead to the undesirable contingency  
of its being existent. It is stated also :

All the non-existent objects have no particularity because they  
have no nature of their own. If there is a particularity, they become  
different (from each other). You should, in that case, accept their ex-  
istence.

Therefore, It is right that the effect pre-exists because of the  
notion of cause. In this way, the theory of non-pre-existence of effect  
as held by the Vaiśeṣikas does not stand in the encounter.

( Buddhist theory of non-existence of composite criticised )

बौद्धपक्षे तु भूयान्दोषः । कथं तर्हि द्रव्यान्तरं पटो नेष्यते ? “तन्तुष्वेव तथास्थेषु पट  
इत्यादिबुद्ध्यः” इत्येवमादिना न्यायेनावयविप्रतिषेधात्संयोगोऽपि न संयोगिभ्यस्तेषामर्थान्त-



रमिष्टः। तत्रैतावती परिकल्पना स्यात्- यदुत तन्तुसंयोगो वा पटः, संयोगकारणं वा द्रव्यान्तरम् ? उभयं च तेषां नार्थान्तरम्। अथोत्पत्तिविनाशौ कस्यापीति मायाकारचेष्टितम्। तदपि चित्रतरोऽयमुपन्यासः। काणादानां तु द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिविनाशाभ्युपगमान् तार्किकसदृशो विचारः। तस्मात्परमर्ष एव पक्षो ज्यायान्। यथा चासत्कार्यं न संभवति तथा चशब्दात्सदसत्कार्यमपि।

In the theory of the Buddhists<sup>38</sup> there are many defects. Why is then the cloth not accepted as different substance? On account of the rejection of the composite on the basis of the maxim 'the notion of cloth, etc., is in the threads arranged in that form, the conjunction is also not accepted as different element form the conjunct objects', The imagination may be like this. Whether the cloth is the conjunction of the threads or some other substance is the cause of conjunction? Both of these, however, in their theory, are not different substances, Hence, the origination and destruction are the acts in the form of illusion.

This view is rather more strange. On account of accepting the origination and destruction as belonging to some different substance, the view of the followers of *kaṇāda* is not similar to that of the logicians (Buddhists).<sup>39</sup> Therefore, the view of the great seer only is better.

(Criticism of jain view)

परस्परविरोधात् नैव सन्नासदिति एके। एतदप्यनुपपन्नम्। कस्मात् ? सत्त्वे हेत्वभिधानान्निश्चितः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सद्भावः ॥ ९ ॥

As there is no possibility of the non-existent effect; similarly, (there is no possibility of) effect as existent and non-existent simultaneously through the word *ca* (in the *kārikā*).<sup>40</sup> Some people hold that on account of mutual contradiction the effect is neither existent nor non-existent (before origination). This is wrong.

Why?

Since the reasons are adduced in the favour of existence, the existence of the effect earlier to its origination is certain.

## KĀRIKĀ 9

1. Change is the very nature of the constituents. In the state of dissolution, however, there is no *virupaparinama* leading to creation of the universe, though they are not devoid of *sarupaparinama*.
2. The context demands the reading *paramavibhaga...* in place of *paramavibhaga*.
3. The universe is nothing but a collected form of the constituents in different quantity.
4. It further suggests that the constituents are the material as well as the instrumental cause of the universe. There is no external instrumental cause to activate them for creation.
5. I.e., when the material cause itself modifies into the effect, there is no room for postulating the origination of something new.
6. Here, we prefer the reading *asiddhenarthantarasiddheh* as found in Poona manuscript which conveys the sense of the reading *siddhenarthantasiddheh* accepted by Chakravarti.
7. The horn of the hare is non-existent like the horn of the crow and, hence, there is no propriety in arguing for the existence of one on the basis of the other. In fact, something established is resorted to do establish the other.
8. Here we prefer the reading *asambhavat* as found in Poona manuscript in place of *anupalabdhi sambhavat* accepted by Pandeya.
9. The sense is that the causes of non-perception of even an existent object enumerated in the 8th *karika* do not apply here.
10. *Malatilatagandhena* should be read as *malatilata gandhena*. There is no purpose in joining them.
11. According to the *satkarya* theory of the *Samkhyas* that which exists cannot absolutely disappear and nothing absolutely new takes place. In the present case, however, the earlier existing qualities disappear and new are introduced. It does not, therefore, fit in the theory of the *Samkhyas*.
12. The cloth placed on the threads is observed as different, but it is not the case with its own components. Hence, there is no ground to know the differentiation between the two. The cloth, in the theory of the *Samkhyas*, is the particular arranged form of the threads.

13. The meaning is that the argument is based upon two presuppositions that the composite is different from the components and that there is the relation of inherence between them. The Samkhyas do not accept even the first on which the second is based.
14. The meaning is that the material cause is different from the instrumental in the sense that the former gets modified in the form of the effect while the latter serves as an external instrumental cause.
15. Just as the loom, etc., are not always invariably concomitant with the effect, the same will be the case with the threads if the causal status of the loom, etc., and that of the threads is considered to be the same.
16. The context demands the reading *bhedanamagrahanat...* in place of *bhedanam grahanat.....*
17. Two-ness cannot be known without observing the two objects at one time.
18. If it is held that the composite exists in the collection of all the components, it would not be cognised with the perception of a single object out of all the components. Consequently, with the perception of horns the knowledge of cow cannot take place. Here, the context demands the reading *go'agrahana.....*
19. If the composite is supposed to pervade all its components, existing in all of them separately, it would be manifold like components themselves.
20. The meaning is that the corporeal objects are non-pervasive (*avyavyavrtti*) in nature and thus cannot occupy the same place.
21. Here, elephant and tree are not different from army and forest respectively.
22. The pronoun 'these' stands for the above mentioned compounds. The reading marked to be doubtful by Pandeya could possibly be *canarthantaratve.....*
23. It is because the Samkhya teachers visualised the effect existing in its causal form.
24. The sense is that it is wrong to consider action, properties, etc., as the probans for the inference of the substance.
25. *Karanam* is more suitable to the context than *Karanam*.

26. As stated above, the substance, according to the Naiyayika, is that which is endowed with action, attribute and name.
27. The sense is that if the effect is supposed to be unrelated to the instrumental causes, it would not stand in need of causal operation.
28. From the Nyaya standpoint the instrumental causes like loom, etc., are selected for the production of cloth. These are different from cloth. Similarly, the material causes like threads, etc., are also selected for the production of cloth and, hence, they should also be treated as different.
29. The sense is that the effect will be equally different from all the causes. Due to the common characteristic of difference any effect would come out of any cause.
30. The context demands full stop after *prasangacca*.
31. These examples prove that the effect exists in the object which is selected for its production. Hence, the reason that the effect is different from the causes selected for its production, involves the defect of non-conclusiveness. Actually the effect differs from its instrumental causes and not from the material causes. The above reason, however, treats both kinds of reasons at par and consequently involves defects.
32. In the above examples the so called effect is directly observed while such is not the case with the cloth.
33. It refers to the Samkhya reply postulated against the futility of the agents, etc. The agents, etc., are not futile since they bring about the characteristics of transformation, joining together, manifestation and collecting together.
34. Cf. *Vaisesikasutra* 1.1.8
35. Such words are not spoken with reference to the absolutely non-existent objects like horn of the hare.
36. The reading *tasyanyatvam* as found in Poona manuscript is preferable to *tasyananyatvam* as accepted by Pandeya.
37. We prefer the reading *samanyavisesabhavat* as given in Poona manuscript and adopted by Chakravarti to Pandey's reading *samanyavisesabhavat*.
38. According to the Buddhists the composite does not exist apart from the components.

39. The word tarkika should be taken in the sense of the Buddhists here because the Vaisesika theory of causation which is not different from that of the naiyayikas is listed separately and consequently the word tarkika should not be taken in the usual sense of the Naiyayikas.
40. The author means that through the force of the word *ca* in the Karika the theory that the effect is both existent and non-existent is refuted. It may be the reference to the theory of Jaina thinker.

## KĀRIKĀ 10

प्रकृतमिदानीं वक्ष्यामः । किं च प्रकृतम् ? महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं चेति वचनाद्वैरूप्यम् ।

Now we shall speak on the subject under discussion.

And, what is the subject under discussion?

It is the dissimilarity conveyed through the statement 'and its effects like intellect and the rest are dissimilar and similar to the cosmic matter'.<sup>1</sup>

(Cause of mentioning dissimilarity first)

आह—प्राक्सारूप्यग्रहणं, सुखप्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वात् । अधिगतसारूप्यस्य हि सुखं वैरूप्यस्य प्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीति प्राक्सारूप्यग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । यथा तन्त्रान्तरीयाणां सदनित्यं द्रव्यवत्कार्यं कारणं सामान्यविशेषवदिति द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामविशेषसामान्यमुक्त्वा द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्ते गुणाश्च गुणान्तरमित्येवमादिः विशेषोऽभिधीयते ।

Opponent: The similarity should be discussed first because it makes understanding easy. The similarity should be undertaken first because the knowledge of dissimilarity arises easily in case of the one who has understood the similarity. As the other systematists (Vaiśeṣikas) after mentioning the general qualities common to all the substance, quality and action that they are existent, non-eternal, related to the substance, (in the form of the intimate cause), effects, causes and are possessed of the general and particular qualities, state their particularities that the substance gives rise to substance and the quality to the other quality.<sup>2</sup>

उच्यते—तदनुपपत्तिः । अविशेषात् । यथैवाधिगतसारूप्यस्य लघीयसी वैरूप्यप्रतिपत्तिरेवमधिगतवैरूप्यस्य लघीयसी सारूप्यप्रतिपत्तिः । कस्मात् ? परस्परपेक्षत्वात् । वैरूप्यापेक्षं हि सारूप्यं, सारूप्यापेक्षं च वैरूप्यमिति ।

Proponent: It is not correct because it makes no difference. Just as the knowledge of dissimilarity is easier for the one who has known

the similarity, the knowledge of similarity becomes easier for the one who has known the dissimilarity.

Why?

*Because of their mutual dependence.* The similarity depends upon dissimilarity and the dissimilarity, upon similarity.

आह—एवमपि वैरूप्यस्य प्रागभिधाने प्रयोजनवचनम् । द्वयोरविशेषेऽन्यतरस्य प्रागभिधाने नियमहेतुर्वक्तव्य इति ।

Opponent: In this case also the purpose of stating the dissimilarity first should be mentioned. When there is no difference between the two, the restrictive cause of mentioning the one first should be stated.

उच्यते न, वैरूप्यस्य प्रकरणानङ्गभावत् । विच्छिन्नं हि वैरूप्यमतस्तत्पूर्वमभिधाय प्रकरणाङ्गं सारूप्यं सुखमभिधातुमित्येवमर्थमाचार्येणैवं क्रियते । कथं सारूप्यस्य प्रकरणाङ्गत्वमिति चेत् त्रैगुण्याभिधानद्वारेण गुणलक्षणोपदेशात् । तत्सिद्धौ चाविवेक्यादीनां व्यक्तसिद्धेः कारणगुणात्मकत्वाच्च कार्यस्य प्रधाने त्रैगुण्यादिप्रतिपत्तेः, कार्यकारणभावासन्देहाच्च प्रधानास्तित्वप्रसिद्धपदेशात्तत्सिद्धौ च भोग्यस्य भोक्त्रपेक्षत्वात् पुरुषसिद्धेरधिगतभोक्तृभोग्यस्य तत्संयोगस्य च सुखप्रतिपाद्यत्वात्तादर्थ्याच्च तत्त्वभूतभावसर्गाणाम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्प्रकरणाङ्गत्वात्सारूप्यं पश्चान्निर्दिश्यते । तदसम्बन्धादितरत्रागिति ।

Proponent : No, because the dissimilarity does not form the part of the subject under discussion. The authority has done so because the dissimilarity is out of the context and, therefore, after stating it first, it becomes easy to state the similarity which forms the part of the subject under discussion.

How does the similarity form the part of the subject under discussion?

Because the characteristics of the constituents are taught through the description of the objects composed of the three constituents.<sup>3</sup> When that is established, the non-discriminative nature comes to be established in case of manifest,<sup>4</sup> and since the effect is of the nature of the cause, the qualities like composed of three constituents, etc., are understood in the case of cosmic matter as well. And, when the doubt about the relation of cause and effect is dispelled and when the cosmic matter is proved to exist through the reason proving the existence of the cosmic matter, the existence of the conscious entity is proved since the object of enjoyment stands in

need of some enjoyer. So also because the contact of the two is easily comprehended by one who has understood the nature of experiencer and the objects experienced and because the creation of the elements, beings and the mental dispositions is meant for the conscious entity (the existence of the conscious entity is proved). Therefore, it is correct that the similarity will be discussed later because it forms the part of the subject under discussion. The other (viz., dissimilarity will be discussed) first because it is not related to that (i.e., the subject under discussion).

आह—यदि तर्हि भवान्प्राग्वैरूप्याभिधानं न्याय्यं मन्यते तद्वक्तव्यं किं पुनरिदं वैरूप्यमिति ।

Opponent: If you think it proper to discuss the dissimilarity first, you should state what is the dissimilarity in the present case.

(Dissimilarity between cosmic matter and its evolutes)

उच्यते—

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

तत्र हेतुः कारणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । तदस्यास्तीति हेतुमत् । नित्यं ध्रुवम् । न नित्यमनित्यम् । व्याप्नोतीति व्यापि । न व्याप्यव्यापि । असर्वगतमित्यर्थः । सह क्रियया सक्रियम् । अनेकं भिन्नम् । आश्रितमाधेयम् । लिङ्गं तल्लक्षणोपपन्नम् । अवयूयन्त इत्यवयवाः । पृथगुपलभ्यन्त इत्यर्थः । सहावयवैः सावयवम् । परतन्त्रमन्याधीनम् । एते हेतुमदादयः परतन्त्रान्ता निरपवादाः व्यक्तस्यासाधारणाः प्रधानपुरुषाभ्यां धर्माः ।

Proponent: THE MANIFEST IS HAVING A CAUSE, NON-ETERNAL, NON-PERVASIVE, ACTIVE, MANIFOLD, LOCATED, INFERENTIAL MARK, CONJUNCT AND DEPENDENT ; THE UNMANIFEST IS OPPOSITE TO IT.

Here, the term *hetu* (cause) is synonymous of *kāraṇa* (cause).<sup>5</sup> *Hetumat* denotes that which has a cause. Eternal is everlasting. Non-eternal is opposite to eternal. Pervasive is that which pervades. Non-pervasive is that which is not pervasive. The sense is that it is not having access everywhere. Active is that which has activity. Manifest is varied. Located is supported. The inferential mark means that which is endowed with the characteristics of that. The components are those which are joined. The sense is that (they) are found separately. Conjunct is that which possesses the components. Dependent means supported by some other object. These charac-

teristics beginning with caused and ending with dependent are without controversy the (peculiar) characteristics of the manifest not found in the cosmic matter and the conscious entity.

(Having a cause)

आह-हेतुमदित्यविशेषः सर्वत्र सद्भावात् । व्यक्ताव्यक्तपुरुषाणां हि सर्वेषां हेतुरस्तीति अविशेष एवायं पठितव्यः ।

Opponent: The quality of having a cause is not uncommon because it is present everywhere. The cause is found in the case of all the manifest, the unmanifest and the conscious entity, and hence, it should be listed as a common (characteristic).

उच्यते न, कारकपरिग्रहात् । यद्यपि व्यक्ताव्यक्तपुरुषाणामविशिष्टं हेतुमत्त्वं तथापि विशिष्टस्य कारकस्य हेतोः परिग्रहं करिष्यामः । स च व्यक्तस्यैव नान्यस्येति नायमविशेषो भविष्यति ।

Proponent: No, because the creating cause is accepted (here as a cause). The quality of having a cause is common to the manifest, unmanifest and conscious entity but we accept here the uncommon creating cause. That pertains only to the manifest and not to anyone else. Hence, it won't be common.

आह-तदनुपपत्तिः, विशेषानुपादानात् । हेतुरिति सामान्यशब्दोऽयम् । सामान्यशब्दाच्च नार्थप्रकरणशब्दान्तराभिसम्बन्धमन्तरेण विशेषेऽवतिष्ठन्त इति विशेष उपादेयः स्यात् । स तु नोपादीयते । तस्मात्ते अविशेषा एवेति ।

Opponent: That is wrong because there is no mention of this type of peculiar cause. Cause (*hetu*) is a general term and the general term is not used in some particular sense without (considering) the sense, context and the relation with other word, hence, the particularity should have been mentioned. That is, however, not mentioned here. Hence, those are common only.

उच्यते न, सर्वसम्भवानोऽभिधानस्य प्रकर्षार्थत्वात् । इह यः सर्वसंभवी धर्म एकविषय उपादीयते तस्मात्प्रकर्षो विज्ञायते । तद्यथा भोक्ता माणवक इत्युक्ते सर्वेषां भोक्तृत्वस्य संभवादेवं विज्ञायते प्रकर्षेणायं भोक्तेति, एवमिहापि सर्वसम्भवीत्याहाचार्यो व्यक्तं हेतुमदिति । तेन वयमस्मात्प्रकर्षं विज्ञास्यामः । कश्च प्रकर्षः ? कारकज्ञापकयोरुभयोरपि सम्भवे कारकस्यैव ग्रहणम् । अनित्यशब्दसम्बन्धाद्वा । अथवाऽयमाचार्यो हेतुमदित्युक्त्वाऽनित्यमिति पठति । शब्दान्तराभिसम्बन्धात् । योऽनित्यसहचरो हेतुस्तस्येह ग्रहणं गम्यते ।

कश्चाऽनित्यसहचरो हेतुः ? कारकः ।

Proponent: No, because the statement of something applicable to all when applied to one, gives special meaning. Here, the speciality is known from the statement of a quality which though applicable to all is mentioned with reference to one object only. For example, when it is stated that the lad is an eater, it is understood that he eats too much because eating is possible in case of all. Similarly, here also the authority states that the manifest is having a cause, a statement applicable to all. Therefore, we will understand speciality from it.

What is the speciality?

When there is the possibility of both types of cause, viz., producer (*Kārikā*) and indicator (*jñāpaka*), the producer cause is accepted here. Or because of the connection with the word non-eternal. Or, after mentioning the word *hetumat* (having a cause) the authority mentions the word non-eternal (*anitya*). On account of the connection with the other word it is understood here that only the cause which invariably associates with non-eternity should be accepted.<sup>6</sup>

What is the cause which invariably associates with non-eternity? That cause is the producer.

आह एवमप्यनुपपन्नमेतत् । कस्मात् ? उभयत्र तत्संभवात् । उत्पाद्यव्यङ्गययोर्हि विनाशं पटादिषु दृष्ट्वात् अव्यभिचारान्तरान्तरीया मन्यन्ते । तस्य वा परिहारो वक्तव्यः न वा वक्तव्यो विशेषे स्थितिस्तीति ।

Opponent: Even understood like this, it is wrong.

Why?

Because that is possible in both the cases? The other systematists hold so because of the non-violation of the rule since in the case of objects like cloth, whether produced or manifested, the destruction is surely observed. It should be alleviated, or it should not be held that it is applicable to something particular.

उच्यते न, एकान्तवादप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वेण हि वादिनाऽवश्यं किञ्चिन्नित्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अन्ततोविनाशेऽपि न कश्चिदर्थः शब्दबुद्धिभ्यां न व्यज्यते । तथा सत्येकान्तवादोऽयं स्यात् । स च युक्तिमदिभनेष्यते । तथा च संस्कृतमप्येवं कल्प्यमाने विनाशे स्यात् । तस्मादुत्पाद्यव्यङ्गययोर्विनाशं ब्रुवतोऽतिसाहसम् ।

Proponent: No, because it would lead to the undesirable contingency

of the acceptance of the absolutism. Something should be accepted as eternal by all the systematists. In the theory of absolute annihilation also it is not that objects are not revealed by word or knowledge.<sup>7</sup> If this is the case, it would be absolutism. And, that is not desirable to the persons of discrimination (lit. having sense of logic). Even the created object, if considered so, would be destructible.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, it is too bold to speak of the destruction of objects produced and those manifested.

(Having a cause does not contradict pre-existence of effect)

आह-अनित्यत्वानुपपत्तिः, सत्कार्यवादाभ्युपगमात् । यथैव हि नाऽसत् उत्पत्तिरस्त्येवं सतोऽपि विनाशेन न भवितव्यम् । अथ सतोऽपि विनाशोऽभ्युपगम्यते तेन प्रलयकाले विनष्टानां तत्त्वादीनां पश्चादसतामुत्पत्तिः सत्कार्यवादं निराकुर्यात् । तस्मादनित्यं व्यक्तमित्युक्तम् ।

Opponent: The non-eternity does not hold because you have accepted the theory of existence of the effect in the cause. Just as there is no production of the non-existent, there would be no destruction of the existent.<sup>9</sup> If the destruction of the existent is accepted, there would be the production of non-existent objects afterwards which were destroyed at the time of dissolution and, thus, the theory of the pre-existence of the effect is negated. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the manifest is non-eternal.

उच्यते न, व्यक्त्युपगमप्रतिज्ञानात् । सत्यमेव वयं सतो विनाशमाचक्षाणाः सत्कार्यवादं प्रत्याचक्षीमहि । कारणानान्तु यः परस्परं संसर्गात्संस्थानविशेषपरिग्रहस्तस्य विरोधित्यन्तराविर्भावादं व्यक्तिस्तिरोधीयत इत्येतद् विनाशशब्देन विवक्षितम् । तथा च वार्षगणाः पठन्ति-तदेतत् त्रैलोक्यं व्यक्तेरपैति, न सत्त्वाद् अपेतमप्यस्ति, विनाशप्रतिषेधात् । असंसर्गाच्चास्य सौक्ष्म्यं सौक्ष्म्याच्चानुपलब्धिस्तस्माद् व्यक्त्युपगमो विनाशः । स तु द्विविधः । आसर्गप्रलयातत्त्वानां किञ्चित्कालान्तरावस्थानादितरेषामिति ।

Proponent: No, because we recognise the manifestation and disappearance (of the object). It is true, we would negate our theory of pre-existence of effect if we speak of the destruction of the existent. The meaning intended by us through the term destruction is that the manifestation of the particular form attained

through the mutual connection of the cause is suppressed through the manifestation of the power contradictory to the former (i.e., that of manifestation). Thus, the followers of Vārṣaganya state are not bereft of their existence because the absolute destruction is rejected (by us). Its subtlety is caused by absence of contact (with us);<sup>10</sup> the subtlety results into non-perception; therefore, the destruction is the disappearance of the particular manifestation. That is twofold : the destruction of the objects from the time of dissolution till creation and that of other because of the presence after some time.

(Refutation of the theory of Momentariness)

आह-अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? विप्रतिपत्तेः । सर्वमेव क्षणिकं बुद्धिबोध्यमाकाशनिरोधवर्जितमिति शाक्यपुत्रीयाः प्रतिपन्नाः । तेषां प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः । न वा वक्तव्यो द्विविधमनित्यमिति ।

Opponent: It is wrong.

Why?

*Because of difference of opinion.* The Buddhists hold that everything which is known through intellect except space and destruction is momentary. Either (the points of) their refutation should be mentioned or it should not be stated that destruction is of two kinds.

उच्यते-न हत्वनुपगमात् । प्रतिक्षणमुच्छिद्यते त्रैलोक्यमित्यत्र लिङ्गमभियुक्ता अपि नोपलभामहे । तस्मान्नैतत् युक्तमस्माकं बुद्धाववतिष्ठ इति ।

Proponent: No, because of the non-acceptance of the reason. Even after exerting too much we do not find the probans to establish that all the worldly objects are destroyed every moment. Therefore, it does not appeal to us that it is right.

आह-अन्ते क्षयदर्शनात् । इह यस्यान्ते क्षयस्तस्य क्षणिकत्वं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा प्रदीपज्वालाबुद्धिशब्दानाम् । अस्ति चान्ते क्षयः संस्काराणाम्, तस्मात् क्षणिका ।

Opponent: Because the destruction is observed at the end. Here, the object which meets destruction at the end is observed to be momentary just as the knowledge and the word as also the flame of the lamp. The created objects meet destruction at the end. Therefore they are momentary.



उच्यते । तदनुपपत्तिः साध्यत्वात् । इह तु सिद्धनातिदेशो भवति । तद्यथा गवा गव-  
यस्य । न तु प्रदीपज्वालान्बुद्धिशब्दानां क्षणिकत्वं प्रसिद्धम् । अतो न किंचिदेतत् ।

Proponent: This is wrong, because it is also to be proved. Here, the  
extended application is through the established (to the unes-  
tablished) just as the extended application through cow to  
gavaya. The momentariness of the flame of the lamp,  
knowledge and word is not well known. Therefore, it does not  
carry any force.<sup>11</sup>

आह-नैतदप्रसिद्धम् । कस्मात् ? वृद्ध्यदर्शनात् । यदि हि अविनष्टायां ज्वालाया-  
मिन्धनान्तरे ज्वालान्तरमुत्पद्येत. वृद्धिः स्यात् । न तु दृश्यते । तस्मादनवस्थिता प्रदीपज्वाला ।  
किंचाश्रयाभावात् । यदाश्रया ज्वालोत्पत्तिस्तदुत्पद्यमानैवासौ निरुणद्धीति न युक्तनस्या विना-  
श्रयेणावस्थातुम् । उपयुक्तेन्धनाया अवस्थानप्रसङ्गात् । किं चावरणोपनिपाते प्रभाभेदप्रस-  
ङ्गात् । ज्वालानामवस्थानमिच्छत उपरिष्ठादावरणोपनिपातात्प्रभायास्तन्तोऽरिव द्वैधीकरणं  
स्यात् अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मान्न दीपे ज्वालानामवस्थितिरस्तीति । एतेन शब्दोऽपि प्रत्युक्तः ।  
कथम् ? तस्यापि यदि वनाशो न स्यात् द्रुतपवनाम्बुधारभिघातात्प्रतिक्षणमपूर्वशब्दाविर्भा-  
वात्पूर्वशब्दाविनाशाच्च वृद्धिः स्यात् । अदृष्टा चासौ । किंच प्रत्यक्षत उपलब्धेः । पाण्युपघा-  
तजो हि शब्द उत्पत्तेरूर्ध्वं न भवतीति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमिदम् । अभिव्यक्तेरिति चेन्न, नियमदर्श-  
नात् । शब्दानां वाच्यवक्तृभेदभिन्नानां कारणनियमो दृष्टेः । न चैतदस्ति समानेन्द्रियग्राह्या-  
णाम् । किंच प्रथक्श्रुतेः । अभिव्यक्तिकरणदेशाच्च पृथक् । श्रूयते शब्दः । न चैतदभिव्यक्तानां  
घटादीनां दृष्टमिति क्षणिकाः । बुद्धेस्तु प्रागेवोक्ता नाशहेतवः । तत्र यदुक्तं साध्यत्वात्प्रदीप-  
ज्वालान्बुद्धिशब्दादीनां क्षणिकत्वस्य न संस्काराः क्षणिका इति, एतदयुक्तम् ।

Opponent : It is not unestablished.

How?

*Because no augmentation is observed.* If another flame would be  
produced in the undestructed flame with addition to new fuel; there  
would have been augmentation. This is, however, not observed so.  
Therefore, the flame of the lamp does not remain the same. *Moreover*  
due to the absence of support. That supported by which the flame  
comes forth also is subjected to production and meets destruction. It  
is not proper for it to subsist without support, because otherwise it  
would involve the undesirable contingency of its existence when  
there is serviceable fuel to it (even in absence of lamp). *Moreover,*  
*because there would arise the undesirable contingency of division of*  
*flame due to the sudden occurrence of some obstruction.* The flame  
would like the threads be divided into two due to some obstruction  
(i.e., stroke) from above in case of those holding the continuity of the

flame. This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, there is no con-  
tinuity (or non-destruction) of the flames in the lamps. Similarly, the  
word is also refuted.

Why?

If that would not be destroyed, that would always go on in-  
creasing when the earlier (produced) one is not destroyed and there  
is the rise of the new word due to the stroke by swift blowing of the  
wind, and flow of water. It is, however, not observed so. *Moreover, be-  
cause of its being directly perceived.* It is established through percep-  
tion that the word produced through striking with the hand does not  
subsist after its production.

It is argued that it is manifested (when we call it produced)?

*It is not so, because of restriction.* The rule of restriction to some  
cause is observed in case of words mutually different due to the dif-  
ference of denotation and the speaker. This, however, does not hold  
good in case of those cognisable by the same sense. *Moreover, be-  
cause it is heard as different.* The word is heard at a place different  
from that of its manifestation. That is, however, not observed in case  
of pot, etc., which are manifested. Therefore, the words are momen-  
tary. The reasons for the destruction of knowledge are already  
stated above. The statement that the products are not momentary  
since the momentariness of the flame of the lamps, word and the  
knowledge is still to be proved, is wrong.

उच्यते-यदुक्तं वृद्ध्यदर्शनादिति, अत्र ब्रूमः-अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? विशेषप्रति-  
पत्तेः । क्षणिकमित्युक्तपरिमाणोऽयं कालनिर्देश आश्रीयते । वृद्धयभावादिभ्यश्च कदाचिद्वना-  
शमात्रं प्रतीयते । स तु विनाश एकक्षणमवस्थितयतानां ज्वालानां भवति न पुनः क्षणद्वयं त्रयं वा  
पर्युषितानामित्यत्र हेतुः — तस्माद्युक्तमप्येतदनुक्तम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं इन्धनाऽनवस्थानाज्ज्वाला-  
नवस्थानमित्यत्र ब्रूमः-एतदप्यनुपपन्नम्, साध्यत्वात् । क्षणमवस्थितस्येन्धनस्य निरोधः न  
पुनः — इत्येतदप्रमाणकमाज्ञामात्रादहीतशिक्षाकः प्रतिपत्तुमुत्सहेतुः यत्तुक्तं आवरणोपनिपा-  
तात्प्रभाभेदप्रसङ्ग इति-एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? उभयथाऽनुपपत्तेः । किं तावद् यस्य द्वैधी-  
भावो दृष्टस्तदक्षणिकम्, आहोस्विद्यस्य न दृष्टः तत्क्षणिकमिति ? किं चातः ? तद्यदि तावदे-  
वमभ्युपगम्यते यस्य द्वैधीभावस्तदक्षणिकमिति- तन्तोऽक्षणिकत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ मतं यस्य  
द्वैधीकरणं न दृष्टं तत्क्षणिकमिति यथा किमित्युदाहार्यम् । कुतः ? यस्मात् न ह्यनुदाहृतो  
वादः । एतेन शब्दवृद्धिः प्रत्युक्ता यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं पाण्युपघातजशब्दानवस्थानादिति तत्र भवतै-  
वोक्तं व्यङ्ग्यत्वादिति । यत्तुक्तं नियमदर्शनाच्च व्यङ्ग्यः शब्द इति तदयुक्तम् । अनेकान्तात् ।  
शुक्लकृष्णौ नियमतः शुक्लकृष्णशब्दाभ्यां प्रत्याप्येते न च तौ तयोर्न व्यङ्ग्यौ । एवं शब्द-  
स्यापि वक्तृवादिनियमः स्यात् । न चाव्यङ्ग्यः स्यात् । यदप्युक्तं व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकयोर्देशभेदानु-

पपतेर्न व्यङ्ग्यः शब्द इति तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? चक्षुर्वत्तत्सिद्धेः तद्यथा चक्षुषो रूपस्य च देशभेदेऽपि व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावः, एवं शब्दस्यापि स्यात् । तस्मान्न शब्दोऽपि क्षणिकः । बुद्धेस्तु स्वाधिकार एव क्षणिकत्वहेतुनिराकरणं वक्ष्यामः । तत्र यदुक्तमन्ते क्षयदर्शनात् प्रदी-पज्वालाबुद्धिशब्दवत्क्षणिकाः संस्कारा इत्येतदयुक्तमिति ।

Proponent : As regards the statement that because no augmentation is observed, we reply that it is wrong.

Why ?

*Because of a particular understanding.* Through the term momentary is understood the indication to the time of the said measurement. And, sometimes through the absence of the the augmentation is known the destruction only. The reason as to the destruction pertains to the flames subsisting for one moment and for the objects which get destroyed after two or three moments....

Therefore, even though it is right, it is not stated. As to the statement that the flames do not persist because the fuel does not persist, we reply that it is also wrong, because it is also still to be proved. That the destruction pertains to the fuel persisting for a moment and not ....who uneducated person dares to understand only this unestablished thing only through the command?<sup>12</sup> The statement that there would arise the undesirable contingency of division of the flame due to sudden occurrence of some obstruction (stroke), is wrong.

Why ?

*Because it does not hold good in both the ways.* Whether the object whose division is observed is non-momentary or that whose division is not observed is momentary, should be replied.

What ensues from this (discussion) ?

If it is accepted that whose division is observed is momentary, it would involve the undesirable contingency of the non-momentariness of the threads. If it is held that that whose division is not observed is momentary, what will be the example as (the third) state of inference?

Why ?

Because that which is not exemplified is not a thesis. By this only the augmentation in word is refuted. Again, as regards your statement that because the words produced by striking by the hand do not subsist (we reply that) you have yourself stated that because they are manifested.<sup>13</sup> Your statement that the word is not

manifested due to the observation of such a rule,<sup>14</sup> is not correct, because there is no certainty. For example, the white and black (qualities) are as a rule known by the words śukla and kṛṣṇa; it is not that these are not manifested by these words. Similarly will be the rule regarding the speaker, etc., with reference to the words. Nor would (in that case) the word be non-manifested. Your statement that the word is not manifested because there is impropriety of difference of place in case of the manifested and the manifestor, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is established so as in the case of eye. Just as the relation of manifested and manifestor is found in case of the form and the eye even when there is difference of place, the same would hold good in case of word also. Therefore, the word also is not momentary. We shall speak of the refutation of the reasons for momentariness of the intellect (knowledge) in its own context. Thus, the statement that the products are momentary because of the observation of their destruction at the end as in the case of flame of lamp, word and knowledge, is also wrong.

आह - इतस्तर्हि प्रदीपादीनामनन्येषां च भावानां क्षणिकत्वम् । कुतः ? अवस्थाने हेत्वभावात् । नष्टश्चेदर्थोऽभ्युपगम्यते ननु प्राप्तमिदमुत्पन्नमात्रस्यास्य विनाशविघ्नो नास्तीति तावत्येव विनाशेन भवितव्यम् । अथ सति प्रतिबन्धे न विनाशः स्यादिति कौटस्थ्यं सर्वभावानां प्राप्तमिति ।

Opponent: Then, due to this reason there is the momentariness of the lamp and all other objects.

Why ?

*Because there is no reason to prove their subsistence.* If the object is admitted to be destroyed, it results into the notion that there is no obstruction in its destruction just after its origination. The destruction should take place then only (not after its origination). Hence, if there is obstruction (to destruction), there would be no destruction at all. This results into the immutable nature of all the objects.

उच्यते - न, कारणोपपत्तेः । अधिकारो हि सर्वभूतानां संस्कारवशादुत्पत्तिस्तदवस्थानमेव तेषामलं स्थितये । सति विनश्वरत्वे संस्कारोपयोगे तु स्थित्यपभ्रंश इत्यतोऽस्ति कंचित्कालमवस्थानं भावानाम् । न च कौटस्थ्यप्रसङ्गः । किंचान्यत् । संततिविनाशप्रसंगात् । नष्टंश्चेदुत्पत्तिसमनन्तरं विनाश इष्यते सन्ततिरप्यन्ते क्षयदर्शनात्रंष्ट्री । तस्या अपि तथैव विनाशः प्राप्तः । ततश्च तडिद्विलसितवत्क्षणदृष्टनष्टस्य त्रैलोक्यस्याभावे संसारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । तस्माद-

युक्तं नष्टरूपतिसमकालमेव विनाश इति ।

Proponent: *It is not so because there is the possibility of the cause.*

The origination due to the past impression is the claim of all the beings; the subsistence of that (impression) is enough for their subsistence. Though they are perishable, still when there is this destruction of past impression, their situation falls down. Hence, the beings exist for some time only. There arises no undesirable contingency of

the immutable nature (of the objects). Moreover, there would arise the undesirable contingency of destruction of continuity of progeny. If it is desirable that the destructible objects are destroyed just at the time of their production, the continuation of the idea of the objects also is destructible because it is observed to be destroyed at the end. That would also be destroyed in the same way. There would arise the undesirable contingency of extirpation of the whole world in absence of the three worlds which are destroyed within a moment, just when seen like the flashing of the lightning. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the destructible objects are destroyed at the time of their origination only.

कारणावस्थानात्र दोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतमस्ति कारणं पूर्वोत्पन्नो भाव उत्तरस्योत्पत्तौ । स चाप्युत्तरस्य, इत्येवं सन्तेतरनुच्छेदः । विरोधिभावान्तरसंसर्गात् भयतस्तथोत्पत्तेर्भ्रंश इति ।

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because the cause persists? It may be like this. An entity originated earlier is the cause of the origination of the latter effect. That effect is again the cause of the succeeding effect. Thus, there is no extirpation of the progeny. However, through the contact of effect of the opposite nature the destruction of such an origination takes place on both the sides.

एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? पूर्वहेतुत्यागात् । प्रागुक्तं येन नष्टव्यमसौ मन्त्रौषधमंगलप्रयोगैरपि क्षणादूर्ध्वं नावतिष्ठते । साम्प्रतं तु नष्टी संततिः कारणवशादेव तिष्ठतीति सोऽयं पूर्वहेतु-  
त्यागः ।

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because the earlier reason is given up (by you). It is stated earlier that since it is destructible, it does not subsist after a moment even through the application of an incantation, medicines and benediction. Now you hold that the progeny is destructible and subsists due to some other cause only. Thus, the earlier reason is abandoned.

विनाशहेत्वभावात्क्षणिकत्वमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, नास्ति भावानां विनाशहेतोरुपलम्भ इति । अतः स्वाभाविकः प्रध्वंसः । तस्मादुत्पत्तिसमकालमसौ केन वार्यते ? इदमप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनभ्युपगमात् । को हेतुदवमस्यति अहेतुको विनाशः । किं तर्हि प्रागेवोक्तमर्थ-  
वशाद् भावानां स्थितिस्तदव-विरोधिद्रव्यान्तरसंबन्धेनाध्यात्मिकादिना भवतीति ।

If it is argued that there is momentariness of the objects because of the absence of the cause of destruction? It may be like this. The cause of destruction of the objects is not available. Therefore, the destruction is natural. Therefore, what prevents it from taking place at the time of origination of an object ?

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is not accepted. Who will accept that the destruction is without some cause? On the contrary, it is already stated that the objects subsist due to some perpose.....(the destruction) of the bodily objects, etc., takes place due to their contact with some other opposite substance.

विनाशस्य विनाशप्रसङ्गादयुक्तमिति चेत् यदि तर्ह्यभावोपि हेतुमान्यरिकल्प्यते प्राप्तमस्यापि घटवद् विनाशित्वम् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मादहेतुको विनाश इत्येतदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? व्यक्त्यपगमप्रतिज्ञानात् । भावविनाशिनं प्रति सत्यमेवायमुपलम्भः स्यात् । व्यक्त्यपगमस्तु नो विनाशः । स तु हेतुमत्त्वेन कथं विरोत्यत इति ? तस्मान्न विनाशहेत्वभावात्क्षणिकं संस्कृतमिति ।

If it is argued that it is wrong because of the undesirable contingency of the destruction of destruction? it may be like this. Then, if the absence is also supposed to be caused, it involves the destruction of it also just like that of pot. This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the destruction is without some cause.

It is wrong.

Why ?

Because we have already declared the disappearance of the manifestation (as destruction). This censure would certainly apply to the one who believes in the destruction of the object. The disappearance of the manifestation, however, is destruction according to us. How will it be contradicted by the nature of having a cause ? Therefore, the product is not momentary on account of absence of the cause of destruction.

इतरच्च न क्षणिकम् । कस्मात् ? अग्रहणप्रसङ्गात् । इहाऽसतोऽग्रहणं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा द्वितीयस्य शिरसः । क्षणादूर्ध्वं च ते घटादयो न भवन्ति । तस्मात्तेषामप्यग्रहणप्रसङ्गः ।

Due to the following reason also the product is not momentary. By which reason ?

*Because there would arise the undesirable contingency of its non-perception.* In our ordinary life the non-perception of the non-existence is certainly felt just as that of the second head. The pot, etc., do not exist after one moment according to you. Therefore, there arises the undesirable contingency of their non-perception also.

तत्सदृशोत्पत्तेरदोष इति चेत् स्यादेतत् - उत्पत्तिसमकालं निरोधेऽपि घटस्याऽन्यस्य तादृशस्योत्पत्तिर्भवति, तन्निरोधेऽन्यस्येत्येवमविच्छेदेन ग्रहणं भवति, ज्वालानदीस्रोतोऽनुसन्धानवदिति । एतदप्युक्तम् । कुतः ? कारणाभावात् स्यादेतदेवं यदि तदानीं सदृशोत्पत्तौ कारणं स्यात् । न तु तदस्ति, प्रागेव निरोधात् । तस्मादसदेतत् ।

If it is argued that this fault does occur because the origination of some object similar to that? It may be like this. Even though the pot is destroyed at the time of its origination, there is the origination of the other pot similar to that. When that (latter) is destroyed, (there is) the origination of still some other and so on and so forth. In this way, there is the continuous knowledge of that object just like the suitable connection of the flame of the lamp and current of the river.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the absence of the cause. It would be like this if there would have been some cause of the origination of similar object at that time. That is, however, not the cause because of the destruction (of the cause) earlier only. Therefore, it is also wrong.

पूर्वोत्पन्नस्य कारणभावात्तत्सिद्धिरिति चेन्न, उपादानात् तन्निष्पत्तिप्रसिद्धेः । इहोपादानान्मृत्पिण्डकसंज्ञकाल्लोके घटनिष्पत्तिः प्रसिद्धा । न च तदानीमस्ति मृत्पिण्डः । किञ्च क्रमाऽनुपलब्धेः । इह शिविकादीनामनुक्रमेण घटोत्पत्तिरुपलभ्यते । न चानुक्रमोऽस्ति । किञ्च कारकसामग्र्याभावात् । इह कुम्भकारदण्डचक्रसूत्रोपलसामग्र्यद् घटनिष्पत्तिः प्रसिद्धा । न चास्त्येषां तत्र सम्भवः । किञ्च तदुत्पाद्यान्तरोत्पाद्यस्यानिष्पत्तेः । इह घटाद् घटे निर्वृतिर्न प्रसिद्धा लोके । न चाऽप्रसिद्धोऽस्ति दृष्टान्तः ।

It is argued that that is established because that which was originated earlier serves as the cause ?

No, because it is well known that that (effect) originates from the material cause. Here, in the world, it is well known that the pot originates from the lump of clay which is its material cause. And, the lump of clay does not exist at that time (i.e., at the time of the

origination of the pot).

*Moreover, on account of the non-observation of the successive order.* Here, the origination of pot is observed in succession with the palankeen, etc. There is, however, no succession (if momentariness is accepted).<sup>16</sup> *Moreover, because of the absence of causal material.* It is well established here that the pot is produced from the causal material consisting of the potter, stick, potter's wheel, the thread (string or wire) and the stone (or rock). There is, however, no possibility of these objects (if the theory of momentariness is accepted). *Moreover, there is no production of the other product from some product originated from causal material.* The production of some pot from another pot is not well established in the world. That which is not well established cannot serve as an example.

बुद्धिशब्दवदिति चेत् स्यादेतत् यथा बुद्धिर्बुद्ध्यन्तरं सदृशं सूते, शब्दश्च शब्दान्तरमेवं घटाद् घटनिष्पत्तिर्भवति इति । एतदप्यसत् । कस्मात् ? सिद्धं हि बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तरं शब्दाच्च शब्दान्तरं जायत इत्येतदप्यस्माकं प्रसिद्धम् । तस्मात्त्रलापमात्रमेतत् । तत्र यदुक्तं सदृशोत्पत्तेः सोऽयमिति ग्रहणमविच्छिन्नं क्षणिकत्वेऽपि भावानामित्येतदयुक्तम् । किञ्चान्यत् । कार्योत्पत्तिकाले कारणनिवृत्तेः । यदा न कारणमस्ति न तदा कार्यमुत्पद्यते द्रयोर्घटयोर्युगपदुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । यदा तु कार्यमुत्पद्यते तदा कारणं निरुद्धमिति निर्बीजः प्रादुर्भावः प्राप्नोति । अनिष्टं चैतत्; सततोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ।

If it is argued that it is just like the knowledge and the word ? It may be like this. Just as the knowledge gives rise to the other knowledge similar to it and the word to some other word,<sup>17</sup> similarly, the pot originates from the other pot.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

It is well known to us that it is established that one knowledge originates from the other and one word from other. Therefore, this is merely a prattling.<sup>18</sup> The statement that in spite of the momentariness of the objects it is due to the production of the similar object that there is the continuous knowledge that the object is the same, is also wrong. *Moreover, because of the disappearance of the cause at the time of the production of the effect.* The effect does not originate when there is cause because (otherwise) there would arise the undesirable contingency of the simultaneous perception of the two pots.<sup>19</sup> When the effect is produced, the cause is destroyed and, hence, the origination comes to be without cause. This is also undesirable because it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the continuous origination.



अनुत्पन्ने हेतुसामर्थ्याददोष इति चेत् स्यात्तदनुत्पन्ने कार्ये कारणेन प्रयोजनम् । उत्पन्ने तदव्यापारानर्थक्यात् । अस्ति चाऽनुत्पन्ने कार्ये कारणम् । अतो न निर्बीजः प्रादुर्भाव इति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभावेऽपि तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । अंग तावत् अणुशो विभज्यन्तामग्नौ वा क्षिप्यन्ताम्, तन्वस्तदापि प्रसिद्धविनाशानामभूवन्निति शक्यमुपदेष्टुं, यदि तेभ्यः पट उत्पद्यते । तस्माद् भ्रान्तिरियम् ।

If it is argued that because of having the capacity of being a cause when it is not produced, there is no fault? It may be like this. There would be the use of cause when the effect is not produced because the operation of that is useless after the production. The cause does exist when the effect is not yet produced. Therefore, the origination is not without a cause.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there would arise the undesirable contingency of the production of that (effect) even in the absence of the cause. Let the threads be reduced to the particles or thrown into fire. If the cloth is produced from them, it is possible to prescribe that origination took place from these which were well known to be destroyed. Therefore, it is merely the illusion.

युगपत्कार्यकारणयोरुत्पत्तिनिरोधौ तुलानतोन्नतवदिति चेत् स्यादेतद्यथा नामोन्नामौ तुलान्तर्ययोगपद्मेन भवत एवमुत्पत्तिविनाशौ कार्यकारणयोरिति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? कार्यकारणभावाऽदर्शनात् । किमिदमुदके निमज्जद्भिः फेनमवलम्ब्यते ? तुल्या तस्य ह्येकस्यावनतिरवस्था तद् द्वितीयस्योन्नतये हेतुर्भवन्ति, भवतः कारणविनाशः कार्योत्पत्तिश्च युगपदेन भवतः । न च तयोर्हेतुमद्भावः शक्यः कल्पयितुम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

If it is argued that the production of the effect and the destruction of the cause are simultaneous just like the rising and bending of the beams of the balance ? It may be like this. Just as the rise and bending of the beams of the balance take place simultaneously, similarly, the production of the effect and the destruction of the cause take place simultaneously.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because (in that case) we do not observe the relation of effect and cause. Why is the bubble resorted to by the one who sinks into the water? The state of bending of one beam of the balance<sup>20</sup> becomes the cause of the rise of the other. In your case, however, the destruction of the cause and the origination of the effect take place

simultaneously. It is not possible to postulate causality in their case. Therefore, it is wrong.

विशेषग्रहणात् क्षणिकत्वसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्— यद्युत्पन्नमात्रोपरतिर्नास्ति भावानां, किंकृतः शरीरादीनां प्राणापानश्रमरूपादिकृतोऽब्जाश्मप्रभृतीनां च शीतोष्णस्पर्शकृतो भेदः ? घण्टादीनां चाशब्दकानां पञ्चाच्छब्दवतां ग्रहणम्, तस्मादनिषिद्धः च क्षणभङ्ग इत्येतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । उक्तमत्रोत्तरं कारणाऽभावेऽनुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गादिति । किञ्च संस्थानान्तराऽनुपलब्धेः । न ह्यत्र पूर्वसंस्थानविपरीतं संस्थानान्तरं गृह्यीमहे । तस्मादविशिष्टास्त इत्येवमवगम्यताम् । विशेषग्रहणन्ववस्त्वन्तरानुग्रहे शक्यन्तराविर्भावात् । उक्तं च — “व्यक्तेरपगमोऽभीष्टः पूर्वसंस्थानहानितः । तदभावादसिद्धोऽस्य विशेषः — ॥ १० ॥

If it is argued that the momentariness is proved by the observation of particularity? It may be like this. If the objects do not come to an end at the very time of their origination, what brings about the disturbance in the body, etc., caused by the breathing in and out as well as the affliction and the disturbance in case of lotus and cloud, etc., caused by the cold and hot touch ? The bell, etc., are observed as having the word afterwards, they are essentially devoid of word. Therefore, the maxim that the objects are destroyed every moment is not refuted.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the reply given earlier. The reply is already given that because it would lead to the undesirable contingency of non-production (of the effect) in absence of the cause. *Moreover, because the other state of arrangement is not observed.* We do not perceive some other state of arrangement opposite to the former. Therefore, it should be understood that they are not different (from earlier). The knowledge of difference is due to the manifestation of another power without accepting the other object.<sup>21</sup> It is stated also;

The disappearance of the manifestation is accepted due to the loss of the earlier arrangement. In the absence of that its difference is not proved.

(Here, the text of the Yuktidīpikā up to kārikā 13 is not available.)

## KĀRIKĀ 10

1. Samkhyakarika 8
2. Vaisesikasutra 1.1.7-9.
3. The constituents are not directly perceived and hence their nature is inferred through the objects composed of them.
4. The objects are non-discriminative, etc., because they are composed of three constituents.
5. The statement is to suggest that the term *hetu* should be understood as the Karika (producer) and not jnapaka (indicator).
6. The sense is that where there is the producer cause, the object produced is non-eternal. The cause of manifestation does not imply the non-eternity invariably.
7. The sense is that even in the theory of those who hold the momentariness of all objects the manifestor cause is also accepted.
8. Here, we prefer Chakravarti's reading *asamskrtamati* to Pandeya's reading *samskrtamapi*.
9. I.e. according to the Samkhya theory of causation nothing is absolutely destroyed. Therefore, nothing is destructible because in the so called state of destruction it exists in its causal form.
10. The meaning is that in case of modification, the change takes place in the form and not in essence.
11. The meaning is that we proceed from known to unknown in argumentation, just as the knowledge of *gavaya* arises through the knowledge of cow through their similarity. Similarly, it should be known to and admitted by both the parties that flame and lamp, knowledge and word are perishable and, hence, momentary also.
12. The sense is that it is devoid of logical foundation and, hence, cannot be accepted by the intellectuals.
13. The meaning is that the statement itself implies that the word is manifested and not produced.
14. The rule refers to the use of words in a single sense at all the places.
15. The context demands full stop after *iti*.
16. The sense is that an object is created in succession of parts and not at a time.

17. The knowledge is destructible but is revived again through other causes. Similarly, in the apprehension of the word the process is that the sound is produced at the sounding object and is destroyed after giving rise to another sound and so on and so forth.
18. It appears that something is lacking in this sentence as it supports rather than contradicting the viewpoint of the opponent.
19. If the pot produces another pot, there would be a moment when both the pots serving as cause and that serving as an effect would be observed.
20. The reading marked as doubtful by Pandeya could possibly be *tulantayoh*.
21. This is actually the difference between the Buddhists and the Samkhya view about change. The change, in Buddhist theory, is the result of momentariness while according to the Samkhyas it is due to the manifestation of some other power different in nature to the earlier.



## KĀRIKĀ 13

(Nature of the three constituents)

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः

एवशब्दः प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्यते ।

THE SATTVA IS ACCEPTED TO BE BUOYANT AND ILLUMINATING, THE RAJAS IS EXCITING AND MOBILE AND THE TAMAS IS SLUGGISH AND ENVELOPING.

The word 'only' (*eva*) is construed at the end of each (expression describing the constituents).

(Buoyancy and illumination)

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमेवेष्टम् । यत् किञ्चित्कार्यकरणे लघु प्रकाशं च तत्सत्त्वरूपमिति प्रत्यवगन्तव्यम् । तत्र कार्यस्य तावदुद्गमहेतुर्धर्मो लघुत्वम्, द्रव्यान्तरप्रकाशनम् । करणस्यापि ग्रहणं सङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायविषयेषु यथास्वं प्रवर्तमानम् ।

The sattva is accepted to be buoyant and illuminating only. That which is buoyant and illuminating in the course of performance of activity, should be accepted as of the nature of sattva. Buoyancy is the characteristic which is the cause of shooting up of the effect, and of the efficient functioning of all instruments. The illumination refers to the illumination of the other objects through (by) driving away the darkness which is the quality of the earth in the form of the shade (or shadow).<sup>1</sup> That of the instruments is also to be taking place in due order in case of the object of determination, ideation and ascertainment.<sup>2</sup>

(Exciteness and mobility)

उपस्तम्भकं चलमेव रजः । यः कश्चिदुपस्तम्भश्चलता चोपलभ्यते तद्रजोरूपमित्यवगन्तव्यम् । तत्रोपस्तम्भः प्रयत्नः, चलता क्रिया । सा च द्विविधा, परिणामलक्षणा प्रस्पन्दलक्षणा

च । तत्र परिणामलक्षणा सहकारिभावान्तरानुगृहीतस्य धर्मिणः पूर्वधर्मात्प्रच्युतिः । प्रस्पन्दलक्षणा प्राणादयः कर्मेन्द्रियवृत्तयश्च वचनाद्याः बाह्यानां द्रव्याणामुत्पत्तननिपतनभ्रमणादीनि ।

That which is exciting and mobile only in rajas. Whatever excitingness and mobility is observed, that should be understood as the form of rajas. Excitingness means special effort and mobility means the activity. The activity is of two kinds : of the nature of modification and of the nature of movement. Through the activity in the form of modification results the deprivation from the earlier characteristics in case of some object assisted by the other assisting conditions.<sup>3</sup> The activity in the form of movement is in the case of the activity like vital airs; the function of the motor organs like speech, etc., as also the going up, falling down and moving around in case of the substances.

(Sluggishness and enveloping)

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः । यत्किञ्चिद् गौरवं वरणं चोपलभ्यते तत्तमोरूपमिति प्रत्यवगन्तव्यम् । तत्र गुरुत्वं कार्यस्याधोगमनहेतुर्धर्मः करणस्य वृत्तिमन्दता । वरणमपि कार्यगतं च द्रव्यान्तरतिरोधानम् । करणगता चाशुद्धिः प्रकाशप्रतिद्विभूता । इत्येष सत्त्वादीनामव्यतिकरेण स्वभावोपलम्भो यत एषां नानात्वमवसीयते ।

The tamas is sluggish and enveloping only. Whatever sluggishness and enveloping is found, should be understood as of the nature of tamas. The sluggishness is the characteristic conducting the effect to fall down and causing the inertness in the activity of instruments. The enveloping also is found in the effect in the form of concealing the other substance. It is also the impurity found in the instruments, which is opposite to illumination. In this form is the differentiation of the nature of sattva, etc., without intermixture, from which is deduced the manifoldness of these constituents.<sup>4</sup>

(All the Constituents occur in a single object)

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं स्त्रीक्षत्रमेघेषु स्वभावव्यतिकरोपलम्भादेको गुणस्त्रिरूपः, सर्वे वा सर्वरूपा, रूपान्तरस्य वा सत उत्पत्तिरिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, गुणभूतस्य भक्तित उपकारात्प्रधानरूपोपपत्तेः । इह गुणभूतस्य भक्तितः प्रधानोपकारित्वे सति भक्तितस्तद्रूपोपपत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथा क्षीरादेः । तद्धि मुखादिषु दृष्टप्रतिलब्धप्रवृत्तिः पित्तस्य स्वेन रूपेणाङ्गभावं गच्छंस्तस्योपकारात्किञ्चित् संपद्यते । न च तथा सदेव । सत्त्वमपि स्त्रैणगुणभूतं सपत्नीरजसः स्वेन रूपेणाङ्गभावं गच्छंस्तस्योपकाराद् दुःखं संपद्यते । तमसो मोहः । एवं क्षात्रं रजः आर्यदारलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य दस्युलक्षणस्य च तमसः । एवं मेध्यं तमः कार्षिके सत्त्वस्य प्रोषितदयितायाश्च रजसः । तस्मान्नास्ति गुणानां स्वाभावव्यतिकरः । किं चान्यत् । अगुणभूतानां स्वभावग्रहणात् । यदा चैतेऽङ्गभावमपगच्छन्तो मध्यस्थास्तुल्यसंस्काराश्च प्रतिपद्यन्ते तदा स्वरूपेणैव । तस्मादसंकीर्णं गुणरूपम् ।

As regards your statement<sup>5</sup> that due to the availability of the intermixture of the nature of these constituents in case of a woman, a warrior and the cloud the single constituent is of three forms or all are of all forms or there is the origination of some other form already existed even before the origination (of these characteristics in the constituent),<sup>6</sup> we reply it is not so, because the main form is justified as the subordinate assists through its being secondary. For example, in case of milk, etc. The milk which has seen that the bile has got advancement in the mouth, etc., becomes subordinate to the bile itself and becomes pungent on account of its assistance rendered to that. It is not that it is originally of that nature. The sattva also which forms a constituent of the woman becomes subordinate to the rajas of the co-wife and produces misery through its service to that. (Similarly ) it produces delusion (when it becomes subordinate to) the tamas. Similarly, the rajas existing in the warrior becomes subordinate to the sattva found in the form of the wife of a noble man and to the tamas in the form of a miscreant.<sup>7</sup> In the same way, the tamas existing in the cloud (becomes subordinate) to the sattva in the former and to the rajas in the case of the woman whose husband is away.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, there is no intermixture of the nature in the case of the constituents. *Moreover, because their (essential) nature is perceived when they have not attained the position of subordinate. when they start to get subordinate position, and when they acquire someone neutral and having the past impressions of the same kind (i.e., the nature of the same constituent), they do so<sup>9</sup> in their own (unmixed) nature. Therefore, the nature of the constituents is unmixed.*

आह—न, सन्देहात् । उभयथा हि रूपान्तरग्रहणं क्षीरादिषु दृष्टम् । ताद्रूप्यात्तैश्च विपरिणतानां गुणभावाच्च । यथोक्तं तत्र कथमिदमेकान्तेन निश्चीयते गुणभावात्सत्त्वादीनां रूपान्तरग्रहणं न पुनस्ताद्रूप्यादेवेति ?

Opponent: No, because of the doubt. The attainment of other form is observed in both the ways in case of milk, etc., in their own form and in the modified form when they become mutually subordinate. How is it absolutely ascertained that the sattva, etc., attain other form due to their subordination and not through their very unmixed form?<sup>10</sup>

उच्यते—ग्रहणविकल्पोपलम्भात् । यदि स्रैणं सत्त्वं ताद्रूप्यादेव सपत्न्या तेन गृह्यते तेन भर्तुरपि तथा ग्रहणप्रसंगो मध्यस्थानां तुल्यसंस्काराणां च । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्माद् भाक्तोऽयं गुणविकल्पोपलम्भः । किं चान्यत् । उत्तरकालं स्वरूपग्रहणान्निवृत्तानुशयाभिश्चै-

कार्यतामुपगताभिः सपत्नीभिः स्वेनैव रूपेण स्रैणस्य सत्त्वस्य ग्रहणमुपलभ्यते । स्वगृहसमवस्थितैश्चार्यदारैः क्षत्रियाणाम् । निष्पन्नशस्यैश्च कृषीवलैर्मैधानाम् । तस्माद् भाक्तोऽयं ग्रहणविकल्पोपलम्भः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् अन्योऽन्यजननवृत्तयो गुणाः, न च संकीर्णस्वभावा इति ।

Proponent: Because of the observation of variety (of form) in their knowledge (i.e., in various forms). If the sattva existing in a woman is supposed to be apprehended in the essential pure form by the co-wife, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of its apprehension by the husband and also the neutral and the person having the similar past impressions in the same form.<sup>11</sup> This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the observation of the variety in the same constituent is of secondary form. Moreover, the apprehension of the sattva of the woman is observed in its essential form afterwards on account of its attaining the essential form; by the co-wives which have a single purpose and by those who are free from the past impressions.<sup>12</sup> So also that (rajas) of the warriors by the wives of the noble men staying in their own house with their husbands. Same is the case with that (tamas) of the clouds by the farmers who have cut their crops. Therefore, the observation of variety of their knowledge is secondary. Therefore, it is right that the constituents perform the function of generating each other,<sup>13</sup> and they are not of the intermixed nature.

(Though opposite in nature the constituents work for a single purpose)

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम् अन्योन्यमिधुनत्वानुपपत्तिः, सत्त्वस्येतरविरोधात्, इत्यत्र ब्रूमः—अस्ति चायं विरोधो गुणानां

प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

किमुपपद्यत इति वाक्यशेषः । तद्यथा वर्तिज्योतिस्तैलानां परस्परविरोधेऽपि प्रदीपकरणैककार्यसाधनभावोपगतानां वृत्तय एकत्र संमूर्छिताः सहभावं प्रकृष्टमपि कालमनुभवन्ति एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमसां सति विरोधे महदाद्येककार्यसाधनभावोपगतानां वृत्तय एकत्र मूर्छिताः सह भवन्तीति ।

As regards your statement that their co-existence does not hold

good because the sattva stands in contradiction to others, we reply, there does exist such a contradiction among the constituents.<sup>14</sup>

### AND (THEIR) FUNCTION IS FOR A SINGLE PURPOSE JUST LIKE THAT OF THE LAMP.

'What holds good' is the remaining sentence. Just as the function of wick, fire and oil which are opposed to each other becomes completely permeated and remain together for a long time when they come together as the parts of a lamp for serving as a means for illuminating, similarly, the function of sattva, rajas and tamas even though opposed to each other is completely permeated and co-exists, when they have become the means of single purpose after attaining the form of intellect, etc.

युक्त्यभावादसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् - का पुनरत्र युक्तिर्येन विरोधिनामेकार्थता भवतीति ?

Opponent: If it is argued that it is not established because there is no argument to prove it? It may be like this. What is that argument through which it is proved that the contradictory objects perform the single act?

उच्यते-गुणप्रधानभावत्वात् । गुणभूतो हि प्रतियोगी प्रधानभूतेन तदुपकारकत्वान्न विरुद्धयत इति संसर्गेण वर्तितुमुत्सहते । तुल्यबलयोस्तु द्वयोः सत्यमेव सहावस्थानस्य नास्ति सम्बन्धः । तथा च भगवान् वार्षगण्यः पठति रूपातिशया वृत्तिशयाश्च विरुध्यन्ते । सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह वर्तन्ते । तद्यथा जलाग्नी पचनीयस्वेदनीयेषु कार्येषु, छायातपौ च सूक्ष्मरूपप्रकाशने, शीतोष्णे च प्रजावस्थितौ । एवं तत्सिद्धः प्रदीपवत्सत्त्वरजस्तमसां विरोधेऽपि सहभावः ।

*Proponent : It is possible because of the relation of principal and subordinate. The subordinate opponent is not opposed to the principal because the former is for the service of the latter. Hence, they can act together. The relation of co-existence, of course, is not found between the two objects having the equal power. So states lord Vārṣaganya "The form in excess and the function in excess contradict the other form and function (which are similarly in excess) and those (form and function) in their ordinary condition co-exist with those which are in excess."<sup>15</sup> For example, water and fire (co-exist) in the act of cooking and*

perspiration, the shade and light in the act of manifesting the subtle form, the cold and heat for the maintenance of the generation. Thus, the co-existence of sattva, rajas and tamas is proved just as that in the case of (the components of) lamp even though they are opposed in nature.

(Mention of six characteristics does not imply the six constituents)

आह, यदुक्तं लघ्वादिभावस्वभावभेदाद् गुणनानात्वमित्यत्रब्रूमः

भिन्ना लक्षणभेदश्चेन्मिथः सत्त्वादयो गुणाः ।

तर्हि लक्षणयुक्तत्वात्षड्गुणाः प्राप्नुवन्ति ते ॥

यदि लघ्वादिलक्षणभेदात्सत्त्वादीनां नानात्वं मिथोऽभ्युपगम्यते तेन लघुत्वप्रकाशत्वयोरपि भेदोस्ति गुणद्वयप्रसंगः । एवमुपस्तम्भचलताभ्यां गौरववरणाभ्यां च द्वयं द्वयमिति षड्गुणाः प्राप्नुवन्ति । अथ मतं लघुत्वप्रकाशयोरभेद इति पृथगनभिधानं प्राप्तम् । तद्भेदे वा ग्रहणभेदमनिच्छतः प्राप्तो लघुत्वादिभेदेऽपि गुणाभेदस्तथा चैको गुण इति प्राप्तम् । यत्पुनरेदुक्तं गुणभूतस्य भक्ति उपकारात्प्रधानरूपापत्तिरिति,

अङ्गभावं व्रजत्सत्त्वं दुःखं सम्पद्यते यदि ।

वैरूप्यस्योपसंहारात्पूर्वदोषनिवर्तनम् ॥

यदि हि रजसोऽङ्गभावमुपगच्छत्सत्त्वमुपकारात्तद्रूपं भवति तेन प्रतिज्ञातस्य रूपान्तरस्योपसंहारात्तैरूप्यं गुणानामेकैकस्य प्राप्तम् । रूपान्तरस्य वा सत उत्पत्तिः । तस्मात्पूर्वदोषापरिहारात्प्रतिज्ञामात्रमेवायं समाधिः । यदप्युक्तं अगुणभूतानां स्वभावग्रहणादिति ।

अङ्गभावानपेक्षं तु ग्रहणं नास्त्येषरपि ।

परमर्षेरपि गुणानां कार्यमेव प्रत्यक्षं न शक्तिमात्रेणावस्थानमसंवेद्यत्वात् । तत्र चाङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनमनिवार्यम् । तस्मादोषमनिच्छता गुणा परित्याज्याः । नास्ति वा सुदूरमपि गत्वा तत्संकरदोषपरिहारः ।

Opponent : As regards your statement that the constituents are many due to the differentiation of their nature in respect of being buoyant, etc., we state :

If it is held that the constituents are many (being different from each other) having different characteristics, they come to be six constituents because of their having six characteristics.

If manyness among the sattva, etc., is due to the difference of the characteristics like buoyancy, etc., there is the differentiation of the buoyancy and illumination. Hence, there arises the undesirable

contingency of granting it as two constituents. Similarly, the rajas also comes to be two on account of excitement and mobility and the tamas also comes to be two on account of its sluggishness and enveloping. If you hold that the buoyancy and illumination are non-different, they should not be spoken to be different. Or, if they are different but the difference in cognition is not desirable, it comes to mean that the constituent is one only. As regards your statement that there is the attainment of the principal form (by the constituent) because of the service rendered through subordination by the subordinate, we reply:

If the sattva after attaining the subordinate form gives (lit. accomplishes) misery, the dissimilarity (of it with rajas) being ended, the earlier objection<sup>16</sup> is not alleviated.

If sattva attains the form of the rajas as it becomes subordinate to the rajas and renders its service to the rajas, the notion of other independent form of each of the constituents comes to an end and, thus, it leads to the conclusion that each constituent is of three forms. Or (we get the idea that) there is origin of some other already existent form. Therefore, the answer to our objection remains only an empty declaration because the defect shown earlier is not alleviated. As regards your statement that on account of observation of their nature when they have not become subordinate, we state 'even a seer cannot cognise them without their state of subordination'. Even to great seer what is cognizable is only the action of the constituents and not their state of existing in potential form because such state is not cognizable. In that case their attainment of state of the principal and subordinate is compulsory. Thus, the concept of constituents is abandoned by the one desiring to avoid the defects.<sup>17</sup> Or, even stretched too far there is no alleviation of the defect of their intermixture of nature.

उच्यते- यत्तावदुक्तं लक्षणभेदाद् गुणनानात्ववादिनो लक्षणद्वययोगादेकैकस्य गुणषट्त्वप्रसंग इति तन् । कस्मात् ? द्वयोर्गुणप्रधानभावानुपपत्तेः । इहार्थान्तरस्यार्थान्तेरेण गुणप्रधानभावो भवति । यथा स्त्रीक्षत्रमेधेषु व्याख्यातम् । न च लघुत्वप्रकाशयोरुपस्तम्भचलनयोगैरववरणयोश्च मिथौ गुणप्रधानभावोऽस्ति, तदनर्थान्तरं धर्मास्त इति नास्ति षट्त्वप्रसंग इति । किं च अप्रसिद्धत्वात् । न हेतुत्ववचित्प्रसिद्धम् यथा यावन्तो धर्मास्तावन्तो धर्मिण इति । न चाप्रसिद्धेन व्यवहारः । किंच पृथक्त्वैकान्तप्रसङ्गात् । लक्षणभेदान्नानात्वप्रतिज्ञस्य सर्वार्थानां स्वसामान्यलक्षयोगात्त्वतोऽर्थान्तरमिति पृथक्त्वैकान्तप्रसंगः । अथैतदनिष्टं न तर्हि वक्तव्यं लक्षणभेदाद् गुणानां षट्त्वमिति । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं अङ्गभूतस्य प्रधानरूपापत्तेः पूर्व-  
नेणनिवृत्तिरिति तदप्युक्तम् । कस्मात् ? भक्त्यभिधानात् । असकृदधीतमस्माभि-

र्भाक्तोऽयं गुणानां ग्रहणविकल्प इति । न च भक्तिः परमार्थ इत्यस्थाने यत्नः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं अङ्गभूतानां सत्त्वादीनामृषेरप्यविषयत्वमिति सत्यमेतत् । यत्तुक्तं कार्यस्य विषयभूतत्वाद-  
ङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनं गुणानां सकलसत्कार्यमपेक्षते । तथा स्त्रीक्षत्रमेधाः प्रकृतास्तेष्वङ्गभावमगच्छत इति विज्ञायत इति । सामान्यशब्दानां हि प्रकरणाद्विशेषेऽवस्थानं भवति । तद्यथा भोजनकाले सैन्धवमानयेत्युक्ते लवणे संप्रतिपत्तिर्नाश्चादिषु । तस्मात्प्रकरणमनपेक्ष्य महति तन्ने दोषाभिधानं बालवाक्यस्थानीयम् । एवं गुणलक्षणोपदेशात्सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यम् ॥१३॥

Proponent : As regards your statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting six constituents in case of the one who speaks of the differentiation of the constituents through the differentiation of their peculiar characteristics, because two characteristics are associated with each of the constituents, (we reply) it is not the case.

Why ?

Because there cannot be the relation of subordinate and principal in case of the two (of the qualities of the constituents). It is observed here that the state of subordinate and principal takes place in case of one object with the other object which is different as it is explained in case of a woman, warrior and the cloud. There is no relation of mutual subordination and principal between buoyancy and illumination; between excitingness and mobility; and between sluggishness and enveloping. These are the qualities and not the other object and, hence, there arises no undesirable contingency of the constituents' being six.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, it is not well established. It is not well established anywhere that there are as many substances as qualities. There is no investigation (or argumentation) of a case through unestablished facts. Moreover, because there arises the undesirable contingency of absolute differentiation. There arises the undesirable contingency of absolute differentiation in case of the one who declares the differentiation through the difference of peculiar characteristics because the characteristics are found associated differently with each object, (and, hence,) each object would be unique. If this is undesirable, it should not be stated that the constituents are six on account of different characteristics.

The objection that the earlier defect is not alleviated because of attainment of the principal form by the subordinate one, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because we have spoken of the secondary sense. We have

repeatedly stated that the variety in the understanding (or knowledge) of the constituents is in the secondary sense.<sup>19</sup> And, the secondary sense is not real. Hence, you are making an effort at a wrong place. Your statement that the *sattva*, etc., which have not attained the state of principal and subordinate cannot be known even by the seers, is right. As regards your statement that the attainment of the subordinate and the principal state refers to the effect (i.e., is found in the case of effect) and as such it depends upon the complete existence of the effect, (our reply is as follows). The woman, warrior and the cloud are the subject of discussion. It is understood that the constituents do not attain the subordinate state in them. The words giving general sense are restricted to a particular sense through context. For example, if it is stated at the time of taking meals 'bring *saindhava* (meaning both horse and salt)', the understanding is with reference to the salt and not to horse, etc. Therefore, the mention of faults in a great system of philosophy with no consideration of the context is like a statement of children.<sup>20</sup> Thus, through the mention of the peculiar characteristics of the constituents, the three constituents are established.

## KĀRIKĀ 13

1. The sense is that the earth abounds in *tamas* and thus is having the quality of darkness and enveloping. If the *sttva* would not illumine the objects, they would have always got darkness.
2. In the theory of the *Samkhyas* the senses proceed to the respective activity of their own and are not prompted by any external instrumentality. The self-motivation for activity is due to *rajas* and less quantity of *tamas*.
3. The change in the objects is caused by *rajas*.
4. The manifoldness of the constituents is inferred from their unmixed qualities because the constituents are *supra sensuous* and hence their manifoldness cannot be directly cognised.
5. As this statement is not available in the present text, it can be assumed that it may have been made in that part of the text which is not available to us. Similar assumption should be made in similar cases in the other parts of the commentary on this *Karika*.
6. The meaning is that a woman, a warrior and the clouds are observed to have the qualities of all the constituents as they are pleasurable to some, painful to other and causing indifference to the rest. Therefore, if it is admitted that the dominance of a certain constituent the rise of certain feeling each of the constituents would be considered as having all these forms or it should be admitted that a new quality is manifested in these constituents.
7. The sense is that in a warrior *rajas* abounds but it excites pleasure in the wife of a noble man because in that case the *rajas* becomes subordinate to *sattva*. Similarly, it becomes subordinate to the *tamas* in the miscreant when the latter shows indifference to it.
8. The sense is like manifests like'. Though every object is composed of three constituents but one of them gets dominance when it comes in contact with a similar constituents and the rest of the constituents start assisting it. For example, a beautiful woman gives pleasure to her husband as when the *sattva* of the husband gets dominated when it finds *sattva* of his wife dominated. As a matter of fact, this theory of *Samkhya* cannot explain as to why does the *rajas* of the wife does not cause dominance of the *rajas* of her husband. Thus, the dominance of



one constituent in one object and the dominance of the same in the other are inter-dependent for their knowledge.

9. i.e. they act according to their own nature giving rise to pleasure, etc.
10. Milk is changed in taste when it modifies itself into curds, etc. When it is not subordinate to anything else, as also in the mouth of the one having advancement of bile. Similarly, it cannot be absolutely ascertained in case of constituents also whether they change the form of own or after their becoming subordinate to the other.
11. The sense is that if the sattva is apprehended in its own form of giving pleasure, it should be of this nature in everyone. Thus, the sattva of a woman should equally give pleasure to the co-wives as well as an indifferent person. It is, however, not so. Therefore, it is proved that the constituents are not apprehended always in their unmixed form.
12. It refers to the situation when the beautiful woman is seen objectively without favour or prejudice towards her. Such a situation arises when persons come together and work for a single purpose without individual interest. Thus, when all the co-wives act for a single purpose of pleasing the king, the beautiful woman is seen in its own form.
13. The text here gives a clue for the interpretation of the expression anyonyajanavrttayah on which the commentary is not available. The expression according to the Y.D. means to give rise to the function of one constituent by becoming subordinate to it.
14. The objector is objecting against mutual co-existing of the constituents with an impression that the objects of mutually opposed nature cannot act together.
15. The Question occurs in the Yogabhasya 3.13. As informed by Chakrabarti Vacaspati ascribes it there to Pancasikha. The Yogabhasya quotes it to establish the non-contradiction between the past and present states as also between the present and the future states of an object. The Yuktidīpikā, however, proves that when the form or function is in the states of pre-dominance over each. Other, there is the contradiction but when one remains as subordinate to the other, there is no contradiction between them.
16. It refers to the objection that each of the constituents is of many forms and not of one. It is clear from the next sentence.

17. The fundamental position that the constituents are not perceptible but are inferred through their activities is given up at the cost of defending the theory that each of the constituents has a distinct nature of its own.
18. Single object may contain many qualities. Thus, the qualities do not bring out the differentiation into object. It is the differentiation of objects only which may serve as the basis for differentiating the objects separately.
19. In fact the constituents cannot be known separately. The knowledge of each is spoken in the secondary sense.
20. The sense is that through the context it is clear that the constituents attain the state of principal and subordinate in the example of woman, warrior and the cloud given above. But the argument of the opponents depends upon the fact that they do not attain the state of principal and subordinate.



## KĀRIKĀ 14

(Undistinguishableness. etc., in Cosmic matter)

आह- अविवेक्यादिरिदानीं गणः कथं प्रतिपत्तव्य इति ?

Opponent : How should the non-discriminative and the group of other qualities be determined ?

उच्यते-

अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धस्त्रैगुण्यात्

यत्त्रिगुणं तदविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मीति (का. ११) । कथमवगम्यत इति चेत्

तद्विपर्ययाऽभावात् ।

यस्माद् गुणविपर्ययः क्षेत्रज्ञः । तत्र विषयत्वमचेतनत्वं प्रसवधर्मित्वं च न भवतीति पुरस्तात्प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । तस्मात्परिशेषतो व्यक्ते एतेषां धर्माणामविरोधः ।

Proponent : THE QUALITIES OF NON-DISCRIMINATIVE, ETC., ARE ESTABLISHED BY THEIR NATURE OF BEING COMPOSED OF THE THREE CONSTITUENTS.

Whatever is composed of the three constituents is non-discriminative, object of knowledge, common, non-conscious and productive. (Ka. 11).

If it is asked how is it known (the reply is )

BECAUSE OF THEIR ABSENCE IN THE OPPOSITE OF THAT.

Because the opposite of that composed of three constituents is the conscious entity. The objectivity, non-consciousness and productivity are not found in that. We shall establish it later on. Therefore, through elimination there is non-contradiction of these qualities in case of the manifest.<sup>2</sup>

आह, तथा प्रधानमिति प्रागुक्तं (का. ११) भवता । तदिरिदानीं कथं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् प्रधा-

नमपि त्रिगुणादियुक्तमिति ?

Opponent : You have stated earlier that the cosmic matter also is similar to that (Ka. 11). How, then, it should be understood that cosmic matter also is composed of the three constituents, etc.?

उच्यते

कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

इह कारणगुणात्मकं कार्यं दृष्टं पटादि । व्यक्ते च त्रैगुण्याद्युपलभ्यते । तस्मात्कारणमप्यस्य तथाजातीयकमिति शक्यमनुमातुम् । सिद्धान्तमात्रोपदर्शनमेतदाचार्यः करोति । न्यायं तु यथोक्तेषु प्रदेशेषूपपादयिष्यामः ॥ १४ ॥

Proponent : THE NON-MANIFEST IS ALSO ESTABLISHED (TO BE SO) ON THE GROUND THAT THE EFFECT IS OF THE NATURE OF CAUSE.

It is observed here that the effect like a cloth is of the nature of the cause. And, the properties as composed of the three constituents, etc., are found in the manifest. Therefore, it is possible to infer that its cause is also of the same nature. The authority has merely mentioned the theory here. We shall adduce the logical justification for it at proper occasions.

## KĀRIKĀ 14

1. The compound is dissolved as tasya (gunasya) viparyaye abhavat.
2. This is established through sesavat type of inference that these qualities are found in the manifest objects.

## KĀRIKĀ-15

आह, कार्यधर्मस्य कारणोपलब्धौ हेतुमदादिप्रसंगः, अविशेषात् । यदि कार्ये दृष्टस्य धर्मस्य कारणे सद्भावोऽभ्युपगम्यते प्राप्तो हेतुमदादीनामपि धर्माणां कार्यदृष्टत्वात्प्रधाने प्रसंगः । अथ कायोपलब्धौ तुल्यायां हेतुमदादयो नेष्यन्ते न तर्हीतरेषामपि कारणावस्थितिरस्तीति ।

Opponent : If the properties of the effect are found in the cause, there arises the undesirable contingency of being caused, etc., in the case of the cosmic matter because there is no difference between the two (cause and effect). If the existence of the properties perceived in the effect is admitted in cause also, there arises the undesirable contingency of existence of the properties like having a cause, etc., in the cosmic matter because these are observed in the effect. If inspite that they are commonly found in the effect, the properties like having a cause, etc., are not desired in the cause, in that case the existence of others also should not be admitted in the cause.

उच्यते न, स्वरूपविरोधित्वे तदपवादविज्ञानात् । कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्येत्यनेन लिंगेन हेतुमदादयोऽपि कारणे प्रसज्यन्ते । तेषां तु कार्यकारणरूपविरोधित्वादपवादो विज्ञायते । कथम् ? यदि तावद्धेतुमदादयो व्यक्ते दृष्टत्वात्प्रधाने व्यञ्जन्ते, कृतकत्वात्कार्यमेव तन्न कारणमिति प्राप्तम् । अनित्यत्वाच्च स्वयमुच्छिद्यमानमननुग्राहकमव्यापित्वादिभिश्चानन्तविकारोत्पादनशक्तिहीनम् । अहेतुमदादयः प्रधानेऽभ्युपगमाद्व्यक्तेरपि प्राप्यन्ते तादृशाः कारणसम्भवात्कार्यमेव तन्न भवतीति प्राप्तम् । अविवेक्यादयस्तूभयत्रापि भवन्तो नेतरेतरस्वरूपविरोधिनः । तस्मात्कार्यकारणभावाभ्युपगमाद्धेतुमदाद्यपवादः, इतरेषां च कारणसद्भावः सिद्धः ।

Proponent : No, because their exception is known because of their opposition in nature. There arises the undesirable contingency of the occurrence of the properties like having a cause, etc., in the cause through the probans that the effect is of the nature of cause. However, their exception is known through the opposi-

tion of the nature of effect and the cause.

How ?

If the properties like having a cause, etc., are found in the cosmic matter on the ground of their occurrence in the manifest, the cosmic matter would be an effect on account of being a product, and it would not be a cause. And, being destructible and on account of being non-eternal, not favouring others, and non-pervasive, etc., it would be devoid of the power of giving rise to various products. Since the properties like not having a cause, etc., are admitted in the manifest, then without the possibility of the cause of those kinds, they would not be the effect at all. The properties like non-discriminative, etc., do not mutually oppose the nature even while existing in both. Therefore, because of the acceptance of the relation of cause and effect, the properties like having a cause, etc., form the exception. The existence of the others in the cause is established.<sup>1</sup>

(Similarity between manifest and cosmic matter presupposes the existence of cosmic matter)

यदुक्तं कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धमिति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः कार्यकारणभावाप्रसिद्धेः । सिद्धे हि व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः कारणत्वे एतदेवं स्यात् । तत्त्वसिद्धम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : Your statement that the non-manifest also is proved (to be so), because the effect is of the nature of the cause, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because the relation of effect and cause is not well-established between the manifest and the non-manifest. This would have been the case if the manifest and the non-manifest would be established as the effect and cause mutually. That is, however, not established. Therefore, it is wrong.

विशेषानभिधानादुभयसाम्यमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा भवानाह व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः कार्यकारणभावोऽप्रसिद्धः, एवं वयं वक्ष्यामः—तयोः कार्यकारणभावाप्रसिद्धिरप्यसिद्धा । न च क्वचिद्विशेषोऽस्त्युभयसाम्यं भविष्यतीति । तच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सद्भावासिद्धेः । सत्यम्, अनभिधीयमाने विशेषे स्यादुभयसाम्यम् । अव्यक्तस्य तु सद्भावं एवासिद्ध इत्ययं विशेषः । तस्मादयुक्तमेतदपीति ।

If it is argued that on account of lack of a particular (reason) both are similar ? It may be like this. As you said that the relation of

cause and effect is not well established in case of the manifest and the non-manifest, we also state that the non-establishment of the relation of cause and effect between them is also not established. Since there is no particularity, both the aspects will be similar.<sup>2</sup>

That is, however, wrong.

Why ?

Because of the non-establishment of the existence. It is right that there would be the similarity of both (the aspects) if the particularity is not put forward. The particularity here is that existence of the non-manifest is not established. Therefore, it is wrong.

कार्यस्य कारणपूर्वकत्वाद्व्यक्तस्य च कार्यत्वादव्यक्तसद्भावे प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत् । कार्यं कारणपूर्वकं दृष्टम् । घटादिकार्यं चेदव्यक्तं प्रमितत्वात्तस्मादिदमपि कारणपूर्वकं भवितुमर्हति । यच्च तस्य कारणं तदव्यक्तमिति । तच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्तात् । इहाकस्मिकी च कार्यस्योत्पत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथेन्द्रधनुषः । असतश्च भ्रान्तिमात्रात् । तद्यथा माया-स्वप्नेन्द्रजालमृगतृष्णिकालातचक्रगन्धर्वनगराणाम् । सतश्च कारणात् । तद्यथा मृदादिभ्यो घटादीनाम् । कार्यं चेदव्यक्तमतः संशयः किमिन्द्रधनुर्वदकस्मादस्य प्रादुर्भावोऽथ मायादिव-दसतोऽथ कारणात्सतो घटवदिति ?

If it is argued that there is the justification for the existence of the non-manifest because the effect presupposes the cause and the manifest is the effect ? It may be like this. The effect is observed as produced from the cause. If the effects like pot are taken to be non-manifest (before and after their worldly existence) because of their nature of being known, it also deserves to have some cause; and whatever is the cause of that is the non-manifest itself.

That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of certainty. Here, the accidental origination of the effect is also observed just as that of a rainbow; the origination of non-existent from delusion (is also observed) just as the maya, dream, jugglery, mirage, a fire brand and the city of the gandharvas (a class of semi-gods); it is also observed as taking place from some existent cause just as that of the pot, etc., from clay, etc. If the effect is non-manifest, there arises the doubt as to whether its origination is accidental like that of rainbow, or from an existent cause like that of pot, etc.

(Proofs for the existence of cosmic matter)

उच्यते— नाकस्मिकमसत्पूर्वं व्यक्तम् । कस्मात् ?

### भेदानां परिमाणात्

यत्परिमितं तस्य सत उत्पत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथा मूलाङ्कुरपर्णनालदण्डवुसतुषशूकयुष्मक्षीर-  
तण्डुलकणानाम् । परिमिता महदहंकारेन्द्रियतन्मात्रमहाभूतलक्षणभेदाः । तस्मात्सत्कारणपू-  
र्वकाः । यदेषां कारणं तदव्यक्तम् ।

॥ इति युक्तिदीपिकायां सांख्यसप्ततिपद्धतौ तृतीयमाह्निकं प्रथमं च प्रकरणं समाप्तम् ॥

Proponent : The manifest is not causeless, or accidental and not from a non-existent cause as well.

Why ?

(Finiteness of objects)

### BECAUSE OF FINITE NATURE OF THE SPECIFIC OBJECT.

The finite object is observed to originate from the existent (cause) just like the origination of the roof, sprout, leaf, stalk, husk, chaff,awn, flower, sap and the particles of rice. The specific objects like intellect, egoism, senses, subtle elements and the gross elements are finite in magnitude. Therefore, they arise from an existent cause. Whatever is the cause of these, is the non-manifest.

Here ends the third discourse of the commentary Yuktidīpikā on Sāmkhyakārikā as also the first chapter.

आह- कस्मादस्यव्यक्तम् ? असद्भेदानामपि परिमाणदर्शनात् । अनेकान्त इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, अस्ति हि मायास्वप्नेन्द्रजालानुविधायिनामपि भेदानां परिमाणमिति । तस्मादनेकान्तिको हेतुरिति ।

Opponent : For what reason does the non-manifest exist ? Because the limited magnitude is observed in case of the non-existent specific objects as well.

If it is argued that it (the above reason) is not conclusive? It may be like this. The limited magnitude is found in case of the specific objects like māyā, dream, jugglery, etc. Therefore, the reason is not absolute.

तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? न हि तेषां नियमोऽस्ति, एतावद्भेदेवोत्पत्तयं नान्यैरिति । महदादयस्तु प्रलयकाले तिरोभूतास्मावन्त एवोत्पद्यन्ते ।

Proponent : This is not the case.

Why ?

There is no restriction in their case that they should originate from this much and not from others.<sup>3</sup> The intellect, etc., which disappear at the state of dissolution, originate from the specific cause only. Therefore, the reason is conclusive.

आह, परिमाणानवस्थानं कालद्वयानुपलब्धेः । सत्यं, साम्प्रते काले महदादयो युक्तपरिमाणाः प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपलब्धेः । अतीतानागतयोस्तु कालयोर्नास्ति प्रसिद्धिः । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : The limited magnitude is not settled because it is not found in the two periods of time (past and future). It is true that the intellect, etc., are possessed of magnitude at the present time only because it is known so through perception and inference. Their limited magnitude is not well known (to exist) in the past and the future time. Therefore, it is wrong.

उच्यते न, विपर्यये प्रमाणानुपलब्धेः । इदानीमेतावन्तो भेदा इत्येतच्छक्यमनुमातुम् अतीतानागतयोस्तु कालयोर्नास्ति प्रसिद्धिः । तस्मात्तु भेदानवस्थाप्रसंगः

Proponent : It is not so because no proof is found for the opposite case as well. It is possible to infer that at present time these objects are finite. They are not known so or otherwise in their past and future periods of time. Therefore, there arises no undesirable contingency of uncertainty with regard to their finite magnitude.<sup>4</sup>

आह, भेदाभेदानवस्थानात् । महदादीनां ये भेदा देवमनुष्यतिर्यञ्चो घटादयश्च तेषामशक्यं परिमाणं परिच्छेत्तुम् । सामान्येऽन्तर्भावादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, अस्ति शरीराणां महाभूतसामान्यं घटादीनां च पृथिवीसामान्यं, तत्परिमाणादेतेऽपि परिमिता इति । तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभावात् । नहि वः सामान्यं द्रव्यादर्शान्तरभूतमस्ति । सारूप्यमात्रे सामान्यपरिकल्पनात् ।

Opponent : Because the identity of all products is not settled. The magnitude of the (finite) products of intellect, etc., like the gods, men and the animal and also that of the pot, etc., cannot be established.<sup>5</sup>

If you argue that the argument is wrong because it is included

in generality? It may be like this. The generality of the gross elements is found in case of the bodies, and the generality of the earth, etc., is found in case of the pot, etc., and since those (causes) are finite in magnitude, these would also be finite in magnitude.<sup>6</sup>

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because of the absence (of generality). The generality according to you, is not something different from the substance, because you have postulated generality as the similarity of form itself.<sup>6</sup>

उच्यते न, तत्त्वान्तरानुपपत्तेः । तत्त्वभेदेन परिमिता भेदा इत्येतद्विवक्षितं यथोक्तमस्माभिरुक्तं च यद्यस्ति तत्त्वान्तरमुच्यताम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं सामान्यस्यार्थान्तरभूतस्य भवत्पक्षेऽनुपपत्तिरिति सत्यमेतत् । तथाविधेनापि तु तेन संव्यवहारो न प्रतिषिध्यते इति वक्ष्यामः । तस्मात्सिद्धं भेदानां परिमाणादस्त्यव्यक्तम् ।

Proponent : No, there is no possibility of different essence (in different types of the same object). What we intend to say is that the specific objects are limited in magnitude due to the differentiation in essence of the elements. We have expressed also the same as we have stated above. If there is variety of essence, you should speak. Your statement that there is no justification for generality as a distinct element in your theory is true. (In this respect), we say that we also do not reject the practical activities through that kind of generality.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, it is established that the non-manifest exists because the specific objects are finite in magnitude.

(Homogeneity)

किं चान्यत् ।

समन्वयात्

इह येन भेदानां समनुगतिस्तस्य सत्त्वं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा मृदा घटादीनाम् । अस्ति चेयं सुखदुःखमोहैः शब्दादीनां समनुगतिः । तस्मात्तेऽपि सन्ति चे च सुखादयोऽस्तमितविशेषास्तदव्यक्तम् । तस्मादस्त्यव्यक्तम् ।

Moreover

## BECAUSE OF HOMOGENEITY

It is observed here that whatever is found in many specific ob-

jects (i.e., the homogeneous element in many specific objects) exists (as the essence of them) just as the clay in the case of pot, etc. The word, etc., are homogeneous in respect of pleasure, pain and indifference. Therefore, these (pleasure, etc.,) exist. When these pleasure, etc., exist without particularity, that state is the non-manifest. Therefore, the non-manifest exists.

आह, नासिद्धत्वात् । सुखादिभिः शब्दादयोऽनुगम्यन्त इत्येतदप्रसिद्धम् केन कारणेन प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति ?

Opponent : No, because it is not established. It is not established that the pleasure, etc., are commonly found in the word, etc.

Through which reason should it be understood?

उच्यते-तद्वृद्धिनिमित्तत्वात् । इह शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगंधानां सन्निधाने स्वसंस्कारविशेषयोगात्सुखदुःखमोहाकाराः प्राणिनां बुद्ध्य उत्पद्यन्ते । यच्च यादृशीं बुद्धिमुत्पादयति तत्तेनान्वितम् । तद्यथा चन्दनादिभिः शकलादयः । तस्मात्त्रासिद्धिः समन्वयस्येति ।

Proponent : Because it serves as the cause of that. It is observed here that there arises in the beings the knowledge in the form of pleasure, pain and indifference due to the contact of word, touch, form, taste and smell, in accordance with the particular type of the past impressions of the beings. Whatever produces a particular type of knowledge, that (quality) exists in the object of knowledge just as a fragment (is endowed with the fragrance) of sandalwood, etc. Therefore, the homogeneity is not disproved.<sup>8</sup>

आह, असिद्ध एवायं समन्वयः । कस्मात् ? विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । न ह्ययं नियमः कारणसदृशमेव कार्यमुत्पद्यते । किं तर्हि विलक्षणं अग्निधूमशब्दादि । कथम् ? न ह्यग्निस्तृणादिस्वभावकोऽग्निस्वाभावको वा धूमः । न च भेरीदण्डादिस्वभावः शब्दः । तस्मात्सुखाद्यनुगताः शब्दादय इतीच्छामात्रम् ।

Opponent : The homogeneity is unestablished .

Why ?

Because of the observation of the effect of dissimilar nature.

This is not a rule that the effect arises as similar to the cause. On the contrary, it is of dissimilar nature as in the case of fire smoke and word.

How ?

The fire is not of the nature of grass, etc.; nor is the smoke of the nature of fire; nor is the word of the nature of drum, stick, etc. Therefore, it is merely a wishful thinking that the pleasure, etc., are

found in the word, etc.

विशेषितत्वात् । सुखादिस्वरूपाः शब्दादयः, तत्सन्निधाने सुखाद्याकारप्रत्ययोत्पत्तिरित्येतदादित एवास्माभिर्विशेषितम् । तस्मात् भिन्नजातीयास्त इति । यत् खल्विदमुच्यतेऽग्न्यादीनां विलक्षणानामुत्पत्तिदर्शनात्प्रधानभेदानामतज्जातीयप्रसंग इति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभिप्रायानवबोधात् । नैव ब्रूमो यो यस्य विकारः स तज्जातीयक इति । किं तर्हि यो यज्जातीयकः स तस्य विकार इति । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । किंचान्यत् उदाहरणाप्रसिद्धेः । न चैतदुदाहरणं प्रसिद्धं अग्न्यादयः स्वकारणजातिं नानुविदधतीत । कस्मात् ? बलवीर्यानुविधानात् । तद्यथा अग्नेर्धूमस्य च त्वक्चन्दननलिकादिस्निग्धतानुवृत्तेस्तैक्कष्याद्यनुवृत्तेश्च । भेरीविकारः शब्दो न तु यथा भेरिरूपमवस्थितम् । प्रदीपेनेव तु दंडाभिघातेन व्यज्यत इति साध्यमेतत् । न चैकैको रूपादीनां द्रव्याकारः समुदायधर्मत्वात् । तस्मात् भेरीविकारः शब्दः । तत्र यदुक्तं विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनादसिद्धोऽन्वय इत्येतदयुक्तम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् समन्वयादस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ।

Proponent : No, because of the specification .We have specified in the beginning that the word, etc., are of the nature of pleasure ,etc. The notion in the form of pleasure , etc., arises in their association only. Therefore, they do not belong to different genus. Your statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting that the evolutes of the cosmic matter are not of the genus of the cosmic matter because of the observation of the origination of the fire, etc., as dissimilar to their causes, is wrong.

Why ?

Because the sense intended is not understood (by you). We do not say that effect is of the genus of that whose modification it is . On the contrary, (we accept that) to whatever genus a particular effect belongs, it is the effect of that. Therefore, this is wrong. Moreover, because of the non-establishment of the example.

The example that the fire, etc., do not correspond to the genus of their cause, is not established.

Why ?

Because of the fact that they (fire, etc.,) follow the powers and potencies (of their causes). To explain, fire and smoke follow the viscosity of skin and pipe of sandal wood, etc., as also the sharpness, etc., (of the fuel). Word is a product of a drum, but it does not subsist in the form of the drum only. It is still to be proved that the word is manifested by the stroke of the stick just as (the object is) manifested

by the lamp. Anyone of the form, etc., also is not of the form of a substance because they are the attributes of the collection. Therefore, the word is not a modification of the drum.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the statement that homogeneity is not established because of the observation of the origination of the effect of some dissimilar nature, is wrong. Therefore, it is right that the non-manifest exists on account of homogeneity.

(Potency of Functioning)

किं चान्यत् ।

शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

इह यावती काचिल्लोके प्रवृत्तिरुपलभ्यते सा सर्वा शक्तिः । तद्यथा कुम्भकारस्य दण्डादिसाधनविन्यासलक्षणायाश्च शक्तेः सन्निधानाद् घटकरणे प्रवृत्तिरस्ति । व्यक्तस्य चेयं कार्यत्वात्तद्भावे प्रवृत्तिरिति । अतस्तस्यापि शक्त्या भवितव्यम् । याऽसौ शक्तिस्तदव्यक्तम् । तस्मादस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ।

Moreover,

## BECAUSE THE FUNCTIONING IS DUE TO POTENCY.

Whatever functioning is observed here in the world, it is all due to the potency, It is just as the activity of the potter for producing the pot is due to the potency in the form of arrangement of the instruments like stick.<sup>10</sup> Since the manifest is an effect, its activity is due to that (potency). Therefore, there should be (admitted) the potency in case of that also. Whatever is the potency, is the non-manifest itself.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, the non-manifest exists.

(Potency is not born at the time of activity)

आह, प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः शक्त्यभावः, प्रवृत्त्यनुपलब्धेः । यदि शक्तिपूर्विका प्रवृत्तिरिति मन्यध्वं तेन यावत्प्रवृत्तिर्नोपलभ्यते तावच्छक्तिर्नास्तित्येतदापन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सत्यां शक्त्यां कार्याभावे स्वरूपाभावप्रसंगात् । यदि खल्वपि विद्यमाना शक्तिः केनचित्प्रबन्धेन कार्यं नोत्पादयेच्छतकिरशक्त्येतदापन्नम् । तस्मात्सहकारिभावान्तरसन्निधानात्प्रवृत्तिसमकालमेवार्थानां शक्तय उत्पद्यन्ते । ताश्च तावदेव प्रध्वंसन्ते ।

तत्र यदुक्तं प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः शक्तिदर्शनाद्व्यक्तस्यापि निष्पादिका शक्तिरस्तीत्येतदयुक्तम् । किं चान्यत् भेदाभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । इह प्रधानमेव वा शक्तिः स्यात् प्रधानाद्वा भिन्ना ? किं चातः ? तद्यदि तावत्प्रधानमेव शक्तिस्तेन कार्यं भेदाच्छक्तिभेदोऽवसीयत इति शक्तिभेदात्प्र-



धानानात्वप्रसंगः । प्रधानैकत्वाद्वा तदव्यतिरिक्तानां शक्तीनामेकत्वप्रसंगः । ततश्च कार्यनाना-  
त्वाभावः । अथ मा भूदयं दोष इति प्रधानादर्थान्तरभावः शक्तीनामभ्युपगम्यते तेन भिन्नानां  
शक्तीनां प्रवृत्तिः सिद्धौ प्रधानसिद्धिर्नास्तीत्येतदापन्नम् । किं चान्यत् । स्वरूपाभिधानं च ।  
प्रधानस्य शक्तिमात्रादप्यर्थान्तरत्वमभ्युपगम्य रूपमीदृक्प्रधानं स्वावस्थायामिति, तच्चाश-  
क्यमभिधातुम् । तस्माद् भेदाभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तेरकल्पनीया शक्तिरिति ।

Opponent : Before the commencement of the activity there is no  
potency because the activity is not observed (at that time). If  
the activity is caused by the potency, you should admit that as  
long as the activity is not observed, that potency also is not  
there; this becomes contingent.

Why ?

If in the presence of the potency there is no effect, there arises  
the undesirable contingency of absence of the essential nature (of the  
potency). If the potency, even though present, would not give rise to  
the effect due to some obstruction, the potency would come to be im-  
potency. Therefore, the potencies of the objects originate at the time  
of activity only due to the coming together of the other assisting ob-  
jects. And, those potencies meet the destruction then and there. The  
statement that there is the potency for producing the manifest also  
because the potency is observed before the activity also, is wrong.  
Moreover, there is no justification of the postulation of the difference  
or non-difference (from cosmic matter). Here, the potency may be  
the cosmic matter itself or different from the cosmic matter.

What ensues from this discussion ?

If the potency is the cosmic matter itself, the difference of  
potencies is understood from the difference of effects; thus, it gives  
rise to the undesirable contingency of manifoldness of the cosmic  
matter due to the difference of potencies.<sup>12</sup> Or, on account of the  
oneness of the cosmic matter, there will arise the undesirable contin-  
gency of oneness of powers which are not different from the cosmic  
matter. From this will result the absence of manifoldness of the ef-  
fects.<sup>13</sup> If with a view that the above defect may not arise, the dif-  
ference of the potencies from the cosmic matter is accepted, even  
when the different potencies are established through activities, it be-  
comes contingent that the existence of the cosmic matter is not estab-  
lished (through this reasoning).<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the statement (of  
description) of the nature of cosmic matter becomes contingent. After  
admitting the difference of the cosmic matter from the potencies, it

becomes impossible to describe that this is the essential form of the  
cosmic matter in its own (unevolved) form. Therefore, on account of  
the impropriety of the postulation of the difference or non-difference  
(between the cosmic matter and potencies) the potency should not be  
postulated.

उच्यते- यदुक्तं प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः शक्त्यभावः प्रवृत्त्यनुपलब्धेरिति, अत्र ब्रूमः नाऽप्रसिद्ध-  
त्वात् । कारणं शक्तिः कार्यं प्रवृत्तिः । न च कार्यानुपलब्धौ कार्याभाव इत्येतल्लोके प्रसिद्धम् ।  
यत्पुनरुक्तं कार्यानिष्ठतौ शक्तेः स्वरूपहानमिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, प्रदीपदृष्टान्तात् । यद्यथा प्रदी-  
पस्य घटादिप्रकाशनशक्तिरस्ति । अथ च कुड्याद्यावरणसामर्थ्यान् घटादीन्प्रकाशयितुं  
शक्नोति । न च शक्यते वक्तुं प्रदीपस्य प्रकाशनशक्तिरशक्तेति । एवमन्येषामपि भावानां  
प्राक्प्रवृत्तेरपि शक्तिः स्यात् । न चाऽप्रवृत्तिदर्शनादस्याः स्वरूपहानं स्यात् । यत्तूक्तं सहकारि-  
भावान्तरसन्निधानात्प्रवृत्तिसमकालमेवार्थानां शक्तिप्रादुर्भाव इति अत्र ब्रूमः - तदप्रसिद्धिः  
शक्त्यपेक्षत्वात् । इह सर्वः कर्ता स्वगतां शक्तिमपेक्ष्य तद्योग्यतया सहकारिभावान्तरमुपादेते,  
सा चेत्प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः स्यात्साधनानां विषयस्वभावानवधारणादनुपादानप्रसंगः । अनिष्टं चैतत् ।  
तस्मात्प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः शक्तिः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं तावदेव प्रध्वंस इति अत्र ब्रूमः न, कार्यनिष्ठादर्श-  
नात् । यदि प्रवृत्तिसमकालमेव प्रध्वंसः स्यात्कार्यनिष्ठैव न स्यात् । तन्निमित्तत्वात्कार्यस्य ।  
अस्ति त्वसौ । तस्मान्न प्रवृत्तिसमकालमेव शक्तिप्रध्वंसः । सदृशसन्धानोत्पत्त्या कार्यनिष्ठेति  
चेन्न । विनाशसमकालोत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् । अथापि स्यादेकस्यां शक्तौ क्षणसाध्यमंशमवसाय  
विनष्टायामन्यत्तत्सदृशं शक्त्यन्तरमुत्पद्यते, तस्मिन्विनष्टेऽन्यदिति । एवं शक्तिसन्तानात्कार्य-  
निष्ठा भवतीति । एतदप्युक्तम् । कस्मात् ? विनाशकालोत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् । को ह्यत्र हेतुर्यत्र  
विनाशसमकालमन्यच्छिक्तरूपं कार्यमवसीययति न पुनः प्राक्तनमेवावस्थितमिति ? किं  
चान्यत् । कौटस्थ्यदोषपरिहात् । क्षणोत्तरकालावस्थाने च भावानां यो दोष उपातः कौटस्थ्य-  
प्रसंग इति तस्य परिहार उक्तः । तस्मान्नास्ति शक्तीनां प्रवृत्तिकाले विनाशः । प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकाल-  
मपि नास्ति । कस्मात् ? पुनः प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् । शक्त्यन्तरोत्पत्तौ प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकालमपि इति चेत्  
न, हेत्वभावात् । को ह्यत्र निबन्धः तस्यां विनष्टायामन्या प्रवृत्त्यन्तरहेतुर्भवति नैव पुनः सै-  
वेति ? कृतार्थत्वादिति चेत् न अनभ्युपगमात् । न ह्येकघटार्था शक्तिरभ्युपगम्यते । तत्र  
येनैव हेतुना एकं घटमवसाय न विनश्यति तेनैव यावन्ति कर्तव्यानीति । तस्मान्निषु कालेषु  
शक्तयोऽवतिष्ठन्ते ।

Proponent : As regards (your) statement that since no activity is ob-  
served before the activity, there is no potency, we reply, it is  
not so, because it is not well established. The cause is the poten-  
cy and the activity is the effect. It is not established in the world  
that there is no effect when it is not observed. As regards the  
statement that in the absence of the production of the effect  
the essential nature of the potency is abandoned, we reply, it is

not so, because there is the example of lamp. It is just as there is the potency of illuminating the pot, etc., in the lamp, but it cannot illumine the pot, etc., due to the capacity of the obstruction in the form of a wall, etc., it cannot (in this case) be said that the capacity of lamp to illumine is incapable. In the same way, there may be the potency of the other objects also before activity. Nor would there be the abandonment of its essential nature due to the non-observation of the activity (at that time). As regards your statement that there is the origination of the potency in the objects at the time of the activity itself due to the association (or collecting together) of the assisting objects, we reply: *it is not established because it depends upon the potency*. Here, all the agents depend upon their own potency and select the assisting objects in accordance with the capability of that (his own potency). If that would not exist before the activity of that, there would be the undesirable contingency of non-selecting the means because the nature of the means is not ascertained without such potency.<sup>15</sup> This is, however, not desirable. Therefore, the potency does exist before activity. As regards your statement that its destruction takes place then only (immediately after activity), we reply, it is not so, because the completion of the effect is observed. If destruction would take place at the time of the activity itself, there would not have been the completion of the effect because the effect is caused by that. (completion) is, however, there. Therefore, the destruction of the potency does not take place at the time of activity itself.

If it is argued that the completion of the effect takes place due to the origination of uniting together (i.e., series) of the similar potencies, we reply, no because there is no possibility of origination at the very time of destruction. It would be like this. When the one potency is destroyed after accomplishing the part to be accomplished within a moment, there arises another potency similar to that and when that is destroyed, the other originates and so on and so forth. Thus, through the continuity of potency the completion of the effect takes place. This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of origination at the time of destruction. What is the reason (to determine) that the potency which is (born) new at the time of destruction completes the effect, and the old itself does not subsist. Moreover, because the defect of immutability is alleviated. We have already stated the alleviation of the defect of undesirable contingency of immutability of all the objects arising through postulating the existence of the object after a moment. Therefore, there is no destruction of the potencies at the time of activity. Nor does it take place after the activity.

Why ?

Because the activity is observed again also.

If it is argued that the other activity takes place when the new potency is produced, (we reply), no, because there is no reason. What is the reason to determine that the other (fresh) potency arising after the destruction of the earlier serves as the cause of the other activity, and not the same.

If it is argued that it is because the earlier has served its purpose, we reply, it is not so because it is not admitted by us. The potency is not admitted for the purpose of a single pot. In that case, it does not perish after completing a single pot; the pots are supposed to be accomplished through the same reason. Therefore, the potencies subsist in all the three periods of time.

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं भेदाभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तिरिति, अत्र ब्रूमः - अस्तु प्रधानादभिन्ना शक्तिः । न तस्य नानात्वं शक्त्येकत्वं वा प्रसज्यते । कस्मात् ? संख्याव्यवहारस्य बुद्ध्यपेक्षत्वाद् बुद्धिनिमित्तस्य चासत्कारेण प्रधानशक्तिस्वभावात्, इहायं संख्याव्यवहारो बुद्ध्यपेक्षः । कथम् ? यदाभिन्ना बुद्धिमुत्पादयति तदेकं, प्रधानावस्थायां च शक्तयोऽस्तमितविशेषत्वादभिन्ना बुद्धिमुत्पादयन्ति । तस्मादेकं तत्प्रवृत्तिकाले विशेषावग्रहणे भेदं प्रतिपद्यते, देवशक्तिर्मनुष्यशक्तिरित्यादि । तस्मान्नासामेकत्वमतो न भेदाभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तिरिति । व्यक्ते दर्शनाच्छक्तीनामव्यक्ते प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत् । व्यक्ते शक्तिप्रवृत्ती दृष्टे न चाव्यक्ते । क्वचिदन्यतो व्यक्तमेवैतस्माद्धेतोः सिद्ध्यति नाव्यक्तमित्येतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सामान्यतोदृष्टान्तात्सिद्धेः । यथैव हि देवदत्ताधारया क्रियया तस्य देशान्तरप्राप्तिमुपलभ्यात्यन्तादृष्टं ज्योतिषां देशान्तरप्राप्तेर्गमनमनुमीयते एवं प्रवृत्तेः शक्तिनियमितत्वादव्यक्तस्य च प्रवृत्तिभूतत्वादवश्यमत्यन्तादृष्टा शक्तिरभ्युपगन्तव्येति सिद्धं शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेरस्त्यव्यक्तम् ।

As regards your further statement that there is no propriety in postulating either of the difference or non-difference (or the potencies from the cosmic matter), we reply, if the potencies be non-different from the cosmic matter, there arises no undesirable

contingency of admitting manifoldness (of cosmic matter) or the oneness of the potencies.

Why ?

Because the usage of number depends upon knowledge and through the rejection of the cause of knowledge it is of the nature of the potency of the cosmic matter. Here also, the usage of number depends upon knowledge.

Why ?

Whatever gives rise to the knowledge of non-difference, is one, and at the state of cosmic matter the potencies give rise to the knowledge of one because all the differentiations are marged there. Therefore, the potency is one only and on account of the knowledge of differentiation at the time of activity, it attains differentiation in the form of potency of the gods, potency of men, etc. Therefore, these (potencies) do not come to be one and, hence, it is not that there is no propriety in the postulation of its difference or non-differentiation (from cosmic matter).<sup>16</sup>

If it is argued that the potencies cannot be understood to exist in the non-manifest through their being observed in the manifest? It may be like this. The potency and the activity are observed in case of manifest only and not the non-manifest. In some respect the manifest is proved as different from this potentiality and not the cosmic matter.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is proved through the inference based on general observation. Just as after observing the attainment of some other place through activity in case of Devadatta, the act of moving in case of planets, which is absolutely non-perceptible, is inferred through their attainment of the other place. Similarly, on account of control of activity by the potency and on account of abundance of activity in the manifest the absolutely invisible potency should be admitted. Thus is established that due to the fact that the activity is caused by potency, the unmanifest exists.

(Difference between cause and effect)

किञ्चान्यत् ।

### कारणकार्यविभागात्

कारणं च कार्यं च कारणकार्ये तयोर्विभागः कारणकार्यविभागः । इदं कारणमिदं कार्यमिति बुद्ध्या द्विधावस्थापनं विभागो यः स कारणकार्यविभागः । तदवस्थितभावपूर्वकं

दृष्टम् । तद्यथा शयनासनरथचरणादिः । अस्ति चायं व्यक्तस्य कारणकार्यविभागस्तस्मादिदमप्यवस्थितभावपूर्वकं, योऽसाववस्थितो भावस्तदव्यक्तम् ।

Moreover,

### BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT.

The compound 'cause and effect' denotes the cause as well as the effect. The difference between those two is denoted by the expression 'difference between the cause and effect'. The difference between the cause and the effect refers to the difference through the knowledge putting them separately as 'this is the cause and 'this is effect'. That difference is observed to be caused by the objects existing separately just is the case with bed, seat, charriot and foot, etc. There is certainly the differentiation into cause and effect in case of the manifest. Therefore, it is also caused by the separately existent objects. Whatever is that separately existent object, is the unmanifest.

आह, तदनुपलब्धेरयुक्तम् । न हि शयनादीनां कारणकार्यविभागः कश्चिदुपलभ्यते । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : It is wrong because it (the difference through causal relation) is not observed. No differentiation into cause and effect is experienced in case of bed, etc. Therefore, this is wrong.

उच्यते न कार्यकारणयोरुपकारकोपकार्यपर्यायत्वात्कारणकार्यमिति निर्वर्त्यनिर्वर्तकभावोऽभिप्रेतः । किं तर्ह्युपकारकोपकार्यभावः । स चास्ति शयनादीनां व्यक्तस्य च । अतो न प्रमादाभिधानमेतत् ।

Proponent : No, since the effect and cause are synonymous with the favouring and the favoured, there is intended the relation of accomplished and the accomplisher in the form of the effect and the cause. What is then the relation of the favoured and the favouring? That does exist in case of the bed, etc., and the manifest. Therefore, this statement is not wrong (or carelessly made).

(constituents are mutually cause and effect)

आह, कः पुनर्व्यक्तस्य परस्परस्य कार्यकारणभाव इति ?

Opponent : What is the relation of being mutually effect and cause in

case of the manifest ?

उच्यते गुणानां तावत्सत्त्वजस्तमसां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमलक्षणैर्धर्मैरितरेतरोपकारेण यथा प्रवृत्तिर्भवति, तथा प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मका इत्येतस्मिन्सूत्रे (का. १२) व्याख्यातम् । तथा शब्दादीनां पृथिव्यादिषु परस्परार्थमेकाधारत्वम् । श्रोत्रादीनामितरेतरार्जनरक्षणसंस्काराः । करणस्य कार्यात्स्थानसाधनप्रख्यापनादिकार्यस्य करणाद् वृत्तिक्षतभंगसंरोहणसंशोषणपरिपालनानि । पृथिव्यादीनां वृत्तिसंग्रहणपन्थिव्यूहावकाशदानैर्गवादिभावो देवमानुषतिरश्चां यथर्तुविधानेज्यापोषणाभ्यवहारसंयवहारैरितरेतराध्ययनं वर्णानां स्वधर्मप्रवृत्तिविषयभावः । अन्यश्च लोकाद्यथासंभवं द्रष्टव्यः ।

**Proponent :** The way there is the activity of the constituents , viz., satva, rajas and tamas by favouring each other through their attributes of illuminating, activity and restraint, we have explained so under the aphorism that they are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference (ka. 12). The identity of substratum of word, etc., in the earth, etc., is for the sake of each other . There is the refinement of each other by the word. etc. That location, instrumentality and the act of generating knowledge, of the organs are mutual. The activity, destruction of the defective part, growth, decay and manitenance through the organs are mutual. (Similarly) there is mutual service of understanding amongst gods, men and animal through the acts of arranging the things according to the season, sacrifices, fostering and taking food. Similarly, the performing their own duties in case of the (four) castes is (mutually dependent). The other similar situations should be observed in the worldly behaviour as possibility is found.

आह, तदनुपपत्तिः । क्रमयौगपद्यासम्भवात् ।

योऽयं गुणानां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमैतरेतरोपकारोऽभ्युपगम्यते स खलु क्रमेण वा स्यात् युगपद्वा ? किं चातः ? तन्न तावत्क्रमेण संभवति । कस्मात् ? एकस्य निरपेक्षस्य प्रवृत्तावितरयोरपि तत्त्वसंगात् । यदि तावत्सत्त्वं पूर्वं गुणान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वशक्ति एव प्रकाशते तयोरुपकारकमित्याश्रीयते । तेन यथा सत्त्वमेवमितरावप्युपकारनिरपेक्षौ स्वकार्यं करिष्यत इत्युपकारानर्थक्यम् । अथ मा भूदयं दोष इत्यतो यौगपद्यमाश्रीयते । तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सहभूतानामनुपकारकत्वाद्, गोविषाणवत् । किं चान्यत् । सदसद्विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । इह सत्त्वं प्रकाशमानं रजस्तमसोर्विद्यमानं वा प्रकाशमाविष्कुर्यात् अविद्यमानं वा ? किं चातेः ? तद्यदि

तावद्विद्यमानमभिव्यनक्ति तेन सर्वेषामेकस्वाभाव्याद् गुणत्वाप्रसंगः । किंच सत्त्ववच्चेतरयोः स्वातंत्र्यप्रसंगः । यथा सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशक्तिरस्तीत्यतस्तद् गुणान्तरनिरपेक्षं प्रकाशते तद्वदितरावपीत्यदोषः । अथ वाऽविद्यमाना प्रकाशशक्तिः सत्त्वसम्बन्धाद्रजस्तमसोरुपजायते । तेन यदुक्तं प्राक्प्रवृत्तेरेव तिष्ठन्ते शक्तय इति तद् हीनम् । ततश्च सत्कार्यवादव्याघातः । किं चायमनेकान्तात् । न ह्ययमेकान्तः परस्परुपकारिणामवस्थितभावपूर्वत्वमिति । तथा हि सत्त्वादयः परस्परुपकारिणो न चावस्थितभावपूर्वकाः । तेन यदुक्तं कारणकार्यविभागाद् भेदानामव्यक्तमस्ति एतदयुक्तम् ।

**Opponent :** That is wrong because there is no possibility of succession and simultaneity. The mutual favouring through illumination, activity and restraint among the constituents accepted by you may be in succession or simultaneously.

What is the result of this discussion ?

That is not possible in succession.

Why ?

Because when one proceeds to activity without requiring the other, the other two would also do so in the same way. (Even ) if the sattva illumines first through the own power without requiring other constituents, that is supposed to be subservient to the other two. Hence, just like the sattva the others also will perform their function without requiring the favour of others. In this way the subservience does not serve any purpose. Now, to alleviate the defect the simultaneity is resorted to. That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because those who are born at a time cannot be mutually subservient just as the horns of the cow. Moreover, there is no propriety in both the alternatives of existence or non-existence. Does the sattva illumining itself exhibit the already existent illumination in the rajas and tamas or does it exhibit the light which was not in existence in them.

What ensues from this discussion ?

If the sattva illumines the light already existing in the other two, there will be a single constituent since all are of one nature. Moreover, there arises the undesirable contingency of the independent nature of the other constituent as in the case with the sattva. Just as there is the power of illumining in the sattva and, hence, it illumines without requiring the other constituents; similarly, the other two also would do so and, hence, the defect does not arise (in our

argument). Or, the power of illumining which did not exist earlier arises through the contact of the sattva and rajas and tamas. Thus, the statement that the potencies exist even before activity, carries no force.

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Then, this is to cut at the very root of the theory of pre-existence of the effect. Moreover, because it is not certain. It is not certain that the objects mutually subservient are caused by some existing object. The sattva, etc., are subservient to each other but are caused by some existing object. Hence, the statement that due to the differentiation into the cause and effect in case of the objects the unmanifest exists, is wrong.

उच्यते-यदुक्तमुपकाराभावः, क्रमयौगपद्यासम्भवादिति, अस्तु युगपदुपकारः। यत्तुक्तम् सहभूतानामनुपकारकत्वं गोविषाणादिवदिति, अत्र ब्रूमः न, अन्यथानुपपत्तेः। न हि गोविषाणयोः सहभूतत्वादुपकारानुपपत्तिः। किं तर्हि एककार्याभावात्। येषां तु कार्यमेकं सहभावे तु तेषामुपकारो न प्रतिषिध्यते। तद्यथा पृथिव्यादीनां धृतिसंग्रहशक्तिव्यूहावकाशदानैः। शरीरस्थितयोरक्रमभाविनोरपि खुरविषाणयोर्नास्ति परस्परुपकारः। तस्मान्न सहभावासहभावानुपकारानुपकारहेतुः। किं च दृष्टत्वात्। दृष्टः खलु वेगेनोर्ध्वगमने वायोररघट्टादीनां युगपदुपकारः न च कश्चिदोषः तथा गुणानामपि स्यात्। संयोगनिमित्त इति चेत् साध्यं किमर्थान्तरभूतमुत प्राप्तमात्रं संयोग इति। यत्सुनरेतदुक्तं सदसद्विकल्पानुपपत्तेरिति अत्र ब्रूमः अयुक्तमेतत्। कस्मात्? पङ्गवन्धवत्तदुपकारे दोषानुपपत्तेः। तद्यथा पङ्गवन्धयोरितरेतरसम्बन्धात् विद्यमानयोर्दृग्गतिशक्त्योरन्योन्यात्मनि व्यक्तिः न चाविद्यमानयोरथ चैककार्यसिद्धिर्यथा च पृथिव्यादीनां परस्परुपकारित्वं शक्तयोरभिव्यज्यते न परशक्त्या एवं गुणानामपीति। यत्सुनरेतदुक्तमेकान्तादिति तदयुक्तम्। कस्मात्? शास्त्रानवबोधात्। इहास्माकं कार्यकारणयोरर्थानभ्युपगमाद् गुणानामवस्थान्तरमेवावस्थान्तरानपेक्षं कार्यकारणशब्दवाच्यतां लभते। तत्र ये तावत्प्रधानावस्थानुभाविनो गुणास्तेषां शक्तिमात्ररूपत्वादिनिर्देश्यप्रकाशादिस्वभावानां नास्ति तन्निबन्धन उपकारः। यदा वैषम्यमापद्यन्ते तदाऽनिवारितप्रकाशादिरूपास्तन्निमित्तमुपकारं प्रतिपद्यन्ते। तस्माद्व्यक्तानामुपकाराभ्युपगमादवस्थितभावपूर्वकत्वं न विरुध्यत इति

शास्त्रमनवगम्यैवमुच्यते नैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः। प्रधानावस्थायामुपकारानभ्युपगमादुत्तरकालमपि तत्प्रसंग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यदि गुणानामाद्ये प्रकोपे स्वसामर्थ्यादेव पूर्वस्मात्प्रच्युतिस्तेनोत्तरकालमपि तद्वदेव भविष्यति। अथ प्रधानावस्थायामपि चोपकारो न तर्हि नानैकान्तिको हेतुरिति। तच्च नैवम्। कस्मात्? अग्निवत्स्वशक्तिनिमित्तत्वात्। तद्यथा सूक्ष्मोऽग्निः सूक्ष्मं प्रकाशं स्वयमेव करोति, घटादिप्रकाशने तु तैलवत्त्वधिपेक्षते। तद्वद् गुणानामाद्यः प्रकोपः स्वशक्तिः। महदाद्यपेक्षस्तूपताकरतः। तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् कारणकार्यविभागादस्त्यव्यक्तमिति।

Proponent : As regards your objection that there is mutual favour because there is no possibility of succession and simultaneity, (we reply), let the favour be simultaneous. As regards the statement that there is no favour in case of the two objects originating simultaneously just as the horns of the cow, we reply, it is not so, because there is no possibility (or justification) otherwise. The impossibility of mutual favour in the case of the horns of the cow is not on account of their origination at a time. On the contrary, it is on account of absence of a single act. In case of the objects which perform single act becoming subservient is not obstructed through their taking place at a time just as through the act of being capable to support and collecting together and providing shape and space in case of earth etc.<sup>17</sup> The mutual favour is not found in case of the hoof and the horn which are located in body even though they do not originate simultaneously. Therefore, simultaneous and successive origination are not the cause for favouring others or otherwise. Moreover, it is observed so. It is observed that in going upward very fast the air and merry-go-round, etc., mutually favour and there is no fault. Similar may be the case with the constituents as well. If it is argued that it is caused by contact, it should be established first whether the contact is a distinct entity or merely the attainment or association. As regards the statement that because of the impossibility in postulating the alternatives (about the illumination, etc.) as already existent or non-existent, we reply, it is wrong.

Why?



The fault does not arise when their favour is like lame and the blind. Just as in the case of the lame and the blind through the contact of both, neither there is the manifestation of the existent power of seeing and going in each other, nor is it the manifestation of non-existent, still there is the accomplishment of a single act; or just as the potencies of mutual favour are manifest in the earth, etc., (and) it is not through the potency of the other; similarly, there may be that (favour) of the constituents too. The statement that because of its not being certain, is wrong.

Why ?

*Because the scripture is not understood properly.* In our theory the other states of the constituents and that without requiring some other state is denoted by the term cause and effect,<sup>18</sup> because we do not accept the meaning of cause and effect (current in your theory). The subservience caused by them is not found in the case of the constituents situated in the state of cosmic matter, and because of their possessing (qualities in) the nature of potency only, their nature of illuminating, etc., is not distinctly visible (in that state). When they attain the state of non-equilibrium, the constituents without losing the form of illumination, etc., attain subservience caused by that (potency). Therefore, without understanding the scripture that after admitting the favour in evolved form of the constituents, its being caused by some existent object is not contradicted, it is stated by you that the reason is not conclusive. If it is argued that there arises the undesirable contingency of non-admitting the favour afterwards (in evolved form) because favour is not admitted in the state of cosmic matter ? It may be like this. If at the time of the initial movement in the constituents there is the abandonment of that state by the constituents through their own power, in the later state also it would be like this only.<sup>19</sup> Hence, the favour is in the state of cosmic matter also and, consequently, it is not that the reason is not non-conclusive. It is not so.

Why ?

*Because it may be due to own potency, as in the case of fire.* Just as the subtle fire itself produces a subtle (very less) light, but requires the oil, wick, etc., in illuminating the pot, etc., the initial movement in the constituents is caused by their own potency and that for the sake of intellect, etc., is through favour. Therefore, it is right to say that on account of the difference of the cause and effect the unmanifest exists.

(Merging of effect in the cause)

किं चान्यत् ।

अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥१५॥

इह यद्विश्वरूपं तस्याविभागो दृष्टः । तद्यथा सलिलादीनाम् । जलभूमी विश्वरूपाश्च महदादयः । तस्मादेषामप्यविभागेन भवितव्यम् । योऽसावविभागस्तदव्यक्तम् । तस्मादस्त्यव्यक्तम् ।

Moreover,

### BECAUSE OF THE RE-UNION OF THE WORLD OF EFFECT.

Here, the re-union of all the worldly effects is observed just as of water, etc. Water, earth and intellect, etc., are of the form of worldly objects. Therefore, they would also be re-united. Whatever is that (ultimate re-union), that is the unmanifest. Therefore, the unmanifest exists.

आह, किं पुनस्तद्वैश्वरूप्यं, को वा विश्वरूप इति ?

Opponent : What are the worldly effects or what is the world ?

उच्यते-वैश्वरूप्यमिति विशिष्टमवस्थानमाचक्ष्महे, अस्तमितविशेषत्वमविभाग इति । विशेषस्य सामान्यपूर्वकत्वादिति योऽर्थस्तदुक्तं भवति अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्येति । एवमेतैः पञ्चभिर्वर्तितव्यक्तस्य कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति सिद्धम् ।

Proponent : Through the term worldly effects we speak of the particular form or arrangement.<sup>20</sup> Since the particular is caused by the general, whatever is that (ultimate) object, that is conveyed through the statement that because there is the re-union of the worldly effects. Through these five probans of direct inference is proved that the unmanifest is the cause of the manifest.

आह-विप्रतिषेधप्रसंगः । कारणान्तरप्रतिषेधावचनात् । यथा भवानाह - प्रधानं जगदुत्पत्तिसम कारणमस्ति । एवं तन्त्रान्तरीयाः परमाणुपुरुषेश्वरकर्मद्वैवस्वभावकालयदृच्छाऽभावान्कारणत्वेनाभिदधति, तेषां च प्रतिषेधो नोच्यत इति । अतो विप्रतिषेधः प्राप्नोति । किं प्रधानमेव कारणं आहोस्विदेतान्येव बोधयमिति ? अन्वयदर्शनात्तदनुपपत्तिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् प्रधानान्वय एव पृथिव्यादिषु सुखादिलक्षण उपलभ्यते । यच्च येनान्वितं तस्यासौ विकार इति युक्तमेतत्प्रागपदिष्टम् । तस्मात्प्रधानविकार एव व्यक्तमिति । तच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्वयसंभवात् । परमाण्वन्वयोऽपि हि व्यक्त उपलभ्यते रूपादिसत्त्वात् ।



पूरुषान्वयः करणस्य संवेदकत्वात् । ईश्वरान्वयः शक्तिविशेषयुक्तानामुपलब्धेः । कर्मदैवान्वयः जगद्वैचित्र्योपलम्भात् । स्वभावान्वयो द्रव्यान्तरसंसर्गोऽपि भावानां तस्मादप्रच्युतेः । कालान्वयः युगाद्यनुविधानात् । यदृच्छान्वयो नियमाभावात् । अभावान्वयो गवादीनां परस्परस्वदर्शनादितरेतराणि प्रत्युक्तानि । कारणान्तरपूर्वकत्वेऽपि खलु व्यक्तस्य शक्त्याः परिमाणदयः पूर्वमेव कल्पयितुम् । तस्मादयुक्तमन्वयादिभ्यः कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ।

Objection : This involves the undesirable contingency of its opposition (by equally important theories) because the other causes are not refuted. You said that the cosmic matter is the cause capable of producing the universe. Similarly, the other systems speak of atoms, Purua, Isvara, acts, luck, nature (of the objects), time, chance and non-existence as the cause of the universe and they are not refuted (by you). Hence, there arises the undesirable contingency of opposition by equally important theories as to whether the cosmic matter only is the cause or these (others) only or both.

If it is argued that it is not applicable because the homogeneity is observed ? It may be like this. In the earth, etc., the homogeneity to the cosmic matter in the form of pleasure, etc., is commonly observed. It is rightly said earlier that the object is the modification of that which is homogeneous to that. Therefore, the manifest is the modification of the cosmic matter only.<sup>21</sup>

This is also wrong .

Why ?

Because there is the possibility of homogeneity to many. The homogeneity to atoms also is found in the manifest because of the presence of form, etc. (in both). The homogeneity of organs is to the conscious entity also because those experience the feelings. The homogeneity to isvara is also observed in case of those which are endowed with a particular capacity. There is the homogeneity to acts and luck because the nature of being variegated or strange is observed in the world. There is the homogeneity to the nature of objects because the worldly objects do not deviate from their nature inspite of their contact with other objects. There is homogeneity to time, etc., because there is the conformity with yuga, etc. There is the homogeneity in respect of negation. The cow, etc., are mutually negated because one is not found in the other . The limited magnitude, etc., of the manifest objects are possible to be postulated even if they are supposed to come out of some other cause. Therefore, it is wrong to say that on account of homogeneity, etc., the non-manifest exists as a cause.

(Atoms cannot be the cause of the universe)

उच्यते-यत्तावदुक्तं परमाणूनामप्रतिषेधप्रसंग इति, अत्र ब्रूमः- तदनुपपत्तिरस्तित्वानभ्युपगमात् । अस्तित्वे हि परमाणूनामभ्युपगम्यमाने सति सत्यमेवं स्यादियमाशंका, किं परमाणुपूर्वकमिदं विश्वमथ प्रधानपूर्वकमिति ? न तु तेषां सद्भावो निश्चितः । तस्मादरयुक्तमेतत् । यत् खल्विदमुच्यते पृथिव्यादिषु रूपाद्युपलम्भादन्वयदर्शनादणूनां सद्भावः प्रधानवदेव कल्पयितव्य इत्येतदपि चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अन्यथापि तदुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्पूर्वकत्वेऽपि हि पृथिव्यादीनां कल्प्यमान रूपादिसत्त्वादतो न युक्तमेतत् । सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वेनाभ्युपगमात्प्रधानेऽपि तत्प्रसंग इति चेत्, अथापि स्याद्यथा तन्मात्राणां रूपादिमत्त्वं कल्प्यते तत्पूर्वकत्वं च पृथिव्यादीनां दृश्यमपि तेषु रूपादिसत्त्वलिङ्गेन परमाणुभ्यो निष्कृष्यते, एवमस्माभिः सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वाभ्युपगमात्तदुद्भिनिमित्तत्वे पृथिव्यादीनां प्रधानपूर्वत्वाक्षेपः करिष्यत इति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? आत्मगुणत्वतिषेधात् । तस्माच्च विपर्ययादित्यत्र (का. १९) सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वप्रतिषेधं करिष्यामः तस्मादसम्यगेतत् ।

Proponent : As to the statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of opposition (by equally important theories) because the atoms are not refuted, we reply that that is wrong because their existence is not admitted (by us). If the existence of the atoms is admitted, this doubt would have truly arisen as whether the world arises from the atoms or from the cosmic matter . Their existence, however, is not certain. Therefore, this is wrong. The statement that because of the availability of nature , etc., in the earth, etc., (and consequently) because of the perception of homogeneity,<sup>22</sup> the existence of atoms should be accepted like that of cosmic matter, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because that can be justified in other way also . This is not correct because the form, etc., are found when the earth etc., are supposed to come out of, subtle elements.

If it is argued that (above mentioned contingency) is applicable to the cosmic matter also because pleasure, etc., are the qualities of the soul ? It may be like this. The subtle elements are postulated to be possessed of form, etc., and the earth, etc., are observed to come out of subtle elements; through the existence of form, etc., in them they are distinguished from the atoms, similarly we object to the theory of considering cosmic matter as the cause because we consider pleasure, etc., as the qualities of the soul and the earth, etc., as the cause of their knowledge.<sup>23</sup>

This is also wrong .

Why ?

Because they (pleasure, etc.,) are negated to be the qualities of the soul. We shall negate the pleasure etc., to be the qualities of the soul in the statement 'therefore, from that contrast, etc., (ka. 19).

Therefore, it is wrong.

आह, यदि पुनस्तन्मात्राणामेव परमाणुत्वमभ्युपगम्यते क एवं सति दोषः स्यात् ?

Opponent : If the subtle elements are accepted as the atoms, what will be the fault ?

उच्यते-न शक्यमेवं भवितुम् । किं कारणम् ? वृद्धिमत्यस्तमात्रलक्षणाः प्रकृतयोऽस्माभिरभ्युपगम्यन्ते । कस्मात् ? स्वकार्याद्धि प्रतीयसी प्रकृतिर्भवतीति च नः समयः । महान्ति च पृथिव्यादीनि महाभूतानि । तस्मात्तेषां तदतिरिक्ततया पृथिव्या भवितव्यम् । परिच्छिन्नदेशाश्च परमाणवः । तस्मान्न तन्मात्राभ्युपगमात्तेषामभ्युपगमः । उपेत्य वा तदसम्भवः कृतकत्वात् । अस्तु वा परमाणूनां सद्भावस्तथापि तेभ्यो जगदुत्पत्तेरसम्भवं ब्रूमः । किं कारणम् ? कृतकत्वात् । अकृतकेन हि जगत्कारणेन युक्तं भवितुं, कृतकाश्च परमाणवः । तस्मात्सत्यपि सद्भावे न तेषां जगत्कारणत्वमुपपद्यते । हेत्वनुपदेशादयुक्तमिति चेत् अथापि स्यात् किं पुनरत्र कारणं येनाऽकृतकं जगत्कारणमिष्यते इति ? उच्यते-तस्यैव कारणत्वप्रसंगात् । यद्धि तत्परमाणूनां कारणं तदेव जगत्कारणत्वेन युक्तं कल्पयितुं स्यात् न तन्निष्पादिताः परमाणवः । कृतकत्वासिद्धेरयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यान्मतं यदि परमाणूनां कृतकत्वं प्रसिद्धमत एतद्युज्यते वक्तुममुष्माद्धेतोरकारणं परमाणु इति । तत्त्वसिद्धम् । तस्मान्न किञ्चिदेतत् । उच्यते-परिच्छिन्नदेशत्वात् । इह यत्परिच्छिन्नदेशं तत्कृतकं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा घटः, परिच्छिन्नदेशश्च । तस्मात्परमाणवः कृतकाः । किं चान्यत् रूपादिमत्त्वात् । इह यद्रूपादिमत्तत्कृतकं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा घटः, रूपादिमत्तश्च परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किं चान्यत् औष्ण्ययोगात् । यदौष्ण्ययुक्तं तत्कृतकम् । तद्यथा प्रदीपः, तद्वन्तश्चाग्नेयाः परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किञ्च वेगवत्त्वात् । इह यद्वेगवत्तत्कृतकम् । तद्यथा इषुर्वेगवान्, तद्वन्तो वायवीयाः परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किञ्च स्नेहद्रवत्वयोगात् । इह यत्स्नेहद्रवत्वयुक्तं तत्कृतकम् । यथा केदारादिष्वापः । इत्थं चाप्याः परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किञ्चाधेयत्वात् । इह यदन्यस्मिन्नाधीयते तत्कृतकम् । तद्यथा उघवम् । आधीयन्ते च परमाणवः पृथिव्याम्, तस्मात्कृतकाः । किञ्च अर्थान्तराधारत्वात् । इह यदर्थान्तरस्याधारत्वं प्रतिपद्यते तत्कृतकम् । तद्यथा घटः । अर्थान्तरस्य च द्वयणुकादेराधारत्वमणवः प्रतिपद्यन्ते तस्मात्कृतकाः । किञ्च प्राप्तिव्यवधानात् । इह ययोर्मध्ये अन्तरा द्रव्यमवस्थितम् प्राप्तेर्व्यवधायकं भवति, तौ कृतकौ । तद्यथा द्वयङ्गुली । तथा चाणू द्वावन्तराण्वन्तरमवस्थितं, यो यः प्राप्तेर्व्यवधायकं, तौ कृतकौ तस्मात्तावपि कृतकौ । किञ्च द्रव्यान्तरारम्भकत्वात् । इह यद् द्रव्यान्तरारम्भकं तत्कृतकं वः । तद्यथा तन्तुः, द्रव्यारम्भकाश्च परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किञ्च प्रत्याक्षत्वात् । इह यत्प्रत्यक्षं तत्कृतकं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा घटः, प्रत्यक्षाश्च योगिनां परमाणवः । अतएव कृतकत्वमिति चेत् स्यान्मतं यत एव योगिनां प्रत्यक्षाः परमाणवस्तत एव कृतकाः । किं कारणम् ? अस्मादादिप्रत्यक्षं घटादि हि कृतकं दृष्टमिति कृत्वा । एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? शरीरकृतकत्वप्रगङ्गात् । शरीरमपि हि योगिनां प्रत्यक्षं, कामं

तदप्यकृतकमस्तु । अथ नैतदेव तर्हि नाकृतकाः परमाणवः । प्रधानादिषु प्रसंग इति चेन्न अनभ्युपगमात् । श्रीकपिलब्राह्मणैरपि प्रधानपुरुषावप्रत्यक्षाविति नः शास्त्रम् । तस्मादर्थकिञ्चिदेतत् । सत्तादिवदित चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा सत्तागुणत्वरूपत्वादीनां सति प्रत्यक्षतवेऽकृतकत्वम् एवं परमाणूनां भविष्यतीति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । परमाण्वकृतकत्ववत्सत्तादीनां सद्भावोऽसिद्धः । तस्माच्छविषाणात्पुरुषविषाणसिद्धिवदग्राह्यमेतत् । सौक्म्यादणूनां कृतकत्वाप्रसंग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, न हि परमाणुभ्यः सूक्ष्मतरमन्यद् भावान्तरमस्ति यदेषामारम्भकं स्यात् । परा खल्वेषाकाष्ठा सौक्म्यस्य यत्परमाणवः । तस्मादेषां कृतकत्वमनुपपन्नमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? पाकजेष्वतिप्रसंगात् । सौक्म्यादकृतकत्वप्रसंगः । तेऽपि परमाणवः सूक्ष्माः । यत्तु खल्वतिसौक्म्यात्प्रधानपुरुषयोरकृतकत्वं दृष्टं तत्सति विभुत्वे । न च यथा प्रधानपुरुषावेवमणवोऽपि विश्वं व्यश्नुवते । तस्मात्सति सौक्ष्म्ये पाकजवदेष्टां कृतकत्वमनिवार्यम् । येषां तु कार्यद्रव्यं पच्यत इति पक्षस्तेषामयमनुपालम्भ इत्यतः परमाणुसमवेतं कर्मोदाहार्यम् । तद्धि सूक्ष्ममतीन्द्रियं कृतकं चेति सिद्धं कृतकाः परमाणवः कृतकत्वाच्चैषामनित्यराप्यन पातिनीति कृत्वाऽन्तरालप्रलयमहाप्रलयेषु प्रध्वंसात्परमाणूनां कारणाभावात्कार्याभाव इति स्वशास्त्रसिद्धादनुमानाज्जगदुच्छित्तिदोषप्रसंगः । तथा भोगिनामुपचितस्य स्वकर्मणोऽनुपभोगात्कृतस्य विप्रणाराः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मान्न जगत्कारणं परमाणवः ।

Proponent : It is not possible.

What is the reason here?

The subtle elements (having the characteristic of that element only) having larger magnitude (than the gross objects) are admitted by us as the causes.

Why ?

And, our theory is that the cause is certainly of larger magnitude than its effect. And, the earth, etc., which are gross elements are great. Therefore, the earth of them (as a subtle element) should be different from them. The atoms, however, are limited in magnitude. Therefore, they are not accepted through the acceptance of the subtle elements.<sup>24</sup> Even if their existence is accepted, it would be impossible (to consider them as the cause of the world) because they are products. Let us admit the existence of the atoms, still we say that the origin of the world is impossible from them.

What is the reason here?

Because they are products. The uncaused should rightly be the cause of the world. The atoms are, however, caused. Therefore, even their existence is admitted, their being the cause of the world is not justified.

If is argued that it is wrong because the reason is not stated? It

may be like this. What is the reason that the uncaused (object) is intended to be the cause of the world?

To this we reply that there would arise the undesirable contingency of admitting that (cause of that cause) as the cause. Whatever is the cause of the atoms, that would be rightly postulated as the cause of the world, but not the atoms which are the products of that cause.<sup>25</sup>

If it is argued that it is wrong because the caused nature of the atoms is not proved? It may be like this. If the caused nature of the atoms would be established, it is right to say that the atoms are not the cause because of the above reason. That is, however, not established. Therefore, this is nothing (i.e., this is not a forceful argument).

To this we reply that *because of their being limited in space*. Whatever is limited in space here is observed to be caused as the pot which is limited in space also. Therefore, they are caused. Moreover, because of possessing the form, etc. Here whatever possesses the form, etc., is observed to be caused, as the pot. And the atoms possess the form, etc., therefore, they are caused. *Moreover, because of their possessing heat*. Whatever possesses heat is caused as the lamp. The atoms of fire are possessed of that (heat). Therefore, they are caused.<sup>26</sup> *Moreover, because of having the speed*. Here, whatever is possessed of speed is caused as the arrow which is possessed of that (speed). The atoms of air are possessed of that. Therefore, they are caused. *Moreover, because of having lubricity and fluidity*. Here, whatever is possessed of lubricity and fluidity, is caused as the water in the basin around the tree. The water atoms are like this. Hence, they are caused. *Moreover, because of their being located*. Here, whatever is located in something else is cause just like *thadhara*.<sup>27</sup> The atoms are located in the earth. Therefore, they are caused. *Moreover, because of being the location of some other object*. Here, whatever comes to be the location of some other object is caused just as the pot. The atoms also become the location of some other object like binary. Therefore, they are caused. Moreover, because of the intervention in union. Here, the objects in the middle of which the other object stands as intervention in the union are caused, just like the two fingers. Similarly, some atom stands in the middle of other two atom. Whatever are intervened by some other object, are caused. Therefore, those (two intervened) atoms are also caused. *Moreover, because of giving rise to some other object*. We hold that here whatever gives rise to some other object is caused, as the threads. The atoms give rise to the other object. Therefore, they are caused.<sup>28</sup> *Moreover,*

*because of their perceptibility*. Here, whatever is perceptible is observed to be caused just as the pot. The atoms are perceptible to the yogins. They are caused.

If it is argued that the above reason is for their being uncaused?<sup>29</sup> the yogins they are uncaused.<sup>30</sup>

Why?

Because the pot, etc., which are perceptible to us only are observed to be caused.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because it would give rise to the undesirable contingency of the supposition of uncaused nature of the body.<sup>31</sup> The body is also perceptible to the yogins; let it also be uncaused. This is, however, not so. Therefore, the atoms are also not uncaused.

If it is argued that it will give rise to the undesirable contingency (of being caused) in case of the cosmic matter, etc., we reply, no, because it is not admitted by us. According to our scripture the cosmic matter and the conscious entity are not perceptible even to a Brahmin like Kapila. Therefore, the argument has no force.

If it is argued that it is (eternal) like existence, etc., It may be like this. Just as the existence, qualitiness, form-ness, etc., are eternal even though they are perceptible, similar will be the case with the atoms.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because it is also to be proved*. Just like the uncaused nature of the atoms, the existence of existence etc., is not proved. Therefore, it is non-acceptable just like establishing the horns of the man through the horns of the hare.

If it is argued that there does not arise the undesirable contingency of caused nature of the atoms because of their subtlety? It may be like this. There is no object more subtle than the atoms so that it may be the cause of these atoms the highest limit of subtlety. Therefore, the originated nature of them cannot be justified.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because it will involve the undesirable contingency of over pervasion to the baked (atoms)*. In the case of those who intend un-

caused nature, there will be the undesirable contingency of admitting uncaused nature in the atoms of earth which are backed and are placed after putting aside the blackness. Those atoms are also subtle.<sup>32</sup> The uncaused nature of cosmic matter and the conscious entity, on the other hand, is through their extreme subtlety in presence of their being all-pervasive in addition. The atoms do not pervade the whole universe as the cosmic matter and the conscious entity do. Therefore, inspite of their being subtle, their caused nature is certain just as is the case with the baked atoms. This objection does not arise in case of those in whose theory only the caused substance is baked. In that case the activity inherent in the atoms should be taken for example. That is subtle, imperceptible and caused. In this way, it is proved that the atoms are caused. Due to the caused nature their non-eternity is also unavoidable and, hence, it involves the fault of extirpation of the whole world through the inference setablished in the own system (of the Vaiśeṣikas) because of the destruction of the atoms in the intermediate and the great dissolution and (consequently) because of the absence of the effect in the absence of the cause.<sup>33</sup> Since the acts accumulated by those who are engaged in enjoyment remain unenjoyed, the acts done perish (unenjoyed). This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the atoms are not the cause of the universe.

(The conscious entity as also Īśvara cannot be the cause)

याऽपि खल्वियमाशंका पुरुषाज्जगदुत्पत्तिर्भविष्यतीति साऽप्ययुक्ता। कस्मात् ? प्रतिषेधात्। तस्माच्च विपर्यासादित्यत्र (क. १९) पुरुषस्याकर्तृत्वमुपपादयिष्यामः। चैतन्याविशेषादीश्वरस्यापि स एव विधिः काणत्वप्रतिषेधे बोद्धव्यः।

The objection that there will be the origination of the universe from the conscious entity is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because we have negated.* We shall establish the non-doership of the conscious entity in the *kārikā* 'from that contrast, etc. (Ka 19).<sup>34</sup> The same method should be known (as applied) in rejecting the nature of being a cause in case of Īśvara because the consciousness is not different (in both the cases).<sup>35</sup>

(Negation of Existence of Īśvara)

आह अस्त्येवमीश्वर इति पाशुपतवैशेषिकाः। कस्मात् ? कार्यविशेषस्यातिशयबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वात्। इह कार्यविशेषः प्रासादविमानादिरतिशयबुद्धिपूर्वको दृष्टः। अस्ति चऽयं महाभूतेन्द्रियभुवनविन्यासादिलक्षणः कार्यविशेषः। तस्मादनेनाप्यतिशयबुद्धिपूर्वकेण भवित-

व्यम्। यत्पूर्वकोऽयं स ईश्वरः। तस्मादस्तीश्वर इति। किं चान्यत् चेतनाचेतनयोरिभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वात्। इह चेतनाचेतनयोरिभिसम्बन्धश्चेतनकृतो दृष्टः; तद्यथा गोशकटयोः। अस्ति चऽयं चेतनाचेतनयोः शरीरशरीरिणोर्भिसम्बन्धः। तस्मादनेनापि चेतनकृतेन भवितव्यम्। यत्कृतोऽयं स ईश्वरः। तस्मादस्तीश्वरः कारणम्।

Opponent : The Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that the Īśvara exists.

Why ?

*Because the particular effects are caused by the intellect surpassing (others). Here, the effects like palace, an aeroplane, etc., are observed to be caused by superior intellect. Whatever is the cause of those is the Īśvara. Therefore, Īśvara exists. Moreover, because the union of conscious and non-conscious is caused by some sentient entity. It is observed here that the union of the conscious and the non-conscious is caused by some sentient entity, just like the union of the bull and the cart. The union of the body and the soul is that of conscious and non-conscious. Therefore, it should also be caused by some sentient entity. That by whome this union is caused is the Īśvara. Therefore, Īśvara exists as the cause.*

उच्यते- यत्तावदुक्तं कार्यविशेषस्यातिशयबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वादीश्वरसद्भावसिद्धिरिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, साध्यत्वात्। अस्मदादिबुद्धिपूर्वकाः प्रासादादयः, अतिशयबुद्धिपूर्वका वा इति साध्यमेतत्। तस्मादनुत्तरम्। किंच प्राक्प्रधानप्रवृत्तेर्बुद्ध्यसम्भवात्कारणान्तरप्रतिषेधात् प्रधानादयं बुद्धिपूर्वकं कार्यविशेषं कुर्वीत। प्राक्च प्रधानविपरिणामाद् बुद्धिरेवनास्तीत्युपपन्नमेतत्। शक्तिमत्त्वात्स्वत इति चेत् स्यात्पुनरेतत् सर्वशक्तिप्रचित ईश्वरः। तस्य प्रागपि प्रधानविपरिणामात्स्वत एवेच्छायोगाद् बुद्धिसद्भावो न प्रतिषिध्यत इति। एतदप्यनुपपन्नम्। कस्मात् ? दृष्टान्ताभावात्। बुद्धिः स्वत एवेत्यत्र पर्यनुयुक्त (स्य) कस्ते दृष्टान्तः ? तस्मादसदेतत्। शक्तिविशेषाददोष इति चेत्, अथापि स्यात् नान्येषां बुद्धिमतामीश्वरतुल्या शक्तिः। अत एषां प्रधानाच्छरीरव्यूहसमकालमात्मादिसन्निकर्षाद्वा बुद्धय उत्पद्यन्त इति, ईश्वरस्य तु स्वत इति। एतदप्यनुपपन्नम्। कस्मात् ? सर्ववादसिद्धिप्रसंगात्। दृष्टान्तविरुद्धमर्थमादाय प्रतिबध्यमानेन शक्तिविशेषः स्मर्तव्य इत्येतस्यां कल्पनायां सर्ववादसिद्धिप्रसंगः स्यात्। तस्माद् ग्रहमात्रमेतत्। एवं स्वत ईश्वरस्य बुद्धिसम्भवो न चेद् भवेत् युक्तमुच्यते प्राक्प्रधानप्रवृत्तेर्बुद्ध्यसम्भवान्न बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकोऽयं कार्यविशेषः। किंच फलानुपपत्तेः। दृष्टमदृष्टं वा फलमुद्दिश्य बुद्धिमन्तः कार्यविशेषान्प्रासादविमानादीनारभमाणो दृष्यन्ते। अनुपहृतश्चायमैश्वर्यात्। किं च प्रयोजकाऽनुपपत्तेः। किं च अनेकान्तात्। न च सर्वः कार्यविशेषो बुद्धिपूर्वकः। वृक्षादीनां तदव्यतिरेकेणोत्पत्तेः। सर्वस्येश्वरबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वाभ्युपगमे दृष्टान्ताभावः। न चास्त्यनुदाहृतो वादः। तस्मादनेकान्तात् बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकं व्यक्तम्। किं च दुःखोत्तरत्वात्। बुद्धिपूर्वकश्चेदस्य कार्यविशेषः स्यात्कर्तुर्दुःखोत्तरविधाने प्रयोजनं नास्ति। शक्तिमांशायमिति सुखोत्तर-



मेव विदध्यात् । दुःखोत्तराद्यं, तस्मात्तु बुद्धिपूर्वकः । किंच दुःखोपायत्वात् । बुद्धिपूर्वकश्चेदयं कार्यविशेषः स्याद्वर्माधर्मयोः कर्मोपपत्तयः सुखोपायाः स्युः, दुःखोपायाश्च, तस्मादबुद्धिपूर्वकः । धर्माधर्मनिमित्तत्वाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यद्यपीश्वरपूर्वकोऽयं कार्यविशेषः तथाप्यादिसर्गो सुखोत्तराणामस्मदुत्पन्नानां प्राणिनां धर्माधर्मपरिग्रहाद् हीनमध्यमोक्तृष्टवयोजातिस्वभावादियोगो भवति । ततश्च नाऽपराधोयमीश्वरस्येति । एतदप्युक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अधर्मोत्पत्तिहेत्वभावात् । ईश्वरश्चेद्धर्माधर्मयोरुत्पात्तावीष्टे धर्ममेव प्राणिनां सुखहेतुत्वादुत्पादयेत् नाधर्मं, प्रयोजनाभावात् । अथ मतम् स्वाभाविकी धर्माधर्मयोः स्वकारणादुत्पत्तिः, यदुक्तं सर्वमीश्वरबुद्धिपूर्वकं व्यक्तमिति तु तस्य व्याघातः । तस्मादीश्वरो न कारणम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं चेतनाचेतनयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वादीश्वरस्य सद्भाव इति, अत्र ब्रूम-अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । योऽयं चेतनाचेतनयोगोऽशकटयोरभिसम्बन्धः स केन चेतनेन कृतः ? यदि चैत्रेण, तस्य कार्यकारणसंघातत्वादाचेतन्यम् । अथ चैत्रशब्दावच्यस्य पिण्डस्योप-द्रष्टा क्षेत्रज्ञः तत्कृत इष्यते तदयुक्तम्, साध्यत्वात् । न हि पुरुषकर्तृत्वमस्मत्पक्षे प्रसिद्धम् । उभयपक्षप्रसिद्धेन व्यवहारः । किं चान्यत् अनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । चेतनाचेतनयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वं बुवतः प्राप्तिमीश्वरकार्यकारणयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वम् । तथा चाऽनवस्थाप्रसंगः । अथ मा भूदयं दोष इति स्वाभाविक ईश्वरस्य कार्यकारणयोरभिसम्बन्ध इष्यते, न तर्ह्येकान्तिको हेतुः । तयोरचेतन्याददोष इति चेत्, स्यात्पुनरेतत् ईश्वरस्य यत्कार्यकारणं तदपि चेतनमीश्वरोऽपि, तस्मात्सम्बन्धेन प्रत्युदाहरणमुपपद्यत इति । एतदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? असम्बन्धप्रसंगात् । चैतन्याविशेषादात्मन आत्मान्तरेणाभिसम्बन्धो नास्ति । एवमीश्वरकार्यकारणयोरपि न स्यात् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । किं च अविपर्ययप्रसंगात् । उभयचैतन्यप्रतिज्ञस्य यथेश्वरस्य करणं बुद्ध्यादयः, एवमीश्वरोऽपि बुद्ध्यादीनां करणं स्यात् । कस्मात् ? अविशेषात् । अथैतदनिष्टं, न तर्ह्युभयोश्चैतन्यम् । कार्यकारणवत्ताऽनभ्युपगमाददोष इति चेत् व्यापी निरवयवोऽनन्तशक्तिः सूक्ष्मेभ्यः सूक्ष्मतमो महद्भ्यो महत्तमोऽधिकरणधर्माऽनादिरित्येवमनन्तलक्षणमीश्वरपदार्थं तद्विदो व्याचक्षते । तस्य कुतः कार्यकरणमवलम्ब्येदमध्यारोपितमिति ? एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनुमानविरोधात् । इत्थं चेदीश्वरो यदिदमनुमानं कार्यविशेषस्यातिशयबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वाच्च चेतनाचेतनयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वादिति तद्व्याहन्यते । कस्मात् ? न ह्येतावदीदृशार्थेन सहैतद् दृष्टमिति । उपेत्य वा, मूर्तिपरिग्रहव्याघातात् । यद्येकान्तेनैव रूप ईश्वरः, क्षित्यादिमूर्तिपरिग्रहो व्याहन्येत । किं चान्यत् - श्रुतेः । श्रुतिरपि चास्य मूर्तिमाचष्टे कृतिवासाः पिनाकहस्तो विततधन्वा नीलशिखण्डीत्यादि । तदभ्युपगमात्स्वपक्षहानिरिति चेत्, स्यान्मतं यदि तर्हि श्रुतिवचनान्मूर्तिमान्मीश्वरः परिगृह्यते । तेन सिद्धमस्याऽस्ति-त्वम् । कस्मात् ? न ह्यसतो मूर्तिमत्त्वमुपपद्यत इति कृत्वा । एतदप्युक्तम् । अभिप्रायाऽनवबोधात् । न ह्येकान्तेन वयं भगवतः शक्तिविशेषं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे, माहात्म्यशरीरादिपरिग्रहात् । यथा तु भवतोच्यते प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तः तयोः प्रयोक्ता नास्तीत्ययमस्मदभिप्रायः, तस्मादेतस्य बाधकम् । अतो न प्रधानपुरुषयोरभिसम्बन्धोऽन्यकृतः । किं चान्यत् अशक्यत्वात् । कुर्वाणः खल्वप्ययमभिसम्बन्धं शरीरमात्रेण वा शरीरिणः कुर्यात्, शरीरकारणेन वा ? किं चातः ? तत्र तावच्छरीरमात्रेण करोति । कस्मात् ? अनपेक्षस्य शरीरोत्पत्तौ निमित्ताभावात् ।

न शरीरकारणेन, विभुत्वात् । परिच्छिन्नयोगोऽशकटयोरभिसम्बन्धोऽन्यकृतः, विभू च प्रधानपुरुषौ । किं च पारार्थ्यात् । गोशकटयोरभिसम्बन्धः पारार्थो दृष्टः । न तु प्रधानपुरुषयोरभिसम्बन्धः पारार्थ इति । ईश्वरार्थ इति चेत्, उक्तत्वात् । दृष्टादृष्टार्थ ईश्वरस्यानुपपन्न इत्यादावेवोक्तमेतत् । एवं तावत्प्राप्तानामीश्वरपरिग्रहे दोषः ।

Proponent : As regards the statement that the existence of Īśvara is proved because the particular effect is caused by the superior intellect, we reply, no, because it is still to be proved. It is yet to be proved whether the palaces, etc., are caused by the intellect like ours or by some superior one. Therefore, it needs no reply. Moreover, he would have produced the particular effects from the cosmic matter without the intellect<sup>36</sup> because the intellect does not exist before the activity of the cosmic matter and there is no other instrumental cause. Before the modification of the cosmic matter, intellect does not exist and, hence, it is not right.

If it is argued that he would create the universe himself because he is endowed with power ? It may be like this. The Īśvara is full of all the powers. The existence of intellect is not rejected because even before the modification of the cosmic matter he is himself endowed with desire (and could create the intellect). The existence of intellect is, thus, not negated.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no example. What is the example in favour of one proving that intellect is by itself (created with desire, etc.)? Therefore, it is wrong.

If it is argued that it is not a fault because of his possessing particular power ? It may be like this. The other beings endowed with intellect do not have the power equal to Īśvara. Thus, the intellects of these beings originate from the cosmic matter at the time of formation of the body or due to the contact with the soul, etc.<sup>37</sup> The intellect of the Īśvara, however, originates by itself (through his will).

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there will arise the undesirable contingency of establishment of all the theories. If accepting the object which is opposite

to the example, and if through the contradicted reason some particular power should be accepted, this postulation would involve the establishment of all the theories. Therefore, this is merely a tenacity. Thus, if the intellect of the Īśvara would not originate itself, it is rightly stated that the particular effects (of the universe) are not caused by some intelligent being because there is no possibility of intellect earlier to the activity of the cosmic matter. *Moreover, because of the absence of possibility of (desired) result.* The intelligent persons are observed to start creating the particular effects like palace, aeroplane, etc., with the visible or invisible objective. This (Īśvara) is however, unobstructed (to achieve something) because of his lordly power. *Moreover, the Instigator is not possible (in case of Īśvara).* The intelligent beings are observed to start the particular activities when instigated by other. This is, however, not possible in case of Īśvara because there is no propriety (in holding someone as) endowed with instigation (to Īśvara). *Moreover, because of its being non-conclusive.* All the particular effects are not caused by intellect because the tree, etc., originate without that also. There is no example to support the view that everything is caused by the intellect of Īśvara. And, there is no theory when it is not exemplified. Therefore, on account of non-conclusiveness the manifest objects are not caused by some intelligent beings. *Moreover, because of resulting in misery.* If the particular effects are created deliberately (by some intelligent being), there is no purpose of the creator in creating the object which resulted in misery. And, the Īśvara is powerful also and, hence, he would have created the objects which result in pleasure. Everything in this universe results in misery. Therefore, the particular effects are not caused by intellect. *Moreover, on account of being accomplished with the difficult means.* If the particular objects would have been caused by intelligence, the attainment of virtue, wealth, pleasure and liberation would have been through the easy means. They are, however, attainable through difficult means. Therefore, they are not caused through intelligence.

If it is argued that the above defect does not arise because the virtue and vice serve as the cause of them, it may be like this. The particular effects are caused by Īśvara, but still the beings which originate as abounding in pleasure in the initial state of creation are associated with mean, moderate and eminent age, caste (or birth) and nature due to the accumulation of virtue and vice. This is then not the offence of Īśvara.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the absence of the cause of production of vice. If the Īśvara is desired for the production of virtue and vice, he would have produced only the virtue of the beings for it (virtue) is the cause of pleasure. He would not have produced the vice because of the absence of purpose of (producing vice).<sup>38</sup> If it is argued that the production of virtue and vice from their cause is natural, it would contradict the statement that everything is caused by the intelligence of the Īśvara. Therefore, Īśvara is not the cause. As regards your statement that the existence of Īśvara is proved because the contact of conscious and unconscious is caused by some conscious being, we reply that it is wrong.

Why ?

*Because it is yet to be proved.* By which conscious being is caused the contact of the conscious bull with the unconscious cart ? If you say it is caused by Caitra, he is also unconscious because of being the composite of cause and effect. If it is desired to be made by the entity who is soul the seer of the body denoted by the word Caitra, it is also wrong, because it is also to be proved. The agency (doership) of the conscious entity is not proved in our philosophy. The argumentation is on the ground well known to both the parties. Moreover, because of involving the undesirable contingency of infinite regress, in case of those who speak the contact is done by some sentient being, it would imply that the contact of Īśvara with the cause and effect (body of Īśvara) is done by some other conscious being. And, thus there arises the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. To alleviate this fault the contact of the Īśvara with the cause and effect (body) is accepted as natural. It is also not right, as in that case the reason is not conclusive. If it is argued that the defect does not arise because all of them are conscious, it may be like this. All the cause and effect (body) of Īśvara and also the Īśvara are conscious. Therefore, it can serve as an counter example of the contact.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because it would involve the undesirable contingency of its being non-contact.* There is no contact of one soul with the other soul because of non-difference of consciousness. In this way, there would not have been the contact between Īśvara and the body also. This is, however, not desirable. Moreover, because of the undesirable contingency of the absence of contradiction. In the case of one who con-



siders both as conscious the Īśvara also would be an instrument of the intellect etc., as the intellect etc., are that of Īśvara.

Why ?

Because there is no differentiation between the two. Since it is not desirable, the consciousness does not belong to both. If it is argued that the defect does not arise because the endowment with cause and effect (body) is not accepted? The knower of that describes the entity Īśvara as pervasive, without components, endowed with endless power, subtlest among the subtle, greatest among the greatest, having supremacy as the characteristic, beginningless and having endless characteristics. How is all this imposed upon him taking recourse to cause and effect (body)? This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it goes against the inference (of Īśvara). If the Īśvara is of this nature, the inference that the Īśvara exists because the particular effect is caused by the superior intellect and because the contact between the conscious and unconscious entities is brought about by some conscious entity, is contradicted.

Why ?

Because this is not observed with such an object.<sup>39</sup> Or if it is granted (for the sake of argument), (it will again be wrong) because it will again contradict the idea of assuming a shape (by Īśvara). If the Īśvara is of this nature exclusively, it would contradict the (idea of) assuming the shape of earth, etc., (by Īśvara). *Moreover, because of the scriptures.* The scripture also speaks of its assuming a form—wearing the hide (of an atelope), having a bow (trident) in the hand, with his bow stretched, with blue peacock tail. If you argue that accepting it you will have to deviate from your position? It may be like this. If the Īśvara as endowed with shape is admitted through the statement of the scripture, his existence is proved.

Why ?

Because taking the form is not possible (or justified) in case of non-existent entity. This is also wrong. Because the (real) purport is not understood. We do not reject the particular power of lord absolutely, because he assumes the magnificent body, etc. What we mean to say is there is none different from cosmic matter and the conscious entity as the instigator of the two as held by you. Therefore, (our) position refutes this. Therefore, the contact of, the cosmic matter and the conscious entity is not caused by some other entity.

Moreover, because of impossibility (or lack of) power of doing. Even while making this contact, he may cause the contact of the soul with merely the body or with the cause of to body (i.e., the cosmic matter).

Why do you ask so ?

It does not relate the soul merely with the body .

Why ?

Because there is no cause of forming the body for the one who has no desire. Nor does it do so (relate the soul) with the cause of the body because of all-pervasiveness (of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity). The contact of the bull and the cart is made by some other because they are limited in magnitude. The cosmic matter and the conscious entity are all-pervasive. *Moreover, because of being meant for other.* The contact of the bull and the cart is observed to be meant for others. The contact of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity, on the other hand, is not meant for Īśvara (we reply) no, because we have already refuted. This is stated in discussing that the visible or invisible purpose is not justified (or possible) in case of Īśvara in the theory of the pāsupatas.

वैशेषिकाणां चायं दोषः । किं च द्रव्यादिपदार्थान्तरभावाभावपरिकल्पनाऽनुपपत्तिश्च । तैरीश्वरो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायभूतो वा परिकल्प्यानः परिकल्प्यते, पदार्थान्तरभूतो वा ? किं चातः ? तत्र तावद् द्रव्यादिभूतः । कस्मात् ? द्विविधं हि द्रव्यं अनेकद्रव्यमद्रव्यं च । तत्र नाऽनेकद्रव्यमीश्वरः, कृतकत्वाददोषप्रसंगात् । नाऽद्रव्यं, परिसंख्यानात् । पृथिव्यादीनि मनःपर्यन्तानि नवैव द्रव्याणीति वः सिद्धान्तः । इतिकरणस्य परिसमाप्त्यर्थत्वात् । किंच गुणकर्मनिर्देशात् । सति चास्य द्रव्यत्वे वैशेषिकगुणनिर्देश आचार्येण कृतः स्यात् । कारणान्तरप्रयोगसमर्थस्य च कर्म निर्दिष्टं स्यात् । न तु तथा । तस्मान्न द्रव्यगुणादयः । आश्रयपरतन्त्रा हि गुणादयः परार्थाः । एवं न द्रव्यादिभूतो नापि पदार्थान्तरभूतः । पदार्थत्वे हि सति द्रव्यादिवल्लक्षणमुक्तमभविष्यत् । आचार्येण तु नोक्तम् । तस्मात्सूत्रकारमते नास्तीश्वरः । लिंगादिति चेत्, स्यान्मतम्—संज्ञाकर्मत्वमस्मद्विशिष्टानां लिङ्गम् । प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वाद्वा संज्ञाकर्मण इत्येतस्माल्लिंगादीश्वरपरिग्रह आचार्यस्य सिद्ध इति । तदव्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभिप्रेताऽसिद्धेः । सत्यनेन लिङ्गनास्मदादिभ्यो विशिष्टशक्तेः कस्यचिदेव माहात्म्यशरीरस्याऽन्यस्य वा प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । संज्ञामात्रं तु यथा भवद्भिः सर्वकारणानां सृष्ट्युपसंहारप्रवृत्तिहेतुरेकः स्वतन्त्र इष्यते । तथा चास्माल्लिङ्गात्प्रतिपत्तिः । किं चान्यत् । प्रागनुपदेशेऽकौशलप्रसंगात् । ईश्वरपरतन्त्रे चेदणूनां प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ति स्यातां तमेव प्रागुपदिशेत् । धर्मवत्त्वानपदार्थस्य वा प्रागनुपदेशादकुशलः सूत्रकार इत्येतदापद्यते । न चैतदिष्टमुभयम् । किं चान्यत् असंकीर्तनात् । शास्त्रप्रदेशे चायमीश्वरो न कस्मिंश्चिदप्याचार्येण संकीर्तितः । न चास्य वध्वा इव श्वशुरनामसंकीर्तने दोषोपपत्तिः स्यात् । दोषसंविभागाथमिदमाचार्यस्याऽनिष्टमध्यारो-

प्यते, न तु मतमस्यैतत् । एवं काणादानामीश्वरोऽस्तीति पाशुपतोपज्ञमेतत् । तस्मादीश्वरोऽप्य-  
कारणम् ।

This is the fault in the theory of the vaiśeṣikas. Moreover, there is no propriety in the postulation (of Īśvara) as different from or identical with the entities like substance etc. Whether Īśvara is postulated by them as postulating it as of the form (i.e. identical with) substance quality, activity, generality particularity and inherence or as a different entity?

It is not as the substance, etc.

Why ?

The substances (experienced by us) are (a combination of) many substances and of the form of non-substance. Īśvara is not (a combination of) many substances because otherwise it would involve the undesirable contingency of its being created (non-eternal).<sup>40</sup> Nor is it of the form of non-substance because (this kind of objects) are enumerated (by the Vaiśeṣikas themselves). Your theory is that the substances are nine only viz., earth to mind because the term *iti* (used in the enumeration of the substances) denotes the completion. Moreover, because the qualities and the activities are mentioned (as belonging to each substance but not to the Īśvara). If it would have been substance, the present authority would have mentioned its qualities according to the Vaiśeṣikas. And in case it is capable of using a different cause, there would have been the mention of its activities. However, it is not done. Therefore, Īśvara is not any of the substance, quality, etc. The qualities, etc., which are meant for others are dependent upon their substratum. In this way, it is neither of the form of substance, etc., nor some different entity. If it would have been an entity, its definition (or peculiar characteristic) would have been stated by the author as is the case with substance, etc. It is, however, not stated by the author. Therefore, there is no Īśvaras in the opinion of the writer of the Vaiśeṣika aphorism. If it is argued that it is proved through the probans, it may be like this, The name and activity in our bodies is the probans to prove the soul or from the probans in the form of name and activity which are directly perceived as proving the acceptance of Īśvara by the authority. That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it does not prove as to which is intended (by you). It is true that through the above probans there would have been the knowledge of one qualified by the power more than ours, or as

having magnificent body or some other. The one you have accepted as an independent instigator of the activity of all the causes leading to destruction is merely a name. And, similar is the knowledge arising of this probans. Moreover, there would arise the undesirable contingency of unskillfulness (of the author of the aphorisms) in not mentioning it earlier. If the activity and stopping of the activity of the atoms would be governed by Īśvara, the author of the aphorism would have mentioned it earlier. On account of not mentioning the main category, like virtue it comes to mean that the author of aphorisms is unskilled. The two are undesirable. Moreover, because of the non-mention. The Īśvara is not mentioned by any of the authorities in the scope of the scriptures. There would not be possibility of defect, as it is by mentioning the name of the father-in-law by the daughter-in-law. To share the defect the view is imposed upon the author of the aphorisms though the view is undesirable to him. This is, however, not the view of the author of the aphorisms. It is accepted by the followers of the Pāśupata school that there is Īśvara in the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore, Īśvara also is not the cause of the universe.

(Atoms of actions cannot be cause)

कर्माणुभिर्व्याख्यातम् । कथम् ? यथा कृतकत्वात् जगत्कारणमणवः, एवं कर्माणि न शरीरनिमित्तं, तस्मात्तदप्यकारणम् । इतरेतरनिमित्तत्वाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथाऽन्तरेण शरीरं कर्म नोत्पद्यमानं दृष्टमेवमन्तरेण कर्म शरीरस्यापि कारणान्तरशक्यं कल्पयितुमिति परस्परनिमित्तत्वान्नाऽस्य परिवर्तस्य पूर्वकोटिः प्रज्ञायते । तस्मान्नास्त्यनयोः कारणान्तरमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनवस्थानामवस्थानपूर्वकत्वदर्शनात् । तद्यथा शुक्रशोणितच्छरीरं शरीराच्छुक्रशोणितमित्यस्य परिवर्तस्य पूर्वकोटिरदृष्टा, प्रतिज्ञायते चाऽयोनिजत्वमीश्वरशरीराणामादिसर्गे च । तथा च बीजादङ्कुरादयोऽङ्कुरादिभ्यो जमीत्यनवस्था । भवति चात्रादिसर्गे परमाणुमात्रादपि बीजप्रादुर्भावस्तथा शरीरकर्मणोरनवस्था । इदानीमपि चादिसर्गे चाधिकारमात्रवशाच्छरीरोत्पत्तिः स्यात् । साधारणविग्रहत्वप्रसंग इति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यद्यधिकारनिमित्ता शरीरोत्पत्तिरादिसर्गेऽभ्युपगम्यते प्राप्तमेकेन शरीरेण सर्वपुरुषाणामभिसम्बन्धो नियमहेत्वभावात् । ततश्च शरीरान्तरानर्थक्यम् । तेनैव सर्वेषामुपभोगसामर्थ्यादिति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? प्रत्यक्षविरोधात् । सत्यमेतदनुमानतः । प्रत्यक्षतस्तु शरीराणि प्रतिपुरुषम्, तस्मान्नायं प्रसंगः । अपवर्गनियमप्रसंग इति चेत् स्यान्मतं यद्यधिकारमात्रवशाच्छरीरोत्पत्तिः परमर्षेरेवापवर्गसाधनं शरीरादुत्पद्येतेति । उच्यते—न तस्यैव, किं तर्हि सर्वेषां गुणानां प्राधान्यात्तन्निमित्तानि शरीराण्यादिसर्गे सांसिद्धिकान्युत्पद्यन्ते । तत्र यस्य सत्त्वप्रधानं कार्यकरणं स परमर्षिः । यस्य सत्त्वं रजोबहुलं स माहात्म्यशरीरः । एवं गुणसम्पर्काद् गुणप्रधानाप्रधानभावेन यावत्स्थावरशरीरप्रादुर्भाव इत्यतो नास्ति गुणानां शरीरविनियोगपक्षपातः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्कृतकत्वात् कर्म जगत्कारणमिति । एतेन चैवं व्याख्याम् । तदपि हि कर्मणामेव

प्राप्तपरिपाकाणामभिधानमर्थान्तरमेवेति चेत्साध्यम् । तस्मादप्यकल्पनीयमिति ।

The view (that the creation is caused by the atoms of action is already explained (refuted).

How ?

Just as the atoms being product cannot be the cause of the universe, similarly the actions are not the cause of the body, Therefore, the actions also are not the cause of the universe.<sup>41</sup> If it is argued that the defect does not arise because of their-dependence? It may be like this. As the act is not observed to take place without body, similarly it is not possible to postulate some other cause than the acts for the body. And, since they serve as the cause for each other, the first of them which revolves in a cycle is not known. Therefore, there is no other cause for them. This is also wrong, because those which have endless series of cause and effect are also observed to be caused from a final point. For example, the body is produced from the semen and blood, and the semen and blood originate from the body and thus the first of these which revolves in this type of cycle is not observed. It is, however, declared that it in the initial creation as also the bodies of Īśvara were produced without womb. Similarly, the sprout, etc. originate from seed and the seed from the sprout etc., thus leading to the endless series of cause and effect. In the initial creation, however, the seed originates from merely the atoms. Similarly, there can be explained the endless series of cause and effect with reference to the body and the acts. Now as well as in the initial creation there would be the body merely due to potency of constituents. If it is argued that it would involve the undesirable contingency of a common body (for all the souls)? It may be like this. If in the initial creation the production of the body is admitted as caused by potency, it would imply the contact of all the conscious entities with a single body only because there is no cause for restriction. Then, there will be no use of the other bodies because the enjoyment of all conscious entities is possible through that only. This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it goes against perception. It is right through inference. Through perception, however, the bodies are proved as differently located with each conscious entity. Therefore, this undesirable contingency does not arise.

If it is argued that it will again involve the undesirable contingency of the restriction with reference to liberation? It may be like

this. If the production of the body is due to potency, the means of liberation would arise from (the body of the) great seers only. To this the reply is not him only. On the other hand, on account of the predominance of all the constituents over each other the bodies causing that (means of liberation) are naturally born in the initial creation. Out of those whose mode of action abounds in Sattva, is the great seer. He whose sattva is mixed with more Rajas is the magnificent body. In this way, through the association of the constituents and through the relation of dominant and non-dominant among the constituents the bodies upto the immovable (beings) are born. And, thus, there is no partiality of the constituents towards assuming (making up) a particular body. Therefore, it is right that the actions being caused are not the cause of the universe. Through this only is this explained. If it is argued that that is the other name for the acts which are matured for fruition, it is still to be proved. From this reason also it should not be postulated so.

(Time is not the cause)

यदप्युक्तं कालाज्जगदुत्पत्तिर्भविष्यतीति तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? कारणपरिस्पर्श-  
न्दस्यैव तदभिधानसन्निवेशात् । न हि नः कालो नाम कश्चिदस्ति, किं तर्हि क्रियमाणक्रियाणा-  
मेवादित्यगतिगोदोहघटास्तनितादीनां विशिष्टावधिसरूपप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वम् । परापरादिलिङ्ग-  
सद्भावात्मनिपत्तिरिति चेन्न, अकृतकेषु तदनुपपत्तेः । यदेव कृतकं तत्रैव परमपरमित्यादिः  
प्रत्ययो दृष्टः । स यदि क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तः स्यादविशेषात्रित्यानित्येषु स्यात् । क्वचित्सा-  
मर्थ्यादपाकजवददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्— यथाऽग्निर्संयोगः पाकजहेतुः तथा चाविशेषेऽपि  
पृथिव्यामेव पाकजोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं भवति नाकाशादिषु । एवं कालोऽपि परापरादिहेतुरथ  
चाऽनित्येष्वेव स्यान्न नित्येष्विति । तच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? विशेषोपपत्तेः । रूपादिविक्रिया-  
हेतुरग्निस्तद्युक्तं यदसौ तद्वति द्रव्ये पाकजानादद्यात्, तद्वत्याकाशादौ । कालस्तु सम्बन्धमात्रो-  
पकारी न विक्रियाहेतुः । तस्मादसदेतत् । एवं यदि क्रियाभ्योऽन्यः काल इष्यते कारणपरिस्पर्-  
न्दस्य जगत्कारणत्वमथान्यत्साध्यम् ।

The statement that the universe will be produced by Time is also wrong.

Why ?

Because that name is included in the motion of the causes. There is nothing called Time in our theory. On the contrary, it is the cause of the knowledge of the identity of a particular duration in the acts in the form of the thundering of the cloud.

If it is argued that the time is known through the existence of the probans in the form of (the knowledge of) later and earlier, (we reply) it is not applicable in case of the objects which are not created.

The notion of earlier and later, etc., is observed in case of the created objects only. If that would have been caused by something else than activity, it would be found commonly in both—the eternal and the non-eternal objects. If it is argued that the defect does not arise since the capacity is found in some cases only as some atoms are not baked with fire? It may be like this. The contact of fire is the cause of production of baked atoms but still inspite of lack of particularity it becomes the cause of the baking of atoms in the earth only and not in the case of space, etc. Similarly, the time is also the cause of earlier and later, but still it would be applicable to the non-eternal objects only and not to the eternal. That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there is the possibility of particularity. The fire is the cause of bringing change in form, etc. Hence, it is right that it brings about the production of the baked atoms in the substance possessed of that (form) and not in the one possessing it, like space. The time is, however through serviceable (helpful) through mere association and not a cause of bringing out the change. Therefore, the above argument is wrong. In this, if time is accepted to be something else than the activity, the movement of the cause comes to be the cause of the universe. Hence, it should be proved as something else.

(Accidence or chance is not the cause)

यदृच्छाऽपि न कारणं कर्मवत् कार्यकारणभावात् । कार्यकारणभूतं हीदं व्यक्तमिति प्राग्व्याख्यातम् । स च कार्यकारणभावः प्रेक्षापूर्वकृतानां शयनादीनामुपलब्धौ यादृच्छिकेषु चानुऽपलब्धौ न तस्या लिङ्गमिति शक्यं वक्तुम् ।

Accidence is also not the cause of the universe because there is the relation of cause and effect (in the products) just as in the case of activity. It is explained earlier that the manifest is composed of cause and effect. The relation of cause and effect being available in the case of bed, etc., which are the creation of some intelligent being and are absent in the objects originating accidentally, there is no possibility of the mention of probans for accidence (for the establishment of that as the cause of the universe).

(Negation is not the cause)

अभावोऽप्यकारणम्, परिमाणादिदर्शनात् । न हि तत् उत्पन्नानां परिमाणमुपपद्यत इत्यतो नाप्यन्वयः । सात्मकनिरात्मकयोरत्यन्तजातिभेदात् ।

The negation also is not the cause because of the observation of the limited magnitude, etc., (in the universe). The magnitude is not possible in the case of the objects produced out of that (negation)

and, hence, there is no possibility of homogeneity also because there is complete opposition of genus between the objects having the nature and those having no nature.<sup>43</sup>

(Power, Favour and Separation are not the causes.)

नापि शक्तिस्तदभावात् । नोपकारोऽनवस्थानात् । न विभागो निरात्मकत्वात् ।

Nor is the universe caused by power because it does not exist at all.<sup>44</sup> Nor is the favour (the cause of the universe) because it will involve infinite regress.<sup>45</sup> Nor is the separation (the cause of the universe) because it has also no nature of its own.<sup>46</sup>

तस्मान्न परमाणुपुरुषेश्वरकर्मदैवकालस्वभावयदृच्छाऽभावेभ्यो व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते । न चेदेभ्यः, परिशेषतः प्रधानस्यैवास्तित्वलिङ्गमिदम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् भेदानां परिमाणादिभ्यः कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ॥१५॥

Therefore, the manifest is not produced from atoms, Puruṣa, Īśvara, actions, luck, time, nature (of the objects), chance and negation. If it (the universe) is not produced from these, it is the probans for the existence of the cosmic matter through residual. Therefore, it is right that the unmanifest is the cause of the universe because of the finite nature of the products. etc.



## KĀRIKĀ 15

1. The qualities which do not contradict should be accepted as existing in both the cause and the effect while the others which are opposite in nature should not be considered to be common in both.
2. Both of these are merely the statement without reason and, hence, no side can claim superiority over the other.
3. The meaning is that there is no specific cause of these objects. Therefore, there is no restriction of cause-effect relation in them.
4. If they would be finite in magnitude in the past and the future states as well, there would arise the undesirable contingency of their being finite in all periods of time and consequently it would imply the rejection of the theory of origination from an object unlimited in magnitude.
5. The bodies of the beings like gods, men and animals are innumerable and, hence, they cannot be easily known to be intellectual limited and in number.
6. The Samkhyas do not consider generality as an independent category, but the similarity of form. The form is not different from the substance.
7. Though the Samkhyas do not accept generality as a distinct category, but at the same time they do not discard the similarity in objects as also the world dealings through that.
8. Like manifests like Sattva manifests sattva. Since sattva is of the nature of pleasure, it raises the feeling of pleasure in accordance with the past impression of a being. Thus, it is proved that sattva is of the nature of pleasure.
9. It is accepted even by the Samkhyas that the sound is not a modification of drum. The drum is merely an instrumental cause in the production of sound. There is, therefore, no harm if the sound is not of the drum.
10. The word *Ca* in the text presents difficulty in interpretation. The sentence may be interpreted as the activity of potter and the arrangement of the instruments like stick for producing the pot are due to the potency.
11. The sense is that the manifest objects like intellect proceed to their activity which is caused by the potency in the form of non-

manifest.

12. The argument proceeds from effects to the causes. The effects are many. Consequently there must be many potencies in cosmic matter.
13. If the power would be one, it would give rise to a single effect only.
14. The argument would lead to the existence of potencies and not to the existence of cosmic matter which is supposed to be different from potencies.
15. The Samkhyas maintain that the cause perform its activity due to the potency inherent in it. The selection of the material as well as instrumental causes is prompted by the potency. If the potency would not be there, the agent would not have selected them.
16. The objection based upon oneness or manifoldness of cosmic matter was raised against the non-difference of the potencies from the cosmic matter. The alleviation of the former objection alleviated the latter.
17. It refers to the gross elements which act for mutual benefit. For example, earth gives support, water helps in collecting together and giving shape while space helps others to exist together.
18. The state of constituents giving rise to the other state is called cause while the latter is the effect.
19. Consequently, there is no proof that it is due to subservience in the state of manifestation.
20. It is so since the Samkhyas hold that the worldly objects are nothing but the particular arrangement of the three constituents in different proportion.
21. Cf. *samanvayat* as a reason to establish the existence of cosmic matter.
22. The sense is that the nature of atoms is found in the gross elements also just as the nature of the atoms of earth is observed in the earth as well.
23. The causality of the atoms is negated on the ground of homogeneity between the subtle elements and the earth, etc., we object to the causality of cosmic matter on account of considering pleasure, etc., as the qualities of the soul, and the earth, etc., as their manifestor and consequently both are homogeneous to the soul.

24. Though the subtle elements are also limited in magnitude, yet the meaning intended here is that they are more in magnitude than the earth, etc. This is, however, not the case with atoms.
25. To avoid the infinite regress the ultimate cause should be taken to be uncaused.
26. Possessing the form, etc., should be understood as having the form, etc., manifested because some form, etc., exist in unmanifest state in cosmic matter.
27. The meaning of thadhara is not clear. Chakravarti suggests vad-hara which is also not clear.
28. It could be argued that the cosmic matter also gives rise to other objects. Hence, the same argument may apply there also. Therefore, the argument could possibly be interpreted as that which gives rise to similar object is non-eternal. Cosmic matter gives rise to the objects dissimilar in nature.
29. The reading should be *ate evakrtakatvam* in place of *eva evakrtakatvam*.
30. The reading should be *evakrtakah* in place of *eva krtakah*.
31. The reading should be *sarirakrtakatvam* in place of *sarira krtakatam*.
32. The backed atome are considred to be non-eternal even by the Vaisesikas.
33. Since the atoms are caused and non-eternal they would not exist as the cause at the time of dissolution, and hence, in absence of any other cause the universe will not originate again.
34. The non-active object cannot be the cause of the universe.
35. The sense is that Isvara is like Puruṣa in nature. Like conscious entity it is also composed of consciousness. The entity composed of consciousness is, however, inactive and hence cannot be the cause of universe.
36. The context demands that the reading should be *ayamabud-dhipurvakam*.
37. The implication of the alternate explanation is not clear from the Sāṃkhya point of view. It may be the case when it is not understood as an alternate cause but is taken together with the first itself. The text in that case would mean the intellect is born at the time of creation of the body from cosmic matter when the soul also comes in contact with the body. Or, here intellect may

- stand for the principle alongwith the power of deliberation which is not possible without the contact with the soul.
38. The virtue and vice cannot be supposed to exist in the initial creation of the universe. Therefore, the production of them needs some cause. It cannot be the Isvara himself because there is no purpose of Isvara in producing and attaching vice to particular persons only. Thus, it cannot be properly explained why some beings are happy and the others miserble in the initial state of creation.
  39. The superior intellect and the contact between conscious and non-conscious are not possible in this case.
  40. The maxim is that the composite substance are non-eternal by nature.
  41. The actions are the activities and require the pre-existence of the body in the beginning of the creation to officiate over worldly activities.
  42. It is still to be proved whether action means the acts ready for fruition. Secondly, it cannot be in any case established that actions are the cause of creation in the initial state of creation.
  43. In brief, the maxim 'like produces like' is viciated if something possessed of particular qualities is supposed to be produced from that having no quality.
  44. The Sāṃkhyas like the Naiyayikas and unlike the Mimāṃsakas believe that power is not an independent object.
  45. The favouring entity would be supposed as created by some other favouring entity and so on and so forth.
  46. Separation is also not an independent object. Hence, it also cannot be accepted as separate entity.



## KĀRIKĀ-16

(Cosmic Matter acts through the three constituents)

आह एवमप्यस्य व्यक्तहेतुत्वमनुपपन्नम्, एकत्वात् । बहूनां कार्यारम्भो दृष्टस्तन्वादी-  
नाम् । एकं प्रधानं, तस्मात् तदारम्भशक्तियुक्तमिति

Opponent: In this way also it is not possible that it (the cosmic mat-  
ter) is the cause of the manifest because of its being one. The  
production of effects is observed through (collection of) many  
as that of the threads. The cosmic matter is one. Therefore, it  
is not endowed with the power of the activity for creation.

उच्यते—यद्यपि गुणानां प्रधानलक्षणमवस्थान्तरमभिन्नबुद्धिनिमित्तत्वादेकामपिकार्य-  
काले किञ्चिद्वैषम्योपजनितव्यपदेश्यरूपाभिरितरेतरोपकारिणीभिः शक्तिभिः समुदायत्वमाप-  
द्यते । तस्मादिदानीं

**प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदायाच्च**

प्रवर्तते इत्यनेनोत्पत्तिमाचष्टे । त्रिगुणत इत्यव्यपदेश्यरूपाणां प्रधानभावेन गुणशक्तीनां  
वैषम्यादव्यपदेश्यरूपान्तरमाह । यत्रैतच्छक्यते वक्तुं त्रयः सत्त्वादय इति तदवस्थानं कार्यार-  
म्भकमिति । समुदायादित्यनेन परस्परापेक्षाणामारम्भशक्तिमवद्योतयति । एतदुक्तं भवति—  
कार्यकाले गुणाः परित्यक्तपूर्वावस्था भेदं प्रतिलभ्य परस्परपकारेण संहन्यन्ते । संहताश्च  
व्यक्तमुत्पादयन्ति । तस्मान्नाऽवस्थान्तरस्याभिन्नबुद्धिनिमित्तत्वात्प्रधानैकत्वदोषः गुणभेदान्नै-  
कस्य कार्यारम्भ इति ।

Proponent: Though the other state of the constituents in the form of  
the cosmic matter is one because it gives rise to a single  
knowledge, yet it comes to be (or attains) the state of collec-  
tiveness through the powers which are mutually helpful and  
which get some designation brought about by uncequilibrium.  
Therefore, now,

**IT OPERATES THROUGH THE THREE CONSTITUENTS AND  
IN COMBINATION.**

Through the expression 'operates' the author states 'creation'.  
Through the expression 'through the constituents' the author means  
another nameable form of the constituents which are essentially of  
unnameable form through the unequilibrium of the powers of the  
constituents because of their attaining the state of principal and  
subordinate. The state in which it is possible to say that there are  
three, sattva, etc., it is the (initial active) cause of the effects. Through  
the expression 'through their combination' the author suggests the  
power of giving rise to the effect invested in the constituents stand-  
ing in need of each other. This is meant here. At the time of opera-  
tion the constituents having given up the earlier state and  
having attained the differentiations, get together through mutual ser-  
vice. And, having got together, they give rise to the manifest. There-  
fore, there arises no defect of oneness of the cosmic matter because  
it is the other state which gives rise to a non-different or one  
knowledge. There is no operation for initial activity by a single en-  
tity only because there is the difference of the constituents.

(Cosmic Matter does not move but modifies)

आह, निष्क्रियत्वात्तर्हि प्रकृतेः कार्यारम्भोऽनुपपन्नः । क्रियात्वानभ्युपगमे वा व्यक्तवैध-  
र्म्यविरोध इति ।

Opponent: There is no possibility of initial operation in the cosmic  
matter because the cosmic matter is inactive. Or, if the activity  
is accepted, there will be contradiction with the statement of  
its dissimilarity to the manifest.<sup>2</sup>

उच्यते—न, क्रियावैधर्म्यभेदात् । द्विविधा हि क्रिया प्रसन्दलक्षणा परिणामलक्षणा च.  
तत्र प्रसन्दः प्रधानस्य सौख्यात्प्रतिषिध्यते ।

**परिणामतः**

तु तत्कार्यमारभते इति ।

Proponent: No, because of the distinction through different types of  
activities. There are two types of activity—movement and  
modification. The movement is negated in cosmic matter be-  
cause it is subtle.

**THROUGH MODIFICATION**

Its effects start.

आह— ननु च परिणामोऽपि सौक्ष्म्यात्प्रधानस्य नोपपद्यते । कस्मात् ? न हि सौक्ष्म्यात्सूक्ष्मस्याकाशादेर्विपरिणामो दृष्ट इति ।

Opponent: The modification is also not possible in the cosmic matter because it is subtle in nature.

Why?

Because the modification is not observed in the subtle objects like space because of their being subtle in nature.

उच्यते—

संस्कारस्य सौक्ष्म्येऽपि परिणामोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तस्माद् युक्तः सूक्ष्मपरिणामीति ॥

Proponent: In spite of subtlety of refinement, its modification should be accepted.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it is right to declare it subtle and modifiable.

(Nature of modification)

आह, कः पुनरयं परिणामो नाम ?

Opponent: What is the modification?

उच्यते—

जहद्वर्मान्तरं पूर्वमादत्ते यदा परम् ।

तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो धर्मो परिणामः स उच्यते ॥ इति ।

यदा शक्त्यन्तरानुग्रहात्पूर्वधर्मान् तिरोभाव्य स्वरूपादप्रच्युतो धर्मो धर्मान्तरेणाविर्भवति तदवस्थानमस्माकं परिणाम इत्युच्यते ।

Proponent: "When the object without deviating from its essence, acquires the new qualities leaving the earlier, that is called modification."<sup>4</sup>

When an object without deviating from its essential nature comes up with the other (new) qualities after subduing the earlier qualities with the help of the power, that state is said by us to be the modification.<sup>5</sup>

आह, नैतदभिधानमात्रं दृष्टान्तमन्तरेण प्रतिपद्यामहे । तस्माद्यथा किमिति वक्तव्यम् ।

Opponent: We do not understand this mere mention without an example. Therefore, an example should be given.

उच्यते—यथा पालाशं पलशादप्रच्युतनिमित्तान्तरस्यातपादेरनुग्रहाच्छ्यामतां तिरो-

भाव्य पीततां व्रजति तथेदं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

Proponent: just as an object made of palasa wood without deviating from palasahood attains the yellow colour after subduing the blackness on account of the influence of other cause like heat, etc., it should also be understood like this.

आह न, अन्यथोत्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधात् । कथं पुनरेतदवगम्यते पालाशं स्वरूपादप्रच्युतं धर्मान्तरस्य परित्यागमुपादानं च करोति, न पुनरन्यथा चान्यथा चोत्पद्यत इति ?

Opponent: No, because the production of a different object is not negated. How is it known that the object made of palasa wood leaves and acquires the other qualities without deviating from its essential nature, and it is not born a fresh again and again.

उच्यते—क्षणभङ्गप्रतिषेधात् प्रागेवक्षणभङ्गनिर्दिष्टं विनष्टानां भावानां पुनरुत्पत्तौ नास्ति कारणम् । तदभावे चोत्पत्तिरयुक्तेति ।

Proponent: Because of the negation of momentariness. Earlier only in case of momentariness it is mentioned (that) there is no cause for (accepting) the production or the origination of the object already destroyed.<sup>6</sup> And, the production is not justified without that.

(change in form or quality does not change the original)

आह, धर्मधर्मिणोरनन्यत्वाऽभ्युपगमाद्धर्मोत्पत्तिविनाशे धर्म्युत्पत्तिविनाशप्रसंगः । न हि वो धर्मेभ्योऽन्यो धर्मो । तत्र यदि धर्मस्य निवृत्तिरभ्युपगम्यते धर्मिणोऽपि निवृत्तिरनन्यत्वात्प्राप्ता । धर्मोत्पत्तौ तदुत्पत्तिः । तत्र यदुक्तं धर्मोत्पत्तिविरोधे धर्मोत्पत्तिविनाशमिति एतदयुक्तम् ।

Opponent: There arises the undesirable contingency of the production and destruction of the qualified object through the production and destruction of the qualities because of the acceptance of the identity of the qualities and the object qualified. In your theory, the object is not different from the qualities. If the destruction of quality is accepted, there results the destruction of the qualified also because of their being one. Similarly, is the production of that object with the production of the qualities. Therefore, the statement that the essential nature of the object persists in spite of the origination and

destruction of the qualities, is wrong.<sup>7</sup>

उच्यते न, सेनादिवद्व्यवस्थानोपपत्तेः। तद्यथा सेनाङ्गैर्भ्योऽनन्यत्वं सेनायाः न च सेनाङ्गानां विनाशे सेनाविनाशः। तद्यथा तन्तुभ्यो नाऽन्यः पटः। बौद्धानां संयोगावयवप्रतिषेधात्। न च पटविनाशे तन्तुविनाशः तत्र। यतुक्तं धर्मविनाशे धर्मविनाश इति एतदयुक्तम्।

Proponent: No because of the possibility of its staying (i.e., existing) like the army. To explain, there is the non-difference of the army from its parts. And, there is no destruction of army with the destruction of the parts of the army.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, the cloth is not different from the threads because the conjunction and whole are rejected by the Buddhists. And, there is no destruction of threads with the destruction of cloth. The statement that the qualified object is destroyed with the destruction of the qualities, is wrong.

(Generality and particularity)

आह, एवमप्ययुक्तम्। तत्कस्मात्? सामान्यविशेषयोर्धर्मिस्वरूपपरिकल्पनानुपपत्तेः इह रूपादिसामान्यं वा धर्मिरूपत्वेन परिकल्प्यमानं परिकल्प्येत रूपादिविशेषो वा? किं चातः? तत्र तावद्रूपादिसामान्यं धर्मिस्वरूपमिति शक्यं कल्पयितुम्। कस्मात्? असम्भवात्। यदि तावत्पृथिवि सामान्यं घटादिविशेषस्तेन पृथिव्यपि तन्मात्रपेक्षया विशेषः। यावत्प्रधानमिति नास्ति सामान्यम्। तदभावाद् धर्मिस्वरूपाभावः। अथ विशेषा घटादयस्तेषां विशेषान्तरेण सहाऽवस्थानाद्धर्मिस्वरूपानवस्थानात्। ततश्च यदुक्तं स्वरूपादप्रच्युतो धर्मो धर्मान्तरं विजहाति, धर्मान्तरमुपादत्ते इति तद्व्याहृत इति।

Opponent: This is also wrong.

Why?

Because there is no justification of postulating the general or the particular as the essential nature of the object qualified. While postulating like this in the nature of the object qualified, one may postulate the general quality or the particular.

What difference does it make? the generality of form, etc., cannot be postulated as identical with the object qualified.

Why?

Because it is impossible. If the earth its general and pot, etc., the particular, the earth also is particular in comparison to the subtle elements. There is nothing general upto the state of cosmic matter.<sup>9</sup> In the absence of that (general) there will be the absence of the form of the object qualified (by generality). If they (the qualified ob-

jects) are the particular, i.e., qualified by particularity like, pot etc., the form of the object qualified could not be decided because those will exist with the other particular object. Then, the statement that the object qualified without deviating from its essential nature leaves the other qualities and acquires the new, is contradicted.

उच्यते-यदुक्तं रूपादिसामान्यविशेषयोर्धर्मिस्वरूपपरिकल्पनानुपपत्तिरिति, अस्तु सामान्यम्। यत्तुक्तं सामान्यं सामान्यान्तरापेक्षं विशेषत्वमिति न प्रत्ययनिवृत्तौ सामान्याभाववस्थितेस्ततश्च धर्मिस्वरूपसिद्धेः, यावत्पृथिवीत्ययं प्रत्ययो न निवर्तते सामान्यं घटादिविशेषः, द्रव्यत्वं चासौ, धर्मान्तरपरिवर्तेषु तदाकारप्रत्ययोत्पत्तिः स्वरूपावस्थानसिद्धेर्धर्मा घटादयः। यदा तु पृथिवीप्रत्ययनिवृत्तिस्तदा तन्मात्राणां सामान्यभावो द्रव्यत्वं च विशेषो धर्म इति यावत्प्रधानं तस्य तु सामान्यान्तरानुपपत्तेः कौटस्थ्यमेव। यत्र सर्वविशेषाभावस्तत्रधानम्। यदि तु पृथिव्यादीनां नित्यमव्यावृत्तं सति कौटस्थ्यमेषां प्राप्तम्। तस्मात् धर्मिस्वरूपाभावः शक्तेर्वा सामान्यभावाऽभ्युपगमात्। अथवा सुखदुःखमोहशक्तय एवेह महदादिना विशेषान्तेन लिङ्गेन परिणामं प्रतिपद्यन्ते। तासां च सततं सामान्यप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वात्स्वरूपादप्रच्युते तद् द्रव्यत्वं लिङ्गस्य धर्मत्वम्। अप्रसिद्धेरयुक्तमिति चेन्नोक्तत्वात्। प्रागुक्तमेतत्सुखादिपूर्वकमिदं विश्वमिति।

Reply: As regards the objection of postulating general or particular as the object qualified, we reply: let it be the general. As regards your statement that one general is particular in comparison to (or depending upon) other (wider) general, (we reply) it is not so because the absence of general becomes certain with eradication of all knowledge (of general); because the nature of the object qualified is proved thereby. Until the knowledge that this is earth is not dispelled, the earth is general and the pot, etc., the particular. This is substance also. The pot, etc., are the modifications (qualities) because the subsistence of the form (of the object qualified in case of earth etc.) is proved through the origination of knowledge of its identical form when the qualities are changed. When the knowledge of the earth is dispelled, there is the knowledge of generality with reference to the subtle elements and of the substantiality as the particular quality. This order goes on up to the cosmic matter. It is unchangeable general (object). Cosmic matter is the state where there is the absence of all particularities. If the general nature in the earth, etc., would be al-

ways associated with them, they come to be unchangeable because there would always be their general form only. Therefore, there is no absence of the form of the object qualified. Or because the general nature (generality) is admitted with reference to the power. Or, the powers, viz., pleasure, pain and indifference undergo modification into the mergent object like the intellect, etc., up gross elements. Because they do not deviate from their essential nature as they are always the cause of the knowledge of generality, that substance-ness is the (general) quality of the mergent. If it is argued that it is not so because it is not well-known, we reply it is not so because we have already stated. We have already stated that the universe comes out of pleasure, etc.

आह- एवमपि वैश्वरूप्यानुपपत्तिः। कारणाविशेषात्। यदि सुखादिशक्तय एव परिणामिन्यो यदिदं ब्रह्मादि स्थावरान्तं वैश्वरूप्यं तत्रोपपद्यते।

Opponent: In this way also there is no possibility of the universe because there is no specification of the cause. If the power, viz., pleasure, etc. are modifiable, (the origin of) the universe beginning from Brahma to the immovable objects does not become possible.

Why?

Because there is no origination of a identical (or absolutely similar) effect.

(The constituents give rise to various objects)

उच्यते- शक्तिश्च परिणामिनि भवति तेन वैश्वरूप्यम्। कथम्?

सलिलवत्प्रति प्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

यथान्तरिक्षाविशिष्टस्याम्भसः प्रच्युतिराश्रयेण गोभुजङ्गमोद्वादीनां, विशेषात्क्षीरमूत्र-विषादिवैश्वरूप्यं चोपपद्यते। तथा गुणशक्तयो विशिष्टाः परस्पराश्रयविशेषाद् ब्रह्मादि स्तम्भान्तं जात्याकृतिवाग्बुद्धिस्वभावाहारविहाररूपं वैश्वरूप्यं प्रतिपद्यते। तस्मात्सिद्धमेतत् प्रकृतिरेव सर्वभावनां प्रसवित्री। न च कश्चिदोष इति ॥ १६ ॥

Proponent: The power is also modifiable; the universe originates from that.

How?

### LIKE WATER, ON ACCOUNT OF RESORTING TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE CONSTITUENTS.

As the water falls from the sky without differentiation in it, there arises in it the difference into milk, urine and poison according to the differentiation as it comes into the contact with a cow, camel and snake. Similarly, the power in the form of the constituents which are specified get various forms right from Brahma to the gross objects like the species and form (of the object), tongue, intellect, nature, wordly activities. Therefore, it is established that the cosmic matter is the origination of all the entities. And, there is no fault in it.

॥ युक्तिदीपिकायां सांख्यसप्ततिपद्धतौ चतुर्थमाह्निकम् ॥

Here ends the fourth discourse of the Yuktidīpikā.

## KARIKA 16

1. The reading given by ch. viz. samudayadityanena in place of samudayatyena of pandey's text, is correct.
2. The other commentators deny movement in the cosmic matter because of its being all -pervasive.
3. The context demands the reading kriyatvabhyupagame in place of kriyatvanabhyupagame of pandeyas's text.
4. Here, samskara may mean creation. It implies that the change leading to creation is so subtle that it is not perceptible, still the modification is not denied. The objects imperceptible in nature also undergo change.
5. It differentiates the Samkhya view of change from that of Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta. In the system of Nyaya the object is created afresh and the same object does not modify into the other. In Advaita vedanta the change is illusory. In Samkhya, however, change is real but the object created is not altogether fresh but is the modified form of the cause in which some qualities are given up while the other are introduced.
6. Of. Karika 9
7. Since the Samkhya do not accept inherence as a relation, they accept tadatmya (identity-cum-difference) between the quality and its substratum. Therefore, the objector raises such an objection.
8. The argument is based upon the relation between part and whole. The example though not based upon quality and its substratum cannot be said to be wrong. The Samkhyas admit the relation of identity-cum-difference. (tadatmya) between part and whole also.
9. The Samkhyas are presented to hold the same view as the Naiyayikas regarding generality and particularity. There is no fixed rule about them. However it is certain that samanya is of two kinds: the most pervasive and the least pervasive like the qualities of a particular object. The objects in middle may be said to be general or particular comparatively. The cosmic matter is the most general while a particular object made of gross elements is the least general. About the objects in middle generality or particularity depends upon their comparative position. In Samkhya the rule is that the cause is more pervasive than the effect. In other words, in the hierarchy of causal classification the

earlier is more general than the latter.

10. The nature or the form of the object is determined by the knowledge of that. If something is known as earth, it is determined as earth though the qualities may change.
11. The sense is if the general nature is not deviated, that object would be eternal in its form and thus the causal relation would come to an end.

## KĀRIKĀ-17

(Existence of Conscious Entity)

आह, समधिगतं प्रधानम् । पुरुष इदानीं कार्यकारणव्यतिरिक्तोऽस्तीत्येतत्प्रतिपाद्यम् । कुतः संशय इति चेत् अनुपलभ्यमानस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वादित्युक्तम् । किं चान्यत् । आचार्यवि-  
प्रतिपत्तेः । विज्ञानस्कन्धव्यतिरिक्तो नास्ति कश्चिदर्थ इति शाक्यपुत्रीयाः प्रतिपन्नाः । कस्मात् ?  
सर्वप्रमाणाऽनुपलब्धे । इह यदस्ति तत्प्रत्यक्षादिना प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते, तद्यथा रूपादि । ततश्च  
तावदयमात्मा न प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते । कस्मात् ? अशब्दादिलक्षणत्वात् । नान्तःप्रत्यक्षतः ।  
कस्मात् ? त्रिगुणादिविपरीतस्य तदविषयत्वात् । न पूर्ववच्छेषवदभ्याम् । कार्यकारणाऽनुप-  
पत्तेः । न च सामान्यतोदृष्टात् । धर्मसामान्याऽभावात् । नाप्तवचनात् । अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि  
बौद्धानां श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणेतिहासाः प्रमाणम् । यश्चैषामागमः, स एवमाह

“आत्मैव ह्यात्मनो नास्ति विपरीतेन कल्प्यते ।

नैवेह सत्त्वमात्मास्ति धर्मास्त्वेते सहेतुकाः ॥

द्वादशैव तवाङ्गानि स्कन्धायतनधातवः ।

विचिन्त्य सर्वाण्येतानि पुद्गलो नोपलभ्यते ॥

शून्यमाध्यात्मिकं विद्धि शून्यं पश्य बहिर्गतम् ।

न दृश्यते सोऽपि कश्चिद्यो भावयति शून्यताम् ॥

पुनरप्याह “अस्ति कर्मास्ति विपाकः, कारकस्तु नोपलभ्यते य इमान्स्वान्धर्मानाक्षि-  
पति । अन्याश्च प्रति सन्दधाति, अन्यत्र धर्मसंकेतात् ।” । तस्मात्सर्वप्रमाणाऽनुपलब्धेर्नास्त्या-  
त्मेति ।

Opponent : The cosmic matter is understood. Now, it should be es-  
tablished that the conscious entity exists as different from body.  
If it is asked why does the doubt arise, (the reply is) we have al-  
ready stated that the imperceptible object is observed to be of  
both the kinds (or in both the ways).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, because there  
is the difference of opinion among the authorities. The Bud-  
dhists hold that nothing except thought-faculty and constituents  
of the body exists.

Why?

Because it is not known through any of the means of knowledge.

Whatever exists in the universe is known through some means  
of knowledge like perception as for example the form, etc. The soul  
(postulated by the Sāmkhyas) is not known through perception.

Why

Because it is by nature devoid of sound, etc.<sup>2</sup> Nor is it known  
through internal perception.

Why ?

because the objects contradictory to one (devoid of the  
qualities like) composed of three constituents, etc., are not the object  
of that (internal perception). Nor is it known through apriori<sup>3</sup> and  
aposteriori<sup>4</sup> type of inference because the idea of cause and effect  
does not hold good (in case of soul). Nor is it known through the in-  
ference based on analogy<sup>5</sup> because there is absence of all common  
qualities in it. Nor (is it known) through valid testimony because it is  
not accepted by us as a means of valid knowledge. The sruti, śmṛti,  
Purāṇa and itihāsa are not the means of valid knowledge according  
to the Bauddhas. Their own scripture states as :

“There is no soul of the one (supposed to be wrongly) pos-  
sessed of it. It is invertedly postulated. There is no entity called soul.  
There are the elements which are caused. You are composed of  
twelve only the skandhas, āyatanas and the dhātus. After analysing all  
these, the man is not observed. Know the internal objects as void and  
consider the external objects also as void. The one who cherishes the  
void is also an ignorant as well.”<sup>6</sup>

Again, it is stated that “the acts are there, their fruition is there.  
No agent, however, is observed to take these elements off and to col-  
lect the others, than the stipulation of the qualities.” Therefore, since  
the soul is not established by any means of knowledge, it does not  
exist.

(The Existence of soul established through inference  
based on analogy).

उच्यते—यतावदुक्तं प्रत्यक्षतः पूर्ववच्छेषवदभ्यां चात्मनो नोपलब्धिरिति, सत्यमेतत् ।  
यत्तूक्तं सामान्यतोदृष्टादनुपलब्धिरात्मसामान्याऽनुपपत्तेरिति, तदयुक्तम् ।

(composite is meant for others)

कस्मात् ?

संघातपरार्थत्वात्



इह सघाताः परार्था दृष्टाः । तद्यथा शयनासनरथचरणादयः । अस्ति चायं शरीरलक्षणः  
संघातः । तस्मादनेनाऽपि परार्थेन भवितव्यम् । योऽसौ परः स पुरुषः । तस्मादस्ति पुरुषः ।

Why ?

### BECAUSE THE COMPOSITE IS MEANT FOR OTHER

The composites are observed to be meant for others just as the bed, seat, chariot and feet, etc. The body is also a composite. Therefore, it should also be meant for other. The other entity referred to here is the conscious entity. Therefore, the conscious entity exists.

(Conscious entity is non-composite in nature)

आह, संघातार्थत्वोपलब्धेः । शयनादयो हि सत्यपि परार्थत्वे संघातार्थाः । यदि च तैर-  
तिदेशः कार्यकारणसंघातस्य क्रियते प्राप्तमस्य तद्वत्संघातार्थत्वम् । एवं पुरुषविपरीताऽर्थसि-  
द्धिप्रसंगः । अथैतदनिष्टं, न तर्हि चक्षुरादयः परार्थाः ।

Opponent : Because the nature of being meant for (other) composite is also experienced. The bed, etc., though meant for others are meant for some other composite. If their application is extended to the composite of the cause and effect (i.e., body), its nature of being meant for some other composite is established. This would lead to the undesirable contingency of establishing something opposite to the conscious entity (in nature). If it is undesirable, the sense of sight, etc., would not be meant for others.

उच्यते-न शक्यमेतदापादयितुम् । कस्मात् ? असंहतत्वसिद्धौ वादप्रवृत्ते । सिद्धे  
सत्यसंहतत्वे पुरुषस्यायं वादः प्रवृत्तः । तस्मान्न पारार्थ्यमनेन बाध्यते । कथमवगम्यत इति  
चेत्, प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धेः । सति हि संघातत्वे देवदत्तादिवदयं पुरुषः प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्येत ।  
तथा च सति संशयाभावात्प्रवृत्तिरेवास्य वादस्य न स्यात् । तस्मादयुक्तं संहतार्थाः शयनादिव-  
च्चक्षुरादयः ।

Proponent : This cannot be accepted.

Why?

Because the discussion is commenced after the establishment of non-composite nature of the conscious entity. The discussion is taken up when the non-composite nature of the conscious entity is proved. Therefore, it (the reason) does not go against the nature of

being meant for other.<sup>7</sup> If it is asked how is it known, we reply, because it is not cognised directly. If there would be composite nature (of the conscious entity), the conscious entity would be directly known like Devadatta, etc. If this would have been the case, there would be no doubt and consequently the discussion would not commence. Therefore, it is wrong that the eye, etc., are meant for other composite as is the case with the bed, etc.

आह, परस्पोपकारित्वात्पारार्थसिद्धिः । इह क्षेत्रोदकसूर्यादयः शस्यादीनामुपका-  
रकाः । तथा कार्यकारणत्वात्संघातश्च । यथोक्तं तस्मादयुक्तमेतेषां पारतन्त्र्यमिति ।

Opponent : Their nature of being meant for other is proved by their mutual service. The field, water, sun, etc., are doing service to the crop. Therefore, on account of serving the body it is composite. This is stated so and, hence, their nature of being dependent, is wrong.

उच्यते-न शयनादिवत्ततोऽन्येनार्थवत्त्वात् । तद्यथा शयनाद्यङ्गानां सति परस्पोपका-  
रित्वे ततोऽन्येनार्थवत्त्वात्तदभावे चार्थानिर्णयक्यम् । एवं चक्षुरादीनां सति परस्पोपकारित्वे  
ततोऽन्येनार्थवत्त्वं भवितुमर्हति । तदभावे चार्थानिर्णयक्यमिति ।

Proponent : No, because it (eye) is, like bed, etc., meant for other than itself. For example though the parts of the bed are mutually meant for other, yet they are purposive for some entity other than themselves and are useless in the absence of that. Similarly, though there is mutual serviceableness in the eye, etc., yet they are purposeful only through (in presence of) someone different from them. And, in the absence of that there is the purposelessness of them.

आह, शयनादीनां देवदत्तार्थत्वात्तस्य च भेदा बहिर्भावात्परस्परार्थत्वप्रसंगः । एवं  
शयनादयो देवदत्तार्थाः कार्यकारणसंघातश्च देवदत्तशब्दवाच्यस्तत्र भेदानामेव भेदार्थत्वात्पुरु-  
षार्थसिद्धिः । दृष्टान्ताऽभावो वा । अथ मतं शयनादयो न देवदत्तार्थाः, किं तर्हि क्षेत्रज्ञार्थाः ।  
तथा सति साध्यसमो दृष्टान्त इति ।

Opponent : Since the bed, etc., are meant for Devadatta, and the latter being not outside the realm of composite nature, there arises the undesirable contingency of their being meant for one another (i.e. one composite for the other). Thus, the bed, etc., are meant for Devadatta and the object denoted by the word Devadatta is

the composite of cause and effect (body). Hence, the purpose of the conscious entity is served (by some composite only) since one composite is meant for the other. Or there will be no example (to support your thesis). If you hold that the bed, etc., are not meant for Devadatta, etc., but are meant for the self, in that case the example would be equally unproved like the probandum (i.e. the example would be equal to the probandum).<sup>8</sup>

उच्यते-न, प्रसिद्धनुरोधात् । सत्यं कार्यकारणसंघातस्य पारार्थ्यम् । भोक्तृत्वं नोपपद्यते । लोके तु देवदत्तार्थत्वं शयनादीनां प्रसिद्धम् । अतस्तदनुगच्छन्तो वयमप्येवं ब्रूमः । कस्मात् ? प्रसिद्धेः । प्रसिद्धेन ह्यप्रसिद्धं तद्धर्मतामापद्यते । पश्चात्तु द्वयोरप्येकधर्मानुगमाद्धर्मन्तरेणाऽपि तद्वत्ताऽनुमीयते । तथा च क्षणभङ्गाधिकारे भवद्विरप्युक्तं "यस्य हि प्रतिक्षणमन्यथात्वं नास्ति तस्य बाह्यप्रत्ययो भेदः, पश्चाद्विशेषग्रहणे नास्ति । तद्यथा भूमेरपच्यमानायाः पाकजानाम् ।" न च भूमेः प्रतिक्षणमन्यथात्वं नास्ति, अक्षणिकत्वप्रसंगात् । सौक्ष्म्याद् दुरधिगमो भेद इति दृष्टान्तः प्रत्युक्तः । तस्मात्प्रसिद्धं संघातपरार्थत्वादस्ति पुरुषः ।

Proponent : *No, on the basis of its being well known.* It is true that the composite of effect and cause is meant for other ; the nature of their being experiencer does not hold good, i.e., they cannot be the enjoyer. In the world, the bed, etc., are commonly experienced as meant for Devadatta, etc. Hence, following it we also speak like this.

Why ?

Because it is a well known fact. Through the commonly experienced fact the unexperienced also comes to possess the nature of the former. Afterwards, since both are having the same nature, it is inferred from the other quality that the one possesses this nature also. You have also stated in the discussion (lit. realm) of momentariness : "In case of them in whose theory there is no change every moment, there is no differentiation externally just as in the case of backed atoms of the earth afterwards when the particularity is once cognised! And it is not that there is no change every moment in ground ; otherwise it will involve the undesirable contingency of its not being momentary. Thus, the example that the differentiation is difficult to be cognised on account of subtlety, is refuted. Therefore, it is proved that conscious entity exists because the composite is meant for others.

(Opposition to the properties of the manifest)

इतस्व-

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि च बाह्याध्यात्मिकं तथा प्रधानम् । तत्र यद्येतावदेतत्स्यात् किमपेक्ष्य व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोस्त्रैगुण्यादीति ?

And due to the following reason also the conscious entity exists.

### BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION TO THE THREE CONSTITUENTS AND THE OTHER PROPERTIES

The internal and the external objects are composed of three constituents, non-discriminative, objective, common to many conscious entities and productive (and) so is the cosmic matter. If this is so, in comparison to what there are the properties of being composed of three constituents and the others in manifest and the non-manifest?<sup>9</sup>

(Control over non-sentient)

किं चान्यत् ।

अधिष्ठानात् ।

इहाकस्मिन्कां प्रधानप्रवृत्तावर्थवशः सन्निविशेषनियमो न स्यात् । श्रोत्रादि पृथिव्यादीनां देवमानुषतिर्यक्षु हितयोगार्थश्चाहितप्रतिषेधार्थश्च सः । तस्मादस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्तो यदधिष्ठितानां गुणानामयं चित्ररूपो विपरिणामः ।

Moreover,

### BECAUSE OF THE CONTROL

In case the activity of cosmic matter is causeless (or sudden), there would not have been the restriction (or rule) about a particular arrangement meant for a particular purpose (object). That rule (or particular arrangement) of earth, etc., in the form of ear, etc., is found in the (body of) gods, man and animal for the attainment of (association with) the desired and the avoidance of the undesired. Therefore, there does exist the conscious entity) different from them controlled by the constituents undergo diverse transformation.

(Control is metaphorical)

कर्तृत्वप्रसंगादधिष्ठानानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, स्यान्मतं यदि गुणानां पुरुषाधिष्ठितानां प्रवृत्तिरभ्युपगम्यते, कर्तृत्वमस्य प्राप्तम् । अर्थाऽकर्ता न तद्व्यतिरिक्त्यधिष्ठितत्वमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अर्थे तदुपचारात् । यथाऽपुरुषार्थः सिद्ध्यति तथा गुणा कार्यकारणभावेन व्यूहन्त इत्यतस्तत्पारतन्त्र्यादेशामधिष्ठितत्वमुपपद्यते, पुरुषस्य चाधिष्ठितत्वम् । अतो नास्य

कर्तृत्वप्रसंगः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् अधिष्ठानात्पुरुषः ।

**Plausible objection :** If it is argued that the control is not justified because it would involve the undesirable contingency of (supposition) of agency (in the conscious entity)? It may be like this. If the activity is admitted (to belong) to the constituents controlled by the conscious entity, there will be the admittance of agency in it. If it is not an agent, there is no controlling power (in the consconscious entity).

**Reply :** This is also wrong.

**Why ?**

Because the control is metaphorically spoken with reference to the purpose (of the conscious entity).<sup>10</sup> The constituents attain the state of effect and cause (i. e., objects) in a way that the purpose of the conscious entity is fulfilled. Hence, since they are dependent upon him, their nature of being controlled is justified. (Similarly) the control-ship of the conscious entity (is justified). Therefore, arises no undesirable contingency of the agency of the conscious entity.<sup>11</sup> Hence, it is right that the conscious entity exists because of the control.

(conscious entity exists as an enjoyer)

किञ्चान्यत् ।

पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्

इह सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वादचेतनं व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च, तस्मादस्य परस्परं भोगो नोपपद्यते; इत्यवश्यं भोक्त्रा भवितव्यम् । योऽसौ भोक्ता स पुरुषः ।

Moreover,

### BECAUSE OF THE ENJOYERSHIP THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY EXISTS.

Here, both the manifest and the unmanifest, being of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, are unconscious in nature. Therefore, there is no propriety in considering their mutual enjoying. Whosoever is this enjoyer is the conscious entity.

(Enjoyment of conscious entity is metaphorical)

आह, कः पुनरयं भोगो नाम ?

**Opponent :** What is this enjoyment ?

उच्यते— भोग उपलब्धिसद्भावात् ।

**Proponent :** The enjoyment is caused by the attainment of the object.

विज्ञानमेव हि विषयोपलब्धिसमर्थमित्यतस्तावन्मात्रमेवास्तु किं पुरुषेण परिकल्पिते-  
नेति ?

**Opponent :** The knowing faculty is capable of attaining the objects. Hence, let there be the knowing faculty only (as the enjoyer). What then is there the need of postulating the conscious entity ?

उच्यते— किं पुनरिदं विज्ञानं नामेति ?

**Proponent :** What is then this knowing faculty ?

आह, चित्तं मनो विज्ञानमिति । तच्च षड्विधं ज्ञानं - चक्षुर्विज्ञानं, श्रोत्रविज्ञानं, श्रोत्रविज्ञानं, घ्राणविज्ञानं, जिह्वाविज्ञानं, कायविज्ञानं, मनोविज्ञानमिति । तत्र रूपं प्रतीत्य चक्षुश्चोत्पद्यते चक्षुर्विज्ञानम् । एवं श्रोत्रशब्दघ्राण-ग्रन्थ-जिह्वा-रस-मनोधर्माश्चित्तमुत्पादयन्ति । तस्य धर्माः— वेदना, संज्ञा, चेतना, स्पर्शो, मनः, संस्कार एवमादयः तस्माद्विज्ञानस्कन्धस्यैवोपभोगसामर्थ्या-  
न्नास्त्यात्मेति

**Opponent :** Knowledge, consciousness, mind are synonymous. There are six kinds of knowledge : Knowledge arising of eye, Knowledge arising of ear, Knowledge arising of nose, knowledge arising of tongue, knowledge arising of skin and the knowledge arising of mind. That which arises with the help of the form and eye is the knowledge arising of eye. In this way, the ear and word, nose and smell, tongue and taste, and the properties of mind give rise to the consciousness. Its attributes are affection, perception, psychic stirring, conduct, mind (deliberation) and impressions, etc. Therefore, since the knowing faculty forming the part of the body is capable of enjoying, there is no soul at all.

(Consciousness can belong to soul only)

उच्यते— न, अचेतनविकारस्य चेतनानुपपत्तेः । यत्तु खल्विदमिष्यते रूपं प्रतीत्य चक्षुश्चोत्पद्यते चक्षुर्विज्ञानमित्यादि, तेनाचेतनविकारत्वात्तदचेतनं घटादिवदित्यापन्नम् । तस्मान्मनो धर्मश्चेतनेति मनोरथमात्रमेतत् । विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनात्तत्सिद्धिरिति चेत्, स्यान्मतं नायं नियमः यदुत यज्जातीयं कारणं तज्जातीयकेन कार्येण भवितव्यम् । किं तर्हि विलक्षणकार्यो-



त्पत्तिरपि भावानामुपलभ्यते। तद्यथा-शृङ्गाच्छ्रो जायते, गोलोमाऽविलोमभ्यो दूर्वा। वत्स-  
तराम्बुक... यश्चन्द्रकान्तेन्दुसंयोगात्सलिलम्। सूर्यकान्तगोमयार्कसम्पर्कात् सुधोदकसम्पर्काद्-  
रणिनिर्मथनाच्चाग्निः। एवमचेतेनेभ्यो रूपादिभ्यश्चेतनमुत्पद्यत इति। एतच्चायुक्तम्, चेतना-  
चेतनोत्पत्तिनियमवत्तन्नियमात्। यथा सत्येतस्मिन्विलक्षणकार्यप्रादुर्भावे भवतश्चेतनाच्चि-  
त्तान्नाचेतनं घटाद्युत्पद्यत इति नियमः, तथा सत्येतस्मिन्विलक्षणकार्यप्रादुर्भावे नाचेतनेभ्यो  
रूपादिभ्यश्चेतनं चित्तमुत्पद्यत इत्ययं नियमो नः। तस्मादेषां दृष्टानां सति बहुत्वे मायाकारनग-  
रविन्यासवदयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वादसाधीयस्त्वम्। प्रदीपवत्तद्वयवस्थेति चेत्, स्यादेतत्  
यथाऽचेतनेभ्यः सत्त्वादिभ्योऽव्यवसायकं घटाद्युत्पद्यत इति नेदानीं व्यवसायको महात्रोत्प-  
द्यते। एवं रूपादिभ्योऽचेतनं घटाद्युत्पद्यत इति नेदानीं चेतनं चित्तं नोत्पद्यत इति। एतदप्यनु-  
पपन्नम्। कस्मात्? शक्तिभेदात्। प्रकाशस्वाभाव्याद् व्यवसायात्मकं सत्त्वम्। तद्युक्तं यदि  
तत्रान्याद्व्यवसायात्मको महानुत्पद्यते। तमः प्राधान्याद्घटादयः। भवतस्त्वेकारः रूपादयः  
तस्मादयमसमः सामाधिः।

Proponent : No, because of the non-justification of postulating consi-  
ciousness as belonging to a product of the non-conscious. With  
the acceptance that the knowledge arising of eye arises with  
regard to the eye and the form, it (knowledge) would be non-  
conscious because of its being the modification of the non-con-  
scious, just as a pot. Therefore, it is merely a cherished well  
that the consciousness is the property of the mind.

If it is argued that it is proved through the observation of the  
production of dissimilar effect? It may be like this. This is not a rule  
that the effect should belong to the genus of its cause. On the other  
hand, the origination of a dissimilar effect is also observed in case of  
the objects. For example, from the peak of the mountain is born the  
reed grass (used for arrows), the durva grass originate from the  
samall hair of the cow (of the body) when not placed in opposite  
direction; the small of cowdung from a waned calf and water from  
the contact of moon with the moonstone. (Similarly) fire is produced  
from the contact of the sun-stone and the cowdung, contact of water  
and lime, and the attrition of arni wood. In this way consciousness is  
produced from the form, etc. which are unconscious.

Reply : This is also wrong. That restriction is like the  
restriction of the origination of conscious and non-conscious. For  
example, inspite of the origination of dissimilar effects, there is  
a restriction in your theory that from the conscious citta there  
is no origination of the unconscious pot, etc., Similarly inspite of

the origination of dissimilar effects the rule in our theory is this  
that the conscious citta does not originate from the form, etc.,  
which are unconscious. Therefore, though there are many examples,  
yet you are not better (in theory) because you have (accepted)  
the objects of wrong knowledge which are like the construction  
of the city of illusion. If it is argued that the rule will be like a  
lamp? It may be like this. As the pot, etc., which are not of the  
form of resolution originate from the sattva which is non-sentient  
in nature, it is not that the intellect also which is of the nature  
of resolution does not originate from that. Similarly, the non-con-  
scious pot, etc., originate from the form, etc., which are non-con-  
scious, but it is not that the citta which is conscious does not  
originate from it.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because of the differentiation into capabilities. The sattva is of  
the nature of resolution because of its being of the nature of light.  
Then, it is right if (you say that) the intellect which is of the nature of  
resolution originates when that dominates. The, pot, etc., are of the  
nature of non-resolution because they abound in tamas.<sup>12</sup> The form,  
etc., in your theory are, however, of a single nature. Therefore, the  
solution here is not equal to our case.

(Resolution and consciousness)

आह, किं व्यवसायचैतन्ययोः कश्चिद्रूपभेदोऽस्ति न वेति?

Opponent : Is there some difference of nature between resolution  
and consciousness or not?

उच्यते - किं तर्हि त्रैगुण्यात्सति प्रत्ययरूपत्वे संवेद्या बुद्धिर्यथा तु व्यवसायरूपं तथा  
चैतन्यरूपमिति। तथा च वार्षाणाः पठन्ति- बुद्धिवृत्त्याविष्टो हि प्रत्ययत्वेनानुवर्तमानामनु-  
याति पुरुष इति। आह च

अर्थाकार इवाभाति यथा बुद्धिस्तथा पुमान्।

आभासमानो बुद्ध्याऽतो बोद्धा मणिवदुच्यते॥

यथा यथा मनोवृत्तिः पुरुषोऽपि तथा तथा।

बुद्धिरूपमवाप्नोति चेतनत्वात्पराश्रयम्॥

Proponent : Though the intellect being composed of the three constituents and of the nature of knowledge is knowable, yet when it is of the nature of resolution, it is conscious in nature. Thus state the followers of Varsaganya : 'the conscious entity enveloped with (or possessed of) the function of the intellect follows the intellect and continues (to exist) in the form of knowledge'.<sup>13</sup> It is stated also :

"The conscious entity appears as having assumed the form of the objects, as the intellect so the conscious entity, shining through (or appearing like) intellects, the conscious entity is said to be a knower as a jewel.<sup>14</sup> As is the modification of the mind, so appears the form of the conscious entity. The conscious entity attains the form of the intellect because it is sentient the form-which is located in the other entity."

आह, रूपाभेदात्पुरुषान्तःकरणयोरन्यतरपरिकल्पानाऽनर्थक्यम् । यदि तर्हि यथा व्यवसायरूपं तथा चैतन्यरूपम्, एवं सति व्यवसायमात्रं परिकल्पनीयं चैतन्यमात्रं वा ? कस्मात् ? न ह्येकान्तकारिणोर्युगपत् कल्पने सामर्थ्यमस्ति । रूपान्तराऽभिधानं वा । अथ व्यवसायचैतन्ययोः पदार्थान्तरमेवेति नित्यतो विशेष्यते, तर्हि वक्तव्यमिदमप्युच्यते रूपं नाऽमुच्यते ।

Opponent : The postulation of either of the conscious entity and the internal organ serves no purpose because of the (postulation of) non-difference in the nature (of them). If the position is like this-as the nature of the agent of resolution, so is the nature of consciousness, in this case either you should postulate resolution only or conscious entity only.

Why?

There is no justification of postulation of acting together in case of the one who can act lonely. Or there (should) be the statement of the difference of nature. If the distinction finally remains in case of the resolution and consciousness, it should be stated that this is the nature of this only and not of this.

उच्यते-य एवमाह रूपाभेदादर्थभेद इति स तावदिदं प्रष्टव्यः-अथ किम् ? भवतः किं विज्ञानविषययोराकारभेदोऽस्ति उत नास्तीति ?

Proponent : One who argues for non-difference of objects due to the non-difference of the form should be asked-so what? In your

theory is there the difference in form between the consciousness and object or not?

नेत्याह । कस्मात् ? आकारान्तरे सति विषयपरिच्छेदानुपपत्तेः । न हि विषयस्य विज्ञानप्रत्यवभासमन्तरेण शक्यं स्वरूपं परिच्छेत्तुम् । तत्र यदन्याकारो गौरन्याकारं गोविज्ञानं स्यात्तेन यथाऽन्याकारेणाऽश्वविज्ञानेनाऽन्याकारस्य गोरपरिच्छेदः, एवमन्याकारेण गोविज्ञानेनान्याकारस्य गोरपरिच्छेदः स्यात् । तस्मान्नास्ति विषयविज्ञानयोराकारभेद इति ।

Opponent : No,

Why ?

Because there would not arise the discriminative knowledge of an object when the form is different. The form of the object cannot be known without the knowledge of the object. If the cow would be of some other form and the knowledge of the cow of some other form, there would not arise the discriminative knowledge of the cow which is of different form from the cow, just as the knowledge of the cow, which is of different form from that of the horse, does not arise from the discriminative knowledge of the horse which is also of different form from the cow.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, there is no difference between the knowledge and the form.

उच्यते-तयोरिदानीं विषयविषयविज्ञानयोः किमुभयत्वमुताभेद इति ?

Proponent : In this case, is there the distinction between the object and knowledge or both are identical ?

आह, कस्मात् ?

Opponent : Why?

उच्यते-ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभावादिति ।

ज्ञानविज्ञेययोर्यद्वद्रूपाभेदेऽपि भिन्नता ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकभावेन तथैवात्मप्रकाशयोः ॥

यथैव तर्हि भवतः सत्यप्याकाराभेदे ज्ञानविज्ञेययोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकभावपरिकल्पनाद् भेद एवं पुरुषान्तःकरणयोरपीति । ग्राह्यग्राहकभावासिद्धेरयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यथा गौतमि-ज्ञानयोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकभावो निश्चितो नैवं पुरुषान्तःकरणयोः । तस्माद्वैषम्यमिति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? मार्गान्तरगमनात् । प्रागुक्तं येषामाकारभेदो नास्ति तेषामेकत्वम् । इदानीं तु रूपाऽभेदेऽपि ग्राह्यग्राहकभावादेवं ब्रुवतो मार्गान्तरम् । ज्ञानमात्राभ्युपगमादशाक्यीयमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, ज्ञानमेवान्तराऽसद्विषयभूतानुरज्जितं विषयविषयरूपेण प्रत्यवभासते । न तु किञ्चिद्ग्राह्यं किञ्चिद् ग्राह्यरूपापन्नमस्ति । तस्माज्ज्ञानविज्ञेययोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकभेदाद् भेद इत्यशा-

कथीयमेतत् इति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सिद्धान्तभेदात् । येषां बाह्यो विषयोऽस्ति तत्पक्षेऽयं दोषः । इतरेषां तु ज्ञानमात्रस्य विषयविषयिभावं प्रतिषेत्स्याम इति ।

Proponent : Because there is the relation of illuminator and the illuminated.

"As there is the difference between the knowledge and the objects of knowledge even though their form is not different, similar is the case with (the difference) between soul and the light through the relation of the object cognised even though there is no difference in form; in the same way, there is the difference between the conscious entity and the internal organ."

If you argue that is wrong because the relation of the cogniser and the cognised is not determined? It may be like this. Just as the relationship of the cognised and the cogniser is fixed between the cow and its knowledge, it is not so between the conscious entity and the internal organ. Therefore, it involves dissimilarity.

This is wrong.

Why ?

Because you have adopted a different way (here). Earlier you have stated that the objects whose form does not differ are identical. Now, however, speaking like this (i. e. holding the difference) due to the relation of the cognised and the cogniser even in the absence of non-difference in the form (of the two), you have adopted a different way.

If it is argued that it is non-Buddhist (position) because of the admittance of knowledge only (by the Buddhists)? It may be like this. Only the knowledge appears in the form of the objects (of knowledge) and the cogniser when it is coloured by an object which is only internally existent, and (in reality) does not exist. There is nothing external which is endowed with the character of something cognised. Therefore, the position that there is the distinction between the knowledge and the object of knowledge on account of the distinction between the cogniser and the cognised, is non-Buddhist.

That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the difference of the theory. The defect is applicable to those in whose theory the external object exists. We reject the position of the others that the state of both the objects and the cogniser is knowledge itself.

(Conscious entity is not an agent of resolution)

आह, एवमपि विषयाऽनवस्थाप्रसंगः । विषयिणो विषयत्वप्रतिज्ञानात् । यदि विषयिणोऽप्यध्यवसायस्य विषयभावः प्रतिज्ञायते तेन पुरुषस्यापि विषयिणोऽन्यो विषयीति प्राप्तम्, तस्याप्यन्य इत्यनवस्थाः । अथ मा भूदयं दोष इति पुरुषो निश्चयरूपत्वात् विषयो न तर्ह्यध्यवसायादपि निश्चेतुरर्थान्तरं कल्पयितव्यमिति ।

Opponent : In this way also there would arise the undesirable contingency of infinite regress in case of the objects, because you have recognised the subject of knowledge also as an object of knowledge. If the objectivity of a cogniser is recognised, it would result in the position that there will be other knower of the conscious entity which is himself a knower. There will be someone else of that also. Thus will be the infinite regress. Thus in order to alleviate the defect (it should be postulated that) the conscious entity being of the nature of ascertainment is not the object; nor should then be postulated some cogniser other than resolution.

चेतनात्वात्पुरुषे तदनुपपत्तिः । इन्द्रियाणि तावद् ग्रहणमात्ररूपत्वादप्रत्ययानीति प्रत्ययवदन्तस्तावत्करणं परिकल्प्यते । अन्तःकरणमप्युपात्तविषयेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपातात्तद्रूपात्तावपि सत्यामचेतनत्वात्स्वयमुपलब्धुमसमर्थमेव विषयमित्यतो भोक्तारं चेतनं पुरुषमपेक्षते । पुरुषस्य तु चेतनत्वाद् द्रष्टृन्तरमशक्यं कल्पयितुम् । तस्मान्नाऽनवस्थाप्रसंगः ।

Proponent : That is not possible in the case of conscious entity because of its being conscious. The senses are of the nature of apprehension only and, hence, are not the knowledge.<sup>17</sup> Hence, some internal organ as endowed with the knowledge is postulated. The internal organ also being unconscious is not capable of cognising the object even it has attained the form of the object following the operation of the senses which have attained the form of the object. Hence, the conscious enjoyer is required. Since the conscious entity is conscious, there is no possibility of postulating some other seer of the conscious entity. Therefore, there is no (scope for) undesirable contingency of infinite regress.

आह, पुरुषस्याध्यवसायकर्तृत्वप्रसंगः, चैतन्यात् । यद्यचेतना बुद्धिस्तेन तस्या अध्यवसायो वृत्तिर्घटादिवन्न प्राप्नोति । अतः पुरुषस्याध्यवसायः प्राप्तः । ततश्च बुद्ध्यभाव इति ।

Opponent: There arises the undesirable contingency of conscious entity's being agent of resolution because of its being con-



scious. If the intellect is unconscious, there will be no operation of resolution in case of it as it is not in case of a pot. Hence, the resolution will belong to the conscious entity. Then there would be the absence of intellect.

उच्यते—न, कैवल्यादप्रतिबन्धप्रसंगात् । अनामिश्ररूपं पुरुषतत्त्वमिति एतदुपरिष्ठाद्वक्ष्यामः । स यदि व्यवसायकः स्यात्, अप्रतिबन्धेन दिङ्निश्चयादिषु सुप्तमत्तमूर्च्छितानां च व्यवसायः स्यात् । दृष्टस्त्वेवमवस्थस्य व्यवसायप्रतिबन्धः । तस्मान्न पुरुषस्य व्यवसायः । यस्य पुनरन्तःकरणं व्यवसायकं तस्यैवं दोषो नास्ति । कस्मात् ? त्रैगुण्यात् । सत्त्वादिसंस्थानविशेषो हि बुद्धिः, करणान्तरप्रतिषेधात् । तत्र यदा व्यवसायलक्षणं सत्त्वं गुणाभावात्प्रधानभूतेन तमसा तिरस्कृतशक्तिं भवति तदाऽव्यवसायप्रतिबन्धः ।

Proponent : No, because (otherwise) there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of obstruction because of the isolation of conscious entity. We shall say later on that the conscious entity is of the unmixed form. If it would have been the agent of resolution, there would be resolution of the person asleep, intoxicated or fainted in respect of ascertaining the directions without any obstruction. The obstruction in resolution of a man in these states is, however, observed. Therefore, the resolution does not belong to conscious entity. This defect does not arise in the theory of one according to whom the agent of resolution is the internal organ.

Why ?

*Because of its being composed of three constituents.* The intellect is a particular arrangement of Sattva, etc., because of the rejection of some other instrument (or operation of some agent). When Sattva having the characteristic of resolution becomes overpowered by Tamas which becomes dominant, then the resolution is obstructed.

आह, कथं पुनरेतद् गम्यते सर्वमिदमचेतनमिति ?

उच्यते—प्रकृतिविकारभूतत्वात् । इह यत्प्रकृतिविकारभूतं तदचेतनम् । तद्यथा तन्तुपटादयः प्रकृतिविकारभूतं तस्मादचेतनम् । आकाशे दर्शनान्नैकान्त इति चेन्न, असिद्धत्वात् । न ह्याकाशस्यात्मपक्षे प्रकृतिविकारत्वाभावः सिद्धः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्प्रकृतिविकारभूतत्वादचेतनं सर्वम् । अत एव च चेतनस्याऽप्रकृतिविकारभूतत्वं परस्परवैधर्म्यात् । तस्मान्नान्यस्य परमार्थस्य भोक्तृत्वमाचेतन्यादुपपद्यते, न चेत्प्रकृतं भोक्तृभावादस्ति पुरुषः ।

Opponent : How is it known that everything in the world is unconscious?

Proponent : Because of being the modification of cosmic matter.

Here, whatever is the modification of cosmic matter is unconscious, just as the threads, cloth etc., being the modification of cosmic matter are unconscious. If it is argued that it is not conclusive because of its (i.e. of the unconsciousness) observation in the space, we reply, no, because it is not established. The absence of considering the space as the modification of cosmic matter is not established in our theory.<sup>18</sup> Therefore it is right that everything being the modification of cosmic matter is unconscious. Hence, is the nature of non-modification of cosmic matter in the case of the conscious entity because they are contradictory (dissimilar in nature), Therefore, the enjoyer-ness of some other ultimate object (than conscious entity) is not justifiable or possible because of its being unconscious in nature. If it is not so, (i.e. if there is no other enjoyer), it is rightly stated that conscious entity does exist because of its being an enjoyer.

(Tendency for Isolation)

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

इह प्रवृत्तिमतां निमित्तमन्तरेण निवृत्तिर्नोपपद्यते । प्रधानमपि च प्रवृत्तिमद्, व्यक्तदर्शनात् । तस्माद्यस्य कैवल्यं प्रधानप्रवृत्तिहेतुः स पुरुषः । प्रधानानुभ्युपगमादुभयाऽप्रसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, प्रधानं चेतनवदस्माकमप्रसिद्धम् । यावत्तस्य कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तिर्भवता पुरुषास्तित्वे लिङ्गमपदिश्यते तदिदमसिद्धं प्रतिपाद्यत इति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? पूर्वं तत्प्रतिपादनात् । प्राक्प्रधानमप्रतिपाद्यैवमाचक्ष्णाः सत्यमेवं पर्यनुयोगार्हः स्यात्, साधितं तु प्रधानं परिमाणादिभिरित्यतो न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

AND BECAUSE THERE IS THE TENDENCY FOR ISOLATION.

Here, the cessation of activity of the active agents is not justified without some other reason. Cosmic matter also is active, because it (activity) is observed in the case of manifest.

Therefore, he, whose isolation is the cause of the activity of cosmic matter, is the conscious entity.

If it is argued that since cosmic matter is not accepted, both of them are not established, it may be like this. The cosmic matter also

is not well established for us like the conscious entity. The activity for isolation which is stated to be a reason by you for the existence of conscious entity is not yet proved (and hence,) the proved or existent thing is not being established by it.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is established earlier. The one saying this before establishing (the existence) of cosmic matter would surely deserve reproach. The cosmic matter, however, is already established (by us) through 'limited magnitude', etc., and hence, it (your argument) is not effective.

(Controversy does not prove non-existence of conscious entity.)

सर्वाचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः पुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यदि पुरुषस्य सत्त्वमेव स्यात्तेन तं प्रत्याचार्याणां न धर्मविवादः स्यात् । अस्ति चासौ । तथा हि केषांचिन्निर्गुणः, केषांचित्परवान् । अतः सर्वेषां विभुः, परिमितोऽन्येषां, तथैको नैक इति । तस्माद् भ्रान्तिमात्रं पुरुषकल्पनेति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सर्वपदार्थाभावप्रसंगात् । रूपादिष्वपि विप्रतिपत्तेः । केषांचित्क्षणिकाः, केषांचित्कालान्तरावस्थायिनः, तथाश्रिताः, स्वतन्त्रा इत्यादि । तथा श्रोतादीनि भौतिकानि, आहंकारिकाणि, पौरुषाणीति विप्रतिपत्तिः । एवं सर्वपदार्थाऽभावः स्यात् । तस्मिन्तस्ति पुरुषः । तत्र युक्तं सर्वप्रमाणाऽनुपलब्धेर्नास्ति पुरुष इति एतदयुक्तम् । यदप्युक्तम् "शूक्यमाध्यात्मिकं पश्येति" तस्य पश्चात्प्रतिषेधं वक्ष्यामः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं "अस्ति कर्मास्ति विपाकः कारकस्तु नोपलभ्यत" इति सत्यमेतत् । न हि पुरुषस्कन्धानां निक्षेपे प्रतिसंधानेऽन्यत्र वा कारक इति नः पक्षः । तस्माच्छेयोऽर्थाभिः सर्वागमतर्कविरुद्धां नैरात्म्यवादपरिकल्पनाभ्रान्तिमसमञ्जसामपोह्य पुरुषसत्त्वपरिज्ञानादेव जननमरणातिसर्वोपद्रवप्रतिपक्षभूतं परममृतं ध्रुवं स्थानमवाप्तव्यमिति ॥ १७ ॥

If it is argued that the existence of conscious entity is not proved because of the controversy among all the authorities.? It may be like this. If there would have been the existence of conscious entity, there would not have been the religious (doctrinal) controversy among the authorities. However, the controversy is there. For example, according to some it is devoid of qualities while according to others it is subservient, all-pervasive according to all but limited in magnitude according to others. Similarly, it is one or many (according to different authorities). Therefore, the postulation of conscious entity is just merely an illusion.

This is wrong.

Why?

Because it involves the undesirable contingency of the absence

of all objects, because the controversy is found in case of form, etc., also. According to some those are momentary and according to others existing for some more time ; similarly, dependent according to others. The senses also are products of elements, or products of egoism or products of man thus is the controversy about them. In this way, there would be the absence of all objects. Therefore, conscious entity does exist. It is right that it is wrong to say that conscious entity does not exist because it is not cognised through any means of knowledge. We shall refute the statement ' the internal objects should be seen as void ' afterwards. The statement that 'the action is its fruition also is, the agent, however, is not observed, is right. If the component forming the human body are set aside, there is no other agent to form the (human body); this is our theory. There be the desirous of liberation after setting aside the wrong and illusory postulation of the theory of absence of soul, which is contradicted by all the scriptures and arguments, should attain the everlasting immortal place which is opposite to (i.e. devoid of) all the calamities like birth, death, etc., through the knowledge of the existence of the conscious entity only.

## KĀRIKĀ 17

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1. The imperceptible object is observed to be existent or otherwise. Therefore, since the conscious entity is imperceptible, its existence or non-existence is not certain.
2. Since the sensuous perception depend upon the sense-organs which cognise sound, touch, taste, smell and form, the object devoid of these qualities cannot come under the purview of the sense-organs.
3. For details see karika 5.
4. For details see karika 5.
5. For details see karika 5.
6. Cf. Madhyamikakarika
7. The author means to say that parārtha denotes that meant for some other which is not itself composite in nature.
8. The existence of the conscious entity depends upon the fact that the composite objects are meant for others while the fact of their being meant for other presupposes the existence of some other entity. Thus, the probans and the probandum are mutually dependent and the lack of ascertainment in case of one disproves the other also.
9. There characteristics become the distinguishing features only when there is some entity devoid of them.
10. The reading should be probably yatha purusarthah in place of yatha apurusarthah. In fact the practice of avagraha is very modern and the reading suggested by us can very well be adopted here.
11. The control is merely through presence. The Purusa does not do something but the constituents act for a certain purpose which belongs to the conscious entity, and thus is the control over the constituents. Since the constituents depend upon the conscious entity, they are controlled though the conscious entity is not an active controller.
12. The differentiation of nature among all the objects is caused by the differentiation of the constituents as their components.
13. This is the description of the empirical state of the conscious entity. In its transcendental state it is of the nature of pure consciousness, free from its contact with the intellect.

14. The analogy suggests that the knowledge in the conscious entity is not real but apparent. The conscious entity does not undergo any change in the empirical state also.
15. The sense is that the knowledge of one object cannot lead to the knowledge of the other different from it. Similarly, if the knowledge and the object would be different, to have the knowledge would not mean to know the object.
16. The Samkhyas consider the difference between grahana and pratyaya. The former refers to taking the form of the objects without the awareness of them, while the latter emphasises the awareness of the object, though the fact of its taking the form of the object is not denied.
17. The context demands the reading akasasya smatpakse instead of akasay atmapakse.

## KĀRIKĀ-18

(Multiplicity of the conscious entity)

आह, गृह्णीमहे तावदस्त्ययमात्मेति । इदानीमनेकोऽथैक इति विचार्यम् । कुतः संशय इति चेत्, सम्बन्धिनामुभयथा दृष्टत्वात् । इह कस्यचिदेकस्यानेकेन । सम्बन्ध उपलभ्यते । तद्यथा श्रोत्रादिना शरीरस्य । कस्यचिदेकस्यानेकेन । तद्यथाऽकास्य घटादिना । अयमपि चात्मा कार्यकारणसम्बन्धीत्यतः संशयः किं श्रोत्रादिवदनेकः, आकाशवदेको वेति ? किं चान्यत् । आचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः । औपनिषदाः खलु एक आत्मेति प्रतिपन्नाः । काणादाक्षपादार्हतप्रभृतयः पुनरनेक इति । यथा चैकानेकत्वं प्रत्यात्मनो विप्रतिपत्तिरेवं साक्षित्वौदासीन्यद्रष्टृत्वाकर्तृत्वेषु । तस्माद्भक्तव्यं कथमेते धर्माः पुरुषेऽवतिष्ठन्त इति ?

Opponent : We admit that the soul exists. Now it should be thought upon whether the soul is one or they are many. If you ask why does such a doubt arise, (we reply), *because the relatives are observed in both the ways*. In some cases, there is found the contact of many with many, for example, that of the body with ears, etc. In some cases the contact of one with many is found, just as that of the space with pot, etc. The soul is related to bodies. Hence, arises the doubt whether it is many like ears, etc., or one like space. *Moreover, because of the controversy among the authorities*. The followers of the Upaniṣads consider that the soul is one. Kaṇāda, Gautama and the Jains, etc., hold them as many. As there is the controversy about the oneness or manyness of soul, similarly there is the controversy about its nature of being a witness, indifferent, seer and non-agent.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, it should be told as to how these qualities exist in the conscious entity.

(Definite adjustment of birth, death and organs)

उच्यते—यत्तावदुक्तं सम्बन्धत्वादात्मपदार्थे सन्देहः किमनेकोऽथैक इति, अत्र ब्रूमः—बहवः पुरुषा इति प्रतिज्ञा । कस्मात् ?

जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात्

जन्मेति महदादेः सूक्ष्मशरीराश्रितस्य लिङ्गस्य यथासंस्कारं बाह्येन शरीरेण सम्बन्धः । मरणमिति पूर्वकृतस्य कर्मणः फलभोगपरिसमाप्तेः साम्प्रतस्य च फलभोगस्य प्रत्युपस्थाने लिङ्गस्य पूर्वशरीरत्यागः । करणं त्रयोदशविधमिति (का. ३२) वक्ष्यति । जन्म च मरणं च करणानि च जन्ममरणकरणानि । तेषां प्रतिपुरुषं नियमः एतस्माल्लिङ्गादात्मनो बहुत्वमवसीयते । एतदुक्तं भवति—जन्मलक्षणं च मरणलक्षणं च कार्यकारणस्यावस्थान्तरम् । परस्परविरोधिनी तमप्रकाशवत् । तत्र यद्येक आत्मा स्यात् तेन यथैकं द्रव्यं तमप्रकाशावेकप्रदेशोपनिपातिनौ न शक्नोत्यनुभवितुमसम्भवात्, एवमयं जन्ममरणे अपि न शक्नुयादुपभोक्तुम् । अस्ति चायं केनचित्कार्यकरणेन जन्मोपभोगः केनचिन्मरणोपभोगः । तेन मन्यामहे नाना आत्मानः, येषां विरोधिधर्मोपभोगसामर्थ्यमिति । तथा करणानां प्रकाशातिशयो विषयग्रहणलक्षणा शुद्धतिशयश्चाष्टाविंशतिधा शक्तिः, तयोः परस्परविरोधादेकेनात्मना युगपदुपभोगो नोपपद्यते । न हि शक्यमेकेनात्मना प्रकाशातिशयो विषयग्रहणलक्षणोऽशुद्धयतिशयश्चाशक्तिलक्षणो विरोधित्वाद्युगपदुपभोक्तुम् । अस्ति चायं करणनिमित्तः प्रतिपुरुषं नियमः । तेन मन्यामहे नाना आत्मान इति ।

Proponent : As regards your statement that there is the doubt with reference to the (number of) soul whether it is one or many on account of its being a correlative, we reply the conscious entities are many, is the assertion.

Why ?

## BECAUSE OF THE DEFINITE ADJUSTMENT OF BIRTH, DEATH AND ORGANS.

Birth means the contact of the internal organs like intellect supported by the subtle body with the external body in accordance with the impressions of the past deeds. Death means the giving up of the earlier body by the internal organs when the experience of result of deeds done earlier is over and when the enjoyment of the result of the deeds done recently is present (near). The organs are thirteen—this will be stated (by the author) later on (Ka 32). The compound birth, death and organs is dissolved as birth and death and organs. There is the definite adjustment of them with each conscious entity. From this probans is deduced the multiplicity of souls. What is meant is this. Birth and death are the other states of the body. They are mutually opposite like darkness and light. If there would have been one soul only, just as a single object cannot experience the falling of darkness and light on it at a time because it is impossible, similarly, one soul cannot experience birth and death at the same time. And, it

is observed that there is the experience of birth by some body and the experience of death by others. Therefore, we admit that there are many souls in case of whom there is the capability of experiencing opposite qualities (separately). Similarly, there is the excess of light which grasps the objects in case of the senses and also the incapability (Ka 47) of twenty eighth kinds in the form of the excess of impurity. Their experience by one soul only is not possible since they are opposite in nature. It is not possible to experience in case of one soul only the excess of light in the form of (causing) knowledge of the objects and the incapability in the form of the excess of impurity because both of them are opposite in nature. This adjustment in case of every conscious entity regarding (or caused by) senses does exist. Therefore, we hold that there are many souls.

(Non-simultaneity of action)

किं चान्यत् ।

अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्

कस्मात् ? अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेः प्रधानस्येति शेषः, यस्य प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते ।

Moreover,

### BECAUSE OF THE NON-SIMULTANEITY OF ACTIVITIES THE PLURALITY OF THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY IS ESTABLISHED.

Why ?

Because of the non-simultaneity of activities. 'It is) of the cosmic matter' remains (to be said), in case of which only the activity is possible (or justified).

कस्य प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते ?

Opponent : Whose activity is justified (or possible)?

प्रधानस्य ।

Proponent : Of the cosmic matter.

कथमिति ?

Opponent : How ?

उच्यते—यद्येक आत्मा स्यातेनैकपुरुषाधिकारनिबद्धं प्रधानम् । शक्तश्चासौ युगपदनेकानि शरीराणि उपभोक्तुमित्यतो यावद्भिः शरीरैरपचित्तासु कालमात्रस्वस्मिन्भवपरिवर्ते भवितुं सर्वेषामुत्पत्तेः प्रति युगपत्प्रवर्तते । दृष्टा तु प्रधानस्याऽयुगपच्छरीरभावेन—प्रवृत्तिः । तस्मादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च नाना आत्मान इति ।

If there would have been only one soul, cosmic matter would have bound (or attached to the province of) conscious entity only. This is capable of enjoying many bodies at a time and, hence, the cosmic matter would have been active at a time in the production of all the bodies which should have been born in one cycle when the period of time respectfully incites (requires them).<sup>2</sup> However, the activity (modification) of cosmic matter in the form of various bodies is observed to be non-simultaneous. And, from that non-simultaneous activity of cosmic matter with reference to many bodies is proved the many-ness of the soul.

(Another interpretation of non-simultaneity of activities)

अन्ये पुनराहुः—बहिष्करणमेवाऽयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेः । कथम् ? यद्येक आत्मा स्यात्तेन तत्संस्कारोपनिबद्धान्येव सर्वाणि करणानीत्यतः प्रतिपिण्डमवस्थितैः करणैर्युगपद्विषयान्गृह्णीयात् । बाधिर्याद्युपपद्यते वा सति पिण्डान्तरसम्बन्धिना करणेनान्यस्य शब्दादिकरणमप्रतिषिद्धं स्यात् । न तु तथा भवति । तस्मात्करणानामयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेर्नाना आत्मान इति । तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? पूर्वेणाऽविशेषात् । करणानां प्रतिनियमादित्यनेनायमुपसंगृहीतोऽर्थः । तस्माद्यथोक्तमेवास्तु ।

The others say (interpret it) like this. *Because of the non-simultaneous activity of the external organs only.*

How?

If there would have been one soul only, since all the organs are arranged to accomplish the purpose of the soul, would acquire all the objects simultaneously with the organs situated in each body. In case of some disease like deafness the organ of (hearing) etc., would have been unobstructed means of cognising sound, etc., because sound, etc., would be heard through the organ related to some other body.<sup>3</sup> This is, however, not the case. Therefore, on account of the non-simultaneous activity of the organs also there are many souls. This (interpretation) is, however, wrong.

Why ?

Because this (argument) does not differ from the former. This meaning is included in the argument 'on-account of the definite adjustment of the senses.' Therefore, let the argument be as it is interpreted by us.

(Opposition to the qualities of the manifest)

किं चान्यत् ।

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

इह त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मीत्येते धर्माः प्रतिपिण्डमुपलभ्यन्ते । यथा चैते तथा तत्प्रतियोगिनो नैर्गुण्यादयः पुरुषधर्माः । तत्र यथैव गुणस्वभावविपरीतस्वभावस्योपलम्भादेकस्मात्पिण्डादेकपुरुषसिद्धिः एवं प्रतिपिण्डं गुणस्वभावविपरीतस्वभावस्योपलम्भात्पुरुषानात्मत्वमवसेयम् । तस्मादवस्थितमेतन्नानात्मान इति ॥ १८ ॥

Moreover,

**BECAUSE OF THE OPPOSITION TO THREE CONSTITUENTS, ETC.**

The qualities of being composed of three constituents, indiscriminative, objective, general, unconscious and productive are found in all the bodies.<sup>4</sup> As are these, so are their opposites like absence of constituents, etc., the qualities of the conscious entity. Then, there is the proof for one conscious entity from one body because of the deduction of the existence of the one possessed of the nature opposite to the nature of the constituents. Similarly, on account of the availability of the one of different nature from constituents in each body is deduced the multiplicity of the conscious entity.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, it is established that the souls are many.

## KĀRIKĀ 18

1. These qualities are stated with reference to the conscious entity in the next karika.
2. The sense is that if the conscious entity would have been one and thus would have been enjoying all the bodies at a time, the cosmic matter would create all the beings required at a time.
3. The sense is that deafness, etc., would not cause obstruction in knowledge because the soul, being one according the above theory, would cognise sound through the ears of others if there is the defect in one particular body.
4. Cf. Karika 11
5. Since in each body there is the one entity having the opposite nature to the constituents, there is a separate conscious entity in each body.



## KĀRIKĀ-19

(Nature of Conscious entity)

आह, सिद्धमात्मनो नानात्वम् । साक्षित्वकैवल्यमाध्यस्थद्रष्टृत्वाकर्तृत्वानामिदानीं कस्माद्धेतोः प्रतिपत्तिरिति ?

Opponent : The multiplicity of the soul is established. For what reason now arises the knowledge of witness-hood, isolation, neutrality, seeress and non-agency of the conscious entity ?

उच्यते-

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

तस्मादित्यनेन हेतुसामान्यमाचष्टे । चशब्दोऽवधारणे । विपर्यासादिति सामान्येन हेतुमुपात्तं विशेषेऽवस्थापयति । सिद्धंसाक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्येत्येवमादिना साध्यधर्मनिर्देशं करोति । तत्र साक्षित्वमित्यनेन गुणानां प्रवृत्तावस्वातन्त्र्यं ख्यापयति, प्रधानस्य तदर्थनिबन्धनत्वात्प्रवृत्तेः ।

Proponent : AND, THEREFORE, FROM THAT CONTRAST IS ESTABLISHED THE WITNESS-HOOD OF THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY AS ALSO ITS ISOLATION, NEUTRALITY, SEERNESS AND NON-AGENCY.

With the word 'from that' is expressed the reason in general. The word 'and' (ca) is in the sense of restriction (or specification). The author puts in a specific case the reason which is employed in general (here); (the reason is) that through that contrast, etc. The author mentions the probandum through 'is established the witness-hood of conscious entity', etc.

Through the expression witness-hood, etc., he (the author) suggests the non independence of the constituents with reference to their activity because the activity of cosmic matter depends upon his purpose.

अधिष्ठातृत्वं कथमिति ?

Opponent : How is there the controllership in conscious entity?

उच्यते- यथा हि क्रियासाक्षिणि कस्मिंश्चिदवस्थिते कर्ता तदिच्छानुविधायी कार्यं निर्वर्तयति, न स्वतन्त्रः, एवं प्रधानमपि । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योर्यथेते पुरुषस्यार्थः सिध्यति तथा महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रिय भूतदेवमनुष्यतिर्यक्स्थावरभावेन व्यूहते, न यदृच्छातः । तस्मात्पुरुषस्तदर्थपरतन्त्रत्वात्प्रधानप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योः साक्षी । कैवल्यमित्यनेन संसर्गधर्मत्वमात्मनो निर्वर्तयति, न यथा सत्त्वादीनां परस्परेण प्रकाशादिधर्मपेक्षाणां संसर्गः, एवं पुरुषस्य तैर्भवति । माध्यस्थ्यमित्यनेनातिशयनिहासनपुपत्तेः पुरुषस्य गुणैः सह बाधानुग्रहानुपपत्तिं स्वकार्यप्रवृत्तौ चापक्षपातं दर्शयति । द्रष्टृत्वमित्यनेनोदासीनस्य कार्यकारणपिण्डव्यूहसमकालं चैतन्यशक्तिसद्भावात्सुखदुःखमोहस्वभावानां गुणचेष्टानामनिवृत्तार्थानां सन्निधानमात्रादुपलब्धिमात्रं प्रतिजनाति । अकर्तृभावश्चेत्यनेन सप्तविधमकर्तृत्वमाश्रयति । न ह्ययं विषयेषु बाह्यान्तःकरणसन्निध्येऽध्यवसायं कुरुते । न च सत्त्वादीनां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमलक्षणैर्धर्मैरितरेतरोपकारेण प्रवर्तमानानां स्वेन चैतन्यलक्षणेन धर्मेणङ्गभावं प्रतिपद्यते, नाप्यङ्गिभावम् । एवं सह गुणैः कार्यं न कुरुते स्त्रीकुमारवत् । स्थितप्रयोगं न कुरुते रथकटयन्त्रप्रेरकवत् । न स्वात्मनो मृत्पिण्डवत् । न परतः कुम्भकारवत् । नाप्यदेशान्मायाकारवत् । नोभयतो मातृपितृवत् । तदेवमनेन सूत्रेणाचार्यः पुरुषस्याधिष्ठातृत्वं नैर्गुण्यमौदासीन्यं भोक्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वं च साध्यतामापाद्य त्रिगुणणादिविपर्ययं साधनत्वेनोपन्यति । तैः पञ्चभिस्त्रिगुणादिविपरीतैः कर्मभिः पञ्चानामेषां यथासंभवं प्रवृत्तिरवगन्तव्या ।

Proponent : When someone stands as a witness of the activities, the agent performs the acts according to his will and not independently. In the same way acts the cosmic matter. The intellect, egoism, subtle elements, senses and the gross elements arrange themselves into the form of god, men and animal in the way as the purpose of the conscious entity is fulfilled by their activity and the cessation of activity; but not as they desire. Therefore, conscious entity is the witness because the activity and the cessation of activities are dependent upon the purpose of conscious entity.

Through the statement of isolation the author negates the contact of the conscious entity. There is no contact of the conscious entity with the constituents in a way there is the mutual contact of the sattva, etc., which stand in need of each other's qualities like light. Through the statement of neutrality the author shows the impropriety or impossibility of extending trouble or favour to the constituents and the absence of taking the side (by the conscious entity) in their activity because there is no increase or decrease in conscious entity.<sup>1</sup>

Through the statement of seer-ness the author confirms merely receiving the form of the object merely through the contact with the activity of the constituents<sup>2</sup> which have not yet accomplished the objects and which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, because the power of consciousness exists (in body) from the very time of formation of body (composed of the effects and causes).<sup>3</sup> Through the statement of non-doership the seven kinds of non-doership is resorted to. It does not ascertain the objects in its contact with the external and the internal organs. It does not attain the state of subordination or principal through his quality in the form of consciousness, to the Sattva, etc., which proceed to activity through their qualities of light, motivation and restraint, and through favouring each other. Similarly, he does not act with the qualities as the woman and a boy. He does not employ others to activity while itself situated at one place just as the one who sets the charriot, a cart or a machine in motion. He does not create something from his own self like a lump of clay. Nor does he do something with something else like a potter. Nor does he do something through mere order just as a juggler. Nor does he work jointly like mother and father. Thus, through the present aphorism having made controllership, state of having the absence of the constituents neutrality, enjoyership and non-doership as the probandum the author puts forth the contradiction to three constituents, etc., as the probans. The application (as probans) of those five acts opposed to those of the three constituents should be understood in a way it is possible to do so for the establishment of these five.<sup>4</sup>

(Witness-hood due to absence of constituents)

यस्मादयं सुखादयोऽर्थान्तरभूतः तस्मादयं तत्क्रियासाक्षी । तत्र नैर्गुण्यात्साक्षि-  
त्वम् ।

There, from absence of constituents (results) the witness-hood. Since it is different from pleasure, etc., it is the witness of their activities.<sup>5</sup>

आह, तदसिद्धेः । नैर्गुण्यासिद्धेः । यद्यस्य सुखादिधर्मत्वमात्मनः प्रसिद्धं स्यादत एतद्य-  
ज्जते वक्तुम् । तत्त्वसिद्धम् तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । विशेषाऽनभिधानगदितरात्सिद्धिरपीति चेत्  
स्यान्मतम्, आत्मगुणाः सुखादयो न शब्दगुण इत्यत्रापि भवता विशेषो नाऽभिधीयते । तस्मा-  
देतदप्यसिद्धम् । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अहंकरेणैकवाक्यत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणत्वं स्यात् ।  
दृष्टं तु सुखतोऽहं दुःखतोऽहमिति । तस्मात्सुखदुःखयोः शब्दाद्यात्मभावो न युक्तः ।

Opponent : (It is not right) because it is not well known as his nature of being devoid of the three constituents is not proved. If the

state of non-possessing the pleasure, etc., in case of the soul would have been established, it is right to say. That is however, not established. Therefore, it is wrong.

If it is argues that without stating it particularly, it is proved through otherwise ? It may be like this. You have also not given a particular reason to say that the pleasure, etc., are the qualities of the soul and not those of the word etc., Therefore, it is also not established.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

It would involve the difference of location even when there is single sentence through the use of 'I'. It is observed as used that 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy'. Therefore, it is not right to consider the pleasure and pain, etc., as forming the nature of word, etc.

उच्यते-न, गौरादिष्वनेकान्तात् । तद्यथा गौरः कृष्णोऽहमिति शरीरधर्मेरात्मनो भिन्ना-  
धिकरणत्वमहङ्कारेण एवं सुखदुःखयोरपि स्यात् । न चात्मगुणत्वं स्यादिति ।

Proponent : It is not so. *It (i.e., the reason) is not conclusive with reference to white complexion, etc.* Just as there is the difference of location of the qualities of body and soul even in a single sentence through the use of 'I' as 'I am white' and 'I am black', similar would be the case with pleasure, pain, etc. Those would not be the qualities of the same self (inspite of the use of 'I')

आह, पृथगुपलब्धेरयुक्तम् । यद्यपि गौरादीनामविभक्तमहङ्कारेण ग्रहणं तथापि पृथगयं  
प्रागेतानात्मनो गृहीत्वा पश्चादविभक्तान्गृह्णन्शक्नोति व्यवस्थापयितुममुष्यैते न पुनरमुष्यैति ।  
न त्वेवं सुखदुःखयोः पृथगुपलब्धिः । तस्मादसदेतदिति ।

Opponent : It is wrong because of their being found separately (at different locations). Though there is the knowledge of white complexion etc., as non-separated from body through the expression 'I', yet after perceiving them earlier as not belonging to the soul and after perceiving them afterwards as associated with the soul one can ascertain that these belong to this and not to this. There is no cognition of pleasure and pain separately (without soul). Therefore, it (your argument) is wrong.

उच्यते-नैवमुपपद्यते । कस्मात् ? मार्गान्तरगमनात् । अहंकारेणाऽविभक्तग्रहणादात्म-  
गुणत्वमिति प्रगपदिष्टम् । इदानीं तु सत्यपि तस्मिन्पृथग्रहणादहंभावो बुवतो मार्गान्तरगमन-

मनैकान्तिकस्य चाऽपरिहारः । किं चान्यत्, संशयाऽव्यतिरेकात् । यत एव गौरादयः पृथगुप-  
लभ्यन्ते न सुखादयोऽत एव संशयः । न च यत एव संशयस्तत एव निर्णयो युक्तः तस्माद्युक्त-  
मेतद् गौरादिवदहङ्कारेणाप्यभिन्नग्रहणाच्छब्दाद्यात्मभूताः सुखादयः । किं चान्यत् ।  
स्वभावाऽनवधारणादनुपादानप्रसंगात् । सुखाद्यात्मकाः शब्दादय इत्येवं बुवतः शब्दादीनां  
स्वभावानवधारणादनुपादानप्रसंगात् । । निमित्तत्वेपादानादग्निवददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मत्,  
यथाऽग्निः पाकजनिमित्तमुपादीयतेऽथ चैषां पार्थिवत्वमेवं शब्दादयोऽपि सुखादिनिमित्तत्वे-  
नोपादीयेरन्व अथ चैषामात्मगुणत्वमेव स्यादिति । तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सामानाधिकर-  
ण्यदर्शनात् । यथा निमित्तस्याग्नेर्न पाकजैः सामानाधिकरण्यं पक्वोऽग्निः पच्यतेऽग्निरिति  
एवं शब्दादीनां निमित्तत्वान्न सामानाधिकरण्यं स्यात् । सुखशब्दो दुःख इति दृष्टं तु । तस्मान्न  
तेषां निमित्तार्थेनोपादानमिति ।

Proponent : It is not justified.

Why ?

*Because you have adopted the other way.* Earlier you have given the reason as it is the quality of the soul because it is known as non-separate through the use of 'I'. At present there is the use of 'I' on the ground of its knowledge as different; thus you are adopting a different way and there is no alleviation of the non-conclusiveness. *Moreover, it (the established reason given by you) is not different from the doubt.*<sup>6</sup> The doubt arises since the white complexion etc., are perceived as different and the pleasure, etc., are not so. It is not right to take the decision on the basis of the doubt itself. Therefore, it is right that even though through the 'I' notion pleasure, etc., are not separately perceived like the white colour, etc. *Moreover, because of the involvement of undesirable contingency of not selecting them because of the non-determination of their nature.* In the case of one who speaks that the word, etc., are of the nature of pleasure, etc.,<sup>7</sup> there would arise the undesirable contingency of not selecting the word etc., because their nature is not fully determined.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because those are selected as the efficient cause (and not the material cause) just as the selection of fire ? It may be like this. As the fire is selected as the cause of the atoms produced by warmth, though they are of the nature of earth, the word, etc., and in this way those (pleasure, etc.,) would be the qualities of the soul.

That is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because of the perception of having the same locus.* There is no identity of locus between the fire which serves as a cause and the

atoms produced by warmth in the form 'the fire which is already heated is cooking' Similarly, there would have been no identity of location between word, etc., and pleasure, etc., because word, etc., are supposed to be the cause of that. It is also perceived that the pleasing word also (sometimes) causes misery. Therefore, there is no selection of them because of their being the cause.<sup>8</sup>

आह, एवमपि सुखादीनां शब्दाद्यात्मभावो न युक्तः । कस्मात् ? विप्रतिपत्तेः । यथा हि शब्दाः शब्दात्मका इतः सवः शब्दरूपेण गृह्यन्ते, एवं सुखात्मकोऽयमिति सवैस्तद्रूपेण गृह्यते । दृष्टा तु विप्रतिपत्तिः । तस्मादात्मगुणा इति ।

Opponent : In this way also it is not right to take the pleasure, etc., as of the nature of word, etc.

Why ?

Because of the controversy. Just as the word is known by all in the form of word because the word is of the form of the word, the pleasurable object also would be known by all as having that form (pleasurable). However, there is the controversy in this case. Therefore, they are the qualities of the soul only.

उच्यते-न, संस्कारविशेषनिमित्तत्वात् । तद्यथा पितादिसामर्थ्यान्माधुर्यादिषु विप्रति-  
पत्तिः । न चैषामशब्दादिगुणत्वसंस्कारविशेषयोगात्सुखादिषु विप्रतिपत्तिः । न चैषामशब्दा-  
दिगुणत्वमिति । किं चान्यत् । निमित्तनैमित्तिकयोर्विप्रतिपत्तिरस्ति । तद्यथा प्रदीपप्रकाशयोः ।  
ततश्च विप्रतिपत्तेर्निमित्तत्वमपि शब्दादीनामकल्पनीयं स्यात् । यश्च द्वयोर्दोषो न तमेकश्चोद्यत  
इति । आत्मगुणाकांक्षित्वाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् निमित्तमप्रधानत्वादप्यपरिपाकवशेन  
सुखदुःखेनोत्पादयत्यामनः । तन्मयत्वे तु निराकांक्षत्वात्प्रधानस्य व्यवस्थाभेदो न युक्त इति ।  
तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । तन्मयत्वेऽपि गुणभावान्माधुर्यादिषु विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यादा-  
वेवोक्तमेतत् । तस्मात्तन्मयत्वे प्राधान्यमिति चानिश्चिताभिधानमेतत् ।

Proponent : No, because it is caused by a particular past impression.

There is the difference of opinion with reference to sweetness, etc., because of the power of bilious humour (bile). There is no controversy of their being associated with a particular impression of the absence of quality of word, etc. It is not that these are not having the quality of word, etc., *Moreover, the same would involve even if they are considered to be the cause.* This is similar in case of them who consider them to be the cause. There is no controversy in case of the cause and the result,<sup>9</sup> just as in the case of the lamp and the light. Thereby, the causality

of word, etc., would also not be postulated on account of controversy.<sup>10</sup> The fault belongs to both, the one only does not state it (for other).<sup>11</sup>

If it is argued that the fault does not arise when they are intended to be the qualities of the soul? It may be like this. The cause being secondary through the fruition of some other (pleasure or pain) produces them with reference to the soul. If they are identical with the cosmic matter, their different adjustment would not be proper as they do not depend upon the cosmic matter.

This is also not so.

Why?

Because of the statement already made. It is already stated in the beginning that even though they are identical, there is the controversy with reference to sweetness, etc., as they are subordinate (to each other). Therefore, the statement that they are prominent even when they are identical with cosmic matter, is not settled.<sup>12</sup>

आह, एवमप्ययुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? अतीतानागतेष्वपि तु दृष्टेः । तस्मात्सुखादीनां शब्दाद्यात्मभावो न युक्त इति ।

Opponent : This is also wrong.

Why?

Because they are observed in case of past and future as well.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, it is not correct to consider pleasure, etc., as of the nature of word, etc.

उच्यते-न, स्मृतिनिमित्तत्वाद् बुद्धेः । अयमतीतानागतेष्वपि शब्दादिषु स्मार्तसु-  
खदुःखयोगी भवति तत्संपर्कात्तु पुरुषेण तथाऽनुभूयते । पुरुषगुणत्वे तु पाकजवन्निमित्तादुत्प-  
न्नानां सुखादीनां विशेषभावात्तीव्रमन्दताऽनुपपत्तिः स्यात् । तस्मात्सुखदुःखयोः शब्दाद्यात्म-  
भावो न युक्तः । किंचान्यत् अनिमोक्षप्रसंगात् । द्रव्यस्य गुणैरविप्रयोगात्सुखदुःखयोरालम्ब-  
णत्वे सत्यात्मनस्ताभ्यामनिमोक्षप्रसंगः । तस्मात्तयोरालम्बणगुणत्वमयुक्तमिति । श्यामादिवत्तद्वि-  
निवृत्तिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा स्यामगुणत्वे सत्यणोरग्निसम्बन्धात्तद्विनिवृत्तिः, शब्दादिगु-  
णत्वे चाकाशस्याशब्दकस्यावस्थानमेवमात्मनोऽपीति । एतदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? विशेषोपा-  
दानप्रसंगात् । साध्यत्वाच्च, यथा ह्यणुः श्यामतां परित्यज्य रूपविशेषमेव रक्तलक्षणमुपादत्ते,  
न रूपवतां त्यजति, एवमात्मापि बाह्यनिमित्तसामर्थ्यात्सुखात्सुखान्तरं दुःखाद् दुःखान्तरमुपा-  
ददीत । न ते अत्यन्तं जह्यात् । तथा आकाशं शब्दलक्षणं कस्यांचिदवस्थायामशब्दकं भव-  
तीत्यस्मान्प्रति साध्योऽयमर्थः । भेर्यादिशब्दास्तु तदुण एवेति प्रतिपादयिष्यामः तस्मात्सु-  
खदुःखयोः शब्दाद्यात्मभावो युक्तः । एवमनामिश्ररूप आत्मा । ततश्चेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्मज्ञानसं-

स्काराणामनेकस्वभावानां परस्परविरोधिनां च तदुणत्वमनुपपन्नम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतन्निर्गुण  
आत्मा नैर्गुण्याच्च साक्षिमात्र इति केवलो विविकत्वात् ।

Proponent : *Because the knowledge is the cause of memory.* The as-  
sociation of remembered pleasure, pain, etc., takes place in  
case of past and future word, etc., as well. And it is experienced  
so by the conscious entity due to its association with that. When  
they are considered to be the qualities of the soul, there would  
be no possibility of their being severe or slight since there is no  
particularity in the results which are born of some cause, as is  
the case with the baked atoms. Therefore, there is no im-  
propriety in considering pleasure and pain as forming the na-  
ture of word, etc.<sup>14</sup> *Moreover, because it would involve the*  
*undesirable contingency of absence of liberation.* Since the  
qualities can never be dissociated from the substance, there  
would arise the undesirable contingency of non-dissociation of  
them from the soul when pleasure and pain, etc., are taken to  
be the properties of the soul. Therefore, their nature of being  
the qualities of the soul is not right.

If it is argued that their dissociation takes place like black  
colour, etc.? It may be like this. As the black quality, even though  
forming a quality dissociates with the contact of fire, and as the sky  
even though having the word, etc. As quality, remains without word  
etc., also, similar, will be the case with the soul also.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because it would involve the undesirable contingency of taking  
up the other particular (qualities), and because it is still to be proved.  
Just as an atom takes up the particular new red quality after giving  
up the blackness and, thus, does not give up the colour (absolutely),  
similarly, the soul also would acquire the new pleasure after giving  
up the old and new pain after giving up the old due to the capacity of  
the external cause. They would not be given up absolutely. This is still  
to be proved for us that the sky having sound as the quality remains  
qualityless in some stage. We shall establish that the sound of the  
drum, etc., are the qualities of that. Therefore, it is correct to con-  
sider pleasure and pain as forming the nature of word, etc.<sup>15</sup> The  
soul is not of a mixed nature. Therefore, it is wrong to suppose the

qualities like desire, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, knowledge and past impression, which are mutually contradictory and of varied nature, as the qualities of that (soul). Therefore, it is right that the soul is qualityless and it is merely the witness on account of its being qualityless and, hence, is isolated on account of its being devoid of (all the qualities).

(Isolation of the conscious entity)

तस्मादयं गुणेभ्यः पृथग्भूतः तस्मात्केवलः न तैः सह संसर्गेण वर्तते ।

Since it is devoid of all the constituents, it is isolated; it does not remain associated with them.

आह, कः पुनरस्यात्मनो गुणेभ्यः पृथग्भावोऽभिप्रेत इति ?

Opponent : What (type of) dissociation from the constituents is intended in case of the soul?

उच्यते—तदुपकारनिरपेक्षाणां सत्त्वादीनां स्वकार्यसामर्थ्यपृथग्भावः । न हि सत्त्वादयः प्रकाशादिभिर्धर्मैरितरेतरोपकारेण वर्तमानाः पुरुषकृतमुपकारमपेक्षन्ते । प्रकाशादिधर्मसन्निधानमात्रादेव तु प्रवर्तन्ते । तथा च वार्षगणाः पठन्ति “प्रधानप्रवृत्तिरप्रत्यया पुरुषेणाऽपरिगृह्यमाणाऽदिसर्गे वर्तन्ते” इति । यस्माद् गुणास्तदुपकारनिरपेक्षाः प्रवर्तन्ते तस्मादसावपि तत्संसर्गं नाऽनुभवति । दृष्टा तु लोकेऽप्येककार्यत्वापृथग्भावपरिकल्पना । तद्यथा इमे भ्रातरः पृथक्, एषां नैकं कार्यम् । न पृथगिमे येषामेकमिति ।

Proponent : It is the capacity of performing their function by sattva, etc., who do not stand in need of his help. The Sattva, etc., which exist helping one another through their qualities like light<sup>16</sup> do not require the favour from the conscious entity. They perform their activities merely through their association with the qualities like light. So read the followers of Varsaganya : The activity of the cosmic matter without understanding<sup>17</sup> proceeds in the initial state of creation without being controlled by the conscious entity. Since the constituents proceed to activity without requiring his favour, this (conscious entity) also does not experience the contact with them. The postulation of considering them different on the basis of working separately<sup>18</sup> is experienced in the world too. For example, the brothers are separated, these have no common activity. These are not separate, their activity is common.

(Neutrality of the conscious entity)

मध्यस्थो विधित्वात् । यस्मादयं पुरुषो विषयी तस्मान्मध्यस्थः । किं कारणम् ? विषयाणां ह्यतुल्यबलत्वात्, न्यूनातिशयोपपत्तेश्च परस्परेण बाधानुग्रहावुपपन्नौ । विषयी चायम् । तस्मान्नास्ति न्यूनताद्युपपत्तिः । ततश्चेतनाभावः । न चाऽमिश्ररूपत्वात्सङ्गद्वेषौ गुणविषयौ, अतो मध्यस्थः ?

It is neutral because it is the subject of experience. Since the conscious entity is subject of experience, it is neutral.

What is the reason here ?

Because of inequality of power. Because of the possibility of less and more there is a possibility of the mutual obstruction and mutual favour. But, the soul is the subject of experience. Therefore, there is no possibility of less etc., (in it). Hence, the consciousness. The neutrality (of the conscious entity) is proved because on account of its being unmixed it has no attachment or aversion which are the objects of the constituents.

(Seeriness of the conscious entity)

द्रष्टृत्वं चैतन्यात् । प्रकृतिविकारभूतत्वात् सत्त्वादिभ्यश्चैतन्यमपोद्धृत्य पुरुषे व्यवस्थानीयम् । न चाचेतनानां द्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्यते इत्यतः पुरुष एव चैतन्याद् दृष्टा नान्यत्तत्त्वान्तरम् ।

The seeriness of the conscious entity (is) because of its being conscious. The consciousness should be placed in the conscious entity after eliminating it from the Sattva, etc., because of their being the modification of the cosmic matter.<sup>19</sup> The seeriness is not possible in case of the non-conscious objects and, hence, the conscious entity only is the seer because of consciousness, and not any other entity.

(Non-doership of the conscious entity)

अकर्तृभावः, अप्रसवधर्मित्वात् । प्रसवार्थो धर्मः प्रसवधर्मः सोऽस्यास्तैति प्रसवधर्मो ।

The non-doership of the conscious entity is because of his being non-productive. The nature of production is that which leads to production. The productive is one who has the nature of production.

(Non-agency of the active agency)

कः पुनरसौ प्रसवार्थो धर्म इति ?

Opponent : What is that nature required for production ?

उच्यते—प्रस्पन्दनपरिणामौ । निष्क्रियत्वादकर्तेति यावत् । तदिदमप्रसवधर्मित्वादकर्तेति । कथमस्य निष्क्रियत्वमिति चेत् ? चैतन्यात् । अचेतनानां हि क्षीरादीनां क्रियावत्त्वमुप-



लब्धं, चेतनस्य न कस्यचिदित्यतो निष्क्रियः पुरुषः। किंच अनामिश्ररूपत्वात्। अनामिश्ररूपं हि क्रियादिमत्त्वीरादि। अनामिश्ररूपश्चायम्। तस्मान्निष्क्रियः। विभुत्वादिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यथा विभुत्वे सति प्रधानस्य सक्रियत्वमेवं पुरुषस्य इति विभुत्वे सक्रियत्वेन भवितव्यमिति। तच्च नैवम्। कस्मात्? धर्मद्वयसहितस्य साहचर्योपलब्धेः। तद्विभुत्वमाचेतन्यानेकरूपत्वसहितं क्रियावति द्रष्टुं, न केवलम्। न तु तथा पुरुषे। तस्माद्विषमेतत्। एवं निष्क्रियः पुरुषः निष्क्रियत्वाच्च प्रधानाकार्यकरणं न कुरुते। कस्मात्? क्रियावतः कुम्भकारस्य मृत्ति-ण्डात्कार्यनिष्पत्तिसामर्थ्यदर्शनात्। स्यादेतत्। उत्पादितस्यान्येन स्थितिं कुरुते, धात्रीकुमारवत्। स्थितस्य वा प्रयोगं रथशकटयन्त्रप्रेरकवदिति। एतदप्यनुपपन्नं, पूर्वस्मादेव हेतोः अथापि स्यात्स्वतः पुरुषः कार्यकरणं कुरुत इति तदप्ययुक्तम्। चेतनाचेतनयोरत्यन्तभेदात्मक-विकारभावानुपपत्तेः। अथ मतमुभयत इति तदपि नैव संभवति, उभयदोषप्रसंगात्। स्यात्पुनरैतत् अव्यपदिश्य योनिं पुरुषोऽभिध्यानमात्रेण कार्यकरणं कुरुते इत्यसदेतत्। कस्मात्? अनुत्पत्तावभिध्यानानुपपत्तेः। ईश्वरकारणप्रतिषेधेऽभिहितं प्राक् प्रधानविपरिणामाद् बुद्धिमतो बुद्धिर्नास्ति। न च बुद्धिमन्तरेणाभिध्यानमुपपद्यते, तद्वत्तद्भूतत्वात् तथा बुद्धिमत्पूर्वक-सृष्टिप्रतिषेधः कृतः। स इहापि योज्यः, अध्यवसायकर्तृत्वं च प्राक्प्रतिषिध्यम् एवं सप्तविधेना कर्तृत्वेनाऽकर्ता पुरुषः। उक्तं च

नाऽध्यवसायं कुरुते पुरुषो नैव स्थितिं प्रयोगं वा।

न स्वात्मनो न परतो न व्यपदेशान्न चोभयतः॥

तद्युक्तमेतत्

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य।

कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ इति ॥ १९ ॥

Proponent : The nature of production consists of movement and modification. It implies that he is non-doer because of his being devoid of activities. It is non-doer because of its being non-productive. If it is asked how is its nature of being devoid of activity possible, (we reply), because of its being conscious. The nature of possessing the activities is observed with reference to the milk, etc., which are unconscious in nature and not in case of any conscious entity. Hence, conscious entity is inactive. Moreover, because of its being pure (non-mixable) in nature. The objects which are mixable in nature are possessed of activity just as is the case with the milk, etc. This is of unmixable nature. Therefore, it is inactive.

If it is argued that on account of all-pervasiveness the conscious

entity is active? It may be like this. Cosmic matter being all-pervasive is active, conscious entity also should be active on account of its being all-pervasive.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because the association of (both the activity and all-pervasiveness is observed in case of one which is in association with two qualities.<sup>20</sup> The all-pervasiveness in the active object is associated with forms of non-consciousness<sup>21</sup> and many other forms, i.e., composed of three constituents, etc., and not in isolated (all-pervasiveness). It is, however, not the case with conscious entity. Therefore, the example is dissimilar. In this way the conscious entity is non-active and thus being inactive in nature does not produce the body from the cosmic matter.

Why?

Because the capability of producing some effect from the lump of clay is observed in case of potter who is active.

It may be argued that it sustains the object produced by other as a nurse supports the baby, or, there may be his activity by employing others to activity though himself situating inactive only just as the one who sets the chariot, the cart or the machine in motion.

It is also wrong because of the reason stated above.

If it is said to be like this that the Conscious entity produces the body from himself.

This is also wrong. Since the conscious and non-conscious are entirely different (in nature), there is no possibility of being material cause or its modification in case of conscious entity.

If it is argued that from both of them (the creation is produced)?

That is also not possible because it would involve the undesirable contingency of both the faults.

It may be like this that the conscious entity produces the body merely through thinking without naming the state (genus) of birth.

This is wrong.

Why?

Because there is no possibility of thinking in the absence of production. It is already stated in the context of refuting the causality of Īśvara<sup>22</sup> that the intellect of the one possessing intellect does not



exist earlier to the evolution (modification) of cosmic matter. There is no possibility of thinking without intellect because thinking is the function of that intellect only. The creation by some intelligent creator is already refuted. That should be connected here also. And its doership of determination is also refuted earlier. Thus, through the non-doership of seven kinds, it is proved that the conscious entity is no-doer. It is stated also :

The conscious entity does not determine, nor does it sustain or sets the other object in motion. It does not create the object from himself, nor from other objects, nor through calling the name only nor through the both the cosmic matter and himself.

Therefore, it is right that

“And therefore, from that contrast is established the witnesshood of the conscious entity as also its isolation, neutrality, seeriness and non-agency.”

## KĀRIKĀ 19

1. The sense is that which increases or decreases and thus is aspiring for some benefit cannot be neutral, but the conscious entity is not affected by anything.
2. The conscious entity is not an agent of knowledge, but a mere spectator. Knowledge in the conscious entity is actually apparent. Vijnanabhikṣu brings out the difference between witness and the seer. The former is directly related to the object while the latter may be with intervention.
3. This is to stress the idea that consciousness is the nature of the soul itself and is not produced in him by the association with the constituents.
4. In karika 11 Iśvarakṛṣṇa enumerates six points of opposition between worldly objects and the constituents. The Yuktidīpikā considers five of them leaving *aviveki*. From these should be deduced the five points about the nature of the conscious entity. However, there is no sequence or fixation as to which point should be deduced from which point of contrast. They should be understood as they may be possible. For example, the witnesshood and isolation of the conscious entity are deduced from his being devoid of the three constituents, neutrality from his being the subject, seeriness from consciousness, non-doership from non-productivity.
5. The witness should not be actively involved in the activity witnessed by him. Since the conscious entity is different from pleasure, pain, etc., he can be their witness.
6. The cause of the doubt, viz., finding together, itself is accepted to be the conclusion.
7. The context demands the negative particle *na* in the beginning of the sentence.
8. The experience of pleasure and pain depends upon many factors. If a particular object is the cause of pleasure only, it should not cause pain. But, it goes against our common experience. It can, however, be explained on the basis of Sāṃkhya theory. Due to the dominance of a particular constituent at a particular time towards a man having particular impression, the object is said to be of the nature of pleasure or pain or indifference in those circumstances.

9. It cannot be contradicted that the cause invariably gives rise to its effect.
10. The controversy refers to the experience of pleasure, etc., differently by different persons.
11. Pleasure, etc., are considered to be the nature of the cause of objects by both the upholders of different theories. However, in both the cases it cannot be explained satisfactorily as to how the same object is sometimes experienced to be pleasurable and sometimes painful.
12. The sense is that they are identical with the cosmic matter and one of them is prominent at a time. However, it is not a fixed rule as to which of them is prominent. Anyone of them may be prominent at the same time.
13. The meaning is if the pleasure, pain, etc., are identical with words, etc., they should be experienced at the present only because the same word, etc., were not in the past and would not be in the future. Consequently, there would be no memory of the past. Pleasure, etc., and no intuition of the future pleasure etc.
14. The context demands that the reading should be without na.
15. The reading *atmabhavo yuktah* given by Chak. is more appropriate than that of Pandeyas's reading *ayuktah*.
16. Cf. Karika 12-13.
17. It implies that it is not thoughtful but is spontaneous.
18. The context demands the reading *anekakaryatvat* as against *ekakaryatvat*.
19. The word *praktivikarabhutatvat* is confusing. It may be interpreted as the constituents are the *vikara* (modification) of the *prakṛti* which will contradict the *Samkhya* position itself, because in *Samkhya* the constituents are not product or modification of the cosmic matter.
20. The qualities here refer to the activity and all-pervasiveness and prove the nature of the object as possessed of the two qualities.
21. The reading should be *vibhutvamacetanya....* in place of *vibhutvamacetanya...*
22. See YD on the karika 14.

## KĀRIKĀ 20

(False appearance of qualities in the conscious entity)

यतश्चेतनाशक्तिसम्बन्धात्पुरुष एव द्रष्टा नान्यत्तत्त्वान्तरं गुणाश्च कर्तारो, न पुरुषः

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥ 20 ॥

पुरुषसम्पर्काद् हि ग्रहणधारणविज्ञानवचनोहापोहक्रिया यथान्यायाभिनवेशानां करणधर्माणां प्रत्ययरूपाणामिवोपलब्धेश्चेतनाशक्तेश्चाऽध्यवसायवृत्तिमनुरुध्यमानायास्तद्भावसन्निवेशिनां सत्त्वादीनां व्यापारवतामभिसम्बन्धाद् व्यापाराविष्टाया इवोपलब्धिः । यतस्तत्राऽयमनेककालप्रवृत्तिमित्याप्रत्ययाभ्यासवासनापेक्षो भवबीजहेतुर्ज्ञानविशेषः प्राणभृतामवभासते । श्रोत्रमुपलभ्यते त्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वा घ्राणमित्यादि । तथा पुरुषः कर्मणां कर्ता, पुरुषः सुखदुःखयोरिति । तस्मात्करणस्य ग्रहणरूपता पुरुषस्य च कर्तृरूपता, सम्बन्ध्यन्तरसम्पर्कादन्यगताऽन्यत्रोपलभ्यमाना भक्त्याऽध्यवसातव्या, न परमार्थः । उक्तं च

चेतनाऽधिष्ठता बुद्धिश्चेतनेव विभाव्यते ।

कर्तृष्ववस्थितश्चात्मा भोक्ता कर्तव्यं लक्ष्यते ॥

Since the conscious entity only is the seer due to its association with the power of consciousness and not any other entity<sup>1</sup> and the agents are the constituents only and not the conscious entity.

**THEREFORE, DUE TO THE ASSOCIATION WITH THAT THE INTELLECT THOUGH UNCONSCIOUS (ESSENTIALLY) APPEARS LIKE HAVING CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY THOUGH (ESSENTIALLY) NEUTRAL APPEARS LIKE AN AGENT, WHILE (REALLY) THE DOERSHIP BELONGS TO THE CONSTITUENTS.**

Since the activities like seizing, retaining, knowing, speaking, deliberating and reasoning belonging to the organs situated at their respective places, due to the association of the conscious entity appears in the form of the consciousness, as also the power of consciousness which follows the function like determination due to its contact with the intellect, etc., which are arranged in that form and active, seems to be as if encircled by (or full of) activities. (It is

known so) because this kind of particular knowledge<sup>2</sup> which is the cause or the seed of the universe and is in turn caused by the impressions of the practice of wrong knowledge for a long time appears in case of the living being in the form that the senses like ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose know. Thus the conscious entity is the agent of the acts. The conscious entity is also (experiencer) of pleasure, pain, etc. Therefore, the knowledge in the senses and the agency in the conscious entity appear as located in the other, though (really) invested in other, due to the association of the correlative and as such it should be understood metaphorically and not in reality. It is stated also:

“The intellect which is governed by consciousness is (wrongly) taken as if conscious. And the soul which is (essentially) an enjoyer only while located in the agents appears to be an agent.”

(Transference of qualities)

आह, संयोगात्पररूपतापत्तावतिप्रसंगः, अविशेषात् । यदि चेतनसंयोगाद् बुद्ध्यादीनां प्रत्ययवदुपचारः व्यापित्वादस्य घटादिभिरपि संयोग न प्रतिषिध्यत इत्यतः प्राप्तस्तेषामपि प्रत्ययवदुपचारः । अथ संयोगाऽविशेषात्करणानामेव प्रत्ययवदुपचारो न घटादीनां, विशेषस्तर्हि वक्तव्य इति ।

Opponent : In (the theory of) attaining other form through association is involved the undesirable contingency of over-pervasiveness, because there is no specification. If the intellect, etc., are metaphorically taken to be possessed of knowledge (or consciousness) due to their association with the conscious entity, the contact of it (i.e., conscious entity) with the pot, etc., is not negated for it is all-pervasive and, hence, the secondary transference of consciousness to them also becomes contingent. Hence, the restrictive principle should be mentioned through which the secondary transference of consciousness is to the senses only and not to the pot, etc., even though there is no speciality in the contact (of both of them with the soul).

उच्यते—तदप्रसंगः । शक्त्यपेक्षत्वात् स्फटिकादिवत् । यथोपधानसंयोगविशेषे सत्याकाशस्फटिकयोः स्फटिकमेवोपधानसरूपं प्रत्यवभासते शक्तितो नाकाशम्, एवं पुरुषसंयोगाविशेषे बुद्धिघटयोः शक्तितो बुद्धिरेव चेतनारूपापत्रेवोपलभ्यते, न घटः ।

Proponent : That undesirable contingency does not arise, because it (transference) needs the capacity as is found in the case of a

crystal, etc. When the space and the crystal are equally associated with a particular object placed near, only the crystal appears as (having) the form of the object due to its capacity, and not the sky. Similarly, when the contact of the conscious entity is common to both the intellect and the pot, the intellect only due to its capacity appears as having the form of consciousness, and not the pot.

(Transference of qualities of the intellect and the conscious entity due to mutual contact)

आह, पुरुषस्य विकार्यत्वप्रसंगः, रूपान्तरोपादनात् । यदि तर्हि करणसम्बन्धात्पुरुषः कर्तृत्वोपचारं विषयसरूपतां च प्रतिपद्यते, प्राप्तमस्यापि स्फटिकवद्रूपान्तरोपादानाद्विकार्यत्वम् । अथ नाऽस्य विषयरूपापत्तिः, न तर्हि करणस्वरूपः पुरुष इति ।

Opponent : It involves the undesirable contingency of the conscious entity's being modifiable because of taking the other form. If the conscious entity gets the agency and the form of the object metaphorically as also the form of the object, it will also be modifiable like crystal on it would be an effect account of attaining other form. If you argue that it does not attain the form of the object, the conscious entity will not be of the form of the organs also.

उच्यते—न, भक्तितोऽभ्युपगमात् । बुद्धिरुपात्तविषयेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपातात्तद्रूपं प्रतिपद्यते । बुद्धिरूपं तु सन्निधानमात्राच्छक्तिविशेषयोगात्फलभोक्तृत्वाच्च राजनि भृत्यजयपराजयोपचारवत्पुरुष उपचर्यते । न त्वसौ बुद्धिसंपर्कात्तद्रूपो भवति । अत एवास्य सत्यां चेतनाशक्तौ व्यवसायकर्तृत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते, मा भूत् विषयरूपापत्तौ सत्यामनेकस्वभावत्वादिकार्यत्वप्रसंगः । तस्माद्विषयसम्पर्कादप्यविकार्यः पुरुषः, न ह्यस्य नित्यत्वात्किंचिदनुग्रहाय नाऽपघाताय । आह च

मुष्टिर्यथा विकीर्णः सूच्यते सर्षपादीनाम् ।

तिष्ठति न सूक्ष्मभावात्तद्द्वद् द्वन्द्वानि सर्वज्ञे ॥

इति । चेतनाशक्तियोगात्तु द्रष्टृत्वमस्य स्वाभाविकम् । एवं चेद्यदुक्तं

वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।

चर्मोपमश्चेत्सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्समः ॥

इति तदयुक्तम् । किं कारणम् ? यस्मादविकार्यरूपस्याकाशस्य सन्निधानमात्रान्मेघपयोरजोधूमप्रभृतिभिरभित्रदेशत्वादत्यन्तशुद्धस्यापि मलिनमिव रूपमुपलक्ष्यते, न च विकार्य-

त्वम्, एवमात्मनऽपि स्यात् । तद्युक्तमेतत्पुरुषसंयोगात्करणस्य प्रत्ययोपचारः, पुरुषस्य च गुणसंयोगात्कर्तृत्वोपचार इति ।

Proponent : *No, because it is accepted in a metaphorical way.* The intellect attains the form of the object through (following) the function of the sense which is in association with the object. The form of the intellect, however, is falsely attributed to the conscious entity due to its mere contact, due to conscious entity having the capacity for that and due to his being the enjoyer of the fruits, just like the attribution of the victory and the defeat of the servant on the king.<sup>3</sup> It is not that it becomes of the form of the intellect on account of the contact with the intellect.<sup>4</sup> That is why its agency of determination is negated even when it has got the power of consciousness so that there may not be the undesirable contingency of its being a product attaining many natures after assuming the form of the object. Therefore, the conscious entity is non-modifiable even though it has the contact with many objects. Since it is eternal, there is nothing to favour or to hurt. It is stated also:

“As a handful of mustard seeds thrown about at the forepart of the needle do not remain there due to the subtle size, the mutually contradictory experiences also do not remain in the all-knowing person.”

And, due to its being possessed of power of consciousness, the seerhood of the conscious entity is natural. When it is so, the following statement comes to be false.

“What effect do the rains and the sun cast on the sky ? Their effect is cast on the skin only. If that (conscious entity) is like skin, it would be non-eternal and if it (the conscious entity) is like sky, it would be like a non-existing entity.”

What is the reason (for calling it false) ?

Because even the form of sky which is absolutely pure and immodifiable in nature seems to be impure on account of its mere association with the cloud, water, dust, smoke, etc., due to oneness of location. And there is no modifiableness in the sky. In this way is the position of the soul also.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, it is right to say that the understanding is metaphorically spoken as belonging to the organs due to

their contact with the conscious entity. And the agency is metaphorically spoken as belonging to the conscious entity due to the contact with the constituents.

(The contact is metaphorical)

आह, अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? संयोगानुपपत्तेः । पुरुषस्य हि गुणानां च संयोगः परिकल्प्यमानोऽन्यतरकर्मजो वा परिकल्प्यते यथा स्थणुश्चेनयोः, उभयकर्मजो वा मेषयोः, संयोगजो वा द्वयङ्गुलाकाशयोः, स्वाभाविको वा यथाऽग्न्यौष्ण्योः, शक्तिनिमित्तो वा यथा चक्षुरूपयोः, योग्यतालक्षणो वा यथा ऽङ्गुष्ठोपानदद्रव्ययोः, यादृच्छिको वा यथा श्वप्रतत्पातिनोः, विषयविषयिनिमित्तो वा यथा मत्स्योदकयोरिति ? तत्र तावदन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजश्च संयोग एषामुपपद्यते । कस्मात् ? विभुत्वात् । परिच्छिन्नदेशानामप्राप्तौ सत्यामदृष्टः, यथोदाहृतम् । न चैतद् गुणानां पुरुषस्य च सम्भवति, विभुत्वात् । न स्वाभाविकः अनिमोक्षप्रसंगात् । यथाऽग्नेः स्वाभाविकादौष्ण्यान्मोक्षो न भवति एवमात्मनः स्वाभाविकत्वाद् गुणसंयोगादनिमोक्षप्रसंगः स्यात् । शक्तिनिमित्तश्च । किम् ? अनिमोक्षप्रसंगादेव, स न भवतीत्यनुवर्तते । स्वस्वामिशक्तिनिमित्ते हि संयोगे परिकल्प्यमाने शक्त्योः सततावस्थानादनिमोक्ष एव प्रसज्येत । योग्यतालक्षणः शक्तिमात्ररूपत्वादसंवेद्योऽतस्तदसिद्धिः । किंच प्रयोजनान्तरानुपपत्तेः । प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणं हि योग्यमित्युच्यते । तस्या एव तु प्रवृत्तेः पुरुषार्थमपोह्य निमित्तान्तरं शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । आकस्मिकत्वे च नियमद्वैतानुपपत्तिः । तस्मादयुक्तं पुरुषस्य गुणानां च योग्यतालक्षणः सम्बन्धः । न यादृच्छिकः । मोक्षकारणनियमाऽनुपपत्तेः । संयोगकारणप्रतिद्वन्द्वं कैवल्यकारणम् । यदि च यादृच्छिको गुणपुरुषसंयोगः स्यात्तस्याऽज्ञानाविवृत्तिर्नास्तीति तदर्थस्याभ्युत्थानस्याऽनर्थक्यं प्राप्तं विशेषानुपपत्तेश्च कारणान्तरं कल्पयितुम् । अत एतदप्ययुक्तमिति । न वैषयिकः, अनिमोक्षप्रसंगात् । सततमेव हि पुरुषस्य विषयित्वमव्यावृत्तं गुणानां च विषयत्वमित्यनिमोक्षप्रसंग एव स्यात् । एतावांश्च संयोगः परिकल्प्यमानः परिकल्प्येत । सर्वथा च नोपपद्यते । तस्मात्तत्संयोगादित्ययुक्तमभिधातुमिति ।

Opponent : That is wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of contact. The supposed contact of the conscious entity with the constituents may be postulated as caused by the activity of one of the relata as that of a eagle bird and the log; or it may be caused by the activity of both the relata as that of the two rams, or caused by the contact as that of the two fingers with the space, or natural as that of the fire and the warmth, or caused by the power as that of eye and the form, or in the form of the capability as that between the thumb (of the foot) and the shoe, or accidental as that of the hole and the one fallen in it, or that caused through the objectivity and the experiencer as that of the fish and the water. There is no possibility of the contact caused by the ac-

tivity of one and that caused by the activity of the two case of them.

Why ?

Because of their being all-pervasive. The contact is not observed (to take place) between two objects of limited magnitude unless they do not come together as exemplified above. This is, however, not possible in case of the conscious entity and the constituents because they are all-pervasive. Nor is this contact natural because in that case there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation. As there is no dissociation of fire from the warmth which is natural, similarly, there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation (dissociation) of soul from constituents because in this case the contact is natural. The contact caused by power also does not take place.

Why ?

Because there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation. 'That (contact) also does not take place' follows here also. If the contact is supposed to be caused by the power of being owned and the owner, there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation because the power will always be there. The contact in form of capability being identical with power only should not be considered (lit. is not worth considering here). Hence, it is not applicable (in the present case). Moreover, there will not be the possibility of some other purpose. The capable is one which is suitable (capable) for activity. When that (capability) is itself the cause of activity, some other cause of activity can be postulated setting aside the purpose of the conscious entity. But when the activity is accidental, there is no possibility of restriction of the two. Therefore, the contact of the conscious entity and the constituents in the form of capability does not hold good. There is no accidental contact also because the rule regarding the cause of liberation will not hold good. The cause of contact in opposite (in nature) to that of liberation. And, if the contact of the conscious entity and the constituents would be accidental, that would not be dispelled through knowledge and, hence, the efforts for its attainment will be useless and, there remains no possibility of some speciality to postulate some other reason. Therefore, it is also wrong. The contact is not caused by the subject-object relation also because it will also involve the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation. The nature of being a subject is never taken away from the conscious entity and, similarly, the nature of being an object from the constituents. In this way, there would be undesirable contingency of absence of liberation. If some contact is to be postulated, that can be

postulated in some above form, only. In no case, however, it is possible. Therefore, it is wrong to say 'through that contact'.

उच्यते-संयोगानित्यत्वादिह चौपचारिकपरिकल्पनाददोषः। इहाऽनेकविधः संयोगः। तद्यथा प्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः। यथोदाहृतं अन्यतरज उभयकर्मजः संयोग इत्यादि। यत्रासौ न संभवति तत्र सन्निधिमित्रसामान्याद् भक्त्या कल्प्यते। तद्यथाऽऽकाशस्य गवादिविधः। प्रदेशैरिति चेन्न अभावात्। तेऽपि हि निरवयवत्वादाकाशस्य भक्त्या कल्प्यन्ते, मा-भूतकत्वाऽनित्यत्वदोषप्रसंगः। तस्मात्प्रदेशोपचारात्कार्यमप्युपचरितम्। अन्यस्तु शास्त्रीयः संयोगोऽर्थनिमित्तः। तत्रानेकसंयोगोपपत्तेरिह पुरुषान्तःकरणयोरभिन्नदेशत्वात्सन्निधिमित्रसामान्याद् भाक्तं संयोगं परिकल्प्यैवमुच्यत इत्यदोषः ॥ २० ॥

Proponent : The defect does not arise because the contact in this case is non-eternal and because of the postulation of its metaphorical nature. The contact is of many kinds just as the contact through (i.e., caused by) association exemplified as the contact caused by the activity of one or of both. Wherever, this type of contact is not possible, there the contact is secondarily postulated just through the proximity in general as in the case of the contact of sky with cow, etc.<sup>6</sup> If it is argued that the contact of the cow, etc., is with the parts of sky, it is not right *because of the absence (of the parts in sky)*. Those parts are also metaphorically postulated in the sky which has (really) no part, so that there may not be undesirable contingency of the defect of its being caused and non-eternal.<sup>7</sup> Since the parts are metaphorically postulated, the effect is also metaphorical.

Other contact postulated in a particular sastra through some purpose. Since many types of contacts are possible there, here (in the present case) it is stated so after postulating the contact secondarily just through the proximity in general because the conscious entity and the internal organs are located at the same (non-different) place, hence no defect.

## KĀRIKĀ 20

1. The conscious entity is not different from consciousness; the statement of his association with consciousness should be understood as a way of saying, and hence, does not mean that the conscious entity is different from consciousness.
2. As a matter of fact the statement that the conscious entity knows or acts should be understood as these acts falsely appear as located in the conscious entity and are, thus, metaphorically spoken so.
3. The victory and defeat actually belong to the soldiers but are metaphorically attributed to the king because the result of victory and defeat is experienced by the king; similarly the agency and knowledge really belonging to the intellect are attributed to the conscious entity because the latter is the experiencer of their results.
4. The agency of knowledge in the conscious entity is metaphorical and not real. The knowledge is to attain the form of the object, the conscious entity does not attain the form of the object actually.
5. The argument is also employed by Gauḍapāda in his kārīkā to establish the non-attached and inactive nature of the soul.
6. The contact between sky and the cow is metaphorical in so far as it is not caused and is not prompted by some purpose.
7. In the theory of the Sāṃkhyas partite objects are non-eternal. Therefore, sky is not considered to be partite.

## KĀRIKĀ 21

(Purpose of the contact between cosmic matter and the conscious entity)

आह, विज्ञातं संयोगद्वयम् । अयं त्वन्योऽर्थनिमित्तः शास्त्रीयः संयोगो भवता परिभाष्यते । तत्र वक्तव्यं किमर्थोऽसाविति ?

Opponent : The two types of contact are understood. The present one is of second type defined by you as the contact known in the sastra as prompted by some purpose. Then, it should be stated as to for what is it meant hear.

(Perception of the conscious entity)

उच्यते

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थः

दृष्टिर्दर्शनम् । अर्थशब्दो निमित्तवचनः । दर्शनमर्थोऽस्यासौः दर्शनार्थः । दर्शनानमित्तो दर्शनहेतुः दर्शनकारण इत्यर्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति—सन्निधानाऽविशेषे सति आत्मन आकाशादेश्च यस्माद् दृक्छक्तियुक्तः पुरुषः तस्मात्कार्यकारणतामापात्रेन प्रधानेन सह भोक्तृत्वेन संबध्यते, नाऽचैतन्यादाकाशादय इति । अथवा अर्थशब्दः फलवचनः । यथा तृप्तयर्था भुजिक्रिया तृप्त्यै सत्यां निवर्तते प्राप्तयर्था गमिक्रिया प्राप्तौ सत्याम्, एवं पुरुषस्य प्रधानेन दर्शनार्थः संयोगः दर्शने सति निवर्तते । तथा च वक्ष्यति दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरतैकेति (का. ६६) ।

Proponent : FOR THE PERCEPTION OF (THE COSMIC MATTER BY THE) PURUṢA.

Perception is the act of perceiving. The word 'purpose' is used in the sense of prompting (cause). The compound ('for the perception') means 'the prompting cause of which is the perception, i.e., caused by perception, having perception as the cause. This is meant here : even though the proximity (of cosmic matter) is common to both the soul and the sky, etc., yet since the conscious entity is endowed with the power of perceiving, he is related as an enjoyer to the cosmic matter which has attained the state of body, and not (so related with the cosmic matter) are the sky, etc., because they are



non-sentient.<sup>1</sup> Or, the word 'purpose' denotes the result. As the act of eating for getting satisfied comes to an end at the time of getting satisfaction, and as the act of going meant for reaching comes to an end after reaching that place, similarly, the contact of the conscious entity with the cosmic matter is meant for the perception and when the perception (of cosmic matter by the conscious entity) takes place, it comes to an end. The author will state so afterwards that one thinks that 'she is seen by me' and hence gets disinterested, and the other thinks that 'I am seen by him' and stops the activity (K. 66).

(Cosmic matter's purpose isolation of the conscious entity)

आह, एवमपि शब्दाद्युपलब्धिसमकालमेव निवृत्तिप्रसंगः । किं कारणम् ? तस्यामप्य-  
वस्थायां शक्यं वक्तुं दृष्टा प्रकृतिरिति ।

Opponent : In this case also, there arises the undesirable contin-  
gency of conscious entity desisting from activities (of percep-  
tion) at the time of knowing the word etc., only.

What is the reason ?

In that case also it can be stated that the cosmic matter has  
been perceived.

उच्यते यद्यप्येतदेवं तथापि यथा पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थः संयोगः

कैवल्यार्थस्तथा प्रधानस्य ।

कैवल्यमिति विवेकपरिच्छिन्नं सत्त्वादिभिरसंसर्गधर्मित्वमात्मनः, सोऽर्थोऽस्य सोऽयं  
कैवल्यार्थः । सत्यपि हि दर्शनाविशेषे प्रधानं पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थं प्रवर्तते । यदाऽस्य बुद्धिस्त-  
मसोऽङ्गित्वाद्ये गुणाः कार्यरूपापन्नाः शिरःपाण्यादय आध्यात्मिका, बाह्याश्च गवादयः,  
कारणरूपापन्नाश्चालोचनक्रियासंकल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायलक्षणः, सोऽहमित्यविशिष्टप्रत्ययो-  
पसंहारं करोति तदा प्रवर्तते एव । यदा त्वन्ये गुणाः प्रकृतिभूता विकारभूताः कार्यभूताः कार-  
णभूता अचेतनाः परार्था अन्योऽहं न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिर्न कार्यं न कारणं नाचेतनः स्वार्थ इति  
भिन्नप्रत्ययोपसंहारं करोति तदा निवर्तते । सोऽयं पुरुषस्य दृक्छक्तिनिमित्तः प्रधानस्य च कैव-  
ल्यावधिपरिच्छिन्नः पुरुषार्थः ।

सत्यपि पारिभाषिकत्वे

पङ्गवन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगः

एतदुक्तं भवति । प्रागपि कार्यकारणसम्बन्धात्पुरुषे चैतन्यमवस्थितम् । तद्यथा अग्ने-  
र्दहनं परंशोच्छेदनमसति दाहो छेद्ये च न व्यज्यते । तत्सन्निधानसमकालमेव तु व्यज्यते ।

इत्यतः प्रधानमपेक्षते । तथा प्रधानप्यन्तरेण पुरुषोपकारं स्वकादसमर्थमनिष्पन्नकार्यसमं चेति-  
तमनर्थकं स्यादित्यतः पुरुषमपेक्षते । तत्र उभयोरितरेतरापेक्षा तं संयोगमधिकारबन्धमाहुरा-  
चार्याः । पङ्गवन्धदृष्टान्तस्तु नान्तरीयकमात्रं 'प्रदर्शनार्थम्' । यथा पङ्गुर्नान्तरेणान्धं दृक्छक्त्या  
विशिष्टेनार्थेनार्थवान्भवति अन्धश्च नान्तरेण पङ्गुं विशिष्टेनार्थेन, एवं प्रधानं नान्तरेण पुरुषं  
कृतमपि कार्यं द्रष्टुं शक्तमनवधिकं च प्रवर्तमानं विशेषाभावाच्चैव निवर्तते । तथा पुरुषः  
सत्यपि चेतनत्वे नान्तरेण प्रधानमुपलब्ध्याभावादुपलब्धा भवेदिति प्रधानमपेक्षते । तस्मादित-  
रेतरापेक्षया संयोगत्वे कल्प्यमाने यदुक्तं

विना सर्गेण बन्धो हि पुरुषस्य न युज्यते ।

सर्गस्तस्यैव मोक्षार्थमहो सांख्यस्य सूक्तता ॥

इति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? न ह्यसौ विना सर्गेण न युज्यत इति । आह च

दृश्यदर्शनभावेन प्रकृतेः पुरुषस्य च ।

अपेक्षा शास्त्रतत्त्वज्ञैर्बन्ध इत्यभिधीयते ॥

एवं विनापि सर्गेण यस्माद्बद्धः पुमान्गुणैः ।

तस्माद्विफलतां यातु मनोरथमनोरथः ॥

इति सिद्धः संयोगः ।

Proponent : Though it is like this, yet as there is the contact for  
the perception of the conscious entity :

#### AND FOR COSMIC MATTER'S PURPOSE OF ISOLATION (OF THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY)

Isolation is the detachment through discriminative knowledge,  
a state of soul having no contact with the sattva, etc.; one whose pur-  
pose is this, is the one having the purpose of liberation. Even though  
the perception is common, the cosmic matter proceeds to activity for  
the liberation of the conscious entity. When the intellect of the con-  
scious entity possessing tamas entertains the idea of non-separation  
as the constituents which have attained the form of the effect like the  
bodily objects like head, feet, etc., and external objects like cow, and  
also those which have attained the form of the cause like the act of  
reflection, determination, 'I' notion are 'I' only, the cosmic matter  
does proceed for the act. And when the conscious entity entertains  
the idea of separation that the constituents which are the cosmic  
matter, modifications, effects and cause are non-sentient, meant for  
others are different and 'I' who is not a source, modification, effect,

cause, non-conscious, and is meant for his own self, am different, then the cosmic matter desists from activities. Thus, the purpose of the conscious entity is caused by his power of seeing and continues in case of the cosmic matter upto the time of isolation.

Though it is in the technical sense :

### THE CONTACT OF THE TWO IS LIKE THAT OF THE LAME AND THE BLIND.

This is meant here. The consciousness exists in the conscious entity even earlier to his relation with the body. Just as the power of burning in fire and the cutting in an axe is not manifest in the absence of something to be burnt and cut, it (i.e. consciousness) is manifested only at the time of the contact with that (body); therefore, the cosmic matter is needed. Similarly, the cosmic matter also incapable of doing anything by itself and as if not having performed its activity will be useless without the favour to the conscious entity and, hence, needs the conscious entity. The authorities call this contact in the form of mutual expectancy as potential bondage. The example of blind and the lame is only to show that the one cannot function without the other.<sup>2</sup> Just as the lame with the power of seeing does not attain any particular purpose without the blind and the blind also without the lame (does not attain) any particular purpose, the cosmic matter also without the conscious entity is not capable of showing the effect produced and does not desist from its activities for indefinite period without particular reason (for desisting).<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the conscious entity also inspite of its being conscious would not be the subject in the absence of the object without the cosmic matter and, hence, stands in need of the cosmic matter. Hence, when the contact is postulated in form of mutual expectancy, the following statement comes to be wrong :

“The bondage of the conscious entity is not justified without creation and the creation is for the purpose of his liberation only. Oh! what a fine statement by the Samkhya.

Why ?

Because it is not that it is not justified without the creation. It is stated also :

“ The (mutual) expectancy of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity in the form of the object of perception and the subject of perception is said to be the bondage by the knower of the scrip-

tures. In the way, the desire of Manoratha is foiled because the conscious entity is bound by the constituents even without creation.

Thus is proved the contact.

### THE CREATION IS CAUSED BY THAT (CONTACT).

The creation of the elements like intellect, etc., the creation of the mental modes like virtue, etc., and the creation of the physical beings like Brahma etc. proceed as it is caused by the mutual expectancy of the cosmic matter and conscious entity in form of the enjoyer and the enjoyed. That expectancy is not fulfilled due to the infinite number of the conscious entities and, hence, there is no desisting from activity in case of the cosmic matters which are still purposeful, without fulfilling that (expectancy).

Here ends the fifth discourse and the second chapter of the Yuktidīpikā commentary on the Sāmkhyakārikā.

## KĀRIKĀ 21

The contact is caused by conscious entity's perceiving the cosmic matter. Perceiving stands for enjoyment. Since the conscious entity has such a power, it is related to the cosmic matter. The other things like sky though all-pervasive are not related to the cosmic matter as the enjoyer because being non-sentient, they have on capacity to enjoy.

2. The term mātra (only) suggests that the analogy should not be stretched too much as the critics of Sāṃkhya like Sāṃkara have done.
3. Though the cosmic matter is active by its very nature and proceeds to activity itself, yet the purpose is postulated to put a check on the activity.
4. The meaning is that in fact bondage is the mutual expectancy and it may exist with or without creation. The conscious entity is in bondage as long as he needs the cosmic matter, and the cosmic matter is in bondage as long as it needs the conscious entity. Such a mutual expectancy prompts creation and is satisfied by creation itself. Without such an expectancy the conscious entity is not bound even he may be present with the constituents. Therefore, the statement of Manoratha that the conscious entity is bound by the very presence of the constituents is falsified. As regards the identity of Manoratha R. C. Pandey (p. 90) thinks that he may be identified with Manorathanandin a Buddhist ācārya.

## KARIKA 22

(Evolution of the universe)

(Different views of the authorities)

एवं कारणान्तरप्रतिषेधात्प्रकृतेः पुरुषार्थोऽयं व्यक्तभावेन विपरिणाम इति स्थितम् । तत्रेदानीं विप्रतिपत्तिराचार्याणाम् । केचिदाहुः प्रधानादनिर्देश्यस्वरूपं तत्त्वान्तरमुत्पद्यते । ततो महानिति । पतञ्जलिपञ्चाधिकरणवार्षगणानां तु प्रधानान्महानुत्पद्यते इति । तदन्येषां पुराणेतिहासप्रणेतृणां महतोऽहङ्कारो विद्यत इति पक्षः— महतोऽस्मिन्प्रत्ययकर्तृत्वाऽभ्युपगमात् । अहंकारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राणीति सर्वे । महतः षड्विशेषाः सृज्यन्ते पञ्च तन्मात्राण्यहंकारश्चेति विन्ध्यवासिमतम् । तथा अहंकारादिन्द्रियाणीति सर्वे । भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणीति पञ्चाधिकरणमतम् । एकरूपाणि तन्मात्राणीत्यन्ये । एकोत्तराणीति वार्षगण्यः । इन्द्रियाणि संस्कारविशेषयोगात्परिगृहीतरूपाणीति केचित् । परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणानीत्यपरे । विभूनीति विन्ध्यवासिमतम् । अधिकरणमपि केचित्तयोदशविधमाहुः । एकादशकमिति विन्ध्येवासी । तथाऽन्येषां महति सर्वार्थोपलब्धिः, मनसि विन्ध्यवासिनः । संकल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायनानात्वमन्येषाम्, एकत्वं विन्ध्यवासिनः । तथा करणं निलिखितस्वरूपं शून्यप्रामनदीकल्पम्, प्राकृतवैकृतिकानि तु ज्ञानानि प्रेरकाङ्गसंगृहीतानि प्रधानादागच्छन्ति । चेति पञ्चाधिकरणः न तु तथेत्यन्ये । कारणानां महती स्वाभावातिवृत्तिः प्रधानात्, स्वल्पा च स्वत इति वार्षगण्यः । सर्वा स्वत इति पञ्जालिः । सर्वा परत इति पञ्चाधिकरणः । बुद्धिः क्षणिकेति च कालान्तरावस्थायिनीत्यपरे । एवमनेकनिश्चयेष्वाचार्येषु ये तावत्प्रधानमहतोरन्तराले तत्त्वान्तरमिच्छन्ति तत्प्रतिक्षेपायाचार्यः स्वमतमुपन्यस्यति ।

Thus, on account of the negation of some other cause it is established that the modification of cosmic matter in manifest objects is meant for the conscious entity. In this regard there is the difference of opinion amongst the authorities. Some say that some other element of undefinable form arises from the cosmic matter, and then the intellect out of that. According to patanjali, pancadhikarana and varsagana, the intellect comes out of the cosmic matter. The theory of some other authors of the puranas and itihasa is that the I-notion belongs to intellect because theory accept the agency of I-notion in the intellect.<sup>1</sup> All the authorities believe that the subtle elements come out of the I-principle. The view of vindhyavasin is that the six non-specific objects, viz., the five subtle elements and the I-principle are created out of intellect. Similarly, all the authorities hold that the

organs come out of the I-principle. The view of Pancadhikarana is that the organs are elemental in nature (i.e. are produced from the elements).<sup>2</sup> The other authorities hold that the subtle elements are of one form. According to Varsaganya, they are of more than one form. Some Authorities hold the senses have assumed the form due to the particular type of past impressions. The others believe that they (the senses) are of limited magnitude. The view of Vindhyaśāstra is that they are all-pervasive. Some authorities say that their locations are also thirteen. According to Vindhyaśāstra they are eleven. According to other authorities the knowledge (or experience) of all the objects is in intellect but according to Vindhyaśāstra, it is in the mind. According to the other authorities discernment, ego-sense and determination are different but according to Vindhyaśāstra they form a single act (belonging to single organ).<sup>3</sup> According to Pancadhikarana the organs are like the deserted village and dry rivers and the innate or acquired knowledge which is collected together as (or in) the limbs of the instigator comes from the cosmic matter. The others hold that it is not so. Much surpassing their nature in case of the organs is from cosmic matter, according to Varsaganya, the less and comes from within themselves.<sup>4</sup> According to Patanjali it is from within. According to Pancadhikarana it is with an influx from outside. Some hold that the intellect is momentary while the others hold that it exists for some more time. Thus, amongst the authorities having many decided views the present authority puts forth his own view to refute the view of those who intend some other element between cosmic matter and intellect.

(Process of evolution)

प्रकृतेर्महान्

प्रकृतेर्महानुत्पद्यते । महान्बुद्धिर्मतिर्ब्रह्मापूर्तिः ख्यातिरीश्वरो विखर इति पर्यायाः । स तु देशमहत्त्वात्कालमहत्त्वाच्च महान् । सर्वोत्पाद्येभ्यो महापरिमाणयुक्तत्वान्महान् । अन्यस्य तु पक्षे नैवाहंकारो विद्यत इति प्रतिषेधविवक्षयेदमाह

ततोऽहङ्कारः

तस्मान्महतोऽहंकार उत्पद्यते ।

यः पुनराह, महतः षड्विंशेः सृज्यन्ते पञ्च तन्मात्राण्यहंकारश्चेति तन्निरासार्थमाह

तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्मादहंकारात्षोडशको गण उत्पद्यते, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि च । अनेनैव च भौतिकेन्द्रियवादी प्रतिक्षिप्तो बोद्धव्यः

तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूताति ॥ २२ ॥

तस्मादपि षोडशकाद् गणाद्यः पञ्चको गणस्ततः पञ्च महाभूतान्युत्पद्यन्ते । पूर्वपदलोपेनात्र महाभूतानीति वक्तव्ये भूतानीत्युच्यते । भूतसंज्ञा हि तन्मात्राणां न पृथिव्यादीनामत्र तु सांख्याचार्याणामविप्रतिपत्तिः भूतकौटस्थ्यादिनस्तु मीमांसका आहंताश्च । तत्रतिक्षेपेणेदमुच्यत इति ॥ २२ ॥

## INTELLECT COMES OUT OF THE COSMIC MATTER.

The intellect is born from the cosmic matter. Mahat, Buddhi, Mati, Brahmā, Apurīti, Khyatī, Isvara, Vikhara, etc., are synonyms. That is great due to the greatness of space and that of time (occupied by it). It is also great because it has more magnitude than all the other evolutes.

In the theory of others, egoism does not exist. With an intention to refute the view, the present authority states:

## FROM THAT ISSUES THE EGOISM.

From that cosmic intellect is born the cosmic I-principle. To refute the view that from the intellect is born the six non-specific objects—the five subtle elements and the egoism, the present authority states:

## FROM THAT COMES OUT THE SET OF SIXTEEN .

From that egoism is born the set of sixteen—five subtle elements and eleven organs. From this only the one who holds the elemental nature of the senses should be understood as refuted.

## FROM FIVE OF THAT SET OF SIXTEEN COME OUT FIVE, GROSS ELEMENTS

Out of that set of sixteen, from the set of five are born the five gross elements. When the first part of the compound is dropped, instead of saying the gross elements they are called the elements. There is no difference of opinion among the authorities of Samkhya that the subtle elements are technically termed as 'bhuta' and not the (gross elements) earth, etc. The Mimamsakas and the Jains hold the theory of eternity of the elements. Refuting that, it is stated like this.<sup>5</sup>

## KĀRIKĀ 22

1. In their opinion egoism is not different entity from the intellect. And the first evolute is the combined form of intellect and egoism.
2. The view is near to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
3. This is again due to the fact that the internal organ is one.
4. Surpassing the natural power may refer to the extra-ordinary power of the senses observed in our daily life.
5. Since the elements are product, they are destructible and consequently non-eternal.

## KARIKA 23

(Nature of intellect)

आह, उक्तं प्रधानाद् बुद्धिरुत्पद्यत इति । तत्र वक्तव्यं किलक्षणा पुनर्बुद्धिरिति ।

Opponent : You have stated that the intellect is born from the cosmic matter. Here, it should be stated as to of what nature the intellect is.

उच्यते

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः

कोऽयमध्यवसायः ? गौरैवायं, पुरुष एवायमिति यः प्रत्ययो निश्चयोऽर्थग्रहणं सोऽध्यवसायः ।

Proponent : THE INTELLECT IS DETERMINATION.

What is determination?

The determined knowledge of an object as 'this is the cow only' or 'This is the man only' is the determination.

(Momentariness of the intellect)

अत्र क्षणिकवाद्याह यद्यर्थग्रहणं बुद्धिः, अनित्या । कस्मात् ? हेत्वपेक्षणात् । अर्थग्रहणं हीन्द्रियादिविषयसन्निधानमावरणाद्यभावं चापेक्षते । न च नित्यस्य कारणापेक्षोपपद्यते । तस्मादनित्या बुद्धिः । अभिव्यक्तेरदोष इति चेत्स्यादेतत्तेन्द्रियसन्निधानादिभिरर्थग्रहणं जन्यते किं तदर्थभिव्यज्यत इति । तच्च नैवम् । द्विधा दोषात् । साह्यभिव्यक्तिः स्वरूपलाभो वा स्यात् ग्रहणप्रतिबन्धव्युदासो वा । किं चातः ? तद्यदि तावत्स्वरूपलाभः क्रियतेऽर्थग्रहणमिति प्राप्तम् । अर्थग्रहणप्रतिबन्धस्यान्धकारस्य व्युदासस्तदप्ययुक्तम् । विप्रतिषेधात् । ग्रहणं च स्यात्तत्प्रतिबन्धश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । किंच भेदात् । व्यङ्ग्यं हि घटादि चन्द्राकौषधमणिरत्नप्रदीपभेदान्न भिद्यते । अस्ति बुद्धीनामर्थभेदाद् भेदः । वृत्तिभेदाददोषो मृद्वदिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा मृद्वद्रव्यस्य घटादिसंस्थानवृत्तिभेदेऽप्यभेद एवं बुद्धेरिति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । अनन्यत्वात् । यदा बुद्धिरनन्या वृत्तिभ्यः, प्राप्तस्तद्भेदे बुद्धिभेदः । किंच दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः । साध्यं चैतत् किं तदेव मृद्वद्रव्यं घटादिवृत्तिभेदमनुभवति आहोस्वित्प्रत्ययान्तरवशादन्यच्चान्यच्चोत्पद्यते इति ? अवयवभेदाच्च । उपेत्य वाऽनुवृत्तिं ब्रूमः — न हि तदेकं मृद्वद्रव्यम्, किं तर्हि बहवो मृत्परमाणवोऽनेकदेशावच्छिन्नवृत्तय इति । किं चान्यत् । निवृत्तिविभक्तिग्रहणात् ।

तद्धि मृदद्रव्यं संस्थानमपेक्ष्यापि गृह्यते, न त्वर्थग्रहणमनपेक्ष्य बुद्धेर्ग्रहणमस्ति । तस्माद्विषमो दृष्टान्तः । परिणामाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् सत्त्वादीनामङ्गाङ्गिभावनियमात्तेन तेनार्थग्रहणात्मना विपरिणामो वृत्तिरिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । उभयकल्पने दोषप्रसंगात् । यदि धर्मान्तरोपादानपरित्यागौ व्यक्तव्यक्ती, दत्तौत्तर एष पक्षः । अथ नाशोत्पादौ तेन धर्मधर्मिणोरनन्यत्वाद्धर्माणां नाशोत्पादाद् बुद्धेरपि नाशोत्पादप्रसंगः । तदनभ्युपगमे वाऽन्यत्वमिति दोषः । आह च

नष्टोत्पन्नमनन्यत्वादित्यं नित्यमेव वा ।

नष्टोत्पन्नाऽविनष्टानां नित्यं तो नास्ति चैकदा ॥

यदप्युक्तम् - सत्त्वादीनामङ्गाङ्गिभावनियमादिति, तदयुक्तम् । अतएवानित्यत्वसिद्धेः । तुल्यानां गुणप्रधानभावाऽनुपपत्तेः । सत्त्वादीनामङ्गाङ्गिभावाऽभ्युपगमात् वृद्धिक्षयावभ्युपगन्तव्यौ । ततश्च बुद्धिरनित्येति प्राप्तम् । तेभ्योऽनन्यत्वात् । अथ मतं तदवस्थाप्यसौ नित्येति, न तर्हि सत्त्वद्यात्मभूता बुद्धिरिति प्राप्तम् । ततश्च कार्यकारणयोरविवेक इत्यस्य विरोधः । तस्मादनित्या बुद्धिरिति ।

Opponent : Here the upholders of the theory of momentariness object if the intellect is the knowledge of an object, it is non-eternal.

Why ?

Because it requires a cause. The knowledge of an object requires the proximity of the senses, etc., with the object and absence of cover, etc., (over the object). The expectancy of the cause, etc., is not justified (possible) in the case of an eternal object. Therefore, the intellect is non-eternal.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because of the manifestation ? It may be like this. The knowledge of the object is not produced by the proximity of the senses. On the contrary, it is manifested (only) *This is also not so, because it involves twofold defect.* That manifestation may be either the attainment of its essential form or removal of obstruction in knowledge.<sup>1</sup> What difference does it make? If it is considered to be the attainment of the essential form, it comes to mean that the knowledge of the object is produced. If you consider it to be the removal of the darkness which obstructs the knowledge of the object, that will also be wrong, because it involves contradiction. It is contradictory to say that it is knowledge and has an obstruction at a time. *Moreover, because of the difference.* The revealed object, viz., a pot does not change due to the difference of moon, sun, medicinal herbs, a gem, a pearl or a lamp. However, there is the difference in knowledge due to the difference of object.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because the difference is caused by the function ? It may be like this. Just as the earth does not change even when there is the change is its modifications in the form of the arrangement like a pot, there may be no change in the intellect also. That is also wrong, *because of their being identical.*<sup>2</sup> When the intellect is identical with the modifications the difference in modification comes to be the difference in that also.<sup>3</sup> *Moreover, the example is not established.* It is still to be proved as to whether the same earth undergoes the difference of modifications like pot, etc., or it is produced a fresh in case of each modification, because the knowledge arises as different. *Moreover, because of the difference of the components.* Or granting the continuity, we say that the earth is not one. On the contrary they are earth-atoms occupying many spaces. *Moreover, because of the knowledge without the help and with the help.* That earth substance is known with the help of particular arrangement also, but there is no knowledge of the intellect without the help of the knowledge of the objects.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the example is dissimilar.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because of the modification? It may be like this. Because of the rule of relationship of being principal and subordinate in case of Sattva, etc., the modification in the form of the knowledge of the object (in the form of those various states) is called the modification. This is also wrong. There arises the defect in both types of the postulations. If the manifest and the unmanifest (forms) are the acquisition and the giving up of the other attributes respectively, theory has already been refuted. If they mean the destruction and origination (of the other attributes), since the attribute and its locus are one, there will arise the undesirable contingency of the destruction and origination of the intellect with the destruction and the origination of attributes. Or, If it (the identity) is not accepted, there would be the defect of their being different. It is stated also: (The object) being identical with the one destroyed and produced will be either non-eternal or eternal. And in our theory there is eternity of the objects destroyed and produced as also not destroyed at a time.<sup>5</sup>

Your statement that 'on account of the rule of relationship of subordinate and principal in respect of sattva, etc.', is also wrong, *because the non-eternity is proved consequently.* Because there is no possibility of the relationship of principal and subordinate in the case of those which are equal. Through the acceptance of the state of subordinate and principal, the increase and decrease should be ac-



cepted in the sattva, etc. Through this, the intellect comes to be non-eternal because it is not different from them.<sup>6</sup> If you hold that the intellect situated in that state also is eternal, it comes to mean that the intellect is not of the form of sattva, etc. Then will be the contradiction with the theory of non-distinction between the effect and the cause. Therefore, the intellect is non-eternal.

उच्यते—यत्तावदुक्तं हेत्वपेक्षणादनित्या बुद्धिरिति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सिद्धसाधनात् । कस्याऽत्र विप्रतिपत्तिरनित्या वा बुद्धिः स्यान्नित्या वेति ? किं तर्हि हेतुमदनित्यं व्यक्तमिति वचनादनित्यैव । तस्मादिष्टमेवैतत्सङ्गृहीतम् । अतएव क्षणिकत्वमिति चेत्, अथापि स्याद्धेतुत्वपेक्षा हि संस्कृतत्वम् । संस्कृतं च क्षणिकम् । तद्यथा प्रदीप इति । तस्मादनित्ये सत्येपि विशेषाऽनभिधाने क्षणिकत्वमेवानेन हेतुना बुद्धेः प्रतिपाद्यत इति । कस्मात् ? उत्तरवचनविरोधप्रसंगात् । एवमपि यदुत्तरं क्षणिकत्वप्रसिद्धयर्थमुच्यते प्रत्यग्रहणाऽन्यत्वादनित्येत्यादि तस्यानर्थक्यम् । तस्मात् पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धत्वात्सकलमेवेदं प्रकरणं नाध्ययनं, न प्रत्याख्यानमर्हति । परेषां त्वभिनिष्ठा बुद्धिरत्रेत्यसंगतार्थोत्तरापवाददोषमनपेक्ष्यापि प्रत्येकमप्येतदसाधनम्, वृत्तिविषयत्वात् । स्वकारणपरिनिष्पन्नाया हि बुद्धेरव्यापारोऽर्थग्रहणसंज्ञक इन्द्रियादिसन्निधानापेक्षो न बुद्धिः । तदनन्यत्वात्संगनिवृत्तिरिति चेदथमतम्, वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरनन्यत्वादित्यमपि कल्पयित्वाऽयं प्रसंगो न निवर्तते । तथा चोक्तम्—स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्येति (का. २९) । तदप्यबाधकम् । कस्मात् ? उपचारात् । सत्यमनन्या, वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्भेदेनाऽग्रहणात्, तथाप्युपरतव्यापारस्यापि परश्वादेवृत्तिमतः स्वरूपं नोपरमतीति भेदमुपचर्य व्यवहारो नानाकार्यविषयः प्रवर्तते । अतएवाऽन्यत्वप्रसंग इति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यतो वृत्त्युपरमे वृत्तिमतोऽनुपरमः कार्यनानात्वं च अतएवाऽन्यत्वमपि स्यादिति तदयुक्तम्, एकान्तात् । तद्यथा सेनापङ्क्तिसेनाकुण्डलाद्युपरमे न तत्सन्निवेशिनामुपरमः कार्यभेदश्च, न चाऽन्यत्वम् । एवं वृत्तितद्वतोरपि च स्यात् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतद्धेतुत्वपेक्षणस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वात् बुद्धेरनित्यत्वमिति । एतेन व्यक्तिकल्पः प्रत्युक्तः, सोऽपि वृत्तिविषय इति कृत्वा तदयुक्तमिन्द्रियादिभेदे भेदादिति । तदप्यनेनैवोक्तम् । वृत्तिभेदोऽत्र न भेद इति । किं चानेकान्तात् । यथोदकादिभेदात्प्रतिबिम्बभेदो न चाऽव्यङ्ग्यत्वमेवमन्यत्रापि स्यात् । द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तेरदोष इति चेत्स्यान्मतम्, उदकस्याननसंयोगाद् द्रव्यान्तरमेव प्रतिबिम्बलक्षणमुत्पद्यते न तु मुखं भिद्यते इति असदेतत् । कस्मात् ? उभयोः कारणत्वेन कल्पनाऽनुपपत्तेः । न हि मुखं निमित्तं शक्यं वक्तुम्, विप्रकृष्टत्वात्सादादयो मुखापगमेऽप्युपलब्धिप्रसंगात्पाकजवत् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं वृत्तिभेदाददोषो मुद्रतिदि तथा तदस्तु । यत्तूक्तमनन्यत्वाद दृष्टान्ताऽसिद्धेश्चेति वृत्त्यनन्यत्वमिदानीमेव प्रत्युक्तम् । क्षणभङ्गप्रतिषेधे चोक्तं न पृथिव्यादीनामन्यथा चान्यथा चोत्पत्तिः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं नैकं मृदद्रव्यमिति तत्र बुद्धिः प्रमाणम् । यदेकबुद्धिनिमित्तं तदेकं, तत्र यदि मृदोऽनेकत्वेन प्रयोजनं बुद्धिरूपलभ्यते—वयमिति । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम्, मृदद्रव्यस्य संस्थानव्यतिरेकेण स्वभावोऽवधार्यते न तु बुद्धेरर्थग्रहणमन्तरेण स्वरूपग्रहणमिति, तदयुक्तम् । अभावस्याऽरूपत्वात् । उपेत्य वा

यथा बाह्यादयवस्थासु व्याकारा चित्तसन्ततिः ।  
विद्यते बीजमात्रा वस्तथा धीरिति गृह्यताम् ॥

यथा बाह्यार्थाकारवचित्तसन्ततिरथ च सुप्तमूर्छितविरोधसमापन्नानामर्थरूपादृते बीजमात्राऽस्तीत्युपगम्यते सा चित्तापि वाऽवस्थेति वचनात्, न च गृह्यते तथा बुद्धिरपीति कस्मात् परिकल्प्यते ? यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम् यदि धर्मोन्तरोपादानपरित्यागौ व्यक्तव्यक्ती दत्तोत्तर एष पक्ष इति । तदितरत्र तुल्यम् । अस्माभिरपि तदर्थसत्कार्यप्रत्याख्याने दत्तोत्तर एष पक्षो व्यक्तितरं क्रियते इति । नाशोत्पादौ तु अनिष्टावेवेति न परिहारं प्रत्यादरः क्रियते । यदप्युक्तं नष्टादुत्पन्नाच्चाऽनष्टमनुत्पन्नं चान्यन्नास्तीति तदयुक्तम्, अनभ्युपगमात् । नाशोत्पादौ कः प्रतिजानीते यं प्रत्येतदर्थवत्स्यात्, ? किं च त्वत्पक्षप्राप्तेः । भवत एव नष्टोत्पन्नेभ्यः स्कन्धेभ्यो नान्या सन्ततिरथ च नास्ति दोषः । कयाऽपि युक्तया स्यादेतदन्यैवासाविति ततश्चैका सन्ततिरिति हीनम् । यदप्युक्तं गुणवृद्धिक्षयेऽनित्यत्वमिति तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? रूपान्तराप्यायनात् । सत्त्वं हि प्रकर्षमनुभवद्रजस्तमसी च न्यूनतां धर्मादिरूपां बुद्धेरप्याययन्ति, नार्थान्तरं कुर्वन्ति नो खल्वप्यभावम्, एवं रजस्तमो वा प्रकर्षमनुभवत्सत्त्वं च न्यूनताधर्मादिरूपं बुद्धेरप्याययन्ति, नार्थान्तरं कुर्वन्ति नाभावम् । एवं गुणवृद्धिक्षयेऽपि रूपान्तराप्यायनान्नास्ति क्षयो बुद्धेः । तत्र यदुक्तं हेत्वपेक्षणादनित्या बुद्धिरिति एतदयुक्तम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं प्रत्यक्षग्रहणान्यत्वात्प्रतिक्षणं दीपादितैलधारासु शब्दभेदाच्च क्षणिकेति, अत्र ब्रूमः—ग्रहणान्यत्वे चोक्तं वृत्तिभेदो न वृत्तिमद्भेदः । किं चान्यत् । भिन्नार्थग्रहणैकत्वात् । उपेत्य वा ब्रूमः—यदि प्रत्यर्थमन्यदन्यद् ग्रहणं कल्प्यते, विकल्पबाधसमुच्चयसंशयद्वित्वातिशयनिवारणेषु, तथा कल्पांशुं शबलं चित्रमित्यनेकार्थरूपमेकं ग्रहणं न स्यात् । दृष्टं तत् । तस्मान्नाऽयं क्षणकत्वे हेतुः । एवमवस्थितिमिदं—अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्न च क्षणिकेति ।

Proponent : Your statement that the intellect is non-eternal because it requires a cause, is wrong.

Why ?

Because it proves the thesis already established. Whose difference of opinion is there as to whether the intellect is non-eternal or eternal? On the contrary, it is non-eternal on account of the statement that the manifest caused and non-eternal (Ka. 10). Therefore, you have stated which is acceptable also to us.

If you argue that it is momentary on account of the very reason (of the fact of being non-eternal)? It may be like this. The created is one which requires a cause. And, whatever is created, is momentary just as the lamp. Therefore, though it is non-eternal, yet in the absence of a specific statement the momentariness is established through this reason.

Why ?

There will arise the undesirable contingency of the contradiction with the latter statement. Even in this way there will be the meaninglessness of the reason adduced to establish the momentariness, viz., since the knowledge of every object is different, it (the intellect) is non-eternal.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, due to its involving contradiction earlier and later, the whole section deserves neither to be studied nor to be refuted. Each of the argument in the theory of the existence of the intellect does not prove (the momentariness of the intellect even after ignoring the defect of irrelevance of the matter and removal of further arguments, because it is relating to the modifications. The function of the intellect (viz., the knowledge of the objects) requires the proximity of the senses and not the intellect.

If you argue that the undesirable contingency is not alleviated because of the theory of non-difference of that (function)? It may be like this. Even postulating like this the undesirable contingency is not alleviated because of your theory of non-difference between the function and the agent. It is stated also 'this is the individual function of the three' (k. 29). This also does not obstruct.

Why ?

*Because of the metaphorical expression.* It is true that the function is non-different from the agent because the two are not cognised separately, but still, the practice regarding various activities goes on after attributing the difference just as the real nature of the axe which is an instrument is not destroyed when its activities are over. If it is argued that with a consequence of this there arises the undesirable contingency of their difference? It may be like this. Since there is no destruction of the agent when the functions are over and there is the multiplicity of the activities (performed by the same agent), there may be the difference between the two. That is also wrong, because it is not conclusive. Just as there is no destruction of the objects involved (viz., army) when the queue or the circle of the army is destroyed, there is the difference in activity also, and there is no difference (between the two).<sup>8</sup> The same may be the case between the function and the functioning agent. Therefore, it is right that since the object which requires a cause is applicable to the function, there is no non-eternity of the intellect. Through this only is replied the alternatives regarding individuals. That is also applicable to the function only and, hence, it is also said that it differs due to the difference of the senses, etc. This is also refuted through this only; the difference relates to the functions and there is no difference in it. *Moreover, because of its being non-conclusive.* Just as the reflection

differs due to the difference of water etc., and it is not that there is no reflectable object, similar may be the case at other places also.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because of the production of other fresh object ? It may be like this. There is the production of the other fresh object in the form of the reflection, but the face does not differ. It is wrong, because there is no justification of the postulation of both as the cause. The face cannot be said to be a cause because since nose, etc., dominate, there will arise the undesirable contingency of the knowledge of face even when the face is removed away from the mirror as is the case with the atoms produced from warming. The statement that the defect does not arise due to the difference of the function as is the case with the clay may be accepted as it is the statement that the function is non-different because they are not differently cognised and the example is not yet established is refuted just now. It is stated while refuting the momentariness also that the earth, etc., are not born a fresh every moment. As regards the statement that the substance, viz., the earth is not one, the knowledge serves as the proof there. That which causes a single knowledge is single ..... The statement that the nature the earth is determined without its different arrangement but the nature of the intellect is not known without the knowledge of the object, is wrong because there is no definite form of the negation.

You have stated as :

"As the continuous flow of thought when not transformed into the external situations exists in the form of seed only in your theory, similarly, should be known the intellect."

Even granting this statement (we have to state as follows). Just as it is admitted that the continuous flow of thought which is possessed of (or is like) the external object exists in the form of the seed without the form of the object in the case of them who have attained the state of sleep, infatuation or contradiction (i.e., when some contradictory knowledge arises in them) because you have stated that that also is some form in the consciousness. And, that (form) is not known. How is the same case not postulated with the intellect ? As regards your statement 'if the states of manifestation and non-manifestation refer to acquirement or giving up of the qualities', the view is already replied to ; (we say) that is common at other place also (i.e., in our theory also). The theory is replied by us in the context of refuting the theory of prior non-existence of the effect, that the manifestation is not produced. The destruction and production

are not desired by us also and there is required no effort to alleviate the objection. Your statement that the non-destroyed and non-produced is not different from destroyed and produced, is wrong because it is not accepted by us. Who admits destruction and origination to him it would be meaningful. Moreover, because it is applicable to your theory. In your theory only the continuous flow of thought is not different from the created object but still there is no fault (admitted by you). If by any argument it is proved that this is different from that, then the theory that there is only one continuous flow, will be abandoned. Your statement that it is non-eternal due to the increase and decrease in the constituents, is wrong.

Why ?

Because they get some other form. When Sattva dominates and the Rajas and the Tamas become less, they attain, the form of the intellect which is of the nature of virtue, etc. Neither do they create some other object nor do they come to an end. Similarly, when the Rajas and Tamas become dominant and the Sattva as dominated, they attain vice as form of the intellect; neither they create something fresh nor do they destroy it. In this way, since there is the attainment of another form, there is no destruction of the intellect even when the constituents are decreased or increased. The statement that intellect is non-eternal as it requires a cause, is also wrong. To the statement that intellect is non-eternal because in the case of the lamp and continuous line of oil, the difference at every moment is directly perceived and because the word differs (in each case), we reply we have already stated that in case knowledge differs, it is the difference in function and not in the agent. Moreover, because of the non-difference while knowing many objects. Even accepting it, we state if the knowledge is postulated to be different in respect of every object, there would not be a single knowledge having many things as object in case of alternative, condition, contradiction, collection (of many objects of knowledge) doubt, two-ness, excellence and negation, as in the case that the deer is spotted and having variegated colours This is, however, perceived. Therefore, this is not a reason to prove momentariness. In this way, it is settled that the intellect is determination and it is not momentary.

बुद्धेस्तु त्रिगुणात्मकत्वात्तस्य तस्य गुणस्य प्रकर्षे तत्तद्रूपान्तरमुत्पद्यते इति ।

Since the intellect is composed of three constituents, particular form with the dominance of particular constituents is produced (in it).

(Form of Intellect with the dominance of sattva)

आह, कस्य गुणस्य प्रकर्षे बुद्धेः किं लक्षणं रूपान्तरमुपजायते ?

Opponent : With the dominance of which constituent what kind of form of intellect is produced?

इत्युच्यते

धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग एश्वर्यम् ।

सात्त्विकमेतद् रूपम्

अत्र त्वेतद्रूपमिति सत्यपि धर्मादिभेदे बुद्धिरित्यभेदविवक्षाविषय एकवचननिर्देशः क्रियते । एतदुक्तं भवित यदा रजस्तमसी वशमापाद्य बुद्धिगतं सत्त्वमुत्कृष्टं भवति तदा धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग एश्वर्यमित्येतद्रूपं भवति । तत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितानां कर्मणामनुष्ठानाद् बुद्धयवस्थः सत्त्वावयव आशयभूतो धर्म इत्युच्यते । स तु द्विविधः । ब्रह्मादिस्थानेष्वभिप्रेतशरीरेन्द्रियविषयोपभोगनिर्वर्तको ज्ञानाद्यङ्गभूतश्च प्रथमः । अग्निहोत्रहवनादिक्रियानुष्ठानसाधनो यमनियमसाधन इतरः । तत्राऽहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयमकल्कता ब्रह्माचर्यमिति पञ्च यमाः । अक्रोधो गुरुशुश्रूषा शौचमाहारलाघवमप्रमाद इति पञ्च नियमाः । एतेषामविलोपेनाऽनुष्ठानाद्यतेरेवविधोत्तरणे सत्त्वधर्म आशयतां प्रतिपद्यते, पो ज्ञानादीनां रूपाणामप्यायनं करोति । एतदभ्युदयनिः श्रेयसयोः सोपानभूतं प्रथमं पर्व । यत्राऽयमवस्थितो यतिरितरेषां पर्वणामनुष्ठाने योग्यो भवति । ज्ञानं द्विविधं शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं च । तत्र शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमानागमरूपम् । गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं च द्विविधं अपूर्वमभ्यासजं च । तयोरपूर्वम्— ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनमिति (का. ५१) सिद्धिकाण्डाऽनुपतितानि प्रमाणानि । अभ्यासजं पुनः वैराग्यपूर्वावजयपृष्ठलब्धं शान्तममलं ध्रुवं सकलभवाऽभप्रतिपक्षभूतम् । यदाचार्यो वक्ष्यति—

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नाऽस्मि न मे नाऽहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानमिति ॥ (का. ६४)

विरागस्तु रागप्रतिपक्षभूतो ज्ञानाभ्यासोपजनितो बुद्धेः प्रसादः । तस्य तु यतमानव्यतिरेकैकेन्द्रियवशीकारलक्षणाश्चतस्रोऽवस्था भवन्ति । तत्रेन्द्रियाणां विषयाभिलाषलक्षणकषायपाचनं प्रति यः प्रयत्न उत्साहः सा यतमानसंज्ञा । यतमानको ह्ययमस्मिन्वर्षणवस्थितो यतिर्भवति । यदा तु केषांचिदिन्द्रियाणां परिपक्वं सा व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा । व्यतिरिच्यन्ते हि तदा यतेरिन्द्रियाणि परिपक्वाण्यपरिपक्वेभ्यो विशिष्टतराणि भवन्तीत्यर्थः । विपरिपक्वसर्वेन्द्रियस्तु संकल्पमात्रावस्थिकषायो यदा भवति तदैकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा । निवृत्तसर्वेन्द्रियविषयेच्छस्य यतेरेकमेव मनोलक्षणमिन्द्रियं तदा परिपक्वं भवति । संकल्पमात्रावस्थितस्यापि परिपाको वशीकारसंज्ञा । संकल्पमूलोच्छिन्नविषयमृगतृष्णो हि अयं यतिरिन्द्रियाणामन्तः करणस्य च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरीष्टे । एकाग्र एकारामोऽविद्यापर्वणोऽतिक्रान्तः, परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रत्यनन्तरो भवति । तदेवं चतुरवस्थं वैराग्यपर्वं विज्ञाय तदनुष्ठानाय यतिः प्रयतेत ॥ तस्योपायो दृष्टानु

श्रविकविषयप्रत्याख्याने य उपदिष्टो यश्च तुष्टिषु वक्ष्यमाणस्तमेकीकृत्योत्तरोत्तरां । तत्त्वभूमिं विज्ञानस्य विषयीकुर्वन्पूर्वस्यां तत्त्वभूमौ मध्यस्थः स्यात् । ऐश्वर्यमप्रतिघातलक्षणम्, यत्तुन-  
रष्टविधं अणिमा महिमा लघिमा गरिमा प्राप्तिः प्राकाम्यमीशित्वं वशित्वं यत्रकामावसायि-  
त्वमिति । अत्राणिमा, महिमा, लघिमा, गरिमेति भूतवैशेषिकम् । बुद्धेस्तु प्राप्यादि ।  
एवमेतच्चतुर्विधं महतः सात्त्विकं रूपमिति ।

Proponent : VIRTUE, KNOWLEDGE, NON-ATTACHMENT  
AND LORDLY POWERS—THIS IS THE FORM (OF  
THE TELLECT) WHEN SATTVA DOMINATES.

In the expression 'this is form, etc.', the mention is through sin-  
gular to suggest that even though the virtue, etc., differ, the intellect  
is the object desired to be one. This is to be stated. When the sattva  
present in the intellect dominates after controlling the rajas and  
tamas, the intellect becomes of the form of virtue, knowledge, non-  
attachment and lordly powers.<sup>9</sup> The virtue is the sattva situated as a  
component in the intellect when it has become the impression of the  
performance of the acts prescribed in the śruti and the smṛti. That is  
of two types. The first is that which causes the enjoyment of the  
desired body, senses and the objects in the world of Brahmā, and is  
the part of or is secondary to the knowledge.etc., and the other is  
that which is accomplished through the performance of the ritualis-  
tic acts like offering oblation to the sacrificial fire and is ac-  
complished through restraints, and observance. The restraints are  
five, viz., non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, non-meanness or non-  
wickedness and sexual restraints.<sup>10</sup> The observations are five, viz.,  
absence of anger, service to the preceptor, purity, eating less and  
non-carelessness.<sup>11</sup> Through the uninterrupted practice of these the  
quality of sattva comes to be an impression and it causes the attain-  
ment of forms of intellect like knowledge. This is the first phase serv-  
ing as a first step to worldly prosperity and liberation. A monk  
situated at this phase becomes able to practise for the other phases.  
Knowledge is of two kinds; of the nature of knowledge of word, etc.,  
and of the nature of knowledge of discrimination between con-  
stituents and conscious entity.<sup>12</sup> That of the nature of knowledge of  
word, etc., is of the form of perception, inference and verbal tes-  
timony. The knowledge in the form of discrimination between con-  
scious entity and constituents is also of two kinds : innate and  
generated through practice. Out of them the innate is—the means of  
knowledge falling under the discussion (chapter) of attainments as  
'reasoning, oral instruction and study' etc. That generated through  
practice is caused by non-attachment, is calm, pure, everlasting and

contradictory to all the worldly (produced) and non-worldly (non-  
produced) objects. The authority will himself state it as:

"Thus, through the repeated practice of truth there arises the  
knowledge in the form 'I am not', 'nothing is mine', and 'not I'—the  
knowledge which is pure on account of absence of contradiction and  
is absolute."<sup>13</sup>

Non-attachment is opposite to attachment. It is the limpidity of  
intellect brought about by the practice of knowledge. There are four  
states of it, viz., effort, discrimination, pertaining to a single sense  
and control. The state of effort is the effort or resolution to bring to  
maturity the passion in the form of the desire for the object of senses.  
The person engaged in this effort and present at this phase becomes  
an ascetic. When there is the abandonment (lit. maturity) of the ob-  
jects of some senses only, the state of non-attachment is called dis-  
crimination. Then, the senses of an ascetic which are warded off  
(from some objects) discriminate i.e. become more particular  
towards (warding off) the objects which are not given up. When one  
attains the state in which all the senses are warded off (from their ob-  
jects) and the passion remains in the form of thought only, that state  
is called pertaining to a single sense. Then, the only sense called  
mind is warded off in case of an ascetic who has given up the desires  
for the objects of all the senses. The abandonment of the attachment  
present in the thought also is the state called control. The ascetic in  
this state has cut as under the mirage of the object from the root  
which is the thought and becomes lord of the activities and cessation  
of the activities of the senses as well as the internal organs. (In this  
state) non concentrates at one, rejoices in one, goes beyond (cross-  
es) the phase of ignorance and becomes identical with the supreme  
Brahman.<sup>14</sup> Thus, knowing the phase of non-attachment having four  
states an ascetic should try for accomplishing it. The means of it is  
like this. Combining the means taught (prescribed) for renouncing  
the objects—perceptible and taught in the scriptures and those  
taught (prescribed) in respect of the contentment which will be ex-  
plained later on, one should make the higher state of Reality as the  
object of knowledge and should become indifferent to the earlier  
(lower) one. The lordly power is of the nature of non-obstruction  
which is of eight forms : atomic character, grandeur, buoyancy,  
gravity, approach, fulfilment of desires, sovereignty or superimacy  
and infallibility of desires. Here, atomic character, grandeur, buoyan-  
cy and gravity are the particular qualities of the elements and of the  
intellect are the approach, etc. In this way is the fourfold form of in-

telleet abounding in Sattva.

(Form of intellect of tamas with dominance)

आह, अथ गुणान्तररूपं किम् ?

Opponent : What is the form of the intellect with the dominance of the other constituents ?

उच्यते

तामसमस्माद् विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

एतत् अस्माद्धर्मदिः सत्त्वरूपाद्विपर्यस्तं तामसं तमप्रकर्षोपजनितमित्यर्थः । अत्र शास्त्रचोदितानुष्ठानादाशयनिष्पन्नसत्त्वावयवो धर्म इत्युक्तम् । शास्त्रचोदितस्य नित्यस्य च कर्मणोऽनुष्ठानाद् बुद्ध्यवस्थस्तमोऽवयव आशयतां प्रतिपन्नोऽधर्मः । स चापि द्विविधः—अनिष्टशरीरेन्द्रियविषयोपभोगनिर्वर्तकः, ख्यातिवारकश्च । यथा च ज्ञानं द्विविधं शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं चैवमज्ञानमपि विपर्ययेण वाच्यम् । यथा च चतुरवस्थं वैराग्यं तथा यतमानादिकश्चतुरवस्थो रागः यथा चाऽष्टगुणमैश्वर्यमणिमादि तथाऽष्टगुणमनैश्वर्यमेवमेतत्तामसं महतो रूपम् । यच्चैतदधर्मादिनिमित्तभूतमुत्कृष्टं तमोरूपं तद्रजसा सहाऽविरोधादेकतामिवापन्नमशुद्धिरित्याचार्यैः पठ्यते । सत्त्वरूपं तु प्रकाश इति । अनयोश्चाभिधानाद्यः पञ्चाधिकरणपक्षः प्राकृतवैकृतानां ज्ञानानां प्रधानवच्छुष्कनदीस्थानीयान्तःकरणे बाह्ये च प्रेरकज्ञानांशककृत उपनिपातः तथा सात्त्विकस्थित्यात्मककृतमप्रत्ययस्याऽवस्थानमिति तत्प्रतिक्षिप्तं भवति । किं कारणं ? यस्मादशुद्धिरेव प्रकाशमलमतिप्रवृत्तं निवर्तयितुं प्रकर्षपन्नाऽन्याभूता च प्रवर्तयितुम् । इत्येवमष्टरूपा बुद्धिर्व्याख्याता ॥ २३ ॥

Proponent : THE FORM WHEN THE TAMAS DOMINATES IS REVERSE TO IT.

This is reverse to the virtue, etc., which are of the form of sattva, and is abounding in tamas which means that it is born by the dominance of tamas. Here, virtue is said to be the parts of the sattva brought about (to dominance) by the impressions of the acts prescribed in the scriptures.<sup>15</sup> Vice is the part of tamas present in the intellect (and) brought (to dominance) by the impressions due to non-performance of the daily duties and the acts prescribed in the scriptures. That is also of two kinds : that which causes the undesirable body, senses, objects, and that which wards off (or puts an impediment to) the discriminative knowledge. As the knowledge is of two kinds of the form of the knowledge of the word, etc., and of the form of the discriminative knowledge of the constituents and the conscious entity; the absence of knowledge should also be stated as reverse to it . Just as the non-attachment is in four states called ef-

fort, etc., the attachment also is of four states. Just as the lordly power is of eight kinds, the absence of lordly powers is also of eight kinds. Thus, it is the form of the intellect dominated by tamas. The form in which sattva dominates is called light. Due to the mention of these the following view of Pāñcādhikarapa is refuted. The innate and the acquired knowledges are laid down by the part of the knowledge of the imperator in the internal and external organs which like cosmic matter are like the dry river, and thus is made the situation abounding in sattva for the principle which is (really) benefit of cognitions.

What is the reason here ?

Because the impurity itself is enough to obstruct the light in its increased form and to induce the other (opposite) dominant form. Thus is explained the intellect having eight forms.



## KĀRIKĀ 23

1. The first can be exemplified as the production of a pot, and the second as the removal of darkness, etc. , which obstruct the knowledge of the pot.
2. The sense is that the modification does not bring some change in the substratum. For example, in various types of pots the clay remains the same.
3. This objection is based upon the distortion of Sāṃkhya view about the mutual relation of modification and its substratum. They are not absolutely identical as implied in the argument, but there is in fact, the relation of identity-cum-difference between them.
4. The meaning is that the modification and its substratum are separately observed in case of earth and, hence, their distinction can be known while such a distinction is never observed in case of the intellect and its modification because the intellect is never observed without modification so that the two may be distinguished.
5. Avinaṣṭa should be understood in the sense of existing objects which are liable for destruction though are not yet destroyed.
6. The increase or decrease in the constituents would imply the change and destruction of the intellect.
7. The sense is if the intellect is proved to be momentary through its being non-eternal only, the other reason to prove the momentariness of the intellect would be purposeless.
8. The actions of the army when arranged in a queue and when arranged in a circle are different.
9. Thus, knowledge, virtue, etc. , are the forms of the intellect and are located in it.
10. Cf. Yogasūtra 2.30. In the Yogasūtra we find non-hoarding in the place of akalkatā.
11. A different list of observances is found in the Yogasūtra 2.32.
12. The division is based upon the object to be cognised. The first cognised the worldly objects while the latter cognises the metaphysical truth.

13. S. K. 64.
14. The statement is indicative of the upanisadic influence on this text. It does not correspond to the Sāṃkhya terminology.
15. The virtue is neither the performance of scriptural act nor the impressions of these acts, but the sattva which dominates as having the impressions.



## KĀRIKĀ 24

(NATURE OF EGOISM)

यस्त्वसावनन्तरमुक्तोऽहङ्कारस्तं व्याख्यास्यामः ।

Now we shall explain the egoism which is mentioned after (the intellect)<sup>1</sup>

आह, यद्येवं तस्मादिदमेव तावदुच्यतां किमस्याहङ्कारस्य लक्षणमिति ?

Opponent : If it is so, you should state at this state only what is the definition of egoism.

उच्यते -

अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः

कर्तुं स्वात्मप्रत्ययमवमर्शात्मको योऽयमहमिति प्रत्यय उत्पद्यते स खल्वहङ्कारः, महत्तत्त्वान्तरम् । कस्मात् ? तस्य सर्वविषयाध्यवसायरूपत्वात्, अस्य तु स्वात्मप्रत्ययमवमर्शात् । न त्वर्थान्तरम् । कस्मात् ? प्रकृतिविकारयोरनन्यत्वाऽभ्युपगमात् । न हि नः प्रकृतेरर्थान्तरभूतो विकार इति प्राग्विस्तरेण प्रतिपादितम् । स च मूर्तिप्रत्ययाभ्यां महतः स्थूलतरः । कस्मात् ? अविभागात्, विभागनिष्पत्तेः कालादिवत् । त्रिगुणस्य च महतो विकारत्वादसावपि त्रिगुणः । कस्मात् ? प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारे दृष्टत्वात् तन्तुपटवत् । तद्भावसन्निविष्टास्तु ये सत्त्वा दयस्य आचार्यैवैकारिकतैजसभूतादिशब्देनाख्यायन्ते । तथा च शास्त्रमाह "एतस्माद्धि महत् आत्मन इमे त्रय आत्मानः सृज्यन्ते वैकारिकतैजसभूतादयोऽहङ्कारलक्षणाः । अहमित्येवैषां सामान्यलक्षणं भवति । गुणप्रवृत्तौ च पुनर्विशेषलक्षणमिति" ।

Proponent : THE EGOISM IS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Egoism is the cognition 'I am' in the form of reflecting upon his own self arising in the agent.

It is a different category from intellect.

Why ?

Because the intellect is of the nature of ascertainment of all the objects and this (egoism) reflects upon its own self. However, it is not (essentially) different (in nature) from the intellect.

Why ?

Because of the acceptance of the identity of the cause and its modification. It is established in detail earlier that the modification is not totally a different object (in essence) from the cause. That is more gross than the intellect in respect of form and knowledge.

Why ?

*Because of the non-separation.* Because the separation is not possible in time, etc. Since it is a modification of intellect which is composed of three constituents, it is also possessed of three constituents.

Why ?

Because the nature of the cause is observed in the modification as in the case with the threads and the cloth.

The sattva, etc., present in the form of that egoism are technically called by the authorities to be the Vaikārika, taijas and bhūtādi.<sup>2</sup> The scripture states, "From this great self are born these three selves.....vaikārika, taijas and bhūtādi in the form of egoism. The general characteristic of these is the notion 'I am' and when the constituents (composing that) become active, (they attain) the particular characteristics."<sup>3</sup>

(Evolution from egoism)

आह, का पुनर्गुणप्रवृत्तिर्यस्यामस्मिप्रत्ययैकरूपस्याऽहङ्कारस्य विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीति ?

Opponent : What is the activity of the constituents in which there arises the particular and different (type of) knowledge concerning the egoism which is (actually) of a single form, i.e., the notion 'I am'.

उच्यते - योऽयं

तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।

द्विविध इन्द्रियलक्षणस्तन्मात्रलक्षणश्च । सा गुणप्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते । कस्मात् ? तत्कार्यत्वात् । गुणप्रवृत्तिकार्यो हि सर्गः । दृश्यते च खलु लोके कार्यकारणमुपचर्यमाणम् । तद्यथा शालीन्भुङ्क्त इति ।

Proponent : FROM THAT PROCEEDS THE EVOLUTION OF TWO KINDS.

That of two kinds is in the form of the senses and in the form of the subtle elements. That (evolution) is called the activity of the

constituents.

Why ?

Because of being the effect of that. The evolution is the effect of the activity of the constituents. The cause is observed in the world as metaphorically spoken as effect; for example, in the expression like 'he eats the unhusked rice'.

आह, प्रागुक्तमहंकाराद्योडशको गण उत्पद्यते । इदानीं पुनरुच्यते तस्माद्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः । तदिदं पूर्वोत्तरव्याघातादयुक्तमिति ।

Opponent : Earlier you have stated that the group of sixteen originates from egoism. Now it is stated that two kinds of evolution proceeds from that . It is wrong because of the contradiction involved in earlier and latter (statements).

उच्यते—न, सामान्येन विवक्षितत्वात् ।

अभेदविवक्षायां हि कृत्वा कार्यकारणलक्षणमेवमस्माभिरुपदिष्टं द्विविधः सर्ग इति । भेदविवक्षायां पुनः

ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकस्तान्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥

इन्द्रियाणामयमैन्द्रियः एकादश परिमाणस्य एकादशकः । एवं तन्मात्रेषु वक्तव्यम् । तन्मात्राणां शब्दस्पर्शादीनामयं तान्मात्रः सर्गः । पञ्चकश्च पञ्च परिमाणस्येति पञ्चकः । अस्य तु षोडशकस्य विकारस्य संज्ञालक्षणप्रयोजनान्युत्तरत्र वक्ष्यति । एषा गुणप्रवृत्तिर्व्याख्याता । यस्यामस्मिप्रत्ययस्य विशेषग्रहणं भवति—शब्देऽहं स्पर्शेऽहं रूपेऽहं रसेऽहं गन्धेऽहमिति ।

Proponent : No, because it is desired to be stated in general . With an intention of speaking without (further differentiation it is stated by us here that there are two kinds of evolution in the form of effect and cause. And, when the differentiation is intended to be stated:

#### THE SET OF ELEVEN CONSISTING OF THE SENSES, AND THE GROUP OF THE FIVE SUBTLE ELEMENTS.

The term 'consisting of the senses' denotes 'of the senses'. The term 'set of eleven means that which is of the measurement (number) of eleven.<sup>4</sup> The same should be stated in case of the subtle elements. The evolution of the subtle elements in that of the subtle elements of sound, touch, etc. The group of five means the measurement (or number) of which is five. The author will speak of the name, charac-

teristics (definition) and purpose of the group of sixteen evolves later on. Thus is explained the activity of the constituents, in which is particularly cognised the notion of 'I am' as I am in word, I am in touch, I am in sight, I am in taste and I am in smell.

(Significance of three forms of Egoism)

आह, अहङ्कारे सत्त्वादीनां संज्ञान्तरावचनम्, आनर्थक्यात् । यदिदमहंकारे सत्त्वादीनां संज्ञान्तरमारभ्यते वैकारिकस्तैजसो भूतादिरिति, तत्र वक्तव्यम् । कस्मात्, ? आनर्थक्यात् । व हि तत्त्वान्तरसन्निवेशिनां सत्त्वादीनां संज्ञान्तराभिधाने किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमस्तीति, संज्ञाभूयस्त्वात् । अथायं निर्बन्धस्तत्त्वान्तरम्, संज्ञाभूयस्त्वं प्राप्नोति । प्रयोजनाऽभिधानं वा । विशिष्टयत्नानामाकस्मिकत्वात् । अथवा प्रयोजनं वक्तव्यम्—एवमर्थमहङ्कारे संज्ञान्तराभिधानमिति । कस्मात् ? न हि विशिष्टयत्नानामाकस्मिकत्वमुपपद्यत इति ।

Opponent : In the egoism no other name of the Sattva, etc., should be mentioned because it is purposeless (meaningless). The different name for Sattva, etc., in egoism which comes to be as Vaikarika, taijas and bhutadi, should not be mentioned.

Why ?

Because it is purposeless (i.e., meaningless). There is no purpose in giving some other name to the Sattva, etc., occurring in some other object, because there would be many names. If it is insisted upon that this is a different element, there would certainly be many names.<sup>5</sup> Or, the purpose should be mentioned, because the acts done with particular effort are not accidental. Or, the purpose should be stated as to with this sort of purpose is given a different name in the egoism.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of accidental nature in the objects which are accomplished with a particular effort.

उच्यते—न, कार्यविशेषहेतुत्वात् । महदादिलक्षणानां हि गुणानामनेकरूपस्तत्त्वारम्भ इति हि न संज्ञान्तरमारभ्यते । अहंकारस्तु सत्त्वतमोबहुलयोरिन्द्रियतन्मात्रपर्वणोः प्रकृतिः, तदर्थमाचार्याणां यत्नविशेषः । धर्मादिविशेषाभ्युपगमान्महति प्रसंग इति चेत् न विशेषितत्वात् । तत्त्वान्तरारम्भ इति विशेषितम्, न तु धर्मादयस्तत्त्वान्तरमतो न महति प्रसंगः । विशेषाऽनभिधानादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, कः पुनरत्र विशेषो येन धर्मादि न तत्त्वान्तरम्, तत्त्वान्तरं तु श्रोत्रादीति ? एतच्च नैवम् कुतः ? वृत्तिमात्रे तदुपचारात् । वृत्तिमात्रे हि महतो धर्माद्युपचारः । तथा च तन्त्रान्तरेऽप्युक्तम् "प्रकाशवृत्तिर्धर्म" इति । वृत्तिनिष्पादितस्तु संस्थानविशेषो वृत्तिमतस्तत्त्वान्तरमित्यनयोर्विशेषः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् कार्यविशेषहेतुत्वमिति ॥२४॥

Proponent : *No, because of its being a cause of particular kinds of effects.* There proceed elements of many forms (nature) from the constituents (situated) in the form of the intellect and, hence, no different name is given for that. The egoism, on the other hand, is the cause of the phases of the senses and the subtle elements which abound in Sattva and Tamas respectively. Therefore, there is a particular effort of the authorities (to give particular name). If it is argued that there arises the undesirable contingency (many names) in case of intellect because of the acceptance of the particulars like virtue, etc., (we reply) *no, because it (particular name) is qualified.* It is qualified by 'rise of another element'. The virtue, etc., are not different elements and, hence, there is no undesirable contingency (of different names) in the intellect.

If it is argued that it is wrong because the particularity is not stated ? It may be like this. What is the particular reason that the virtue, etc. are not different (independent) element, and the ear, etc., on the other hand, are different (independent) elements ?

It is not so.

Why ?

That is metaphorically stated in the case of function. The virtue, etc., are metaphorically spoken with reference to merely the function of the intellect. It is stated in the other system also: 'the virtue is the function of the light'. The particular arrangement brought out by the function of the possessor (or location or the function) is stated to be a different element. This is the difference between the two cases. Therefore, it is right that the reason is to be a cause of particular effects.

## KĀRIKĀ 24

1. It refers to the order of creation in Kārikā 22.
2. Vaikārika, taijas and bhūtādi are the technical terms denoting the three states of egoism as it dominates in sattva, rajas and tamas aspect respectively. These are roughly stated to be three kinds, though really they are the three aspects or states of one and the same entity.
3. The source of the quotation is not known. The particular characteristics refer to the particular states above. The activity of the constituents refers to that at the time of evolution from the cosmic aspect of egoism.
4. There are the five organs of knowledge, five organs of action and the mind.
5. The objector means that the giving of the different name to the state of dominance of a particular constituent would lead to the indefinite objects due to the dominance of each constituent in different objects.

## KĀRIKĀ 25

(Evolution from the sattva dominating Egoism)

आह, यद्येवमिदं तर्हि वक्तव्यममुष्य कार्यविशेषस्यैवं संज्ञकादहंकारात्प्रवृत्तिरिति ।

Opponent : If it is so, it should be stated that there is the evolution of this particular effect from the egoism bearing this name.

उच्यते—

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।

सर्ग इत्यनुवर्तते । एकादशेन्द्रियाणि सत्त्वबहुलानि वैकृतादहंकारात्प्रवर्तन्ते निष्पद्यन्ते इत्यर्थः । एकादशाभिधानादेव चेन्द्रियप्रतीतिः, पूर्वसूत्रे तत्सामानाधिकरण्यात् । अतो न पुनरिन्द्रियग्रहणम् ।

Proponent : THE GROUP OF ELEVEN ABOUNDING IN SAT-TVA EVOLVES FROM THE VAIKARIKA (SATTVA DOMINATING) FORM OF EGOISM.

The word 'evolution' follows here also.<sup>1</sup> The meaning is that the eleven senses abounding in Sattva proceed or evolve from the Sattva-dominating form of egoism. Through statement of eleven there arises the knowledge of the senses because in the preceding aphorism they (two words) have the grammatical agreement in the same case. Therefore, there is no mention of the senses again.

(Evolution from tamas dominating egoism)

आह, तन्मात्रसर्गः पुनः किं गुणः, कस्माच्चाहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते इति ?

Opponent : What are the qualities of the subtle elements and from what form of egoism do they evolve?

उच्यते—

भूतादेस्तान्मात्रः स तामसः

भूतादेर्भूतादिसंज्ञकात्तमः प्रधानात्तान्मात्रः सर्गः । तान्मात्रस्तु तमोबहुलो भूतादिसंज्ञ-  
नदहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते । तत्र पुनस्तन्मात्रग्रहणात्संख्या शस्यत इति नोच्यते ।

Proponent : THE GROUP OF SUBTLE ELEMENTS, WHICH ABOUNDS IN TAMAS, PROCEED FROM THE TAMAS DOMINATING FORM OF EGOISM.

The subtle elements evolve from the egoism named bhūtādi and abounding in Tamas. The group of subtle elements abounding in Tamas proceed from the form of egoism termed bhūtādi. Here also the number is told by mentioning the subtle elements only and, hence, is not explicitly stated.

आह, प्रकृतिविशेषनिर्देशानर्थक्यम् । प्रागुक्तं सत्त्वादीनामहङ्कारावस्थितानां वैकारिकाद्याः संज्ञा उच्यन्ते । तद्यदि सत्त्वं वैकारिकशब्देनोच्यते वैकारिकाणि चैन्द्रिय एकादशकः सर्गः प्रवर्तते इत्युक्ते गम्यत एतत् सात्त्विकोऽसौ, भूतादेस्तान्मात्र इत्युक्ते गम्यत एतत् तामस इति । कस्मात् ? न ह्यस्ति सम्भवो यत्सत्त्वात्तमोबहुलः सर्गः स्यात्तमसश्च स्वबहुल इति ।

Opponent : The mention of a particular nature is meaningless. It is already stated that the names vaikārika, etc., are applicable to Sattva, etc., present in the form of egoism. If the Sattva is denoted through the word vaikārika, and if the group of eleven organs evolves as vaikārika in nature, it becomes known that they abound in Sattva. When it is stated that the subtle elements (evolute) from the form of egoism called bhūtādi, it becomes known that they abound in Tamas.

Why ?

It is not possible that there may be the evolution (of objects) abounding in Tamas from the Sattva and that (of the objects) abounding in Sattva from the Tamas.

उच्यते— न, अप्रसिद्धत्वज्ञापनात् । यस्यैवार्थस्य ज्ञापनार्थमेवमिह क्रियते, कथं गम्यते सत्त्वं वैकारिकशब्देनोच्यते, तमो भूतादिशब्देन, रजस्तैजसशब्देन ? अप्रसिद्धार्था हि तान्त्रिकी परिभाषेयमनिर्णीता न गम्यत इति ।

Proponent : No, because it suggests the unfamiliar nature. How is it known that Sattva is known through the word vaikārika, Tamas through the word bhūtādi and Rajas through the taijas, for the suggestion of which it is done so here. The technical definition is not familiar and is not known without deciding (discussing).

(Taijas form of Egoism)

आहं, तैजससंज्ञानर्थक्यमिति ।

Opponent : The name taijas serves no purpose.

उच्यते न,

तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

उभयत्र तत्सामर्थ्यात् । स्यादेतदेवं यद्यस्य कार्यसामर्थ्यमेव न स्यात् । अस्मात् तैजसादुभयमध्येतत्तन्मात्रेन्द्रियसंज्ञकं प्रवर्तत इत्यनुवर्तते । कथम् ? यदा हि वैकारिकोऽहङ्कार इन्द्रियभावेन प्रवर्तते तदा निष्क्रियत्वात्तैजसं प्रवर्तकत्वेनाकांक्षति, भूतादि भेदकत्वेन । कस्मात् ? तेनैव तद्वेदात् । तद्यथाऽग्निनग्नौ प्रक्षिप्तोऽग्निरेव भवति, आपो वाऽप्सु प्रक्षिप्ता आप एव भवन्ति, एवं सत्त्वमेव सत्त्वे तु भेदं जनयति गुणान्तरसंसर्गमपेक्षते । भूतादिलक्षणस्य तु तमसः संसर्गाद् भिद्यमानं तैजसेन च रजसा क्रियात्मकेनाऽनुगृहीतमेकादशेन्द्रियभाजमपेक्षते । तथा भूतादिलक्षणं तमोऽहङ्कारात्तन्मात्रभावेन प्रवर्तमानं प्रवृत्त्यर्थं तैजसमाकांक्षति, वैकारिकं भेदकत्वेन । कस्मात् ? तेनैव तस्य भेदादिति योज्यम् । शास्त्रं चैवमाह-“तदेतस्मिन्वैकारिके स्तक्ष्यमाण एष भूतादिस्तैजसेनोपष्टब्ध एतं वैकारिकमभिधावति । तथैव तस्मिन्भूतादौ स्तक्ष्यमाणे एष भूतादिस्तैजसेनोपष्टब्ध एतं भूतादिमभिभवति ।” इत्यनेन न्यायेन तैजसादुभयनिष्प्रतिरिति व्याख्यातोऽहङ्कारः ॥ २५ ॥

Proponent : NO BOTH PROCEED FROM THE TAIJAS FORM OF EGOISM.

*Because of its capability with reference to both, it is at both the places.*<sup>2</sup> It would have been so (purposeless) if there would have been no capability for functioning in it. It follows from the preceding that from this taijas form of egoism proceed both types of evolutes called the senses and the subtle elements.

How ?

When the vaikārika form of egoism evolves in the form of the senses, because of its being inactive it requires taijas as the im-  
perator; (it requires) bhūtādi as causing difference.

Why ?

Because that (Sattva) is differentiated by that (bhūtādi) only. Just as the fire thrown in fire becomes fire only, water thrown in water becomes water only. In this way, the Sattva requires the association of the other constituents while bringing out the difference in the Sattva. He looks for the state of the eleven organs being differentiated through the association of the Tamas which is in the form of bhūtāda form of the egoism and favoured (or assisted) by the Rajas in the form of taijas, which is of the nature of activity. Similarly, the tamās in the form of bhūtādu form of egoism evolving in the form

of the subtle elements from the egoism requires taijas form of egoism for activity and vaikārika form of egoim for differentiation.<sup>3</sup>

Why ?

It should be added here that because the differentiation in that (sattva) is caused by that ( tamas) only. The scriptures also state like this. When the vaikārika form of egoism creates, this bhūtādi form of egoism activated by the taijas form of egoism joins the vaikārika form of egoism. Similarly, when the bhūtādi form of egoism creates, the bhūtādi activated by taijas dominates the vaikārika form.<sup>4</sup> Through this maxim there is the evolution of both from the taijas. Thus is explained the egoism.

## KĀRIKĀ 25

1. It follows from the last Kārikā.
2. It works at both the states of egoism because it is capable of working at both the states. Sattva and tamas are inactive in themselves. The activity for evolution in both the states is caused by rajas.
3. This brings out the fact that the difference in the nature of various objects is caused by the proportion of the three constituents. Even in the objects abounding in sattva, the mutual differentiation is brought about the proportion of tamas in them. The quality of rajas causes activity, mobility or change in an object.
4. The context demands the reading vaikarikāmabhibhavati in place of bhūtādīmadabhibhavati.

## KARIKA 26

(Sense organs)

आह, प्रागपदिष्ट ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारादिति, तत्सामान्याभिधानात् प्रतिपद्यामहे । तस्माद्वक्तव्यं कानीन्द्रियाणि भवतोऽभिप्रेतानि ?

Opponent : It is stated earlier that the group of eleven organs proceed from the sattva-dominating form of egoism. We do not understand it through the general statement. Therefore, it should be stated as to which organs are intended by you here.

(Organs of knowledge)

उच्यते - द्विविधानीन्द्रियाणि, बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि च । तत्र

**बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि कर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाख्यानि ।**

कर्णौ त्वक्चक्षुषी च रसनं च नासिका च कर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाः । आख्यानमाख्या प्रत्यायनमित्यर्थः । एतैः शब्दैराख्या येषां तानीमानि कर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाख्यानि । अधिष्ठानभेदाद् द्विवचनेन विग्रहः क्रियते । एतानि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रत्यवगन्तव्यानि । बुद्धेरिन्द्रियाणि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि ।

Proponent : THE ORGANS ARE OF TWO KINDS : THE ORGANS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THOSE OF ACTIVITY.

The organs of knowledge are called ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. The compound term ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose mean the ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose. Calling or saying is the name which means to convey or giving for understanding. Those which are conveyed through these words are ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose.<sup>1</sup> The compound form of the word is dissolved in dual (in case of ears and eyes) due to the difference of locations. These should be understood as the organs of knowledge. The organs of knowledge are the senses related to knowledge.

किं पुनरेतानि बुद्धेरिति ?

Opponent : What are they to the knowledge ?



उच्यते—शब्दादिविषयप्रतिपत्तौ द्वारम् । कस्मात् ? अबहिर्वृत्तित्वात् । अन्तःकरणस्य नास्ति बहिर्वृत्तिरित्यतो नाऽलमेतत्साक्षाच्छब्दादीनर्थान्प्रतिपत्तुम् । तस्माच्छ्रोत्रादिलक्षणं साक्षाद् बाह्यविषयप्रकाशनसमर्थं कारणान्तरमपेक्षते । तत्प्रणालिकया तस्य विषयग्रहणम् । तस्माद्युक्तमुक्तं बुद्धेर्बाह्यविषयप्रतिपत्तौ द्वारभूतत्वाद् बुद्धीन्द्रियाणीति ।

Proponent : They serve as the gate for the knowledge of the objects like word.

Why ?

Because of the absence of the functioning externally in case of internal organ. There is no function of the internal organ outside (the body) and, hence, it is not capable of knowing the objects like word, etc., directly. Therefore, some other means in the form of ear, etc., which are capable of illuminating (grasping) the external object directly are required. The knowledge of object of that (internal organ) arises through the medium of that. Therefore, it is rightly stated that senses of knowledge are so because they serve as the gate for knowledge of external objects by the intellect.

(Organs of action)

आह, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पुनः कानीति ?

Opponent : What are the organs of action ?

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

वाक्च पाणि च पादौ पायुश्चोपस्थश्च वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः । एतानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुराचक्षते । कर्मार्थानीन्द्रियाणि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि । किं पुनः कर्म ? वचनादि वक्ष्यमाणम् । एतद्विकुर्वत् इति कर्मेन्द्रियाणि ।

Proponent : THE SPEECH, HANDS, FEET, ANUS AND GENERATIVE ORGAN ARE THE ORGANS OF ACTION.

The compound speech, hands, feet, anus and generative organ means speech, hands (two) feet (two) anus and the generative organ. These are stated to be the organs of action. The organs of action are those meant for action.

What is the action ?

That is to speak, etc., which will be stated later on. Since they perform these actions particularly, they are the organs of action.

(Difference of the senses from their locus)

आह, कथमेतदुपलभ्यते अधिष्ठानादर्थान्तरभूतानीन्द्रियाणि, न पुनरधिष्ठानमात्र-

मिति ?

Opponent : How is it known that the senses are different from their locus and are not the locus itself ?

उच्यते—अधिष्ठानादिन्द्रियपृथक्त्वम्, शक्तिविशेषोपलम्भात् । यथा शरीरासम्भविनो विषयव्यवसायलक्षणस्य शक्तिविशेषस्योपलम्भादर्थान्तरं बुद्धिरनुमीयते, एवमधिष्ठानासम्भविनो विषयग्रहणलक्षणस्य शक्तिविशेषस्योपलम्भादर्थान्तरमिन्द्रियमिति ।

Proponent : There is the distinction of the organs from their location because some particular power is observed. Just as the intellect is inferred to be a distinct object due to (through) the observation (experience) of a particular power in the form of ascertaining the objects, which is not possible in the case of the body (physical), similarly, the organs as distinct (from locus) are inferred from the observation of a particular power in the form of grasping the objects, which is not possible in the case of the location.

आह, न, असम्भवाऽसिद्धेः । अधिष्ठानमात्रस्य विषयग्रहणं न सम्भवित, अर्थान्तरस्य च सम्भवति इत्येतदुभयमपि चाऽप्रसिद्धमिति ।

Opponent : No, because the impossibility is not yet established. Both of the facts that the grasping of the object is not possible in the case of the locus and is possible in case of some other object only, are unfamiliar.

उच्यते—नैतदप्रसिद्धम् । तुल्यजातीयेषु तदनुपपत्तेः । यस्माद् भौतिकेष्वन्येषु घटादिषु विषयग्रहणसामर्थ्यासम्भवः आहंकारविकारवत्तत्सामर्थ्याप्रतिषेधात्त्रेन्द्रियाणां नस्तत्प्रतिषेधोऽनुमातव्य इति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? शक्तिभेदापत्तेः । वैकारिकं सत्त्वमाहङ्कारिकं प्रकाशरूपं, तच्छक्तिविशेषादिन्द्रियाणि उत्पद्यन्ते । भूतादिलक्षणस्य तमसः सामर्थ्यात् तन्मात्राणि परस्य, पृथिव्यादीनामेकरूपत्वात् । तस्मादयमसमः समाधिरिति । एतेन भौतिकत्वं प्रत्युक्तम् ।

Proponent : It is not unfamiliar because that (grasp of an object) is not justified in case of the objects which are of the similar genus (to their locus). Since the grasping of the object is not possible in case of the material objects like pot.<sup>2</sup>

Since the capability is not generated in the case of the objects originating from the egoism, the negation of that in the case of our senses also should not be inferred.<sup>3</sup>

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there will arise the undesirable contingency of differentiation of power (even in your theory). In our theory the vaikārika state of sattva is of the nature of light and the senses originate due to that particular power. In the case of other kinds of egoism subtle elements are born on account of the power of tamas in the form of bhūtādi type of egoism because those (subtle elements) are identical in nature to the earth, etc. Therefore, the above solution is not based upon similarity of cases. Through this is refuted the elemental nature of the senses.<sup>4</sup>

(Refutation of considering the sense as one)

आह, कथमवगम्यते बहूनीन्द्रियाणि, न पुनरेकमेवेन्द्रियं मनोवत्सर्वार्थमनेकाधिष्ठानं स्यादिति ?

Opponent : How is it known that the senses are many and would a single sense meant for all types of knowledge would not be located at many organs as is the case of mind ?

उच्यते-न, युगपत्प्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिप्रसंगात् । यद्येकमेवेन्द्रियं मनोवत्सर्वार्थमनेकाधिष्ठानं स्यादेकविषयप्रतिपत्तौ वा सर्वविषयप्रतिपत्तिः । दृष्टस्तु ग्रहणभेदस्तस्मान्नैकमिन्द्रियमिति । भौतिकैरनुग्रहोपघातदर्शनादिन्द्रियाणां भौतिकत्वमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, इह भौतिकानां घटादीनां भौतिकैर्मृददण्डचक्रसूत्रोदकमुद्रादिभिरनुग्रहोपघातो दृष्टः । यदि च भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि न स्युः नैषां भौतिकैरञ्जनादिभिरनुग्रहः क्रियते, उपघातश्च रजःप्रभृतिभिरिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्तात् । तद्यथा भौतिकैर्वदनादिभिरन्तःकरणस्य ग्रहणधारणस्मृतिलक्षणोऽनुग्रहः क्रियते, उपघातश्चोपलादिभिः । न चास्य भौतिकत्वम् । एवमिन्द्रियस्यापि स्यात् । वैशेषिकगुणव्यञ्जकत्वाद्विकारप्रतीतिरिति चेत् अथ मतम् - पृथिव्यादिवैशेषिको गन्धो ध्राणेनाऽभिव्यज्यते । औदको रसे रसनेन च । आग्नेयं रूपं वीक्षणम् । वायवीयः स्पर्शस्त्वचा आकाशीयः शब्दः श्रोत्रेण । येन च यस्य वैशेषिकगुणाभिव्यक्तिस्तस्य तद्विकारत्वं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा प्रदीपस्य रूपाभिव्यञ्जकत्वे सति तैजसत्वमिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनिष्टाप्रसंगात् । वैशेषिकगुणव्यञ्जकानां तद्विकारत्वमिच्छतः प्राप्तमपां गन्धाभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वात् पार्थिवत्वम् । अथैतदनिष्टं, न तत्त्वैकान्तिको हेतुरिति । तत्र यदुक्तं वैशेषिकगुणाभिव्यञ्जकत्वाद् भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणीति एतदयुक्तम् ॥ २६ ॥

Reply : No, because there will arise the undesirable contingency of activity or the absence of activity (of all the senses) simultaneously. If there is only one sense for all knowledges (or located at many points) as is the case with mind, there

would arise the knowledge of all the objects with the knowledge of one object. However, the difference in knowledge is experienced. Therefore, the sense is not one. If it is argued that the senses are material in nature because of the observation of favour or injury to them by the material objects? It may be like this. Here, the favour or injury to the material objects like pot is caused by the material object like clay, stick, wheel, thread (rope), water and a hammer. If the senses would not be material in nature, the favour to them would not be rendered through the collyrium, etc., and the injury by dust, etc., which are material in nature. This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of its being non-conclusive. The favour in respect of grasping (or seizing), retaining and remembering to the internal organ is rendered through face, etc., which are elemental in nature and the injury to that also is rendered by stone etc., which are also material in nature. And, it is not material in nature. In the same way, the case may be with the senses also. If it is argued that the knowledge of the modification (from the material element) arises through the manifestation of the particular quality? The smell which is particular quality of earth is manifest through nose, the taste belonging to the water through tongue, the form or colour belonging to the fire by the organ of sight, the touch actually belonging to air, through skin, and the word actually belonging to the sky through the ear. The object is observed to be the modification of the one the quality of which is manifested by it. For example, the lamp which is the manifestor of the form is of the nature of the Light.<sup>5</sup>

This is wrong.

Why ?

Because it would involve the undesirable result. In the view of those who intend that the manifestor is the modification of the manifested element, there arises the undesirable contingency of earthly nature (origin from the earth) of the water because the water causes the manifestation of smell.<sup>6</sup> If this is undesirable, the reason is not conclusive. Thus, the statement that the senses are material in nature because of being the manifestor of the particular quality of the material elements, is wrong.

## KĀRIKĀ 26

1. The senses are actually the powers of sight, etc., in the body, yet are located at various points in our body.
2. The senses are the product of egoism while their locations in the body are material in nature. The material objects like pot are not observed as grasping the objects.
3. This seems to be the statement of the objector.
4. This is a reply to the above contention that all the products of egoism do not grasp the objects and, hence, the senses need not necessarily grasp the objects.
5. This seems to be the argument of the Naiyāyikas to establish the material nature of the senses.
6. The meaning is that sometimes the piece of earth does not give smell but does so when sprinkled with water. In that case water helps the manifestation of smell and, hence, would be considered as the product of earth.

## KĀRIKĀ 27

(Definition of mind)

आह, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि अहङ्कारादुत्पद्यन्ते इति प्रागपदिष्टम् । इदानीं बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियाणि दशापदिश्यन्ते । तदिदं पदार्थन्यूनमिति ।

Opponent : It is stated earlier that the eleven senses originate from egoism. Now the senses of knowledge and of action are mentioned as ten only. Hence, the one entity is less.

उच्यते— स्यादेतदेवम्, यद्येतावदिन्द्रियपर्वं स्यात् । किं तर्हीति—

**सङ्कल्पकमत्र मनः**

अत्रेन्द्रियपर्वणि मनो भवद्भिः प्रत्यवगन्तव्यम् । तत्र संकल्पकमिति लक्षणमाचक्ष्महे । संकल्पोऽभिलाष इच्छातृष्णाद्यनर्थान्तरम् । संकल्पयतीति संकल्पकम् । एतन्मनसो लक्षणम् ।

Proponent : It would be this only if the phase of senses would be this much only. What then,

**IN THESE, MIND IS THE DESIRING PRINCIPLE.**

Here, mind should also be accepted in the phase of the senses. There, we speak 'desiring principle' as the definition.<sup>1</sup> Samkalpa, abhia, iccha, tṛṣṇā, etc., are synonymous. The desiring principle is that which desires. This is the definition of mind.

(Separate existence of mind)

तस्मादस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलभ्यमानस्यास्तित्वमवसीयते । कस्मात् ? व्यस्तसमस्तानामिन्द्रियान्तराणां तदसंभवात् । अपोह्य हि मनः संकल्पं व्यस्तानामिन्द्रियान्तराणां भवान्प्रिकल्पयेत् समस्तानां वा ? किं चातः ? तत्र तावद्द्वयस्तानामिन्द्रियाणां संकल्पो भवति । किं कारणम् ? अनियतविषयत्वात् । नियतो हि श्रोत्रादीनां शब्दादिविषयः । अनियतविषयश्च संकल्पः । किंच त्रिकालविषयत्वात् । वर्तमानविषया श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः त्रिकालविषयश्च संकल्पः । तस्मान्न व्यस्तानां नाऽपि समस्तानाम् । बधिरादिषु तदभावप्रसंगात् । यदि समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः संकल्पः स्यात्प्राणादिवदिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिः, न

चान्यतरवैकल्ये तदभावः, एवं समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः संकल्पः स्यान्नचान्यतरवैकल्ये तदभावः स्यादिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । विशेषितत्वात् । निर्विषया प्राणादिवृत्तिः । शब्दादिविषयस्तु संकल्प इति विशेषितम् । तस्माद् व्यस्तसमस्तानामिन्द्रियाणां संकल्पानुपपत्तेर्मनसो लिङ्गमेतदस्तित्वे इति सिद्धम् ।

From that is ascertained the existence of it though it is not directly perceived.

How ?

Because that (desire) is not possible in case of the other senses individually and collectively. Keeping aside the mind will you postulate desire as an act of the other senses individually or collectively ?

What difference does it make ?

*Because the objects of desire are not fixed (restricted).<sup>2</sup> The objects of the senses like ear, i.e., the word, etc., are fixed. The objects of desire, however, are not fixed. Moreover, because its objects belong to three periods of time. The function of the ear, etc., has its object existing at present, but the objects of desire belong to the three periods of time. Therefore, desiring is not the act of the senses individually or collectively. Moreover, there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of that (act of desire) in case of deaf persons.*

If it is argued that the act of desire may be the function of senses collectively as is the case with vital air, etc?<sup>3</sup> It may be like this. As the vital airs, etc., are the function of the senses collectively and when one sense gets damaged, they do not come to an end, similarly, the act of desiring also may be the activity of all the senses collectively and it would not come to an end when any one of them is damaged.<sup>4</sup>

This is also wrong because of the particularity (or distinction). The circulation of vital airs is without object. The act of desiring, however, has word, etc., as its object. This is the particularity. Therefore, since the act of desiring is not possible in case of the senses individually or collectively, it is proved that it (act of desiring) is a probans for the existence of the mind.

(Mind is both sense of knowledge and action)

आह, तदवधारणीयम्, इन्द्रियद्वैविध्यात् । द्विप्रकाराणि हीन्द्रियाणि पुरस्तादुपदिष्टानि । तत्र मनोऽप्यवधारणीयं किं बुद्धीन्द्रियम् अथ कर्मेन्द्रियमिति ?

Opponent : It is yet to be decided because the senses are of two kinds. Two kinds of senses are mentioned earlier. Hence, it

should be decided whether the mind is a sense of knowledge or a sense of action.

उच्यते—

तच्चेन्द्रियमुभयथा समाख्यातम् ।

ह्यर्थे चः पठितः । तद्धीन्द्रियमुभयथेत्यर्थः । मनो न केवलं बुद्धीन्द्रियमपि तु कर्मेन्द्रियमपि ।

Proponent : : IT IS STATED TO BE THE SENSE OF BOTH THE KINDS.

The word *ca* is used in the sense *hi* (certainly). That is certainly both kinds of sense. This is what is meant here. The mind is not only the sense of knowledge but also the sense of action.

नियमहेत्वभावादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यात्पुनरेतत्, कोऽत्र नियमहेतुः यदिन्द्रियत्वाविशेषे-  
मनस एवोभयप्रचारत्वमभ्युपगम्यते, नान्येषामिति ?

Opponent : If it is argued that it is wrong because of the absence of the reason for such a restriction? It may again be like this. What is the reason for restriction that even when the nature of being a sense is common, yet the application of being of both the kinds is to the mind only and not to the others ?

उच्यते

अन्तस्त्रिकालविषयं तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तत् ॥ २७ ॥

त्रिकालविषयत्वात् । इह यस्यान्तस्त्रिषु च कालेषु करणस्य वृत्तिस्तदुभयचारम्, तद्यथा बुद्धिः । साक्षात् विषयाऽनभिसन्धानादतीतानागतवर्तमानविषयत्वाच्च मनोऽन्तस्त्रिकालविषयम् । तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तदिति सिद्धम् ॥ २७ ॥

॥ युक्तिदीपिकायां सांख्यसप्ततिपद्धतौ षष्ठमाहिकम् ॥

Proponent : SINCE IT IS INTERNAL (AND HENCE) HAVING THE OBJECTS OF THREE PERIODS OF TIME AS ITS OBJECT, THEREFORE, THE APPLICATION OF 'BEING OF BOTH THE KINDS' IS TO THAT.

Because it has the objects of the three periods of time as its objects. Here, what is internal and the function of which is with reference to the objects of three periods of time, that is said to be of both the kinds, just as the intellect. The mind is internal because it is not

related to the objects directly and has the objects of three periods of time as it has the objects the objects of past, future and present. Therefore, it is proved that the appellation of being of both the kinds is applicable to it.

Here ends the sixth discourse in the Yuktidīpikā commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā.

## KĀRIKĀ 27

1. The mode of defining mind again suggests the non-difference between the function and the functioning agent.
2. The meaning is that the senses cannot have desire individually.
3. Cf. S. K. 3.
4. Here starts the reply to the admitting of desire as the collective activity of the senses.
5. The reading of the kārikā in the Yuktidīpikā is peculiar and the expression is novel.

## KĀRIKĀ 28

(Function of the senses)

समधिगतं करणपर्व । तस्येदानीं व्यस्तसमस्तवृत्तयो वक्तव्याः । सति चोभयाभिधाने व्यस्तवृत्तिरेव तावदुच्यते, न समस्तवृत्तिः । किं कारणम् ? प्रकरणशेषभूतत्वात् । श्रोत्रादीनां हि सद्भावप्रकरणमिदमनुक्रान्तम् । स चैषां सद्भावः शक्तिविशेषोपालम्भादित्युक्तम् । इदानीं सौ शक्तिविशेषोऽस्माकं व्यस्तवृत्तिरित्युच्यते । तस्मात्तदनुक्रमणं करिष्यामः ।

The phase of the organs is understood. Their individual and collective functions should be mentioned now. Though we have to state the both, yet the individual function is mentioned and not the collective. What is the reason here ? Because it does not form the part of the context. We have undertaken in succession the context of the existence of the ear, etc. And, it is stated that the existence of these is due to the observation of the particular power. That particular power is said to be the individual function now in our theory.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, we shall follow that order.

(Objects of the senses)

आह, यद्येवं तस्मादुच्यतां तस्य करणस्य कस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः, किं लक्षणं वेति ?

Opponent : If it is so, you should state with reference to what object is the function of which organ, or what is the nature of that.

उच्यते- यदुक्तं तस्य कस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिरित्यत्र ब्रूमः

रूपादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।

रूपादिषु शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धेषु स्वभेदभिन्नेषु पञ्चानां श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणानां श्रवणस्पर्शनदर्शनरसनघ्राणलक्षणो व्यापारो वृत्तिरित्युच्यते । तत्र करणनिर्देशे श्रोत्रेन्द्रियस्य प्राक्यातातद्विषयनिर्देशातिलब्धेन प्रयोजनं नास्तीति कृत्वा शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामित्येव पठितव्यम् । प्राक्तनस्तु प्रमादपाठः ।

Proponent : With reference to your statement as to in respect of what object is that function of senses, we reply :

THE FUNCTION OF THE FIVE (SENSES) IS THE PRIMARY ABSTRACT APPREHENSION ONLY IN RESPECT OF THE FORM, ETC.

The function of the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose in the form of the act of hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling with respect to word, touch, form, taste and smell which are mutually different due to their own differentiation, is called the function. Since in the mention of the organs ear is enumerated first and there is no purpose in violating the order in the mention of the object of that we have read the kārikā as 'of the five with reference to the word, etc.' The earlier reading is due to carelessness.<sup>2</sup>

(Nature of function of the organs)

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं किलक्षणेति अत्र ब्रूमः- आलोचनमात्रमिष्यते । आलोचनं ग्रहणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । मात्रशब्दो विशेषनिवृत्त्यर्थः । तद्यथा भैक्षमात्रमस्मिन्ग्रामे लभ्यत इत्युक्ते नान्यो विशेष इति ज्ञायते । छन्दोमात्रमधीते माणवक इत्युक्ते नान्यदधीत इति । एवमालोचनमात्रमिन्द्रियाणामिष्यते वृत्तिरित्युक्ते नान्यो विशेष इति गम्यते । तेन किं सिद्धं भवति ? यदुक्तमन्यैराचार्यैः सामान्यज्ञानमिन्द्रियाणां विशेषज्ञानं बुद्धेरिति तत्प्रतिषिद्धं भवति ।

As regards your statement as of what nature is the function, we state-it is intended to be merely the abstract apprehension. Apprehension and getting the impression (or knowledge) are synonymous. The term 'only' is to exclude the particular. For example, when it is stated that the student reads the vedas only, (it is understood) that he does not read anything else (particularly). Similarly, when it is stated that the function of the senses is intended to be the abstract apprehension only, it is understood that nothing else particular (is the function).<sup>3</sup> What is proved thereby? The statement of the other authorities that knowledge of the general ensues from the senses and the knowledge of the particular belongs to the intellect, becomes refuted.

(Abstract apprehension is not the knowledge of generality)

आह, कः पुनरस्मिन्दर्शने दोषो यत एतत्प्रतिषिध्यत इति ?

Opponent : What is the defect in this opinion because of which it is subject to refutation?

उच्यते- सामान्यविशेषयोरितरेतरापेक्षत्वे सत्येकस्मिन्नविरोधादन्यतरपरिकल्पनाऽनर्थक्यम् । यदि खल्विन्द्रियस्य सामान्यज्ञानं न स्यात्तेन विशेषापेक्षं सामान्यं सामान्यपेक्षश्च



विशेष इति यत्र सामान्यज्ञानं तत्र विशेषज्ञानमपि न प्रतिषिध्यत इत्युभयमपीन्द्रियस्य स्यात् । ततश्चान्तःकरणपरिकल्पनाऽनर्थक्यम् । विशेषवतोवाऽन्तःकरणस्य कः सामान्येन विरोध इत्युभयस्यापि तत्र सम्भवाद्विन्दियानर्थक्यम् । तस्मादप्रत्ययमिन्द्रियमिति । इन्द्रियस्य चेत्यत्ययः स्याद्यथा प्रत्ययवतोऽन्तःकरणस्याऽनियतविषयत्वम् एवमस्यापि स्यात् न तु तदस्ति । तस्मादप्रत्ययमिन्द्रियमिति । किंच कालातिवृत्तिप्रसंगात् । इन्द्रियस्य चेत्यत्ययः स्याद्यथा प्रत्ययवतोऽन्तःकरणस्य त्रिकालविषयत्वमेवमस्यापि स्यात् । न तु तदस्ति । तस्मादप्रत्ययमिन्द्रियमिति । किं चान्यत् स्मृत्यदर्शनात् । इन्द्रियस्य चेत्यत्ययः स्याद्यथा प्रत्ययवतोऽन्तःकरणस्यादिरूपोपपत्तिरेवमत्रापि स्यात् । न तु तदस्ति । तस्मादप्रत्ययमिन्द्रियं सिद्धमिति ।

Proponent : The generality and particularity require each other and since they do not stand in contradiction in a single object, the postulation of the other (either of the external or internal organ) is purposeless. If the knowledge of generality only would belong to the senses, the knowledge of generality would not require the knowledge of particularity and similarly the knowledge of generality, but (actually) wherever is the knowledge of generality, the knowledge of particularity is not negated and, hence, both would belong to the senses. Then, the postulation of the internal organ will not serve any purpose. Or, what is the contradiction of the internal organ, which has the knowledge in particular, with the generality ? And, hence, both are possible there and the senses would be purposeless. Therefore, the senses are without understanding. If understanding would belong to the senses, as there is no fixed object of the internal organ, the same would be the case with the senses, But it is not so, Therefore, the senses are without understanding. Moreover, there will be undesirable contingency of transgression of time. If the understanding would belong to the senses, as the object of the cognition of the internal organs are the objects of the three points of time, the same would be in case of the senses. But it is not so. Therefore the senses are without cognition. Moreover, the remembrance is not observed (in case of the senses). If the cognition would belong to the senses, as there is the possibility of attainment of the initial form (of the object cognised) again in case of the internal organs, the same would be

the case with the senses. This is, however, not so. Therefore, it is established that the senses are without cognition.

(The senses get the form of the objects and do not illumine it)

आह, भवतु तावदप्रत्ययमिन्द्रियम् । तत्तु ग्रहणरूपं न तु प्रकाशकं प्रदीपवदित्यत्र को हेतुरिति ?

Opponent : Let the senses be without understanding. What is the reason that their function is to receive the (form of the) object and not as of illuminating them as the lamp does ?

उच्यते- न कारणान्तरप्रसंगात् । यदि प्रदीपवदिन्द्रियं प्रकाशकं स्यातेन यथा तत्प्रकाशितेषु घटादिष्वर्थेषु करणान्तरमार्गणमेवमत्रापि स्यात् । न चैतदिष्टम् । अतो न प्रदीपवदिन्द्रियं प्रकाशकमिति । अन्तःकरणसद्भावादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्- अस्ति करणान्तरं बुद्धिलक्षणं यदिन्द्रियेण प्रदीपवत्प्रकाशितमर्थं गृह्णाति । तस्मात्परवानुवादोऽयं क्रियते, न प्रतिषेध इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? प्रदीपेन्द्रिययोरन्यतरानुपादानप्रसंगात् । इन्द्रियमपि प्रकाशकम् ; प्रदीपोऽपि । तत्रान्यतरस्यानुपादानं प्रसक्तम् । कस्मात् ? न होकार्यकारिणो युगपत्करणे सामर्थ्यमस्तीति । किं चान्यत् । अन्तःकरणहानेः । इन्द्रियेण प्रदीपवत्प्रकाशितान्वाह्यानर्थान्साक्षादन्तःकरणं गृह्णातीति वदतोऽन्तःकरणमेव हीयते । तस्मादयुक्तमन्तःकरणस्य ग्रहणसामर्थ्यम् । पुरुषस्येति चेन्न करणानर्थक्यप्रसंगात् । साक्षाद्विषयग्रहणसमर्थं पुरुषमिच्छतः करणानर्थक्यं प्रसज्यते । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् ग्राहकमिन्द्रियं न तु प्रदीपवत्प्रकाशकमिति ।

Proponent : It is not so, because there will arise the undesirable contingency of (acceptance of) some other cause (of knowledge). If the senses would be the illuminator like the lamp, as there is the search (i.e., need) for some other instrument in case of the (cognition of) pot, etc., illuminating that, the same would be the case here also. This is, however, not desirable. Therefore, the senses are not the illuminators of the objects like the lamp.<sup>4</sup>

If it is argued that it is wrong due to the existence of internal organs ? If may be like this. There is another organ in the form of intellect which grasps the objects illumined by the senses illuminating as lamp? Therefore, it is the exposition of others' theory and not the refutation of it .

It is not so.

Why ?

Because there will be the undesirable contingency of non-

acceptance of either of the lamp or the senses. The senses are the illuminator of the objects, as also the lamp. There arises the undesirable contingency of non-acceptance of one of them.

Why ?

There is no capability of operation of the two instruments which produce the same effect at a time.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, there will be the abandonment of (the nature of) the internal organ. The very nature of internal organ will be abandoned in case of one who states that the internal organ grasps the external objects illumined (by the senses) as a lamp. Therefore, it is wrong (to postulate) the capability of grasping the objects by the internal objects.<sup>6</sup> If it is argued that the capability belongs to the conscious entity, (we reply) no because there will arise the purposelessness of the organs. The undesirable contingency of purposelessness of the organ arises in the case of the one who holds that the conscious entity is capable of grasping the objects directly. Therefore, it is right that the senses acquire (the form of) the object and are not the illuminator like the lamp.

(Grasping, illuminating and understanding)

आह, भवतु तावद् ग्रहणमात्रमिन्द्रियवृत्तिरप्रत्यया । ग्रहणप्रत्ययप्रकाशाभेदः ?

Opponent : Let it be that the activity of the senses is to grasp the objects (and) not to understand the objects. What is the difference amongst grasping, understanding and illuminating the objects ?

उच्यते— विषयसम्पर्कात्ताद्रूप्यापत्तिरिन्द्रियवृत्तिग्रहणं, तथा विषयेन्द्रियवृत्त्यनुकारेण निश्चयौ गौरयं शुक्तौ धावतीत्येवमादिः प्रत्ययः । तथा विषयसम्पर्कापगमे श्रोत्रादिवृत्तेः ताद्रूप्यापगमो वर्तमानकालता, ग्रहणस्यानुभवात् संस्काराधानं तत्पूर्विका च स्मृतिरिति त्रिकालविषया प्रत्ययस्येत्ययमनयोर्विशेषः । बाह्यस्तु प्रकाशो न विषयरूपापन्नः । संस्कारात् घटादीनां व्यवधानरूपं पार्थिवं छायालक्षणं धर्ममपहत्य व्यञ्जकत्वाय कल्पते, चक्षुषोऽनुग्रहाय । उभयोर्वा चक्षुर्विषययोरित्यपरे । तस्मादुपपन्नमेतत् प्रकाशकं प्रदीपादि, ग्राहकं श्रोत्रादि, व्यवसायकमन्तःकरणमिति ।

Proponent : Grasping, the function of the senses, is the attainment of the form of the object by the senses through the contact with the objects. The determination in the form as 'this is the cow' 'it is white', 'it is running', etc., following the operation of the senses is the understanding. The function of the senses is in present time only as with the cessation of the operation of the

senses when the proximity of the object and the senses come to an end, the acquiring the form of that object the senses also comes to an end, there is the acquirement of the impressions (by the internal organs) through the experience of the form of the object acquired by the senses, and the remembrance is caused by that and, thus, the understanding refers to the three periods of time. This is the difference between the two (viz., grasping and understanding). The illumination is external, and not the acquirement of the form of the object. Through the refinement after removing the quality of shade which is earthly in nature and serves as the hindrance for the (knowledge of) pot, etc., one makes them worthy to manifest so that it renders a favour to the eyes. Or, according to others, it (i.e., refinement) refers to both the eyes and the objects.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, it is right to say that the lamp, etc., are agents of illuminating, the ear, etc., of attaining the form of the object and the internal organs of determining the objects.

(Material origination of the senses refuted)

अथ कर्मेन्द्रियाणां का वृत्तिरित्युच्यते— नैयायिकास्त्वेवमाहुः घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्छेत्राणीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः । भूतेभ्य इत्यनेन स्वविषयोपलब्धिलक्षणत्वं हीन्द्रियाणां भूतप्रकृतित्वेऽसति निर्धहति (?) नान्यथा । तानि पुनरिन्द्रियकारणानि पृथिव्यप्तेजो वायुराकाशमिति भूतानि । एभ्यः पञ्चभ्यो यथासंख्य घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्छेत्राणि पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि भवन्ति । भूतप्रकृतित्वमिति भूतस्वभावं व्याख्यायमानं पञ्चस्वपि सम्भवति । भूतकारणत्वं त्वन्येषु । चतुर्षु तथैव । श्रोत्रे तु कथंचित्कर्णशङ्कुल्यवच्छिन्नभोभागाभिप्रायेण व्यवहारतः समर्थनीयम् । एवं भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि स्वस्वविषयमधिगन्तुमुत्सहन्ति इति तल्लक्षणत्वमेषां सिध्यतीति, अतो भूतेभ्य इत्युक्तम् । एतत् सांख्याचार्याणां नेष्टम् । एवं हि सांख्यवृद्धा आहुः— आहङ्कारिकाणीन्द्रियाणि अर्थ साधयितुमर्हन्ति नान्यथा । तथा हि कारकं कारकत्वादेव प्राप्यकारिभवति । भौतिकानि चेन्द्रियाणि कथं प्राप्यकारीणि दुरवर्तिनि विषये भवेयुः ? आहङ्कारिकाणां तु तेषां व्यापकत्वात् । विषयाकारपरिणामात्मिका वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोऽनन्या सती सम्भवत्येवेति सुवचं प्राप्यकारित्वम् अपि च महदनुग्रहणमाहङ्कारिकत्वे तेषां कल्पते, न भौतिकत्वे । भौतिकत्वे हि यत्परिमाणं करणं तत्परिमाणं ग्राह्यं गृहणीयात् ।

Now it is stated as to what is the function of the organs of action. The Naiyāyikas state like this. The senses, viz., nose, tongue, eye, skin and the ear come out of the elements (N.S. 1.1.12). Through the word 'from the elements' is suggested that the act of cognising

their own object in case of the senses is determined when they are the products of the elements, viz., earth, water, light, air, and the sky. From them come out the nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear respectively. Through the expression 'caused from the elements' the nature of the elements which will be explained later on is possible in all the five. The nature of having elements as the cause is as it is stated in the case of other four. In the case of ear, however, it is to be justified through usage in the senses of the part of the sky occupied by the outer part of the ear. In this way, the senses which are elemental in nature are capable of grasping their own object; hence, their characteristic in the form of that object is proved. Hence, it is stated that they come out of the elements. This is, however, undesirable to the authorities of Sāṃkhya. The propounders of Sāṃkhya say thus. The senses which come out of egoism only accomplish the object (of grasping the objects) and not otherwise. An efficient cause due to its very nature of being so is of the nature of doing the act after reaching the object. How would the senses which are elemental in nature reach the object situated at a distance? In case they come out of the egoism, it is possible because of their being all-pervasive.<sup>8</sup> The nature of reaching the object is well-stated since it is possible when the function of the senses to attain the form of the object is not different from the agents. Moreover, the nature of grasping the objects great and atomic in size is postulated in case of them when they come out of the egoism, and not when they are elemental in nature. In case of the elemental objects the efficient cause would grasp the object and the size of the organs themselves.

(Function of the organs of action)

आह, अथ कर्मेन्द्रियाणां का वृत्तिरिति ?

Opponent : What is the function of the organs of action?

उच्यते—

वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानां तु वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दलक्षणा यथाक्रमं वृत्तयः प्रत्यवगन्तव्याः । तत्रोच्यतेऽनेनेति वचनम् । तस्माद्य एवार्थप्रत्यायनसमर्थो वर्णसमुदायः पद-वाक्यश्लोकग्रन्थलक्षणः स वागिन्द्रियस्यार्थो नाऽन्यः । आदीयतेऽनेनेत्यादानम् । आङ्गि-विध्यर्थे प्रयुज्यते । ततश्च यदेव प्रक्षालनपरिमार्जनोपस्पर्शनाध्ययनप्रहरणशिल्पव्यायामादि कृत्स्नं ग्रहणं स इन्द्रियार्थो नान्यः । विशिष्टं हरणं विहरणम् । अतश्च यदेव समविषमनिम्नोन्नतचङ्क्रमणपरिवर्तननाट्यव्यायामादिः स इन्द्रियार्थो नान्यः । एवमुत्कृष्टः सर्ग उत्सर्गः । अतश्च य एवाऽशितपीतविपरिणामस्य सम्यक्स्वतोतोमार्गानुसारिणो विसर्गः स इन्द्रियार्थो

नान्यः । एवमभिव्याप्यानन्दमानन्दः । ततश्च य एवाऽसाधारणप्रीति नयनाभिनिषितिलक्षणः स इन्द्रियार्थो नान्यः ॥ २८ ॥

Proponent : SPEAKING, HANDLING, WALKING, EXCRETION AND GRATIFICATION ARE (THE FUNCTIONS) OF THE OTHER (FIVE).

The functions of speech, hand, feet, the anus and generative organ should be understood as speaking, handling, walking, excretion and gratification respectively. Out of them, speech is that by which something is spoken. Therefore, the group of letters in the form of word, sentence, verse and book, capable of conveying some meaning, is the object of the organ of speech and not of anything else. Handling is that by which something is spoken. Therefore, the group of letters in the form of word, sentence, verse and book, capable of conveying some meaning? is the object of the organ of speech and not of anything else. Handling is that by which something is handled. The prefix anga and bhi are used in the sense of practice or mode. All that which is the act of handling or seizing in case of washing, cleaning, touching, studying, striking, art and craft, exercise, etc., is the object of this sense and not of anything else. Walking means a particular act of carrying. Whatever is the particular act of walking or carrying involved in walking in even, uneven, low and high places, change (of place), acting and exercise, etc., is the object of this sense and not of anything else. Similarly, excretion is the act of excreting. Hence, the excretion of the modification of eatern and drunck, through the way of proper canal of nutriment in the body, is the object of this sense and nothing else. Gratification is the pleasure covering (the Whole body). Hence, that which results from the eyes full of exceptional love is the object of this sense and of nothing else.

## KĀRIKĀ 28

1. The particular power or function forms the definition of organs as also serves as a probans for their existence.
2. The correct reading should be sabdbādiṣu, etc. , in place of rūpādiṣu.
3. It is implied that the senses have no knowledge but get the form of the object and submit it to the internal organs which transform this apprehension into knowledge. In that stage there is no particularity in knowledge.
4. Only the illumination does not serve the purpose. The impression of that object is to be carried to the internal organs. If the senses would only manifest the object, the purpose of carrying the impression would not be fulfilled.
5. If the senses would reveal the object like lamp, one could see the object in darkness as well because the purpose of lamp could be served by the senses themselves. Moreover, in the presence of lamp or in light there would be no purpose to be served by the senses.
6. The very nature of the internal organs implies that they do not come in contact with the external objects directly. If they do so, they would deviate from their very nature.
7. The refinement is to help the revealing of the object as also the help to the senses to turn them fit to get the form of the object.
8. The idea of all-pervasiveness of the senses is against the statement of the Sāṃkhya that the cosmic matter is all-pervasive while the evolutes are limited in magnitude (Kārikā 10).

## KĀRIKĀ 29

(Function of the internal organs)

आह, प्रागन्तःकरणवृत्तिनिर्देशः, सर्गक्रमानुगमात्पूर्वं बुद्ध्यहंकारमनसां वृत्तिनिर्देशः कर्तव्यः । किं कारणम् ? एवं हि सर्गक्रमोऽनुगतो भवति । क्रमभेदे वा प्रयोजनं वक्तव्यमिति ।

Opponent : The function of the internal organs should be mentioned first. There should be the mention of the function of the intellect, egoism and mind first in accordance with the order in the evolution.<sup>1</sup>

What is the reason here ?

In this way (only) the order in evolution is followed. Or, the purpose of deviation from the order should be stated.

उच्यते—न, इन्द्रियवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वात् । अन्तःकरणस्य हि इन्द्रियवृत्तिप्रवर्कः प्रत्ययः । तथा च वक्ष्यति—दृष्टे तथाऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिरिति (का. ३०) । तस्मात्सर्गक्रमेण विना तन्निर्देशः प्रागाचार्येण क्रियते इति ।

Proponent : No, because that (function of the internal organs) follows the function of the senses. The understanding of the internal organs follows the function of the senses. The author will also state: with regard to the perceptible as also with regard to the imperceptible, the function of the three follows that (function of the senses). Therefore, the mention of that is made by authority first ignoring the order in evolution.

आह, तदसम्भवः, शास्त्रे प्रागाभमानाभिधानात् । शास्त्रं ह्येवमाह—का नु भोः संज्ञा मातुरुदरेऽवस्थितं कुमारं प्रत्यभिनिर्विशत इति ? अस्मीत्येषा माहात्मी संविदिति । तथा कार्यकारणव्यूहसमकालं माहात्म्यशरीरोऽस्मीति प्रतिबुद्ध्यते । प्रवृत्ताश्चैव ह्यव्यक्ता भवन्त्यस्मीत्यस्मितामात्रा । प्रमाणं च शास्त्रम् । तस्मात्प्रागन्तःकरणनिर्देशः कर्तव्यः ।

Opponent : That is impossible because the 'I notion' is mentioned first in the scripture. The scripture states like this: 'What no-

tion is attached to a body situated in the fetus of the mother ? The great knowledge 'I am'. At the time of formation of the body, it is known 'I am the mātmya body'.<sup>2</sup> The egoism which proceeds afterwards lies latent. The scriptures are the authority here. Therefore, the mention of the internal organ should be made first.

उच्यते-तन्निमित्तार्थेन विवक्षितत्वात् । सत्यमेतत् कार्यकारणव्यूहनिष्पत्तिसमकालमस्मीत्येषा माहात्मी सवित् प्रत्युपधीयते । शब्दादिविषयस्त्वनन्तरकरणप्रत्ययः श्रोत्रादिनिमित्त इति । एतत्पूर्वशब्देन विवक्षितम् । न च निमित्तमतिक्रम्य नैमित्तिकाभिधानं न्याययम् ।

अथवा नैव वयमिदं प्रष्टव्या यथा प्रागन्तःकरणवृत्तिनिर्देशः कर्तव्य इति । किं कारणम् ? यस्मात्

### स्वालक्षणं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य

स्वालक्षणमेव स्वालक्षणम् । स्वार्थे तद्धितवृत्तिः, अन्यभावस्तु कालशब्दव्यवायादिति । [यथा बुद्ध्यहंकारमनसां हि सौक्ष्म्यान् शक्यं स्वरूपमभिधातुमित्यतो वृत्तिरेव लक्षणभावेनोपदिश्यते] श्रोत्रादीनामपि च सौक्ष्म्याल्लक्षणमपदेष्टुमशक्यमिति वृत्तिरेवोच्यते, न लक्षणम् । तदेव चैषा लक्षणं भवति । यच्छब्दालोचनसमर्थं तच्छ्रोत्रम् । एवमितरेष्वपि वक्तव्यम् । बुद्ध्यहंकारमनसां च लक्षणमध्यवसायाद्युक्तम् । तदेव वृत्तित्वेनाचक्षाणः श्रोत्रादीनामेव चाभिधानं लक्षणं चाप्याचक्षाणो वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरन्यत्वं ज्ञापयति । अन्यथा तु यथाऽध्यवसायादि लक्षणमेवं रूपादिषु पञ्चानामोलचनमात्रं लक्षणमित्युच्यते, न तु वृत्तिरिति । श्रोत्रादिवद् बुद्ध्यहंकारमनसां व्यवसायादयो वृत्तिरित्युच्यते, न तु लक्षणम् । तस्मादन्यथा निर्देशो ज्ञापकं वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरन्यत्वेति व्याख्याता करणवृत्तिः ।

Proponent : Because that (function of the senses) is desired to be stated for the purpose of considering it as the cause (of the function of the internal organs). It is true that the great knowledge that 'I am' is imposed upon it at the time of the production of the body. The cognition of the internal organs with reference to the objects like word, etc., is caused by the ear, etc., This is denoted by the word caused. It is not right to mention the effect overlooking the senses. Or, we should not be told that the mention of the function of the internal organ should be made first.

What is the reason here ?

Because

### THE FUNCTIONS OF THREE INTERNAL ORGANS ARE THEIR RESPECTIVE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES (DEFINITION)

The respective characteristics mean the individual characteristic of their own. The grammatical operation, viz., taddhita is in the sense of its own. The state of difference is caused by the intervention of time and words. The function only is stated in the form of definition in case of the intellect, egoism and the mind since their (other) essential nature is not capable of being stated because of their subtleness. Similarly, it is not possible to state the definition (or the peculiar characteristic) of ear, etc., on account of their subtleness, and hence their function only is stated and not the definition or peculiar characteristic. Their functions only serve as their definition. That which is capable of getting abstract apprehension of the word is the ear. Similarly, should be said in the case of other senses also. The peculiar characteristic of the intellect, egoism and mind are stated to be the ascertainment, etc. Stating the same as the function and stating the peculiar characteristic also in the form of that as also the same in case of ear, etc., the author suggests the non-difference between the function and the agent. Otherwise, as the ascertainment, etc., are the characteristic, the function of grasping the form, etc., would be stated as the characteristic only and the function. As in the case of ear, etc., the ascertainment, etc., are said to be the function and not the characteristic in case of intellect, etc. Therefore, the mention in the other form is suggestive of the non-difference between the function and the agent.<sup>3</sup> Thus is explained the function of the organ.

(Definition as the peculiar function)

### सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।

सेति पूर्वकृतां वृत्तिमभिसम्बध्नाति । एषेति सर्वनाम्ना प्रत्याकृष्टां तामेव प्रत्यक्षं प्रति निर्दिशति । भवतीति वक्ष्यमाणेन धर्मान्तरेणास्यास्तद्वत्ताऽनुभावित्वं ख्यापयति । असामान्येति धर्ममाचष्टे । सामान्या साधारणेत्यर्थः । न सामान्याऽसामान्या । प्रतिकरणं नियतेत्युक्तं भवति । या हीयमनुक्रान्ता करणवर्णोऽध्यवसायादिका वृत्तिरियं व्यस्तानां करणानां प्रतिस्वं नियता । ततश्चैषां बुद्ध्यहंकाराणां कार्यविशेषनिमित्तभावसंसूचितस्य स्वरूपस्यासंकरः सिद्धः ।

### THIS IS PECULIAR TO EACH

The pronoun 'that' refers to the function stated earlier. With

the pronoun 'this' the author relates to directly presented (discussion) the same which is drawn from above. The expression 'is' proclaims the understanding (or indication) of its identity with the other property to be mentioned later on. The term 'peculiar' refers to the property or quality. The term 'general' means common. That which is not general is uncommon. It is to be stated that it is fixed with (or is peculiar to) each organ. The functions of the phases of the organs, ascertainment, etc., which are enumerated earlier in succession are fixed with (i.e., is peculiar to) each of the organs taken separately. Thus is proved the absence of commingling of the nature of these intellect, etc., which is suggested through the state of being the cause of a particular effect (i.e., activity).

(Common function of all the senses)

आह, सामान्यविशेषयोरितरेतरापेक्षत्वादसामान्यभिधानेन सामान्यस्याप्यभिधानादध्यवसायादिका करणानामसामान्या वृत्तिरित्युक्तेऽर्थादापन्नमेषां सामान्यापि वृत्तिरस्तीति । तस्मादसावपि वक्तव्येति ।

Opponent : When it is stated that ascertainment, etc., are the uncommon function of the senses, it means by implication that there is their common function also because with the mention of uncommon the common also becomes mentioned since the common and uncommon require (i.e., depend upon) each other. Therefore, that (common) also should be stated.

उच्यते-

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥२९॥

सामान्या चासौ करणवृत्तिः सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः । प्राणश्चाद्यो येषां ते प्राणाद्याः, प्राणपानसमानोदाव्यानाः पञ्च समस्तकरणवृत्तिः प्रत्यवगन्तव्येति । तैः सर्वैः सहितः प्राण इति वेदान्तेष्वपि ।

Proponent : THE FUNCTION COMMON TO ALL THE ORGANS IS (CIRCULATION OF) THE FIVE VITAL AIRS, PRANA ETC.

The expression 'the function common to all the organs' means the function of the organs which is common. The expression prana etc.' means those of which prana is the first. The circulation of the five vital airs, viz., prana, apana, samana, udana and vyana should be understood as the function of the organs collectively. It is stated in the Upaniṣads also that prana is with (or common to all of them).

आह, अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? धर्मिणो धर्म्यन्तरवृत्तिभावानुपपत्तेः । वृत्तिरित्ययं शब्दो व्यापारमाचष्टे । न च धर्मान्तरं धर्मान्तरस्य व्यापारो भवितुमर्हतीति ।

Opponent : This is wrong. Why ? Because there is no possibility of becoming a function of a qualified object by some other qualified object (i.e., an object cannot be the function of the other object). The word function denotes activity. And, one qualified object cannot be the function of other qualified object.<sup>4</sup>

उच्यते-न कार्ये कारणोपचारात् । सत्यमेतत् । धर्मी धर्म्यन्तरस्य वृत्तिव्तेनाशक्यः परिकल्पयितुम् । किं तु सामान्यकरणवृत्त्या प्रेर्यमाणो वायुस्तत्प्रवणत्वात्तत्कार्यतां प्रतिपद्यते । तत्र प्राणादिकार्ये वायौ प्राणोपचारं कृत्वा एवमुच्यते-प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ।

Proponent : No because the effect is metaphorically spoken to be the cause. It is true that a qualified object cannot be postulated as function of some other qualified object. However, the air circulated by the function of the organs common to all is said to be a function of them because it is circulated by them. Thus, metaphorically applying the name prāṇa (i.e., activity in circulation of the air) to the air, which is the object of activity involved in prāṇa, etc., it is stated -the five vital airs prāṇa, etc.,

तत्प्रेरणाऽसिद्धेरयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, कथमेतदवगम्यतेऽर्थान्तरप्रेरितस्य वायोरियं क्रिया भवति न पुनः स्वतन्त्रस्येति ?

Opponent : If it is argued that it is wrong because the circulation of that (by the organs) is not yet established? It may be like this. How is it known that the activity in air is when it is circulated by other object and not independently?

उच्यते -न स्वतः, तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वाऽनुपपत्तेः । इहेयमकस्माद् भिन्ना क्रियावायोः स्वतो वा स्यात्, करणवृत्तिव्यतिरिक्तताद्वा ? किं चातः ? तत्र तावत्स्वत उपपद्यते । कस्मात् ? सर्वत्र प्रसंगात् स्वाभाविके हि वायोदिकसंचारेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने सर्वत्र तत्संभवः स्यात् । ततश्च तिर्यक्पातादिवृत्तिर्हन्येत, न चान्यतः । कस्मात् ? अदर्शनात् । न हि पृथिव्यादीनां वायुप्रेरणसामर्थ्यं क्वचिदुपलब्धम् । भस्मादिषु दृष्टमिति चेन्न, अन्यनिमित्तत्वात् । अत्राऽपिचैत्रव्यापार उपलभ्यते इत्यवश्यमन्यत्रिभित्तमुपलभ्यते इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । आत्मेति चेन्न, क्रियाप्रतिषेधात् । उपपादितमेतत्पूर्वमात्मा निष्क्रिय इति । न च निष्क्रियस्य प्रेरणमुपप-



द्यते। न च निर्निर्मिता स्वभावभेदानामनाकस्मिकत्वात्। तस्माद्यत्तन्निमित्तं सा समस्तकरण-  
वृत्तिः।

Proponent : It is not of its own because there is no possibility of being different from that. The activity of the air which is accidentally different from it may be independently of its own or due to some other reason different from the function of the senses.

What does it prove ?

The activity is not possible independently.

Why ?

*Because it would involve the undesirable contingency of its presence everywhere. If the circulation of the air in the direction is admitted to be natural, there will be the possibility of its presence everywhere. In that case the act of falling down (or flying) in the direction (or the function of the flying or falling down of a bird) could come to an end.<sup>5</sup> It is not caused by some other object.*

Why ?

*Because it is not observed. The capacity of circulating the air is not observed anywhere in the earth, etc. If you argue that it is observed anywhere in case of balloons, etc., (we reply) no, because it is caused, by something else. In this case the activity of Caitra etc., is observed and, hence, it should be admitted that some other cause is certainly observed. If it is argued that it is the soul (which activates), we reply, no, because the activity is already negated (in case of soul). It is established earlier that the soul is inactive. The act of instigating is not possible in case of the inactive entity. It is not that it is not caused because the objects which differ in nature (or differ from other naturally) are not causeless since they are not accidental. Therefore, whatever is that cause, it is the activity of all the senses.*

(Prāṇa, etc., are not a single air)

स चायं वायुरेक एव स्थानसंचारविशेषान्नाख्यो भवति। यथैको देवदत्तः पाचको लावक इति क्वचित्। तदयुक्तम्। कस्मात्? युगपत्परस्परातिशयविरोधात्। पूर्वस्मात्पूर्वस्मादुत्तर उत्तरो वायुर्बलीयानिति ह्यभ्युपगमः। तदेतदेकस्यैकस्मिन्काले नोपपद्यते। तस्मादुपपन्नं प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च।

That air is one but is given different names due to its particularity of circulation at different places. Just as the same person Devadatta by name is somewhere a cook and somewhere a wood-cutter.

That is wrong.

Why ?

Because of its contradiction with the mutual pre-eminence at a time. It is admitted that the later air is pre-eminent in comparison to the earlier. This is not possible in case of one at a time. Therefore, it is right that prāṇa, etc., are the five airs.

(Prāṇa)

किं पुनरेषां प्राणादीनां लक्षणमिति ?

Opponent : What is the definition of prāṇa, etc. ?

उच्यते-द्विविधाः प्राणादयः। अन्तर्वृत्तयो बहिर्वृत्तयश्च। तत्र मुखनासिकाभ्यां प्रगमनात्प्रणतेश्च प्राणः। योऽयं मुखनासिकाभ्यां सञ्चरति सोऽन्तर्वृत्तिर्वायुः प्राण इत्यभिधीयते। या काचित्प्रणतिर्नाम भूतेषु तद्यथा प्रणतेयं सेना, प्रणतोऽयं वृक्षः, प्रणतोऽयं धर्मः, प्रणतोऽयमर्थः, प्रणतोऽयं कामः, प्रणतोऽयं विद्यायाम्। तद्विपरीतेषु वा बाह्यप्राणवृत्तिरेषा। प्राणिष्वप्येवैषा भवति। स खल्वयमत्राऽभिव्यक्तो भवति। तद्यथा महता वा दुःखेनाऽभिप्लुतस्य महता वा बन्धुना वियुक्तस्य, सहितस्य वा सौरभेयस्य, निपानावतीर्णस्य वा महिषस्यावगतेः।

Proponent : The prāṇa, etc., are of two kinds –coming inside and going outside the body – It is called prāṇa because it goes (inside) through the nose and the mouth, and because of the inclination (of being towards it). That internal air which enters (inside) through mouth and the nose is the prāṇa. That inclination is observed in the beings sometimes. For example, the Army is inclined; the tree is inclined; this fellow is inclined for virtues; this (man) is inclined for wealth, this (man) is inclined for pleasure; this (man) is inclined for learning. Or the activity of the external vital airs is observed in the case opposite to these. This is observed in the case of the beings also. The same becomes manifest here. For example, after knowing the one overpowered with great misery, separated from a near relative, accompanied with a herd of cattle, or the buffalo fallen in the pool.<sup>6</sup> (Apāna)

अपक्रमणाच्चापानः। योऽयं रसं धातून् शुक्रं मूत्रं पुरीषं वातार्तवगर्भाश्चाकर्षन्धोगच्छन्त्यमन्तर्वृत्तिर्वायुरपान इत्यभिधीयते। यच्चापि किञ्चिदपक्रमणं नाम भूतेषु तद्यथा अपक्रान्तोऽयं धर्मादिभ्यस्तद्विपरीतेभ्यो वा इति बाह्या खल्वपानवृत्तिरेषा।

अपानविषय एवैष भवति । बलवत्तरश्चायं प्राणोद्वायोः कस्मात् ? एषा ह्येतं प्राणमूर्ध्वं वर्तमानमर्वागेव सन्नियच्छति अर्वागेव सन्निरुणद्धि । एषोऽत्राभिव्यक्तो भवति । तद्यथा उपकूपमुप-  
श्वभ्रं वा परिवर्तमानस्याः शतपदीं लङ्घयतः ।

And the apāna is called so because it goes down. The air inside the body which goes downward and pulls down the fluid, secretion or the ingredients of the body, semen virile, urine, excrement (which are constituents of the body) menstrual fluid, and the embryo is called the apāna. The external function of the apāna is the function of going down or retreating in the beings just as this has gone down from the virtue or from the opposite of that. That is the object of apāna. This is more powerful than the prāna air.

Why ?

It brings down the prāna air which is at a higher place and it controls it though seated below. It is manifested in these cases : One moving around the well or a hole or in the case of one crossing a centipede.

(Sāmāna)

हृद्यवस्थानात्सह भावाच्च समानः । यस्त्वयं प्राणापानयोर्मध्ये हृद्यवतिष्ठते से समानो वायुरन्तर्वृत्तिः यश्चापि कश्चित्सह भावो नाम भूतेषु द्वन्द्वारामता । तद्यथा सह दास्ये, सह यक्ष्ये, सह तपश्चरिष्यामि सह भार्यापुत्रैर्बन्धुभिः सुहृद्भिश्च वर्तिष्य बाह्या समान वृत्तिरेषा । समानविषय एवैष भवति इति । बलवत्तरः खल्वयं प्राणापानाभ्याम् । एष ह्येतौ प्राणापानौ ऊर्ध्वमवाक्च वर्तमानौ मध्य एव सन्नियच्छति, मध्य एव सन्निरुणद्धि, स चैषोऽत्राभिव्यक्तो भवति । तद्यथा स्तुतसारस्य वा सारमेयस्य अनडुहो वोढभारस्य, घर्माभितप्ताया वा एडकाया अर्धार्धकायं शकशकेति । प्राणान्ते सर्वप्राणिनां प्राणापानावुत्सृज्योर्ध्वमधश्च मुक्तयोक्त्रौ हयाविव विषमं संचारयन् शरीरं स परास्यति ।

The Samāna is called so because it is located in the heart and stays in its association. The air which is located in the midst of prāna and apāna is the samāna air functioning inside the body. Whatever is associated in the being in collecting together with the other partner is the external function of the samāna air just as I shall give in association with other; I shall sacrifice with others; I shall practise penance together with others, I shall stay with wife, sons, brothers and friends. This is the object of samāna. This is more powerful than prāna and apāna. It controls the prāna and apāna which are present above and below it respectively, itself remaining in the middle. It becomes manifest in the following cases: the dog giving forth the essential part (of the body) or the bull carrying load, or the restling noise of the sheep afflicted by heat. When the life of the beings comes to

an end, it moves irregularly up and down the prāna and apāna air (which are at that time) like the ununited horses and leaves (casts off) the body.<sup>7</sup>

(Udāna)

मूर्धारोहणादात्मोत्कर्षणाच्चोदानः । यस्त्वयं प्राणापानसमानानां स्थानान्यतिक्रम्यरसं धातूश्चादाय मूर्धानमारोहति ततश्च प्रतिहतो निवृत्तः स्थानकरणानुप्रदानविशेषाद्वर्णपदवाक्यश्लोकग्रन्थलक्षणस्य शब्दस्याऽभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तं भवति अयमन्तर्वृत्तिर्वायुरुदान इत्युच्यते । यश्चापि कश्चिदात्मोत्कर्षो नाम भूतेषु तद्यथा हीनादस्मि श्रेयान्, सदृशेनवा सदृशः, सदृशादस्मि श्रेयान्, श्रेयसा वा सदृशः, श्रेयसो वा श्रेयान् । एतस्मिंस्तथा रूपाभिमानो वा प्राप्तविद्यस्तु । दद्यथा बह्वन्तरविशेषादल्पान्तरविशेषोऽस्म्यगुणवतो वा गुणवानस्मीति बाह्योदानवृत्तिरेषा । उदानविषय एवैष भवति । बलवत्तरः खल्वयं पूर्वभ्यः कथम् ? एष ह्येता-  
न्प्राणादीनूर्ध्वमवाङ्मध्ये च वर्तमानानूर्ध्वमेवोन्नयति, ऊर्ध्वमेवोत्कर्षति । स चैषोऽत्राभिव्यक्तो भवति शीतोदकेन वा पर्युक्षितस्य प्रासमसिं विकोशं चोद्यतमभिपश्यतः ।

The udāna is called so because it goes upto, i.e., mounts the head and because it moves the soul upward. The air inside the body is called udāna which mounts the head above the places of prāna, apāna and samāna taking with it the fluid and secretion and returning from there after being obstructed and due to the particular contact (lit. attaining the particular place and organ) it becomes the cause for the manifestation of the word in the form of letter, word, sentence, verse and a book. Whatever is the notion of self-superiority in the being as 'I am superior to the lower (persons)', 'I am equal to my equals', 'I am superior to those similars to me', 'I am equal to the great man', or 'I am superior to superiors' (is due to this). Or, it is the 'I notion' with reference to the form or status like 'I am so in this' in case of an educated person. For example, beginning from the major particular difference to the minor particular difference is the external function of the udāna as 'I belong to the non-virtuous' or 'I am a virtuous man'. This is the object of udāna. It is more powerful than the earlier.

How ?

Because it takes upwards the prāna, etc., present upward, downward or in the middle; it draws them upward only. It is manifested in the case of one sprinkled with cold water or the one seeing a man with a unsheathed sword and ready for discharging it.

(Vyāna)

शरीरव्याप्येतरत्यन्ताविनाभावाच्च व्यानः । यस्त्वयमालोमनखाच्छरीरं व्याप्य रसादीनां धातूनां पृथिव्यादीनां व्यूहं मर्मणां च प्रस्पन्दनं प्राणादीनां च स्थितिं करोति सोऽन्तर्वृत्ति-

व्यानः । यश्चापि कश्चिदत्यन्ताऽविनाभावो नाम भूतेषु तद्यथा पतिव्रता भर्तारं मृतमप्यनुगच्छति भवान्तरेऽप्ययमेव भर्ता स्यात् तथा धर्मादिभिस्तद्विपरीतैश्चेति बाह्यो व्यानविषय एवैष प्रभवति । बलवत्तमश्चायं सर्वेभ्यः । कथम् ? अनेन हि व्याप्ते शरीरदण्डके तद्वशीकृतानां प्राणादीनां समा स्थितिर्भवति । स एषोऽन्तकाले प्राणभूतामविनाभावेन वर्तमानोऽभिव्यज्यते । तद्यथा हा तर्हि पादौ हैमौ शीतीभूतौ गुल्फे जङ्घे ऊरु कटिरुदरमुरक्कण्ठेऽस्थिबुरघुरो वर्तते हू (?) इत्यवैषो बाह्यो व्यान इति । एवमेते प्राणाद्याः स्थानकार्यविशेषसूचिताः पञ्च वायवो व्याख्याताः तेषां प्रेरिका सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः ।

The vyāna is called so because it pervades the body, and because of its being in the case of intimate association. The air inside the body which sustains the prāṇa, etc., and which pervading the whole body right from the nail to the hair and causes the movement in vital parts and the group of the gross (earth) elements, fluid and secretion (in the body) is the vyāna. Whatever is the state of absolute non-separation in the being, is the external object of vyāna. For example, a chaste and virtuous wife follows her husband (after his) with an intention that she may get the same husband in other births also. Similarly, (the absolute non-separation) from virtue, etc., and their opposites. It is the most powerful of all.

How ?

There is the equal position of the prāṇa, etc., which when controlled by him pervade the whole body. At the time of death it is manifested as present in non-separable states in the living beings. For example, when the feet become cold in snow, the sound exists in ankle, shank, hips, belly, chest and throat. This is the external vyāna. In this way are explained the five airs, prāṇa, etc., indicated by their particular location and activities (location, activities or particularities). The instigation of them is the common function of the organs.<sup>8</sup>

(Life or Eight Prāṇas)

एषा च तन्त्रान्तरेषु प्रयत्न इत्युच्यते । स च धर्मादिसंस्कारभावनावशादनुपरतो जीवन्म । आह च

वृत्तिरन्तः समस्तानां करणानां प्रदीपवत् ।

अप्रकाशा क्रियारूपा जीवनं कायधारिका ॥

सा यावदनिरुद्धा तु हन्ति वायुं रजोऽधिका ।

धर्माद्यनावृत्तिवशात्तावज्जीवति मानवः ॥

अत्र च सामान्यकरणवृत्तिग्रहणसामर्थ्यात्प्राणाद्याः पञ्च वायवः । बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि षष्ठम् । कर्मेन्द्रियाणि सप्तमम् । पूरुष्टमम् । पूरित्यहंकारावस्थासंविदमधिकुरुते । यस्मादाह-तत्र

संविदहंकारगतं कार्यं कारणं पूरयति यस्मात् ।

तस्मात्पूरित्युक्ता प्रत्यवभासाऽष्टमं भोक्तुः ॥

सा चाहङ्कारगता संविद् बुद्धिगतैव पुरुषेणोपलभ्यते ।

यस्माद्बुध्यति-

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।

कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ (का. ३६)

सर्वं प्रत्यपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ॥ (का. ३७)

तस्मात्सैव पूरिति । शास्त्रं चैवमाह-प्राणापानसमानोदानव्यानाः पञ्च वायवः । षष्ठं मनः । सप्तमी पूरुष्टमी वाक् । वाग्ग्रहणेन कर्मेन्द्रियपर्वणो ग्रहणम् । मनोग्रहणेन बुद्धीन्द्रियपर्वणः । तदेतत्प्राणाष्टमं वैकारिकं गुणशरीरस्य परिद्रष्टुः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य शरीरमाददानस्य नित्यंस्तम्भस्थानीयं प्रत्यङ्गं भवति, अच्छेद्यमभेद्यमदाह्यमविनाशयमविकम्प्यम् । अनित्यानि पुनर्भौतिकानि बाह्यानि शरीराणि कुशमृत्तिकास्थानीयानि उपचीयन्ते चेति ।

In other systems it is called effort. And, not desisting from its activities due to the manifestation of the past impressions of virtuous deeds, etc., it is called life. It is said also :

The internal function of the organs collectively is like a lamp, without the light (of their own)<sup>9</sup> and is of the nature of the activities, the sustainer of the body and is the life. A human being keeps alive upto the time that (function) abounding in Rajas is not restrained and strikes the air, and continues due to the non-return (non-cessation) of the virtue, etc.

Here, through the force of the mention of the common activities of the senses the prāṇa, etc., are the five airs. The senses of knowledge are the sixth (prāṇa) the senses of the action the seventh, and the egoism, the eighth. The word pūr refers to the knowledge at the state of egoism because it is stated:

Since the knowledge as an act in the egoism completes the causes, it is called pūr, which is the eighth knowledge of the enjoyer (i.e., experiencer conscious entity).

The knowledge residing in the egoism is experienced by the conscious entity present in the intellect only<sup>10</sup> since the author will speak as —

These mutually different modifications of the three constituents and resembling a lamp illumining the entire purpose of the conscious entity present it to the intellect (K. 36). And, because the intellect accomplishes the experience of the conscious entity in respect of all the (objects) (Ka 37.)

Therefore, that (knowledge) only is the pūr. The scripture also says so: the five (are) the airs, namely prāṇa, apāna, samāna, udāna and vyāna. Sixth is the mind seventh is the pūr (knowledge in egoism), eighth is the speech. Through the mention of speech is the mention of the phase of organs of action. Through the mention of mind is the mention of the phase of organs of knowledge. This group of eight prāṇas which are related to the modification becomes (i.e., serves) as the eternal part as a place of support for the seer soul which has attained a body.<sup>11</sup> It is unbreakable, undivisible, uncombustible and undestructible. The external bodies which are non-eternal in nature and serve as the (water) and clay are non-eternal and grow.

(Source of Action)

आह, कुतः पुनरियं प्राणादिवृत्तिः प्रवर्तत इति ? उच्यते-सा कर्मयोनिभ्यः । महतः प्रच्युतं हि रजो विकृतम् अण्डस्थानीयाः पञ्च कर्मयोनयो भवन्ति-धृतिः श्रद्धा सुखा विविदिषा अविविदिषेति । आह च

प्रच्युतो महतो यस्तु न प्राप्तो ज्ञानलक्षणम् ।  
व्यापारो ज्ञानयोनित्वात्सा योनिः कुक्कुटाण्डवत् ॥

तासां लक्षणविषयसतत्त्वगुणसमन्वया भवन्ति । तत्र लक्षणं तावत् व्यवसायादप्रच्यवनं धृतिः । फलमनभिसन्धाय शास्त्रोक्तेषु कार्येष्ववश्यकर्तव्यताबीजभावः श्रद्धा । दृष्टानुश्रविकफलाभिलाषद्वारको हि बद्धेराभोगः सुखा । वेतुमिच्छा विविदिषा । तन्निवृत्तिरविविदिषा । तत्र यदाऽयं जन्तुः शुभाशुभेषु कार्येषु वृत्त्यनुसारी जिज्ञासुरजिज्ञासुर्वा शरीरं परित्यजति तामेव कर्मयोनिमुपपद्यते । तस्यामुपपन्नस्तामेव भावयति । एतत्तावल्लक्षणसतत्त्वम् । आह च

वाचि कर्मणि संकल्पे प्रतिज्ञां यो न रक्षति ।  
तन्निष्ठस्तत्प्रतिज्ञश्च धृतेरेतैर्द्धि लक्षणम् ॥  
अनसूया ब्रह्मचर्यं यजनं याजनं तपः ।  
दानं प्रतिग्रहः शौचं श्रद्धायां लक्षणं स्मृतम् ॥  
सुखार्थी यस्तु सेवेत विद्यां कर्म तपांसि वा ।  
प्रायश्चित्तपरो नित्यं सुखायां स तु वर्तते ॥

द्वित्वैकत्वपृथक्त्वं नित्यं चेतनमचेतनं सूक्ष्मम् ।  
सत्कार्यमसत्कार्यं विविदिषितव्यं विविदिषायाः ॥  
विषयीतसुप्तमत्तवदविविदिषा ध्यानिनां सदा योनिः ।  
कार्यकरणक्षयकरी प्राकृतिका गतिः समाख्याता ॥

विषयसतत्त्वं पुनः सर्वविषयिणी धृतिः । आश्रमविषयिणी श्रद्धा । दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयिणी सुखा । व्यक्तविषयिणी विविदिषा । अव्यक्तविषयिण्यविविदिषा । गुणसमन्वयस्तु रजस्तमोबहुला धृतिः । सत्त्वरजोबहुला श्रद्धा । सत्त्वतमोबहुला सुखा । रजोबहुला विविदिषा । तमोबहुलाऽविविदिषा इति । उक्तं च

लक्षणविषयसतत्त्वं त्रैगुण्यसमन्वयं च पञ्चानाम् ।  
योनीनां यो विद्याद्यतिवृषभं तं त्वहं मन्ये ॥

इत्युक्ताः प्राणादयो योनयश्च ।

How (or wherefrom) does this function of prāṇa, etc., proceed?

Reply: That (function) proceeds from the sources of the action. The Rajas fallen from the intellect is affected by passion or emotion; the five sources of activities are like the egg (which are) — determination, faith, desire for pleasure, desire for knowledge and the absence of desire for knowing. It is stated also:

That which has fallen down from the intellect and has not attained the characteristic (state) of knowledge is the (mediate) operation and is the source of knowledge like the egg, for a cock.

To them (sources of action) belong the characteristics and their objects, with essence, the quality and mutual connection. Out of them, the characteristics are as — not deviating from the resolution is the determination, faith is state of the seed of the notion that the acts prescribed in śruti must be performed without aiming at their results; desire for pleasure is the expansion (enjoyment) of intellect caused by the desire for the fruit of the perceptible (means) and the means prescribed in the scriptures; desire for knowing is the lust to know the objects; absence of that desire for knowing is the cessation (or destruction) of it. When the being having the inclination for virtuous or vile actions, having or not having the desire to know leaves the body, attains the source fit for that activity. Attaining that he promotes his interest in that only. This is the characteristic along with the essence. It is stated also:

When one does not keep his promise in words, acts, determina-

tion, and afterwards becomes firm and determined in that; this is the definition of determination, absence of envy, celibacy, sacrifice for himself, sacrifice for others, austerity, charity, to accept charity and purity—are said to be the characteristics of faith.

When the one desirous of happiness is engaged in learning, (religious) acts or austerities, he always makes an atonement, and always remains with a desire for happiness.<sup>12</sup> The definition of desire is in the form that the duality, oneness, distinctness, eternal, sentient, non-sentient, subtle, the (theory of) pre-existence of effect should be known.

The state of those engaged in meditation is always (in the form of) the absence of desire to know just like that of the one who has drunk the poison, is in the sleeping condition and is intoxicated, and it brings about the destruction of the effect and means (body). It is called the natural state (of the yogins).<sup>13</sup>

These are its objects with the essence. The determination refers to all object. The faith is with reference to the stages of life. The desire of happiness is about the perceptible objects and those mentioned in the scripture. The desire to know is about the manifest objects. The absence of desire is about the non-manifest objects. The combination of constituents is like this. The Rajas and Tamas dominate in the case of determination. The faith abounds in Sattva and Rajas. The desire for pleasure abounds in Sattva and Tamas. The desire to know abounds in Rajas. The absence of desire to know abounds in Tamas. It is stated also:

One who knows the definition, the object with essence and the combination of three constituents belonging to the five causes, him I consider the best of the strivers (or an eminent striver).

Thus are explained the prāṇa, etc., and the source of action.

(Control over the Vital airs)

एतद् द्वयमधिगम्य सम्यङ्मार्गानुगमनं कुर्यात् । रजस्तमोर्धर्मादिसाधनभावविनिवृत्तिस्तत्र प्राणानामन्तर्वृत्तिरनुपाधिकत्वादनिवर्त्या । बहिर्वृत्तिस्तु मार्गामार्गविषयतया प्रयोक्तव्या । कथमित्युच्यते—प्राणविषया तावत्प्रणतिर्धर्मादि विषय एवापरोद्धव्या । ततो ह्यस्य सत्त्ववृद्धिः, सत्त्ववृद्धेश्चोत्तरोत्तरबुद्धिरूपाधिगमः । अपानविषयस्त्वपक्रमणं धर्मादिविषय एवापरोद्धव्यमेवं ह्यस्य ख्यातिविषयाऽऽकारकस्य तमसो निर्हासः । ततश्चोत्तरोत्तरबुद्धिरूपाधिगमः । तथा समानविषयं साहचर्यं सत्त्वधर्मानुगुणं कुर्यात् । यस्माच्छास्त्रमाह—सत्त्वारामः सत्त्वमिथुनश्च सदा स्यादिति । आत्मोत्कर्षं तूदानविषयम् । अविद्यापर्वणोऽन्त्यं रूपं विवर्ज्य तत्प्रतिपक्षैर्निवर्तयेत् । अत्यन्ताऽविनाभावं च व्यानविषयं ज्ञानविषय एव भाव-

येत् । योनीनां चतसृणां धर्मताबीजतामेवादद्यात् । अविविदिषामपि अनिष्टफलहेतुषु भावयेत् । सोऽयं धर्मादिषु प्रवणस्तत्प्रतिपक्षापक्रान्तः सत्त्वारामो विनिवृत्ताभिमानो ज्ञाननिष्ठः सविशुद्धयोनिरचिरेण परं ब्रह्मोपपद्यत इति । आह च

बाह्यां प्राणविवृतिं सम्यङ्मार्गे बुधः प्रतिष्ठाप्य ।

विनिवृत्तविखरकलुषो ध्रुवममृतं स्थानमभ्येति ॥

पञ्चानां योनीनां धर्मादिनिमित्तां च संस्थाप्य ।

परिपक्वमित्यधस्तात् पुनस्तद्भावितो गच्छेत् ॥

इति व्याख्याता व्यस्तसमस्ता करणानां वृत्तिः ॥ २९ ॥

After understanding these two one should follow the right path.<sup>14</sup> The internal operation of the vital airs being unconditioned cannot be terminated through the termination of attainment of the states of the Rajas, Tamas and the means of virtue, etc. Since the external function is related to virtue etc., it should be employed. If it is asked how, (the reply is)—The (act of) going down of the prāṇa should be restricted to (i.e., exclusively concentrated upon) the objects like virtue, etc. From this follows the increase in Sattva and with the increase in Sattva there follows gradually an understanding of the form of the intellect. The act of going upward pertaining to apāna should be exclusively concentrated upon the objects like virtue, etc. In this way there is the complete decrease of the Tamas which is situated in the form of the object of discriminative knowledge, and then follows gradually the understanding of the form of the intellect. In this way, one should make the association of the objects of samāna and vyāna leading to the Sattva constituent. Because the scripture states: “One should always take delight in and be associated with Sattva.” The object of Uddāna is the upliftment of the soul. After completely giving up the last form of the phase of ignorance one should completely resort to the opposite of that. One should cherish the invariable concomitance which forms the object of the vyāna in the object of knowledge only. One should reduce the potency (dharma-tā) of the four causes to the causal potency of virtue. One should cherish the absence of the desire to know with reference to causes leading to the undesired results. One who takes delight in virtue, etc., and is devoid of the opposites of them, taking pleasure in Sattva, is devoid of egoism, is devoted to knowledge, has purified the causes, attains supreme Brahman quickly. It is stated also:

The wise man after firmly establishing the absence of the

operation of the prāṇas with reference to the external objects and establishing them in the right path, and devoid of injurious dirt, attains the immortal and eternal place.

After establishing the five causes in the causal potency of virtue, etc., and advanced in that should not deviate from it absolutely (even from bottom).

Thus is explained the individual and the collective activity of the organs.

## KĀRIKĀ 29

1. The Sāṃkhyas proceed from intellect to the gross elements in discussing the categories. Thus, the place of internal organs precedes the external organs.
2. The mātmya body perhaps refers to the notion of 'I'.
3. The manuscript read *anyatvasya*. Pandey suggests *ananyatvasya*. We have followed his suggestion.
4. The sense is that prāṇa, etc., spoken as the objects of the internal organs are of the nature of air which is an element while the activity should be of the nature of action. Prāṇa, etc., therefore, cannot be spoken as the activity of some other object. The reading *dharmāntaram* by Ch. and Pandey both should be *dharmyantarāh*.
5. If the air is supposed to blow of its own, its activity would never come to an end and as a result a bird in the sky could always fly due to the activity in air and it would not be required to act for the circulation of the air to fly. Consequently, if the activity is always in the air, a bird could never fall on the ground.
6. This is the air going outside the body in much quantity.
7. It keeps the balance of the other airs in the body and controls their movements.
8. Perhaps it refers to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The function is attributed to the soul in those systems.
9. They serve as the substratum of light and manifest it. The light stands for consciousness.
10. It is because the conscious entity does not have direct contact with the egoism. The function of egoism is also experienced through the intellect itself.
11. The soul accompanied with these eight can be termed *jiva*.
12. Such a man always keeps repenting, and neither does he enjoy fully nor does he act satisfactorily.
13. It is the state of meditation in which the basic aim is not the knowledge.
14. It suggests that only the Sāṃkhya way of liberation is the right path.



## KĀRIKĀ 30

(Opponent's view of simultaneous function of the organs)

आह, येयमेकैकस्मिन् रूपादावर्थे करणचतुष्टयस्य वृत्तिः सा किं युगपत् आहोस्वित् क्रमेणेति? कुतः संशय इति चेत् उभयथा दृष्टत्वात् । इहैकार्थविषयाणां युगपदपि वृत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथा चन्द्रमण्डले चक्षुषां मनसो वा । क्रमशश्च तद्यथा घटे मधूकपयसाम् । एकार्थविषयं च करणचतुष्टयम् । अतो नः संशयः किं चक्षुर्मनोवद्युगपदस्य वृत्तिः, आहोस्विन्मध्वादि-वक्रमेणेति ?

Opponent : Is the operation of the four organs with reference to a single object, like form, etc., simultaneous or gradual.<sup>1</sup> If it is asked (why) does the doubt arise, (the answer is) because it is observed in both the ways. The function of the objects with a single object is observed to be simultaneous also just as that of the eyes or the mind with reference to the disc of the moon,<sup>2</sup> and gradual also just as that of the honey, water and milk with reference to a pot. The four organs have a single object. Therefore, there arises a doubt in us as to whether the function belongs to the organs working simultaneously as the function of the eyes and the minds, or whether it takes place gradually as that of the honey, etc.

उच्यते—यथादर्शनमपि तावदुच्यताम् । किमत्र युक्तं भवान् मन्यते ? स चेत्सम्यगुप-  
देक्ष्यसि को निर्बन्धस्तदेव प्रतिपद्यामहे इति ।

Proponent : Tell as you experience it.

What do you think proper in this case?

If you rightly teach, what is the obstinacy? We will accept that only.

यद्यपि तस्मादिदमस्मदर्शनम्

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः

तुशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः युगपदेवेत्यर्थः । बुद्ध्यहंकारमनसां हि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां च समान-

देशत्वम् । तत्र न शक्यत एतद्भुङ्क्षुं सति शक्तिसद्भावे विषयसम्बन्धे च कस्यचित्तत्र वृत्तिः कस्यचित्त्रेति । किं चान्यत् । मेघस्तनितादिषु क्रमानुपलब्धेः । यदि हि क्रमेण श्रोत्रादीनामन्तः करणस्य च बाह्येऽर्थे वृत्तिः स्यादपि तर्हि मेघस्तनितकृष्णसर्पालोचनादिष्वप्युपलभ्यते क्रमः । न तूपलभ्यते । तस्माद्युगपदेव बाह्येऽर्थे चतुष्टयवृत्तिरिति ।

Opponent's Reply : If it is so, the following is our theory here :

*The function of the four is simultaneous only. The word tu means restriction. The sense is 'it is simultaneous only'. Intellect egoism and the mind, as also the sense organs are located at the same place. It cannot be stated that even though the power (in the organ) and their contact with the object is present, yet the function of some takes place while that of the other does not. Moreover, the successive order is not observed in case of the thunder of the cloud, etc. If there would be the successive function of the ear, etc., and the internal organ with reference to the external object, that successive order would be observed in case of the abstract knowledge of thunder of the cloud and also at the sight of a black snake. It is, however, not observed. Therefore, the function of the four with reference to the external object is simultaneous only.*

(Simultaneous functions of the organs refuted)

उच्यते—यदुक्तं श्रोत्रादीनामन्तःकरणस्य चाऽभिन्नकालं वृत्तिरित्यत्र ब्रूमः, अयुक्तमे-  
तत् । किं कारणम् ? यस्मादस्माकं

क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।

तस्येति चतुष्टयमपिसम्बध्यते । चशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः । क्रमश एवेत्यर्थः । क्रमश एव  
हि बाह्यान्तःकरणवृत्त्योरेकार्थनिपातः ।

यतुक्तं समानदेशानां शक्तिसम्बन्धसद्भावे वृत्त्यभावानुपपत्तिरिति, अत्र ब्रूमः—चक्षुरा-  
दिवदेतत्स्यात् । तद्यथा चक्षुस्त्वचोः समानदेशत्वे शक्तिविषयसम्बन्धोपपत्तौ रजोधूमातपादि-  
गतः स्पर्श एवोपलभ्यते, न रूपम् । एवमिहापि स्यात् । तस्मात्

दृष्टे तथाऽप्यदृष्टे

क्रमश एव चतुष्टयस्य वृत्तिः । अदृष्टग्रहणेन पुनरत्रातीतानागतव्यवहितविषयग्रहणम् ।  
तत्रातीतं द्विविधम्, दृष्टविषयदृष्टविषयं च । अत्रापि दृष्टविषयं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमित्यभिप्रे-  
तम्, अदृष्टविषयं स्मृतिः । सा तु लिङ्गागमाभ्यामकस्माद्वा भवति । तथा च वृषगणवीरेणा-  
प्युक्तं भवति—अनागतव्यवहितविषयज्ञानं तु लिङ्गागमाभ्याम् । आह, च

विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगात्प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमुच्यते ।

तदेवातीन्द्रियं जातं पुनर्भावनया स्मृतिः ॥

तदेव भावनापेक्षज्ञानं कालान्तरे पुनः ।  
तत्रैव सेन्द्रियं जातं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमुच्यते ॥

तत्र दुष्टे क्रमः प्रति नास्ति सन्देहः

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं दृष्टे मेघस्तनितकृष्णसर्पालोचनादौ क्रमानुपलब्धेर्युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य  
वृत्तिरित्यत्र ब्रूम— एतदप्युक्तम् । किं कारणम् ? यस्यात्

त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

न तावद् बुद्ध्यहंकारमनसां साक्षाद् बाह्यार्थग्रहणसामर्थ्यमस्ति, अन्तःकरणानुपपत्तिप्र-  
संगात्, श्रोत्रादिवैयर्थ्यप्रसंगात्, द्वारिद्वारभावव्याघातप्रसङ्गाच्च । तस्मात्पूर्वं श्रोत्रादीनामर्थ-  
सम्बन्धोऽस्ति मेघस्तनितादावप्यवश्यमेतदभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । पश्चात् तद्वृत्त्युपनिपाता-  
दन्तद्वकरणस्येत्यस्ति क्रमोऽत्रापि । तत्र यदुक्तं मेघस्तनितादिषु क्रमाऽननुगते युगपच्चतुष्ट-  
यस्य वृत्तिरित्येतदयुक्तम् ।

Reply : As regards the statement that the function of the ear, etc.,  
and the internal organ is at a time (simultaneous), we reply that  
it is wrong.

What is the reason here?

Because according to us :

**AND, OF THAT (GROUP OF THOSE FOUR) SUCCESSIVE  
(FUNCTIONING) ONLY IS MENTIONED.**

Through the expression 'of that' all the four are related here.  
The term *ca* (and) is in the sense of restriction.<sup>3</sup> It is successive only.  
The falling of the function of the external organ and the internal  
organ into a single object is gradual only.

As regards the statement that there is no propriety of the ab-  
sence of the function of those having the same location, in the  
presence of the power and the contact (of the senses with the ob-  
ject), we reply : it may be like the eyes, etc. Just as even though there  
is the (possibility) of the capacity and the contact with the object in  
the case of the eye and the skin even when the eye and the skin are  
located at the same place the touch only of dust, shade and heat or  
sunshine is apprehended, not the form. Similar may be the case here  
also. Therefore,

**IN THE CASE OF THE PERCEPTIBLE, SIMILARLY IN THE  
CASE OF THE IMPERCEPTIBLE (OBJECTS)**

The function of the four is successive only. Here, through the  
mention of the word imperceptible is denoted, the knowledge of the  
objects of past and future time and those obstructed (and hence im-  
perceptible). The knowledge of the past is of two kinds : That of the  
object directly perceived and of the object which is not directly per-  
ceived. Here also that the object of which is not perceived at that  
time is described to be the recognition, and that the object of which  
is not directly perceived is desired to be remembrance.<sup>4</sup> That takes  
place through either of the probandum, scripture or suddenly. It is  
stated by the powerful *varṣagaṇa vīra* also.....The knowledge of  
the objects of future and obstructed ones arises through probands and  
the scripture. It is stated also :

Knowledge arising through the sense—object contact is called  
the perceptive knowledge. And when the same object is recollected  
through past impression when it had become invisible, it becomes  
remembrance. The same knowledge which depends upon past im-  
pression when after some time comes under the purview of the sen-  
ses is said to be recognition. There is no doubt, the successive order  
in case of the perceptible object.

As regards the statement that on account of the absence of ob-  
servation of succession, there is the simultaneous function of the four  
with reference to perceptive knowledge of the objects like the  
thunder of the cloud and the sight of the black snake, we reply that  
this is also wrong.

What is the reason here?

Because

**THE FUNCTION OF THE THREE FOLLOWS THAT (FUNCTION  
OF THE RESPECTIVE EXTERNAL ORGANS).**

The intellect, egoism and mind do not have the capacity of cog-  
nising the external objects directly because of (otherwise) un-  
desirable contingency or the impropriety of impossibility of their  
being the internal organs, of the uselessness of ear, etc., and of the  
contradiction with their (relation) of the gates and the gatekeeper.  
Therefore, there is first the contact of the ear etc., with the object.

The same case must be accepted in case of the thunder of the cloud, etc. Afterwards, is the function of the internal organ also because it follows the function of that (external organ); thus there is the succession in this case also. In that case, it is wrong to say that since the succession is not found in case of the thunder of the cloud, etc., the function of the four is simultaneous.

(Another interpretation of the Kārikā)

अन्यैस्त्वन्यथाऽन्वयो दर्शितः । तद्यथा चतुष्टयस्येति मनोऽहंकारबुद्धीनामन्तः — करणानां बाह्येनैकेन करणेन श्रोत्रेण वा चक्षुषा वा सह चतुष्टयस्येत्यर्थः । अस्य दृष्टे वर्तमाने-युगपद्वृत्तिः पूर्वाचार्यैर्निर्दिष्टा । आचार्येण तु क्रमेणेत्यर्थः । अदृष्टेऽतीतादावपि क्रमशश्च क्रमेणैव, यतस्त्रयस्यान्तःकरणस्य तत्पूर्विका बाह्येन्द्रियपूर्विका वृत्तिः । यदा यथाऽनुभवस्तथा संस्कारः यथा च संस्कारस्तथा स्मृतिरित्येवं वृत्तिर्बाह्येन्द्रियपरिवेति ॥ ३० ॥

By others, however, the connection of the words (in the present Kārikā) is shown (or mentioned) in a different way. It is like this. Of the four, etc., means of the internal organs, viz., mind, egoism and intellect with the one external organ as the ear or the eye. The simultaneous function of this (group of four) in case of the perceptible i.e. the present time is suggested by the earlier authorities by the (present) authority (Īśvarakṛṣṇa) however, successive (function is suggested). In the case of imperceptible, i.e. the objects of past also it is successive only because the function of the three internal organs follows that of the external organ. Whatever kind of experience is there the impression is of that nature. As the impression, so is the remembrance. In this way, the function (of the internal organs) follows that of the external organ.

## KĀRIKĀ 30

1. The four organs meant here are the three internal organs, mind, egoism and intellect and the one respective external organ involved in perception.
2. When moon is seen, its knowledge arises as soon as it is observed. The function of the eye and the internal organs seems to be simultaneous.
3. It is still a matter of deep consideration whether Īśvarakṛṣṇa takes it in the sense of grouping together or restriction.
4. This is the distinction between the remembrance and recognition. The common factor in both the cases is the knowledge of the object cognised earlier. But, in case of recognition, the object is present at the time of recognition while the object is not present at the time of remembrance.
5. Some portion of the text is missing here.

## KĀRIKA 31

(Each sense performs its individual function)

आह, किं पुनरेषां करणानां स्वविषयनियमेन वृत्तिर्भवति आहोस्विदव्यतिकरेणोति ?

Opponent : Dose the function of these organs take place with the restriction to their own objects (or otherwise) blending together?

उच्यते-ननु च प्रागेव रुपादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिरिति (का. २८) चोक्तवाऽऽचार्येणान्तेऽपदिष्टं सैषा भवत्यसामान्येति (क. २९) । तत्रैवं गते भवतः संशयः ।

Proponent : Of course, earlier only after stating that the function of the five is the primary abstract apprehension in respect of the form, etc, (K. 28), it is finally taught by the 'authority' that is the uncommon', etc., (K. 29). In spite of this much you are entertaining doubt.

कुतः इत्युच्यते-सत्यमेवैतत् । तथापि जायते संशयः । कुतः करणान्तरेण स्वविषयो-पलब्धौ करणान्तरोत्सुक्यदर्शनात् । इह करणान्तरेणा चक्षुषाऽऽम्रदाडिमादिरूपोपलब्धौ सत्यां करणान्तरस्य जिह्वालक्षणस्योत्सुक्यं प्रवृत्तिश्चोपलब्धा । तद्यदि स्वविषयनियतानीन्द्रियाणि, नैषां करणान्तरविषयोपलम्भात्तत्साहचर्यपेक्षः स्वविषयग्रहणभावः स्यात् । अस्ति च । तस्मादुपपन्नः संशयः । तत्रेदानीं भवतः प्रतिपत्तिरिति ।

Opponent: You are asking why does the doubt arise, we reply, it is true. But still the doubt arises.

why?

Because the eagerness in an organ is observed when the respective object is cognised by the other organ. The eagerness and activity in the other organ, viz., tongue is observed when the form of the mango or a pomegranate fruit is perceived by the eye.<sup>1</sup> If the senses would have been restricted to their respective objects, there would not have been the cognition of its own object as dependent upon the help of the other organ because the object of that organ is already cognised by that respective organ.<sup>2</sup> And that is there. Therefore, the doubt is valid. What is your resolution here?

(No blending together of function of senses)

उच्यते-अत्रापि नास्तीन्द्रियाणां स्वविषयग्रहण व्यतिकरः । किं तर्हि

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकी वृत्तिम् ।

पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचिन् कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

यस्य करणस्य या वृत्तिरपदिष्टा तद्यथा श्रोत्रस्य शब्दग्रहणम् चक्षुषो रूपग्रहणम् इत्यादि । तामेव प्रतिपद्यन्ते-स्वविषयजिघृक्षयाऽवलम्बन्त इत्यर्थः परस्पराकूतं परस्पराकूतम् । आकूतमभिप्रायोऽभिसन्धिरित्यर्थः । परस्पराकूतं हेतुः प्रतिपत्तेरस्याः, सेयं परस्पराकूतहेतुकी । परस्पराकूतं प्रतिपत्तेः कारणमिति कृत्वा ताच्छब्दं लभते । तद्यथा दधित्रपुसंज्वरः । एतदुक्तं भवति यदा चक्षुषाऽऽम्रदाडिमादि रूपमुपलब्धं भवति तदा रसनेन्द्रियमुपात्तविषयस्य चक्षुषो वृत्तिं संवेद्य स्वविषयजिघृक्षयौत्सुक्यवद्विकारमापद्यते, रसनस्य वृत्तिं संवेद्य पादौ विहरणमारभते हस्तावादानं, तावद्यावदसौ विषयो रसनेन्द्रिययोग्यतां नीतः । ततो रसनं स्वविषये प्रवर्तते । एवमितरेष्वपि वक्तव्यम् ।

Proponent : Here also there is no blending together of the organs in cognising their respective objects. On the contrary

**EACH OF THE ORGANS PERFORMS ITS RESPECTIVE FUNCTION CAUSED BY MUTUAL INTENTION. THE PURPOSE OF THE PURUSA IS THE CAUSE (IMPELLOR) AND THE ORGAN IS NOT IMPELLED TO ACT BY ANYTHING ELSE.**

The organs resort to (or perform) that function which is said with reference to that particular organ, just as the cognition of word by ears and the cognition of form by the eye and so no. They attain that only the sense is that they take resources to that only with the intention of cognising the own object. The compound 'mutual intention' means the intention of each other. Intention means impulse or purpose. The compound 'caused by the mutual intention' means 'the cause of the resort to which is the mutual intention.' Since the mutual intention is the cause, it attains the same word just as the expression as 'curd in association with the zink is the fever'. This is what is to be stated. When the form of a mango or a pomegranate fruit is observed by the eye, then after understanding the function of the eye which has come into contact with the object, the tongue gets deviated from its natural state and becomes endowed with an intention to take or seize its object. After understanding the function of the tongue the feet start walking and the hands start grasping. It happens so until the object is not brought under the capacity (or reach) of the tongue. Then, the tongue proceeds to its object.<sup>3</sup> Similar

should be said about the other organs.

(Senses do not have understanding)

आह. यद्येवं तेन तर्हीन्द्रियान्तरवृत्तिसंवेदनेऽक्षप्रत्ययवत्प्रसंगः। यदि तर्हीन्द्रियान्तर-  
णेन्द्रियान्तरस्य वृत्तिः संवेद्यते, प्राप्तमस्य प्रत्ययवत्त्वम्। अथाऽप्रत्ययमिन्द्रियं परस्पराकृतसं-  
वेदनं, तर्हि न वाच्यमिति। किं च परस्परद्वारिद्वारभावप्रसंगश्च। इन्द्रियान्तर चेदिन्द्रियान्तर-  
स्य वृत्तिं संवेद्य स्वार्थमाकांक्षेत, प्राप्तमस्य द्वारित्वमितरस्य च द्वारत्वम्। तदयुक्तमिन्द्रियाणां  
परस्पराकृतसंवेदनमिति।

Opponent : If it is so (i.e. if the function of one organ is supposed to be understood by the other), there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting that the organs are endowed with (the power of) understanding in respect of understanding the function of the other organ. If the function of one organ is understood by other, it becomes, by implication, endowed with the understanding. If the sense is devoid of understanding, its understanding of mutual intention should not be mentioned. Moreover, there arises (in this case) the undesirable contingency of admitting the relation of a gate and gate-keeper. If one sense would aspire for its object after understanding the function of the other it would be the gate-keeper (principal) and the rest the gates (subordinate).<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the understanding of mutual intention is incompatible in case of the senses.

उच्यते-न, उपचारात्। प्रागेवोपदिष्टमस्माभिरप्रत्ययमिन्द्रियमिति। किं तर्हि स्वविषयस्य पटोः सहचारिणमर्थमिन्द्रियान्तरविषयतामापन्नं संस्पृश्य स्वभावत इन्द्रियान्तरं स्वविषयं प्रति साकांक्षं भवति, तत्सन्निधौ विक्रियादर्शनात्। तत्र संवेदनमुपचर्यैवमुच्यते इत्यदोषः। किं चान्यत्। भौतिकावयवप्रत्ययविवृत्तिवत्तद्विवृतेः। यथा बद्धेः प्रसादसमनन्तरं भौतिकानामवयवानां मुखनयनादीनां प्रसादो भवति, न चैषां प्रत्ययवत्त्वम्, एवमिहापि स्यात्। न च प्रत्ययवत्त्वम्। एतेन द्वारिद्वारभावः प्रत्युक्तः।

Proponent : No, because it is metaphorical. It is already stated by us in the beginning that the senses are devoid of understanding. On the contrary, after touching (i.e. coming into contact with) its respective object which is in contact with the other sense, the same naturally becomes desirous of its own object, because the deviation from its natural state is observed in the vicinity of that. This is stated so after ascribing metaphorically the under-

standing to that and, hence, this is no fault. Moreover, because its expression is like the expression of understanding in the elemental components (of the body) just as with the tranquility or happiness of the intellect, there becomes the tranquility in the elemental components (of the body), like face and the eye and they are not possessed of understanding.<sup>4</sup> Similar may be the case here. And they are not possessed of understanding. By this only, the (argument based upon) the relation of the gate-keeper and the gate is refuted.

(Another interpretation of mutual intention)

मनोऽधिष्ठानसामर्थ्याद्वा। अथवा परस्परविषयमाकृतं परस्पराकृतम्, यथा जलविषयः पुरुषः जलपुरुषः। आकृतमिच्छा संकल्पः मन इत्यर्थः। स हेतुरस्याः सेयं परस्पराकृतहेतुकी ताम्। एतदुक्तं भवति, यथा किञ्चिद्विदित्यं विषये प्रवृत्तं भवति तदा तद्वद्वारेण समस्तमर्थमुपलभ्य तत्सहचारिणमर्थान्तरमाकांक्षदिन्द्रियान्तरं वृत्त्या प्रतिपिच्छते। तेनाकांक्षावता मनसाऽधिष्ठितमिन्द्रियं विक्रियामापद्यते। तथा च तन्त्रान्तरेऽप्युक्तं - “यस्य यस्येन्द्रियस्य विषयं मनो ध्यायत्यभिसम्पत्त्यर्थेन तस्य तस्यौत्सुक्यं प्रवृत्तिश्च भवतीति।” एतदुक्तं स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकृतहेतुकी वृत्तिमिति।

Or, it may be due to the capability of controlling in Mind. Or, the compound ‘mutual intention’ means the intention about (i.e. related to) each other, just as the compound ‘water-man’ means the ‘man related to water’. Intention means desire, resolution, i.e. the mind. The compound ‘caused by mutual intention’ means that function whose cause is that (mind). This is what is to be stated : When some senses starts its function with reference to its object, then after cognising the whole object through that the mind desiring for the other object related to the former object stands in need of the function of the other sense. Controlled by the Manas having the desire the organ gets disturbed. It is stated so in the other system also : “Whose object the mind ponders over with the purpose of accomplishing in that very sense arises eagerness and activity.” Thus is explained that each sense takes recourse to its respective function caused by mutual intention.

(Mind does not physically operate the senses)

किमिन्द्रियं मनोवृत्त्याधिष्ठाय स्वविषये प्रवर्तयति यथा परश्वादीश्चैत्र इति ?

Opponent : Does the mind operate the sense towards the object through its own function as Chaitra does something with the

axe etc?

नेत्युच्यते । किं तर्हि स्वविषयसंकल्पानुगृहीतस्य मनसः संस्पर्शात्स्वय-  
मेवेन्द्रियं स्वविषयं प्रतिपद्यते । कस्मात् ? प्रयोगशक्त्यसिद्धेः । न हि यथा  
चैत्रस्य परश्वादिप्रयोगशक्तिः सिद्धा एवं मनस इन्द्रियप्रयोगशक्तिः । तस्मादयु-  
क्तमिन्द्रियस्य मनः प्रेरकमिति । रज इति चेत्स्यान्मतम्, रजसो हीन्द्रियान्तरप्र-  
योगसामर्थ्यं विद्यते । तस्मादयुक्तमुक्त प्रयोगशक्त्यसिद्धेर्नेन्द्रियाणां मनः प्रयो-  
जकमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् ? कस्मात् ? अविशेषात् । इन्द्रियान्तरेऽपि हि तर्हि  
रजोऽस्तीत्यत आत्मभूतेनैवास्य निमित्तेन प्रवृत्तिरप्रतिषिद्धा, किं मनसा परिक-  
ल्पितेनेति ? किं चान्यत्, करणान्तरानुपपत्तेः । चैत्रो हि परश्वादीनां प्रयोगं  
करणान्तरेण करोति । न तु मनसः करणान्तरमस्तीत्यसमानम् । पाणिवादिति  
चेन्न, चैत्रव्यापारपेक्षत्वात् । तदपि हि चैत्रव्यापारपेक्षं प्रवर्तते न स्वतः । किंच  
तद्व्यतिरेकेण प्रवृत्त्युपलब्धेः । यस्य हि प्रयोजकान्तरापेक्षा प्रवृत्तिः न तस्य  
कदाचिदपि स्वतन्त्रस्य भवति । अस्ति तु संकल्पव्यतिरेकेण मेघस्तनितादि-  
ष्विन्द्रियस्य प्रवृत्तिः । तस्मान्नेन्द्रियान्तरस्य मनः कारकम् । न चेत्कारकं यथा  
मौलानां गुणानामेवमिहापि पुरुषार्थं एवं हेतुर्न केन चित्कार्यते करणमिति  
सिद्धम् ॥ ३१ ॥

No, on the contrary, after coming in contact with the mind which is possessed of the desire for its object the sense by itself goes to its respective object.

Why?

*Because the power of employing (others to activity) is not proved (in case of mind).* The power of employing the senses (to activity) is not proved in case of the mind as the power of employing the axe, etc., is proved in the case of Caitra, etc. Therefore, it is wrong that mind is the impellor of the senses. If it is argued that it is the Rajas,<sup>5</sup> it may be like this. There is the power of employing (or impelling) the senses to activity is in Rajas.<sup>6</sup> Therefore it is wrong to say that on account of the non-establishment of the power of employing, the mind is not the impellor of the senses.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is common. The Rajas exists in the other senses as well and, hence, its activity is not obstructed in case of Rajas forming the senses itself and serving as the cause of the activity. What is, then, the use of postulation of (impelling by) mind.

Moreover, there is no possibility of some other organ. Caitra

employs the axe, etc., through some other organ. There is, however, no organ of the mind and hence, there is this dissimilarity (in the example). If it is argued that it may be (motivated) like the hands, etc., we reply, no, because it (hand) also requires function of Caitra. That (hand) also while functioning requires the function of Caitra, and does not function by itself. Moreover, because the act (of the sense) is observed without that (mind). In the case of one requiring the activity of the other impellor for its activity, the activity is never observed independently. The activity of the senses (independently) is there in case of the thundering of the cloud, etc. Therefore, mind is not the impellor of the senses. When there is no impellor, it is proved that the cause is the purpose of the puruṣa (and) the organ is not activated by anything else, as is the case with (the activity of) the original constituents.<sup>6</sup>



## KĀRIKĀ 31

1. It suggests that the eye and the tongue act upon the same object.
2. The object is the same but there is no blending together of the activities of the organs. Each of them has a separate function.
3. The organ the activity of which precedes would be like a gate and the other organ which is said to understand the activity would function like a gate-keeper (principal). But such a relation is admitted in case of external and internal organs only and not amongst the external organs mutually.
4. The expression of face, etc., are changed in happiness, misery, etc., even though happiness, etc., are located in Intellect. The face, etc., being material in nature, cannot understand misery or happiness of the intellect to reflect them through expression. Similarly, the organs though insentient, may act in accordance with the impression in the other organ.
5. Since rajas is active and motivating and the mind has it as one of its constituents, the mind may be considered as an impeller or motivating force.
6. It suggests that the constituents automatically act and purpose of the conscious entity is served with the activities of the constituents.

## KĀRIKĀ 32

(Number of organs is thirteen)

आह, करणं प्रत्याचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः [तदवधारणं कर्तव्यम् । इाचार्यणां करणं प्रति विप्र-  
तिपत्तिः] । एकादशविधमिति वार्षगणाः । दशविधमिति तान्त्रिकाः पञ्चाधिकरणप्रभृत्यः ।  
द्वादशविधमिति पतञ्जलिः । तस्माद् भवतः कतिविधं करणमभिप्रेतमिति वक्तव्यमेतत् ।

Opponent : On account of the difference of opinion amongst the authorities regarding the organs, its decision should be made. There is the controversy amongst the authorities about the organs. According to the followers of Vārṣaganya they are of eleven kinds; according to the followers of the Tantra, <sup>1</sup> Pañcād-hikaraṇa etc., they are of ten kinds; according to Patāñjali they are of twelve kinds. Therefore, it should be stated as to how many kinds of the organs are intended by you.

उच्यते-

करणं त्रयोदशविधं तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।

पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च बुद्धिन्द्रियाणि मनोऽहङ्कारो बुद्धिश्चेत्येतत्सर्वं पुरुषार्थोपयो-  
गिकरणम् । कस्मात् ? अपुरुषार्थोपयोगित्वे तत्त्वान्तरानुपपत्तिप्रसंगात् । यदि यथा वार्षगणा  
आहुः - लिङ्गमात्रे महानसंवेद्यः कार्यकारणरूपेण विशिष्टाविशिष्टलक्षणेन, तथा स्यात्तत्त्वान्त-  
रम् । तन्न स्यात्, अनर्थकत्वात् ।

**THE ORGANS ARE OF THIRTEEN KIND AND PERFORM THE  
ACT OF SEIZING, RETAINING AND ILLUMINATING**

The five organs of action, five organs of sense, mind, egoism and the intellect—all these form the organs for conscious entity.

Why?

Because if they are not useful to conscious entity's purpose, there would arise the undesirable contingency of impossibility of their being distinct category. If it is accepted as hold the followers of Vārṣaganya—the intellect which is the only internal organ is not cog-

nisible in the form of the effect and cause or in the form of the specific or the non-specific, it may be such a distinct category (if any). That (kind of distinct entity) would not exist because it will not serve any purpose.

आह, सत्यम्, प्रधानलक्षणानां गुणानां वैषम्यमात्ररूपत्वेऽपि तत्त्वान्तरमसौ भविष्यतीति । कस्मात् ? साम्याद्वैषम्यमुपाख्यान्तरमिति ।

Opponent : It is true, inspite of being the form of merely the unequilibrium of the constituents also it would be a distinct category.

How?

Since the unequilibrium bears the other name than the equilibrium.

एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? तत्त्वानवस्थाप्रसंगात् । एवं हि परिकल्प्यमाने प्रधानमहत्तोर्यदन्तरालं तत्त्वान्तराणां तदपि च क्रियारूपत्वादक्रियावत् उपाख्यान्तरमिति तत्त्वान्तराऽनवस्थाप्रसंगः । अभ्युपगमे वा महत्तत्त्वान्तराणां च क्रियाकालविरोधः । तस्मात्तत्त्वान्तराऽनुपपत्तिरनवस्था वा, त्रयोदशविधं करणमित्यन्यतरवदवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तत्र चाऽस्मत्प्रतिज्ञातमेव निर्दोषं लक्ष्यते । तस्मादुपपन्नमेतत् त्रयोदशविधं करणमिति ।

Proponent : This is also wrong.

How?

Because it would lead to the undesirable contingency with regard to the (number) of categories. If this is postulated so, the intermediate state between the cosmic matter and the intellect as also the other elements, which is not possessed of activity since it is of the nature of activity itself, will bear some other name and, thus, there would arise the undesirable contingency of the infinite regress regarding the distinct categories. If it is admitted so, there would be the contradiction with the time of activity in the intellect as well as the other categories. Therefore, either there would be the impossibility of distinct category or the infinite regress with reference to the categories. It should be accepted as a midway alternative that organs are of thirteen kinds. In that case the view established by us only seems to be faultless. Therefore, it is justified that the organs are of thirteen kinds.

(Activity of the organs)

आह, करणमिति क्रियाकारकसम्बन्धगर्भोऽयं निर्देशः । कथम् ? येन तत्करणमिति । तत्र वक्तव्यम् का क्रिया, किं च तत्क्रियते यदपेक्ष्य बुद्ध्यादीनां करणत्वमिति ?

Opponent : The mention of organ implies its relation between the

activity and the agent.

How?

Because due to that (relation) it is an organ. There, it should be stated as to what is the activity here; and what is the object accomplished from the standpoint of which there is the instrumentality in the case of intellect etc.

उच्यते - यदुक्तं का क्रियेत्यत्र ब्रूमः - तन्निर्वर्तकमिहाभिप्रेतम् न दण्डादिवत्, किं तर्हि तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकम् । तत्राऽऽहरणं कर्मेन्द्रियाणि कुर्वन्ति विषयार्जनसमर्थत्वात् । धारणं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि कुर्वन्ति, विषयसन्निधाने सति श्रोत्रादिवृत्तेस्तद्रूपापत्तेः । प्रकाशमन्तःकरणं करोति, निश्चयसामर्थ्यात् ।

As to the statement what is that act, we say - here, that (organ) is intended to be the accomplisher of that (act) but not like a stick etc.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, they accomplish the function of seizing, retaining and illuminating. Out of these, the organs of actions perform the act of seizing, because they are capable of procuring the objects. The organs of sense perform the act of retaining because after coming in contact with the object the function of ear, etc., attain the form of that. The internal organs perform the act of illuminating because of their capability of determining.

(Another mode of assigning seizing, retaining and illuminating)

अपर आह-आहरणं कर्मेन्द्रियाणि कुर्वन्ति । धारणं मनोऽहंकारश्च । प्रकाशानं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि बुद्धिश्चेति । एतदभिसन्धाय बुद्ध्यादीनां करणत्वमुच्यत इति ।

The other explain as - the organs of action perform the act of seizing, the mind and the egoism perform the act of retaining and the organs of sense and the intellect perform the act of illuminating. With this intention is stated the instrumentality of the organs.

(Objects of the organs)

यत्तुक्तं किं कार्यमिति, उच्यते-

कार्यं च तस्य दशधा

दशधेति पञ्च विशेषाः पञ्चाऽविशेषाः । तदप्यत एव कार्यशब्दं लभते

। आहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

तद्व्यवहर्तव्यं धारणीयं प्रकाशयितव्यं च । अतः कार्यमित्युच्यते, न निर्वर्त्यत्वात् ॥ ३२ ॥

As regards the statement as to what is the object accomplished,

we say that :

# AND THE OBJECTS ACCOMPLISHED ARE OF TEN KINDS.

The ten kinds consist of five specific and five non-specific objects.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, these also are called the accomplished objects : *to be seized, retained and illumined.*

They are to be seized, retained and illumined. They are, therefore, called the accomplished objects, and not because they are produced (by the senses).<sup>4</sup>

## KĀRIKĀ 32

1. Tantra may refer either to the philosophical school of Sāṃkhya or the Śaṣṭitantra, a work of some unknown author.
2. They are not the means of producing something like a stick but the action performed by them is of a different kind.
3. The specific and non-specific objects signify the gross elements and the subtle elements respectively.
4. The karaṇa may be used to produce something or to operate on something already accomplished. The function of the organs is of the latter type.

## KĀRIKĀ 33

(Internal organs)

एतस्मिन्त्रयोदशविधे तु करणे त्रयोदशं कतरदिति ?

Opponent : In this group of thirteen organs what are these thirteen organs?

उच्यते - बुद्धिरहंकारो मनश्च । तस्मात् ।

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्

कस्मात् ? विषयाऽनभिसन्धानात् । श्रोत्रादिप्रणालिकया च विषयसंप्रतिपत्तेः । अविशेषाऽभिधानाद् बुद्ध्यादिप्रतिपत्तिरयुक्तेति चेत्स्यान्मतम्, अविशेषेणेदमुक्तमाचार्येण अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधमिति । तत्र कथमिदमवगम्यते बुद्ध्यहंकारमनसां ग्रहणमिहाभिप्रेतं, न पुनरन्येषामिति ? उच्यते - न, प्रथमसंख्याव्यतिक्रमहेत्वनुपपत्तेः । बुद्ध्यादिसंख्यां हि व्यतिक्रममाणस्य प्रतिपत्तौ नास्ति हेतुः । तस्मात्तेषामेव ग्रहणम् । यथा वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभत इति । श्रोत्रस्यान्तःकरणत्वप्रसंगादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यादेतत् - बुद्धिमहंकारं चोक्त्वा तत आह बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि कर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाख्यानीति (क. २६) । तस्माच्छ्रोत्रमन्तःकरणं प्रसज्यत इति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? मनसः पृथगभिधानात् । अत एवेदमाचार्येणापेक्ष्य मनसोऽन्तःकरणत्वं पृथगुक्तम् - तच्चेन्द्रियमुभयथा समाख्यातम्, अन्तस्त्रिकालविषयमिति (क. २७) । तस्मादुपपन्नमन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं बुद्ध्यादीति ।

(These include) intellect, egoism and the mind. Therefore,

## THE INTERNAL ORGANS ARE OF THREE KINDS.

How?

Because they do not come in contact with the object (directly). And, because they observe the object through the channel of ear, etc.<sup>1</sup>

If it is argued since the mention is without some specification it becomes wrong to understand intellect etc., (here)? It may be like this. It is stated by the authority without some specification that the internal organs are three. Then, how is it known that here the mention of intellect, egoism and mind is intended and not of others? No,

because there is no possibility of the reason for transgressing the number stated first. There is no ground for correct understanding in case of the one who transgresses the number of intellect, etc., and therefore, it is the mention of them only as is the case with the idea that he kills the *cātaka* bird for the spring season.

If it is argued that it is wrong because it involves the undesirable contingency of applying the nature of internal organ to the ear? It may be like this. After stating intellect and egoism, the author has stated that the organs of knowledge are those called ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose (Kā. 26). Therefore, it involves the undesirable contingency that the ear is an internal organ.<sup>2</sup>

This is also wrong.

How?

Because the mind is stated separately. From this viewpoint the nature of the internal organ in the mind is distinctly stated by the authority that is said to be the sense of both kinds (external and internal); the internal organ has the object of three periods of time as their object etc. Therefore, it is right (to say) that the internal organs are of three kinds - intellect and the other.

(External organs)

दशधा बाह्यम् ।

पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणीत्येत्द् बाह्यं दशप्रकरमाचार्यैराख्यायते ।

## THE EXTERNAL (ARE) OF TEN KINDS

The five organs of knowledge and the five organs of action (together) are said to be ten kinds of external (organs).

आह, दशधा बाह्यमित्यस्यानर्थक्यम्, परिशेषबुद्धेः । अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधमित्युक्ते गम्यत एतत्परिशेषादेव दशधा बाह्यमिति । तस्मात्तद्ग्रहणमनर्थकमिति ।

Opponent : There is no use of stating that the external are of ten kinds because it is known through remainder. When it is stated that the internal organs are of three kinds, it becomes known through remainder that the external are of ten kinds. Therefore, the mention of that is useless.

उच्यते - न, विषयार्थत्वात् । त्रयस्य विषयाख्यमित्येवं वक्ष्यामीत्याचार्य आरभते । अक्रियमाणे त्वस्मिन् किन्तत् त्रयस्य विषयाख्यमिति न ज्ञायते ।

Proponent : No, because it is for the (statement) of the object. Therefore, said to be the objects of the three ; 'this I shall state' thus the authority starts. If the (mention) is not made, it is not known as to what is said to be the object of the three.

आह, एवमपि विषयग्रहणात्सिद्धेर्बाह्यग्रहणपार्थक्यमिति ।

Opponent : This is also accomplished through the mention of the word object, and the mention of the term external serves no purpose.

उच्यते—वक्तव्यं तावदिदमवश्यं विषयभावप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम् । तत्र शेषे वा यथान्यासं वोच्यमाने न कश्चिद्विशेषः । अथवा नेदं बाह्यसंज्ञाप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमारभ्यते, किं तर्हि नियमार्थम् । कथम् ? दशधा बाह्यं शब्दादिविषयग्रहणभूतमेव त्रयस्यापि विषयाख्यं यथा स्यात्, मा भूदन्तःप्राणादिभूतम् । अथवा दशधैव बाह्यम् । भेदविषयं बाह्यमित्यर्थः । प्राणादिभूतस्य तु भेदो नास्तीत्यदोषः ।

Proponent : It should necessarily be stated for the understanding of their being of the nature of object. Then, understanding it as the remainder or stating it as it is done involves no difference. Or, it is not stated for the understanding of the designation of external with reference to it. On the contrary, it is for restriction (or specification).<sup>3</sup>

How?

So that the ten kinds of external (organs) which have become knowledge (modified into the form) of object like word may be called the object of these and so that the internal (vital airs) in the form of vital air etc., should not be so. Or, (the statement should be understood as) the external are of ten kinds only. The sense is that external are the object causing differentiation (to be differently cognies). There is, however, nodifferentiation in the vital air, etc.<sup>4</sup> Thus there is no fault.

(External organs are objects of internal organs)

तदेतत्

त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।

बुद्ध्यहंकारमनोलक्षणस्य हि त्रयस्योपात्तविषया बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियवृत्तयः सम्पर्काद्विषयरूपप्रत्यवभासनिमित्ततामुपगच्छन्त्यो विषयाख्यतां लभन्ते । तथा मनोऽहंकारावपि बुद्धे । बुद्धिस्तु निश्चयरूपत्वात्करणान्तरनिरपेक्षा सर्वमर्थं प्रवृत्तौ प्रति निश्चयरूपेणाऽध्यस्तं

पुरुषायोपसंहरति ।

तत्र शब्दादिसन्निधाने वृत्तीनां ताद्रूप्यापत्तेस्तदपगमे च ताद्रूप्यापगमात् प्राप्यकारि ।

### THAT IS SAID TO BE THE OBJECT OF THE THREE

The functions of the organs of sense and the organs of action which have taken (the form of) the object and becoming the cause of apprehension or assuming the form of the object through their contact (with the object and the internal organs) get the (name 'object' of the internal organs).<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the mind and the egoism also (become the object) of intellect. However, intellect which does not require any other organ on account of its being of the form of determination submits to the conscious entity all the objects superimposed on it in the form of determination towards activity.

They attain the object because their function attains the form of the objects in the contact of the object, and with the cessation of that (contact) their attaining the form of that also comes to an end.

(The external organs act at present only while  
the internal at the three points of time)

साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यम् ।

उपात्तविषयेन्द्रियवृत्तिसन्निधानात् तदाकारसंस्काराधाननिमित्तस्मृतिप्रत्ययवशात्  
त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

### THE EXTERNAL ORGANS ACT AT PRESENT TIME ONLY.<sup>6</sup>

Due to having the knowledge in the form of memory which is caused by the impression of form brought about by the contact of the function of the senses which has brought (or attained the form of the object): —

### THE INTERNAL ORGANS (ACT) AT ALL THE THREE POINTS OF TIME.

## KĀRIKĀ 33

1. This is the reason as to why they are called internal.
2. If the three are understood to be the first three in the order of enumeration, ear may be wrongly understood as the internal organ because the author discusses the intellect in the 23rd kārīkā, egoism in the 24th and 25th and proceeds to enumerate the sense-organs in the 26th kārīkā as ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. If the first three of all these are understood as internal organs, the enumeration would cover intellect, egoism and the ear. Thus, ear would undesirably fall under the internal organs.
3. I.e., the restriction to the external organs excludes the vital airs, as it is discussed further.
4. The external organs are differently cognised, while the vital airs are not cognised so.
5. Here, it should be observed that the statement refers primarily to the sense-organs and secondarily to the organs of action which help the sense-organs in bringing the object within their reach.
6. It is because they act only after coming in contact with the object.

## KĀRIKĀ 34

(Objects of organs of sense)

आह, प्राक्छब्दादिषु श्रोत्रादीनामालोचनमात्रं वृत्तिरित्यविशेषेणोक्तम् । तत्र किं तथैव प्रतिपत्तव्यमथेन्द्रियाणां विषयविशेषोऽस्तीति ? अथ चोक्तं कार्यं च तस्य दशधा विशेषलक्षणमविशेषलक्षणं च । तत्र केन करणेन कस्य विषयस्य ग्रहणमिति ?

Opponent : It is stated in general earlier that the function of the ear, etc., with reference to the sound, etc., is the mere apprehension<sup>1</sup> In that context should it be understood as it is, or as the object of the senses is the particular object only? And, it is also stated that the object (operated) is also of ten kinds : specific as well as non-specific. Then which object is cognised by which organ?

उच्यते—

**बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाऽविशेषविषयाणि ।**

तेषां पूर्वोक्तानामिन्द्रियाणां यानि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्च श्रोत्रादीनि तानि विशेषाऽविशेषविषयाणि प्रतिपत्तुभेदेन । तत्र देवानां यानि इन्द्रियाणि तानि धर्मोत्कर्षाद्विशुद्धान्यविशेषानपि गृह्णन्ति प्रागेव विशेषात्, योगिनां च संप्राप्तविशेषाणाम् । अस्मदादीनां तु विशेषानेव तमसा परिवृतत्वात् ।

Proponent : OF THESE, FIVE ARE THE SENSORY ORGANS ; THESE HAVE THE SPECIFIC AND NON-SPECIFIC THINGS AS THEIR OBJECTS.

Out of those organs mentioned above the five sensory organs have specific as well as non-specific things as their objects, due to the differentiation of the cogniser.<sup>2</sup> The senses of the gods are pure due to the dominance of Sattva in them (and as such) cognise the non-specific also even earlier to cognising the specific, and the senses of the yogins having cognised specific objects cognise non-specific too. The senses of the beings like us cognise specific objects only since they are covered (or dominated) by Tamas.<sup>3</sup>



(Objects of organs of action)

आह, किं कर्मेन्द्रियाणामपि प्रतिपत्तृभेदाद् ग्रहणभेदो भवति ?

Opponent : Is there the difference of operation due to the difference of the cogniser in the case of the organs of action also.

नेत्युच्यते । किं तर्हि सर्वेषामेव

वाग्भवति शब्दविषया ।

वागिन्द्रियस्य वाय्वभिहतेषु वदनप्रदेशेषु तात्वादिषु उध्वेनेर्वर्णपदवाक्यश्लोकग्रन्थभावेन विकारापादनं सर्वप्राणिनामविशिष्टम् ।

Proponent : No, on the contrary, of all :

### SPEECH HAS SOUND AS ITS OBJECT

The attainment of the modification by the sound in the form of letters, word, sentence, verse and book in the parts of body striking the air, like palate, etc., is the function of the organs of speech, common to all.

आह, अथेतराणि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि कथमिति ?

How are the rest of the organs of action?

उच्यते—

शेषाण्यपि पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

पाणिपादपायूपस्थास्तु आदानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दलक्षणैः कर्मभिः शब्दस्पर्शरसरूपगन्धसमुदायरूपा मूर्तीर्विकुर्वन्तीति ।

Proponent : THE REST ALSO HAVE THE FIVE OBJECTS AS THEIR OBJECTS.

The hand, feet, anus and the generative organ affect the form which is the combination of word, touch, taste, form and handling, walking, excretion and gratification.

(The acts of organs of action are not restricted)

आह, यदि पञ्चविषयाण्येवाऽविशेषाणीति नियमोऽभ्युपगम्यते तेनैकैकरणेष्वदानादिक्रियाऽनुपपत्तिप्रसंग इति ।

Opponent : If the rule that their objects are commonly five objects only is admitted, there will arise the undesirable contingency of

the impossibility of the act of handling etc., in the organs individually.

उच्यते न, नियमप्रतिषेधार्थत्वात् । स्वविषयनियमो बुद्धीन्द्रियवत्कर्मेन्द्रियाणामपि मा विज्ञायीत्यतो नियमप्रतिषेधार्थमिदमारभ्यते । तदर्थमेव चापिशब्दमाचार्योऽधिजगे । सम्भावनाऽर्थमपि च पञ्चविषयाण्येतानि प्रागेव तु चतुस्त्रिविषयाणीति ।

Proponent : No, because it is for the purpose of negating such a rule.

The restriction to the own object may not be understood in the case of the organs of action, as it is found in the case of the organs of sense—hence, the present discussion commences to negate the restriction. For that purpose only the authority has uttered the word 'also'. It also indicates possibility, viz., it has these five objects meaning that it has four or three (also) like the previous one.

(The objects in operation are not non-existent or unreal)

आह, कथमेतदवगम्यते विशेषविशेषविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि, न पुनरसद्विषयाणि इति ?

Opponent : How is it known that the senses have the specific and non-specific object, and they are not having non-existent objects as their objects?

उच्यते—विशेषाणामसत्त्वाऽसिद्धेः । प्रत्यक्षतस्तावद्विशेषा उपलभ्यन्ते । तस्मादेषामसत्त्वमशक्यं प्रतिज्ञातुम् । अथापि स्यात्साध्यमेतत्प्रत्यक्षमेवैतदनवद्यम्, बाह्यवस्तुविषयमयमृगतृष्णिकादिविज्ञानवत्प्रत्यक्षाभासम् । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । सर्वमभूतमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । यत्रो नास्ति किञ्चिद् भूतार्थेन प्रत्यक्षं यदपेक्ष्येतरत् । प्रत्यक्षाभासं स्यात् । उक्तस्त्वयं विकल्पः । तस्मादयुक्तं ज्ञानमात्रमिदमिति । किं चान्यत् । विपरीतदर्शनप्रसंगात् । मृगतृष्णिकास्वप्नविषयैरसद्भिः सतामुसृज्यमिच्छतस्तद्देव विपरीतदर्शनप्रसंगः । तथा हि गन्धर्वनगरादिषु कदाचित्तमेवार्थं गां पश्यति, कश्चिद् गजं पश्यति, कदाचित्पताकाम् । स्वप्ने चैकमूर्तिपतितानां गोपुरुषाश्चरासभनदीवृक्षप्रभृतीनां दर्शनं स्मरणे विपर्ययेण दृष्टम् । तथा वातायनेन हस्तियूथप्रवेशे— । विच्छिन्नानां चावयवानां पुनः सन्धानं आकाशगमनमनीश्वरस्यानिमित्तं राज्यलाभ इति । तदितरत्रापि स्यात् । न त्वस्ति । तस्मादयुक्तं मृगतृष्णिकास्वप्नादिवदसत्त्वं भावानाम् । अर्थक्रिया च न स्यात् । यथा स्वप्ने स्नातानुलिप्ताशितपीतवस्त्राच्छादितानामफलत्वं दृष्टम्, एवमिहापि स्यात् । शुक्रविसर्गवदिति चेत्, स्यादेतत्—यथा द्वयसमापत्तिपूर्वकः शुक्रविसर्गः स च तदभावेऽपि स्वप्ने भवति, एवमितरत्स्यादिति । तदयुक्तम्, रागादिनिमित्तत्वात् । तथाहि जाग्रतोऽपि तत् द्वयसमापत्तिमन्तरेण भवति । तस्मान्मनोरञ्जनानिमित्तं तत् । प्रेतवदिति चेत् स्यादियं मम सदबुद्धिः, यथा प्रेतानाम-

सद्भिःपूयनद्यादिभिरर्थक्रिया, नरकपालैश्च बाधनम् । एवमत्रापि स्यादिति । तदयुक्तम् । असिद्धत्वात् । न ह्येतदसदिति सिद्धम् । किंच प्रत्यक्षेण चाप्रत्यक्षबाधनात् । इह प्रत्यक्षं बलीय इत्यप्रत्यक्षस्य तेन प्रत्याख्यानमुपपद्यते । भवन्तस्त्वप्रत्यक्षेण प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्याचक्षते । तस्मादयुक्तं नरकपालादिवदसतामर्थक्रियेति । स्वभावभेदात्तदसत्त्वमिति चेत्, स्यादेतत्—यदि परमार्थतो नरकपालाः स्युस्तेषामपि दुःखसम्बन्धः स्यात्, मूर्तिमत्त्वाविशेषात् । न तु तेषां बाधाऽस्ति । तस्माद् भ्रान्तिरसाविति । एतदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? कर्मशक्तिवैचित्र्यात् । प्रत्यक्षमेव तावत्कर्मनिमित्तो वाङ्मुद्दिस्वभावाहारविहारशक्तिभेदभिन्नो विचित्रः संसार उपलभ्यते । स निपुणमवैक्षितुमशक्यः, गम्भीरत्वात् । किं पुनरप्रत्यक्षकर्मणां विपाकवैश्वरूप्यमत-कङ्गोचरमस्मदादिबुद्ध्यः परिच्छेत्स्यन्ति ? तस्मान्मनोरथमात्रमेतत् । धर्माऽधर्मानुपपत्तिश्च स्यात् । यथा स्वप्ने ब्रह्महत्यासुरापानागम्यगमनादीनामफलत्वम्, एवमितरत्रापि स्यात्, असदविशेषात् । मिद्धोपघातात्तद्विशेष इति चेत् न, अविशेषात् । असत्त्वे तुल्ये क्वचिदुपघातः क्वचिन्नेतीच्छामात्रमेतत् । एवं चेत् नासन्तः पृथिव्यादयः । न चेदसन्तो युक्तमुपदिष्टं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणीति ॥३४॥

॥ इति श्रीयुक्तिदीपिकायां सप्तममाह्निकम् ॥

Proponent : *Because the non-existence of the specific objects is not established.* The specific objects are directly cognised. Therefore, it is impossible to recognise (or establish) their non-existence.

It may also be argued that it is still to be proved that it is the true perceptive knowledge only without some fault (in it), it may be apparent perception like the knowledge in mirage, etc., which also have the external object and appears like perceptive knowledge.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because the alternative (of real and unreal) would not be impossible.* Everything should be (in that case) admitted to be non-existent (i.e., without essence); because there is no perception of anything as real from the viewpoint of which the other may be the apparent perception. The alternative is, however, already discussed. Therefore, it is wrong that this (object) is merely of the form of knowledge. Moreover, because there would arise the undesirable contingency of opposite (or contradictory) knowledge always. In case of the one who believes in the non-existence of the existents through (on the analogy of) the non-existent objects like mirage and dream, there arises the undesirable contingency of opposite (or perverted) knowledge always like that of the non-existent objects. For example, in the case of city of the gandharvas, etc., one perceives the same objects sometimes as a cow, sometimes as an elephant and some-

times as a flag. The perception, in the dream, of cow, man, horse, donkey, river and tree, etc., in a single form is observed to take place in the opposite way in the memory of that afterwards. for example, in case of the entrance of a group of elephants through window<sup>4</sup>..... the joining of the broken parts of the body, going through the sky and the attainment of the kingdom by the incapable person without cause, etc. That would be the case elsewhere also. This is, however not so. Therefore, it is wrong that the objects are non-existent like the mirage and dream. *And there would not have been the action with some purpose.* As the futility of the acts in case of persons who have bathed, applied ointment, eaten, drunk and covered themselves with clothes in dream, similar would be the case here. If it is argued that it would be like the discharge of semen? It may be like this. Just as the discharge of the semen caused by coming together of the couple, takes place without that in the dream, the same may be the case elsewhere as well. That is wrong, because it (discharge of semen) is caused by attachment, etc. Similarly that takes place ever without coming together of the couple in case of waking persons also. That is why that is not caused by mutual process. If it is like a ghost? It may be like this. The contention of mine may be right. As there is the purposeful activity of the ghosts with the river of the turbulent water, etc., which are non-existent in nature, and also their being with the skull of a man, similar may be the case here. That is also wrong because it is not established. It is not established that those (objects) are non-existent.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, because the non-perceptible is obstructed with the perceptible. Here, the perception is more powerful, and hence, the negation of the non-perceived is possible through that. In your case, however, the perception is negated through non-perception. Therefore, it is wrong to say that there is purposeful activity of the non-existent like that of the human-skull, etc. If it is argued that their non-existence is due to the difference of nature (from the existent worldly objects)? It may be like this. If the human skulls would really exist, their association with the misery would also be there because they are not different from those possessed of form. There is, however, no obstruction in them. Therefore, this is also wrong.

Why?

Because of the difference of the power of the acts. The world caused by actions is directly perceived to be differentiated due to the difference in power of speech, knowledge, nature and character (lit. acts of eating and going). It is impossible to see it thoroughly, be-

cause of its depth. How will then the intellect of the people like us thoroughly know the different objects of the world caused by variegated fruits of acts, which is not directly perceived, and which is beyond the approach of logic. Therefore, it is merely a wishful thinking. Moreover, there would be impossibility of virtuous and vicious deeds. As there is no result of the killing of a Brahmin, drinking wine and cohabiting and prohibited lady, etc., in the dream, same would be the case elsewhere also because non-existence of the objects is common in both the cases. If it is argued that the difference is caused by the assault of sloth (in the dream), the reply is, no, because it is common. When the non-existence in common it is only a wishful thinking as to the assault is effective at some places and not at the others. If it is so, earth, etc., are non-existent. If these are non-existent, it is rightly stated that out of these organs five are the sensory organs, these have the specific and non-specific things as their objects.

Here ends the seventh discourse in the Yuktidīpikā.

## KĀRIKĀ 34

1. The sense is that the objects of the sense-organs are not specified. Now, the question naturally arises whether all the senses act upon all the objects or there is some specification.
2. The term *viśeṣa* stands for gross objects while *aviśeṣa* denotes subtle elements. The former are cognised by the ordinary worldly people while the latter are cognised by the gods and yogins. This is explained in the subsequent lines.
3. It is not that the senses about in *tamas*, but the text means that the senses of human beings have got more *tamas* than those of gods.
4. Here some portion of the text is missing.
5. It proves the belief of the *Sāṃkhya*s in super natural objects, ghosts, ect.

## KĀRIKĀ 35

(Relation of warder and gates between the  
internal and external organs)

द्वारिद्वारभावमेषामिदानीं वक्ष्यामः । तत्र बाह्यं करणं द्वारम्, अन्तःकरणं द्वारीति

Now we shall speak of the relation of warder and the gate in them. Here, the external organ is the gate and the internal organ, a warder.

आह, करणाऽविशेषादयुक्तम् अन्तःकरणस्य हीन्द्रियाणां च करणत्वमविशिष्टम् । तत्र को हेतुरन्तःकरणं द्वारि, द्वाराणीन्द्रियाणीति ?

Opponent : It is wrong because of their commonness as the organs.

The nature of being organ is in case of both the internal organ and the other senses. Then, what is the reason here that the internal organ is the warder and the (external) senses are the gates ?

उच्यते—

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।

तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

सहान्तःकरणेन वर्तते या साऽन्तःकरणा बुद्धिः । अहंकारमनोभ्यां सहिता बुद्धिरित्यर्थः । अत्र चान्तःकरणग्रहणेनैव बुद्धेर्ग्रहणे सिद्धे भूयो बुद्धिग्रहणं प्राधान्यख्यापनार्थम् । भवति हि प्रधानस्य सामान्येऽन्तर्भूतस्यापि पृथगुपदेशः । तद्यथा

जगाम तं वनोद्देशं व्यासः सह महर्षिभिः ।

इति महर्षिग्रहणे व्यासोऽप्यन्तर्भूतः प्राधान्यात्पृथगुच्यते, एवं साऽन्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते, विशिष्टानविशिष्टांश्च शब्दादीन्सन्निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टव्यवहितान्प्रमाणबलेन स्ववृत्ते विषयीकरोतीत्यर्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति अनियतविषयो द्वारी, नियतविषयाणि द्वाराणि । तद्यथा प्रासादस्य पूर्वोत्तरदक्षिणपश्चिमानां स्वदिङ्नियमो न पूर्वमुत्तरं दक्षिणं पश्चिमं वा कदाचिद् भवति, तथेतारण्यपि द्वारीणि । तत्राऽनियताः सर्वदिगवस्थितैर्द्वारैः प्रवर्तन्त एवमिहापि श्रोत्रादीनि स्वविषयनियतानि । सान्तःकरणा तु बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् तस्मादनियतविषयत्वादुपपन्नमेतत्त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि, द्वाराणि शेषाणीति ॥ ३५ ॥

Proponent : SINCE THE INTELLECT ALONG WITH THE (OTHER) INTERNAL ORGANS ASCERTAINS (LIT. EXTENDS OVER) ALL THE OBJECTS, THEREFORE, THE THREE KINDS OF (INTERNAL) ORGANS ARE THE WARDERS AND THE REST ARE THE GATES.

The expression 'the intellect along with the internal organs' means intellect which is in association with the (other) internal organs. The meaning is 'the intellect along with the egoism and the mind'.<sup>1</sup> Here, the mention of intellect is made through the mention of the internal organs yet the mention of the intellect again is to suggest its superiority. There is (found) the separate mention of the superior (even though it is) included in the common objects. For example, in the statement as 'Vyāsa with the (other) great seers went to the forest', Vyāsa who is also included in the mention of the great seers is mentioned separately on account of his superiority. Similarly, is (the expression that) 'intellect along with the (other) internal organs ascertains (i.e. extends over) all the objects'. The meaning is that it makes objects of its activity the word, etc., which are qualified or non-qualified, through the force of means of knowledge.<sup>2</sup> What is meant is this. The warder is that the objects of which are not fixed, and those whose objects are fixed are gates. As in case of a palace there is fixation of directions of its gates towards east, north, south or west. The same may be considered sometimes to east, north, south or west, as is the case with the other gates. There are activities through the doors situated, in all directions without restricting any. Similarly, here also the ear, etc., are restricted to their own objects. The intellect along with the internal organs, however, ascertains (or extends over) all the objects and, hence, since their objects are not fixed, it is right that the three (internal) organs are the warder and the others are the gates.

## KĀRIKĀ 35

1. It suggests that the intellect decides the nature of the objects with the help of the egoism and mind.
2. The objects situated near are known through perception; those situated at a distance and beyond the sense-object contact are known through inference and those which are beyond the reach of them can be known through verbal testimony.

## KĀRIKĀ 36

(Mind and egoism submit the objects to intellect)

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।

कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

एते इत्यनेन त्रयमभिसम्बन्धाति श्रोत्रादीनामन्यतमं मनोऽहंकारश्च । प्रदीपकल्पाइत्यनेन प्रकाशसाम्यं करणपर्वण आचष्टे, यथा प्रदीपः प्रकाशक एवं करणमपि, तद्व्यापारे सति विषयाविर्भावानुपपत्तेः । परस्परविलक्षण इत्यनेन व्यस्तवृत्तिं पूर्वोक्तामाकर्षति । तथा ह्येषां वैलक्षण्यमनुमीयते, आलोचनसंकल्पाभिमानभेदात् । गुणविशेषा इत्यनेन सत्त्वादीनां पुरुष-विज्ञानमुद्दिश्य तद्भावेन परिणामं ख्यापयति । कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थमिति विशेषाऽविशेषलक्षणं कार्यं आहार्यधार्यप्रकाश्यतया यथासम्भवं प्रकाश्य स्ववृत्त्यनुगुणं कृत्वा विषयत्वमापाद्येत्यर्थः । बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति बुद्ध्वादादधति । एतदुक्तं भवति—यदा श्रोत्रादीनामन्यतमं करणं शब्दादौ विषये प्रवर्तते तदा तदद्भारेणाहंकारो मनो वा तं विषयं स्वव्यापारेणानुभूय बुद्ध्वा-धत्ते, तद्विषयतामापादयतीत्यर्थः । कदाचित्तु बुद्धिरेव बाह्यकरणसंकल्पाभिमानान्निश्चिनोति विषयं, कदाचित्संकल्पाभिमानान्निश्चिनोति विषयं तावत्कदाचित्संकल्पाभिमानगृहीतम् । सर्वथा त्वयं शास्त्रार्थो येन वा तेन करणेन विषयमुपात्तं बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति । तथा चाध्यवसाय-रूपापन्नया चेतनाशक्तिरनुगृह्यते । न करणान्तरस्य पुरुषेण सम्बन्धोऽस्ति । ततश्च द्वारिणां बहुत्वादर्शनविशेषस्वातन्त्र्यसमुच्चयान्तःकरणपुरुषकर्तृत्वदोषाणामप्रसंगः ॥ ३६ ॥

THESE (THE CONCERNED EXTERNAL ORGAN, MANAS AND THE EGOISM) MUTUALLY DIFFERENT, (DISTINCT) MODIFICATIONS OF THE THREE CONSTITUENTS, AND RESEMBLING A LAMP (IN RESPECT OF THEIR FUNCTIONS) ILLUMINING THE ENTIRE PURPOSE OF THE PURUSA PRESENT IT TO THE INTELLECT.

Through the expression 'these' the author relates the three—one of the ear, etc., mind and egoism. Through the statement of the resemblance to the lamp the author speaks of the similarity of illuminating resting in the phase of the senses. As the lamp is the illuminator so is an organ because with the function of that (organ) the production of the object is impossible. Through the expression 'mutually distinct' the author draws here respective distinct function

of an organ mentioned above. Through that (separate function) only is inferred their distinction on account of the distinction of (mere) grasping, pondering over and I-notion. Through the expression modification of the constituents, the author suggests that they (the constituents) modify in their (present) form with the purpose of fulfilling (or with a view to) the purpose of the conscious entity. The meaning is that after illuminating, i.e., after making as far as possible an object of knowledge through the respective specific and non-specific acts in the form of 'to be grasped' to be retained, 'to be illumined' the entire purpose of the conscious entity they submit it to the intellect i.e., put (the form) on the intellect. When any one of the (external) organs like ear proceeds to the objects like word, the mind as well as egoism experiencing the object through the former (i.e., operation of the senses) put its form upon the intellect i.e., make it the object of intellect. Sometimes the intellect ascertains the objects through the external object, pondering (i.e. desiring) and the relation to I-notion; sometimes it ascertains through pondering over (desiring and I-notion), while sometimes (it ascertains) the pondering (desiring) and the I-notion. The meaning always in the scripture is that the intellect ascertains the object presented to it by any of the organs. The power of consciousness is favoured by that intellect after the latter has attained the form of ascertainment.<sup>1</sup> There is no (direct) relation of any other organ with the conscious entity. And through this theory on account of the multiplicity of the gate-keepers there does not arise the undesirable contingency of involvement of defects/like the rise of particular knowledge independently (conscious entity), blending together of knowledge at a time and admitting the agency in the complex of internal organs and conscious entity.

## KĀRIKĀ 36

1. The act of attaining the form of the object in the case of the conscious entity is apparent or attributed and not real.

## KĀRIKĀ 37

(Mind and egoism come in contact of the conscious entity indirectly)

आह, कः पुनरत्र हेतुर्येन द्वारित्वाविशेषे सत्यहंकारमनसौ बुद्धौ विषयाधानं कुरुतो न पुनरनयोः साक्षात्पुरुषेण सम्बन्ध इति ?

What is the reason that even though the nature of being warden is common (to egoism and mind), yet they put the form of the object upon the intellect only and there is no direct relation (of them) with the conscious entity?

उच्यते —

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।

अहंकारमनसोर्हि, नास्ति निश्चयरूपता, संकल्पाभिमानमात्ररूपत्वात् । अनिश्चितविषयया च करणवृत्त्या पुरुषस्य सम्बन्धोऽनर्थकः स्यात् । स्वयं वा निश्चेतुरस्य कर्तृत्वं स्यात् । ततश्चाऽऽमिश्रनिश्चयकारणत्वादयमप्यामिश्ररूपः स्यात् । सर्वं चैतदुक्तोत्तरं निश्चयरूपा हि बुद्धिः । अतस्तद्वृत्त्युपनिपाती विषयः सन्निधानमात्रात्पुरुषेण संचेतितो नास्यौदासीन्यं बाधितुमुत्सहते, नो खल्वप्यानर्थक्यमनुषज्यते । एतदुक्तं सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिरिति ।

**BECAUSE THE INTELLECT ACCOMPLISHES THE EXPERIENCE OF THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY IN RESPECT OF ALL THE (OBJECTS).**

The egoism and mind are not of the form of ascertainment because they are of the nature of pondering (desiring) and I-notion only. The relation of the conscious entity with the function of the organs the object of which is not fixed would serve no purpose.<sup>1</sup> Or, there would be the activity in conscious entity if it ascertains the objects by itself.<sup>2</sup> Then, on account of its being the cause for the mixed ascertainment (the ascertainment of the complex object) it would also be of a mixed (complex) form (nature).<sup>3</sup> To all this the reply is already given that the intellect is of the form of ascertainment. Therefore, the object which follows the function of the transformation (of the organs) is made known to the conscious entity merely through

proximity and thus it does not tend to disturb (obstruct) its neutrality, nor does it cling to purposelessness. Thus is explained 'because the intellect accomplishes the experience of conscious entity with respect to all the objects'.

(Intellect discriminates between cosmic matter and conscious entity)

आह, एवमपि शब्दादिलक्षणो विषयः प्रकृतः, स च बुद्ध्या सर्वः प्रतिपाद्यते । तत्र विषयान्तरमप्यस्ति प्रधानपुरुषान्तरलक्षणम् । तथाचाहुः । "उपभोगस्य शब्दाद्युपलब्धिरादिः गुणपुरुषोपलब्धिरन्तः" । तस्मात्तत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं करणान्तरं वक्तव्यमिति ।

Opponent : In this way also only the object like word which is undertaken for discussion, is completely known by intellect. There is, however, another object in the form of the distinction between the cosmic matter and the conscious entity. It is stated also—'the beginning of the experience is the knowledge of the word, etc., and culmination (of it) is the knowledge of the constituents and the conscious entity. Therefore, some other organ should be mentioned for the knowledge of that (discriminative knowledge of conscious entity and the constituents).

उच्यते—न वक्तव्यम् । किं कारणम् ? यस्मात्

सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

यतो यस्मात्कारणात् सा बुद्धिरेव हि काष्ठापन्नेन तमसाऽभिभूतत्वाद्धर्मादीनां सत्त्वधर्माणां प्रकृतिभूतान्विकारभूतान्तरतन्त्रानुपकार्यानुपकारकानचेतनान्संसर्गधर्मिणश्च गुणानात्मत्वेनाऽध्यवस्य पुरुषायोपहरित । स च मिथ्याज्ञानाभ्यासवासनाऽनुरजितं बुद्धिप्रत्ययमनुरुध्यमानो दर्शितविषयत्वात्तथैव प्रतिपद्यते । यदा तु धर्माद्यभ्यासात्तमोरूपापगमे सत्युत्तरोत्तराणां सत्त्वधर्माणामुत्कर्षस्तदा विनिवृत्तमिथ्याप्रत्यया वृत्तिः । न प्रकृतिविकारभूतः स्वतन्त्रोऽनुपकार्योऽनुपकारकश्चेतनोऽसंसर्गधर्मा च । ततो विपरीताश्च गुणा इति शुद्धाध्यवसायं करोति । पुरुषश्च परोपहतवृत्तित्वात्तथैव प्रतिपद्यते । तदेतद् गुणानां पुरुषस्य चान्तरं द्वयोरपि निश्चयस्वभावत्वादस्मात्पूर्वोक्तधर्मभेदेऽपि सति सूक्ष्मं गम्भीरं दुर्ज्ञेयम् । अतश्च सूक्ष्मं यद् बुद्धिमात्रमवलम्ब्य तदविशिष्टायाश्चेतनाशक्तेर्ग्राह्यग्राहकः ॥ ३७ ॥

Proponent : No, it should not be mentioned.

What is the reason here ?

Because:



# **THAT (INTELLECT) ONLY DISCRIMINATES THE SUBTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COSMIC MATTER AND CONSCIOUS ENTITY**

Since when the Tamas becomes intense and when virtue, etc., the qualities of Sattva, etc., are overpowered, the intellect itself after ascertaining the constituents (modifications of the constituents) which are actually the causes and effects, dependents, requiring assistance, assisting others, non-sentient and having the nature of mutual association, as the soul offers the (idea) to the conscious entity. The conscious entity also having past impression of the practice of perverted knowledge and confining himself to the knowledge of (given by) intellect understands in that way only because the object is presented to him.<sup>4</sup> When there is the gradual elevation of the qualities of the Sattva and the form of Tamas is removed through the repeated practice of virtue, etc., the function (of the intellect) becomes devoid of perverted knowledge. The intellect comes to have the pure right ascertainment that (soul) is not the modification of the cosmic matter, is independent, requiring no favour or assistance, not assisting any other, sentient and having no nature of association; and the constituents are opposed to that in nature.<sup>5</sup> Since the conscious entity is that to whom the function is presented by other (i.e. intellect), it knows it in this form only. The distinction between the conscious entity and constituents is subtle, deep and difficult to understand even though there lies the above difference because both the types of knowledge related to the conscious entity's identity to or difference from the constituents is of the nature of ascertainment.<sup>6</sup>

## **KĀRIKĀ 37**

1. If the conscious entity is supposed to come in contact with the senses directly, it would not get the form of the object in an ascertained form. Consequently, no one would have determined knowledge.
2. If the conscious entity is accepted to be a determining principle, it would be active and consequently non-eternal.
3. It would appear in the form of the object the form of which is attained by it. Consequently, it would be of many forms and whatever gets many forms is non-eternal.
4. This happens in the process of bondage.
5. It proves that the discriminative knowledge is located in the intellect, and is presented to the conscious entity.
6. Some portion of the text is missing at the end.

## KĀRIKĀ 38

(Phase of the objects)

व्याख्यातं करणपर्व । कार्यपर्वेदानीं वक्तव्यम् । तस्य च पुरस्तादुद्देशः कृतः—कार्यं च तस्य दशधा पञ्च विशेषा इति । साम्प्रतं तु निर्देशं करिष्यामः ।

The subject of the organs is explained. Now, the subject of the effects should be stated.<sup>1</sup> That is mentioned by name earlier as the effects are ten— including the five specific (objects). Now we shall discuss them.

(Subtle elements are called non-specific)

आह, यद्येवं तस्मादिदमेव तावदुच्यतां के विशेषाः, केऽविशेषा इति ।

Opponent : If it is so, it should be stated as to what are the specific and what are non-specific.

उच्यते—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः

यानि तन्मात्राणि पञ्चाहंकारादुत्पद्यन्ते इति प्रागपदिष्टम् । ते खल्वविशेषाः, कानि पुनस्तन्मात्राणीत्युच्यते शब्दतन्मात्रं, स्पर्शतन्मात्रं, रूपतन्मात्रं, रसतन्मात्रं गन्धतन्मात्रमिति ।

Proponent : THE SUBTLE ELEMENTS ARE NON-SPECIFIC.

The subtle elements are the same which are spoken earlier as those originating from the egoism.<sup>2</sup> They are indeed the non-specific.

What are those called subtle elements ?

To this the reply is—they are the subtle elements of sound, touch, form, taste and smell.

कथं पुनस्तन्मात्राणीति ?

Opponent : Why are these the subtle elements ?

उच्यते— तुल्यजातीयविशेषानुपपत्तेः अन्ये शब्दजात्यभेदेऽपि

सति विशेषा उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितानुनसिकादयस्तत्र न सन्ति तस्माच्छब्दतन्मात्रम् । एवं स्पर्शतन्मात्रे मृदुकठिनादयः । एवं रूपतन्मात्रे शुक्लकृष्णादयः । एवं रसतन्मात्रे

मधुराऽम्लादयः । एवं गन्धतन्मात्रे सुरभ्यादयः । तस्मात्तस्य तस्य गुणस्य सामान्यमेवात्र, न विशेष इति तन्मात्रास्वेतेऽविशेषाः ।

Because there is no possibility of the further particularities of the same class. Though there is no difference with reference to the genus in the case of many words, yet there (in the subtle elements) are no further particularities like high pitch, low pitch and circumplexed (which are found in gross words). Therefore, that is the subtle element of word. Similarly, (there is no) softness and hardness in the subtle element of touch. Similarly, (there is no) whiteness, blackness, etc., in the subtle element of form. Similarly, (there are no) sweetness and sourness in the subtle element of taste. Similarly, (there are no) good smell, etc., in the subtle element of smell. There is only the generality of that quality and not the particularity (of it) and thus there is no further particularity in the subtle elements.

(Gross elements are called specific and evolve from subtle elements)

आह, अथ के पुनर्विशेषा इति ?

Opponent : What are the specific (objects) then?

उच्यते—यानि खलु

तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।

उत्पद्यन्ते

एते स्मृता विशेषाः

तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशम्, स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायुः, रूपतन्मात्रात्तेजः, रसतन्मात्रादापः, गन्धतन्मात्रात्पृथिवी । तेभ्यो भूतानीत्येतावति वक्तव्ये पञ्च पञ्चभ्य इति ग्रहणं समसंख्याकतस्तदुत्पत्तिज्ञापनार्थम् । तेनैकैकस्मात्तन्मात्रादेकैकस्य विशेषस्योत्पत्तिः सिद्धा । ततश्चयदन्येषामाचार्याणामभिप्रेतम् एकलक्षणेभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यः परस्परानुप्रवेशादेकोत्तरा विशेषाः सृज्यन्ते इति तत्प्रतिषिद्धं भवति । किन्तर्हि अन्तरेणापि तन्मात्रानुप्रवेशमेकोत्तरेभ्यो भूतेभ्य एकोत्तराणां भूतविशेषामुत्पत्तिः । तत्र शब्दगुणाच्छब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशमेकगुणम्, शब्दस्पर्शगुणात्स्पर्शतन्मात्राद् द्विगुणो वायुः, शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणाद्रूपतन्मात्रात्त्रिगुणं तेजः, शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाद्रसतन्मात्राच्चतुर्गुणा आपः, शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धगुणाद् गन्धतन्मात्रात्पञ्चगुणा पृथिवी । अत्र च वायोः शीतः स्पर्श अपां च, तेजस उष्णः, अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिव्याः । रूपं च शुक्लं भास्वरं च तेजसोऽपां च, कृष्णं पृथिव्याः । रसो मधुरोऽपाम्, साधारणः पृथिव्याः । गन्धस्तु पार्थिव एव तदवयवानुप्रवेशाद् भूतान्तरेषूपलभ्यते । इत्येते पृथिव्यादीनां धर्माः । अन्ये च परस्परानुग्राहकाः । के पुनस्त इत्याह—

आकारो गौरवं रौक्ष्यं वरणं स्थैर्यमेव च ।  
 स्थितिभेदः क्षमा कृष्णच्छाया सर्वोपभोग्यते ॥  
 इति ते पार्थिवा धर्मास्तद्विशिष्टास्तथा परे ।  
 जलाग्निपवनाकाशव्यापकास्तान्निबोधत ॥  
 स्नेहः सौक्ष्म्यं प्रभा शौक्ल्यं मार्दवं गौरवं च यत् ॥  
 शैत्यं रक्षा पवित्रत्वं सन्तानश्चौदका गुणाः ॥  
 ऊर्ध्वगं पावकं दग्धं पाचकं लघु भास्वरम् ।  
 प्रध्वंस्योजस्विता ज्योतिः पूर्वाभ्यां सविलक्षणम् ॥  
 तिर्यग्गतिः पवित्रत्वमाक्षेपो नोदनं बलम् ।  
 रौक्ष्यमच्छायाता शैत्यं वायोर्धर्माः पृथिव्यधाः ॥  
 सर्वतोगतिरव्यूहो विष्कम्भश्चेति ते त्रयः ।  
 आकाशधर्मा विज्ञेयाः पूर्वधर्मविरोधिनः ॥  
 संहतानां तु यत्कार्यं सामान्यं ते गवादयः ।  
 इतरेतरधर्मभ्यो विशेषान्नात्र संशयः ॥

Those which are:

#### FROM THESE FIVE THE FIVE GROSS ELEMENTS

Proceed :

These (latter) are said to be specific.

There, the space proceeds from the subtle element of word; the air from the subtle element of touch; the fire from the subtle element of form; water from the subtle element of taste; and earth from the subtle element of smell. In spite of the statement of that 'from those proceed the gross elements the mention' 'five from the five' is for the purpose of suggesting their production from the same number of objects.<sup>4</sup> Therefrom is established the production of one gross element from one (a single) subtle. Therefore, the following view of the other seers that the succeeding specific (objects) proceed from the mutual combination of the subtle elements which are having single quality each, is negated. On the contrary, even without the combination of the subtle elements from the succeeding elements (subtle) is the origination of the succeeding specific element. The space having one quality proceeds from the subtle element of word, which has a single quality of word. The air having two qualities proceed from the subtle

element of touch which has the qualities of word and touch. The fire having three qualities proceed from the subtle element of colour which has the qualities of word, touch and colour. The water having four qualities proceeds from the subtle element of taste which has the qualities of word, touch, colour and taste. The earth having five qualities proceeds from the subtle element of smell which has the qualities of word, touch, colour, taste and smell.<sup>5</sup> Here the touch of air and water is cold, hot is the touch of fire, and of the earth the touch is neither hot nor cold. The colour also is white and bright in case of the fire and water and black in the case of the earth. The taste is sweet in case of the water and general in the earth. The smell belongs to earth only and is observed in the other elements due to the combination of the part of that (earth) in them.<sup>6</sup> These are the qualities of the earth, etc. The other qualities (than these) are for mutual favour.

What are those others ? To this the reply is :

Form, heaviness, roughness, covering, firmness, stability, partition, resistance, black shade are enjoyed by all, these are the qualities of the earth. Others are (not) endowed with them. Now you know the qualities which pervade water, fire, air and sky. Lubricity, fineness, splendour, brightness, softness, heaviness, coldness, protection, purification and continuous flow are the qualities of water. The light shoots upwards, is purifier, burner, cooker, light (as opposed to heavy), bright, destroyer and shining. It is, thus, different from others. The peculiar qualities of the air are transverse movement, purification, removing or throwing away, impelling, inspiring, roughness, going near, coldness. The qualities of the sky which are opposite to the qualities stated above should be known as the approach everywhere, non-obstruction and fixity. The collective effects of these are the general objects, cow etc. There is no doubt in it that they originate from the specific objects (having the qualities of each other).<sup>7</sup>

(Mutual favour in gross elements through qualities)

तत्राकारादिभिर्धर्मैः पृथिव्या लोकस्य चोपक्रियते भूतान्तराणां च । तत्राकारात्तावत् गवादीनां घटादीनां चाकारनिर्वृतिः गौरवादेशामवस्थानम् । रौक्ष्यादपां संग्रहौ वैशद्यं च भूतानाम् । वरणादनभिप्रेतानां छान्दनम् । स्थैर्याद् वृत्तिः प्रजानां भूतान्तराणां च । स्थितेर्मात्रादिसन्निधानाद्यनुग्रहः । भेदाद्धटादिनिष्पत्तिः । व्यूहश्चावयवानाम् । क्षान्तेरुपभोग्योग्यता । कृष्णच्छायात्वाद्रात्रिसम्पच्छायाकार्यप्रसिद्धिश्च । सर्वोपभोग्यत्वात्सर्वभूतानुग्रहः । एवं स्नेहादिभिलोकस्योपकारः क्रियते भूतान्तराणां च । स्नेहाद्रूपसंप्रदायुप्रतीकारोऽग्निशमनं संग्रहश्चप-

थिव्याः। सौक्ष्म्यादनुप्रवेशः। शौकल्याच्चन्द्रादिनिर्वृतिः। मार्दवात्सन्तानावगाहनमेकक्रिया कठिनानां। चावनामनम्। गौरवात्सन्तानाच्च भूतानुग्रहार्थं स्रोतस्त्वम्। शैत्यादुष्णप्रतीकारः। रक्षातः प्रजासु घोरशमनम्। पवित्रत्वाद्धर्मोपचयः शौचविधिरलक्ष्योपघातश्च। सन्तानाद्द्रव्यसंघातः। तथोर्ध्वगत्यादिभिर्धर्ममात्रैस्तेजसां लोकस्य चोपक्रियते भूतान्तराणां च। ऊर्ध्वगतेः पाकप्रकाशसिद्धिः। पावकत्वाद् द्रव्यशौचं च। दाहकत्वात्क्षारोत्पत्तिः। शीतप्रतीकारो नभसश्चोष्णत्वं शब्दनिष्पत्त्यर्थम्। पाचकत्वात्स्वेद्यं स्वेदनमन्नपक्तिः पृथिव्यवयवानां क्रियायोग्यता, तथा बाह्यान्तरपरिणामः, रसलोहितमांसस्नाय्वस्थिमज्जाशुक्राणां लाघवाद् दाह्यातिक्रमः। भास्वरत्वाद् द्रव्यान्तरप्रकाशनम्। प्रध्वंसित्वाद् दग्धपक्वानामुपभोगः। तैजसः प्रजापालनम्। तथा तिर्यक्पातादिभिर्धर्मैर्वीर्यानां लोकस्य चोपकारः क्रियते भूतान्तराणां च। तिर्यक्पाताद् दृष्टिविक्षेपो गन्धसंवहनं च। पवित्रत्वात्पूतिद्रव्यपवनम्। आक्षेपनोदनाभ्यामुत्कर्षः प्रथनं धर्माभ्यसः। व्यूहश्च शरीरे रसादीनां धातूनां च। अग्नेश्चोपधानमभिघातश्चाकाशस्य। बलात्समीकरणं सर्वेषाम्। रौक्ष्याद्विशोषणम्। अच्छायात्वादहोरात्रप्रसिद्धिः। शैत्यादुष्णप्रतीकारः। तथा सर्वतोऽगत्यादिभिर्धर्मैर्नभसा लोकस्योपकारः क्रियते भूतान्तराणां च। सर्वतोऽगतेः समन्तात्तुल्यदेशश्रवणनामेकश्रुतित्वम्। अव्यूहविष्कम्भाभ्यां सर्वेषामवकाशतादानमित्युक्ताः पृथिव्यादयः। एते विशेषा इत्युच्यन्त इति।

Through the qualities like shade found in the earth, etc., a favour is rendered to whole (material) world and the substances. Due to form there is the accomplishment of the shape in the pot, cow, etc. and their sustenance (present at one place) is due to their heaviness. Through roughness is the collection of water and the distinctness in the objects. Through the quality of covering there is the covering of undesirable (things). Through firmness is the existence of the public as also of the other beings. Through stability is the favour for quantity, and gathering together, etc. Through partition is the origination of pot, etc., and also the joining of the parts. Through resistance is the capability for enjoyment.<sup>8</sup> Through the black shade is the accomplishment of the night as also the common awareness of the effects of shade. Since it is enjoyable to all, it renders favour to all the beings. In this way by lubricity, etc., also there is rendered service to the world and also to all the beings. Through lubricity is the accomplishment of the form, prevention from the air, extinguish of the fire, and putting together as the earth (i.e. earthly things). Due to its being subtle is its entrance (in other object). Due to its brightness is the production of the Moon, etc., (form it).<sup>9</sup> Through softness is accomplished the act of bathing and diving as also the bowing of the hard things. There is a flow (in the water) for the favour to the beings through its heaviness and continuous flow. Through coldness (in water) is the prevention from heat. Through its purity is the accumulation of the virtues, the procedure of purifying and the

destruction of the unseen.<sup>10</sup> Through the continuous flow is the collecting together of the substances. Similarly, through the qualities like going upward, etc., the fire renders favour to the world as also the beings.<sup>11</sup> Through the (tendency of) going upward is the accomplishment of cooking and giving light. Through its purity is rendered the purity of the substances. Through the burning is the production of acid as also the prevention from cold, and also the heat in the sky for the purpose of the production of the word there. Through its having the power of cooking there is perspiration of what is to be treated by suborific means, the digestion of food, the capability of activity in the parts of the earth and the modification—outer and inner. Due to lightness the acid, blood, flesh, arteries, bones and semen virile transcending the things liable to be burnt. Through its brightness is the illumination of the other objects. Due to its being a destroyer is the enjoyment of burnt and cooked. Through light is the preservation of the people. Similarly, through the qualities like transverse movement, etc., is the favour rendered to the world as also to the beings by the air. Through transverse movement is the casting of galance and the carrying of the odour. Through its purity is the purification of the pure substances. Through removing and impelling is the going up and the spread of the heat and the water as also the collection of fluid and the (solid) ingredient in the body, so are the blowing of the fire and striking in the sky. Through the inspiring is the assimilation of everything. Through roughness is drying of the objects. Through its covering is the accomplishment of day and night. Through coldness is the prevention from the heat. Through the quality of all-pervasiveness, etc., is rendered by the sky the favour to the world as also to the beings. Through the all-pervasiveness there is the hearing of the same sound from all directions in case of those the ears of whom are situated at the same place. Through non-obstruction and fixity is the allotment of the space for all. Thus, are stated the (gross elements like) earth, etc. These are called specific.

(Cause of terming gross elements specific)

आह, कथं पुनरेते विशेषा इत्युच्यन्ते ?

Opponent : Why are they called specific ?

यस्मात्

शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

तत्र शान्तास्तावत् स्वसंस्कारविशेषयोगात्तत्सन्निधौ प्रसादादिधर्मोत्पत्तेः। घोरास्तु शेषादिधर्मनिमित्तत्वात्। मूढाश्च वरणादिधर्महेतुत्वात्। तन्मात्राणि पुनरशान्तघोरमूढानि

अतोऽविशेषा इत्युच्यन्ते । तदेते यथा व्याख्याता अविशेषा विशेषाः पुरुषार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं बहुधा व्यवतिष्ठन्ते । कस्मात् ? न ह्येतेषामेकधाऽवस्थाने पुरुषार्थः सिद्ध्यतीति ॥ ३८ ॥

Because :

### (THEY ARE) CALM TURBULENT AND DELUDING

They are calm because there is the origination of the qualities like calmness in the vicinity of them due to the particular impression of ones own.<sup>10</sup> They are turbulent because they are the causes of the qualities like remainder (?). They are deluding because of their being the cause of the quality of covering, etc. The subtle elements, however, are not calm, turbulent and deluding and, hence, are called non-specific. The above mentioned specific and non-specific as explained earlier are present variously for the accomplishment of purpose of conscious entity.

Why ?

Because the purpose of the conscious entity is not accomplished if they are placed in a homogeneous form.

## KĀRIKĀ 38

1. The 'subject of effect' here refers to the objects of the senses, which are stated to be ten in kārikā 32.
2. Cf. kārikā 22.
3. Thus etymologically aviśeṣa means having no inter differentiations.
4. I.e. the one gross element from one subtle element, first from the first and so on.
5. The view of the Yuktidīpikā about the nature of the subtle elements is worth noting. Here, the succeeding subtle element is said to possess the qualities of the preceding subtle element.
6. For example, if there is some smell in water or air, it should not be understood as their inherent quality, but belongs to the part of earth mixed in them.
7. The qualities of cause are found in the effect also. In the objects like cow all these qualities are available because they are composed of all these elements. These mutually favour each other and are not contradictory because they are found together.
8. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy every object is composed of three constituents. Rajas is always active and stimulating and, hence, always brings the change in the objects. If the resistance to this change is not by tamas, no object would subsist even for a short time and it would not be enjoyed.
9. Since the moon gives pleasant cool touch, and is bright, it is inferred to be abounding in water as its components.
10. Since water is purifying, the water at the sacred places purifies the beings which again leads to virtue and destroys sins.

## KĀRIKĀ 39

(States of specific objects)

आह, अतिसामान्योक्तमिदमित्यतो न प्रतिपद्यामहे । तस्माद्वक्तव्यं कथं विशेषाणामवस्थानमिति ?

Opponent: It is stated in a very general form and, hence, we do not understand it. Therefore, it should be stated as to what is the condition of the specifics.

उच्यते-

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।

तत्र सूक्ष्मा नाम चेष्टाश्रितं प्राणाष्टकं संसरति । मातृपितृजास्तु द्विविधाः । जरायुजा अण्डजाश्च । तेषां कोशोपहताः कोशाः लोमरुधिरमांसास्थिस्नायुशुक्रलक्षणः । तत्र लोमरुधिरमांसांसां मातृतः सम्भवः । अस्थिस्नायुशुक्राणां पितृतः । तत्रैवाशितपीताध्यासा दष्टौ कोशानपरे व्याचक्षते ।

Proponent : THE SPECIFIC IS THREEFOLD—SUBTLE (BODY), THOSE BORN OF PARENTS, ALONGWITH THOSE OF THE OTHER BEINGS.

Out of these subtle are eight prāpas located in the substratum of the physical activities which transmigrate (to some other body).<sup>1</sup> Those born of the parents are of two kinds: those originating from the womb or those originating from the egg.

There are the sheaths of them put in other sheaths—hair, blood, flesh, bones, arteries and semen virile. Out of these the origination of hair, blood and flesh is from the mother, and that of the bones, arteries and semen virile from the father. Some others speak of eight sheaths on account of superimposing the (nature of sheaths) on what is eaten and drunk.

(The specific work as sheaths)

कथं पुनरेषां कोशत्वम् ?

Opponent : How are these known as sheaths ?

आवेष्टनसामर्थ्यात् । यथा कोशकारः कोशेनावेष्टितोऽस्वतन्त्रः, एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरं सप्राणमेतैरावेष्टितमस्वतन्त्रं तत्तत्कर्मोपचिनोति ।

Proponent : Because of their capability of covering. Just as a silkworm does not remain independent when covered by the cover, similarly, the subtle body alongwith the prāṇas when covered by them becomes dependent and accumulates the acts (i.e. impressions of what he does).<sup>2</sup>

(Kinds of living beings)

प्रभूतास्तुद्भिज्जाः स्वेदजाश्च तदेतैस्त्रिविधैर्विशेषैर्दैवमानवतैर्यग्योनलक्षणस्त्रिविधो भूतसर्ग आरभ्यते । तत्र देवानां चतुर्विधं शरीरं प्रधानानुग्रहात्, यथा परमर्षेर्विरिञ्चस्य च । तत्सिद्धिभ्यो यथा ब्रह्मणः पुत्राणां तत्पुत्रपुत्राणां च । मातापितृतो यथाऽदितेः कश्यपस्य च पुत्राणाम् । केवलाद्वा यथा पितृतौ मित्रावरुणाभ्यां वशिष्ठस्य । मनुष्याणां तु जरायुजम् । धर्मशक्तिविशेषात् कस्यचिदन्यथाऽपि भवति । यथा द्रोणकृपकृपोधृष्टद्युम्नादीनाम् । तिर्यग्योनीनामपि चतुर्विधम् ।

जरायुजं गवादीनामण्डजं चैव पक्षिणाम् ।

तृणादेश्चोद्भिज्जं क्षुद्रजन्तूनां स्वेदजं स्मृतम् ॥

एवं त्रिविधा विशेषा व्याख्याताः ।

Those which germinate as a plant and those which are generated by sweating (heat and moisture) belong to other beings. From the three kinds of above specific, there proceeds the creation of three kinds of beings in the form of gods, human beings and the animal (and insects). The body of the gods is of four kinds—due to the favour of the cosmic matter just as that of Brahmā, viṣṇu and Śiva; produced through attainment (of supernatural power) just as that of the sons of Brahmā and of their sons; that produced from the parents (both the father and mother) just as that of the sons of Aditi and Kashyapa; that produced from father only just as that of Vasiṣṭha from Mitra and Varuṇa. The body of the human beings are born of womb. In case of some, however, it is otherwise (i.e. without womb) also on account of the particularity of the power of virtue; just as that of Droṇa, Kṛpa, Kṛpi, Dhṛstadyumna, etc. The body of the animal (and insects) also is of four kinds :

The body of cow, etc., is said to be generated from womb, that of the birds as generated from the egg; that of the grass etc., as generated by sprouting and that of the small creatures from sweating (heat or moisture).<sup>3</sup>



Thus, are explained the specifics of three kinds.

(Perishable and imperishable specific)

तत्र केचिन्नियताः केचिदनियता इत्याह—के पुनरत्र नियताः, के वाऽनियताः ?

Opponent : Out of them some are said to be constant and some perishable. What are the constant, and what are perishable?

सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥३९॥

सूक्ष्मा आसर्गप्रलयात्रित्याः मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते । सह प्रभूतैरिति वर्तते । केचित्तु प्रभूतग्रहणेन बाह्यानामेव विशेषाणां ग्रहणमिच्छन्ति । तेषामुद्भिज्जस्वेदजयोरग्रहणम् । तस्मादुभयथा प्रभूता इत्येतदनवद्यम् ।

Proponent : OUT OF THESE THE SUBTLE ARE CONSTANT AND THOSE BORN OF THE PARENTS ARE PERISHABLE.

The subtle are constant from the creation to the dissolution of the universe (while ) those born of parents perish. The expression is taken together with belonging to other beings. Some intend to include the mention of external specifics only through the mention of prabhūta. In their view, there remains no mention of those germinating as sprout and those born from sweating. Therefore correct interpretation both ways would be the other two (generated sprouting and sweating) beings.

आह, सूक्ष्माभिधानमप्रसिद्धत्वात् । मातापितृजाश्च प्रभूताश्च प्रसिद्धा इत्यतो युक्त एषां परिग्रहः । सूक्ष्मास्त्वप्रसिद्धाः । तस्माद्वक्तव्यं कथमेषामुत्पत्तिरस्तित्वं वेति ?

The subtle should be explained because they are not well known. Those born from parents and the two (generated by sprouting and sweating)/other kinds of beings are well-known and, hence, their inclusion is right. The subtle, however, are not well known. Then, it should be spoken of as to how is their origination or existence.

उच्यते—पूर्वसर्गे प्रकृतेरुत्पन्नानां प्राणिनां सत्त्वधर्मोत्कर्षादन्तरेण द्वयसमापत्तिं मनसैवाऽपत्यमन्यद्वा यथेप्सितं प्रादुर्बभूव । तदेतदद्यापि चानुवर्तते—यत्कच्छपिका निरूपितेनाण्डधारणं करोति । प्रियं खल्वपि चक्षुषा निरीक्ष्य कृतार्थमात्मानं मन्यते । तस्यामपि क्षीणायां वाक्सिद्धिर्बभूव । अभिभाष्य प्राणिनो यदिच्छन्ति तदापादयन्ति । तदद्याप्यनुवर्तते—यच्छङ्खी विरुतेनाऽपत्यं बिभर्ति । प्रियं खल्वपि सम्भाष्य महतीं प्रीतिमनुभवति । तस्यामुपक्षीणायां हस्तसिद्धिर्बभूव । संस्पृश्य पाणिमीप्सितमर्थमुपपादयन्ति । तदेतदद्याप्य-

नुवर्तते—यत्प्रियं चिरादालोक्य पाणौ संस्पृश्य प्रीतिर्भवति । अस्यामुपक्षीणायामाश्लेषसिद्धिर्बभूव । आलिङ्गनेन प्राणिन ईप्सितं लभन्ते । तदेतदद्याप्यनुवर्तते—यत्प्रियमालिङ्ग्य निवृत्तिर्भवति । तस्यामुपक्षीणायां द्वन्द्वसिद्धिरारब्धा । स्त्रीपुंसौ संधृष्ट्याऽपत्यमुत्पादयेतां ममेदं ममेदमिति च परिग्रहाः प्रवृत्ताः । एतस्मिन्नेवावसरे संसारो वर्ण्यते ।

Proponent : In the initial creation of (prior to creation) the son or otherwise (daughter) were born from the living being from the cosmic matter in accordance with their will through the mind without coming together of the couple because the qualities of Sattva were dominant in them. The practice is found even at present—the female tortoise conceives the egg only by reflecting upon, it indeed considers itself satisfied only at seeing its lover. When that power was destroyed, there became the accomplishment through speech. The living beings get whatever is desired after speaking together. This is also found even now. The couch shell (insect in it) conceives through crying only. It indeed feels great pleasure after speaking to her lover. When that (power) came to an end, the accomplishment was (started) through hand. The beings accomplish the desired object through touching the hand. This is found even now that after seeing the lover for a long time and touching the hands there arises the pleasure. When this (power) also was destroyed, there became the accomplishment through embracing. The living beings get the desired object through embracing. This is also found even now that after embracing the beloved they are satisfied. When that (power) also was destroyed, the accomplishment through copulation started. The man and a woman give rise to a baby after coming into collision and hoarding started 'this is mine', 'this is mine'. At this occasion only the world (i.e. transmigration) is explained.

(Different views about subtle body)

तत्र चाचार्याणां विप्रतिपत्तिः । पञ्चाधिकरणस्य तावद्वैवर्तं शरीरं मातापितृसंसर्गकाले करणाविष्टं शुक्रशोणितमनुप्रविशति । तदनुप्रवेशाच्च कललादिभावेन विवर्धते । व्यूढावयवं तूपलब्धप्रत्ययं मातुरुदरान्निस्सृत्य यौ धर्माधर्मौ षट्सिद्ध्युपभोगकाले कृतौ तद्वशादवतिष्ठते । यावत्तत्तस्याच्छरीरपातस्तावत् । यदि धर्मसंस्कृतं करणं ततो द्युदेशं सूक्ष्मशरीरेण

प्राप्यते, तद्विपर्ययात् यातनास्थानं तिर्ग्यग्योनिं वा, मिश्रीभावेन मानुष्यम् । एवमातिवाहिकं सूक्ष्मशरीरमिन्द्रियाणां धारणप्रापणसमर्थं नित्यं बाह्येनाऽपायिना परिवेष्ट्यते परित्यज्यते च । पतञ्जलेस्तु सूक्ष्मशरीरं यत्सिद्धिकाले पूर्वमिन्द्रियाणि बीजदेशं नयति तत्र तत्कृताशयवशात् ध्रुदेशं यातनास्थानं वा करणानि वा प्राप्य निवर्तते । तत्र चैवं युक्ताशयस्य कर्मवशादन्यदुत्पद्यते यदिन्द्रियाणि बीजदेशं नयति तदपि निवर्तते, शरीरपाते चान्यदुत्पद्यते । एवमनेकानि शरीराणि । विन्ध्यवासिनस्तु विभुत्वादिन्द्रियाणां बीजदेशे वृत्त्या जन्म । तत्त्यागो मरणम् । तस्मान्नास्ति सूक्ष्मशरीरम् । तस्मान्निर्विशेषः संसार इति पक्षः । एषा सूक्ष्मशरीरस्योत्पत्तिः ॥ ३९ ॥

There are different views of the authorities in this connection. In the view of Pañcādhikarāṇa, the vaivarta body covered by the organs enters the semen and blood at the time of the intercourse of the father and mother, and after its entrance it grows in the form of an embryo. When the limbs are accumulated after attaining the knowledge (pratyayas), coming out of the womb of the mother it subsists due to the virtuous and vile acts done during the experience of the six attainments (powers). It remains (in the corporeal body) upto the destruction of that. If the (internal) organ is purified by virtuous deeds, the subtle body attains the sky, through the opposite to that it attains the place of miseries or the birth of an animal (or insect) through the mixture (of virtuous and vile deeds). One attains the birth of a human being. In this way, the subtle body which is very swift and capable of getting the senses is eternal and is embraced and left by the external body which is perishable. According to Patanjali, the subtle body transmits the senses to the place of the seed before the accomplishment of the body and disappears after taking the body to the upper reign or the place of miseries or the organs in accordance with the impressions of the deeds done in past life. And there some subtle body arises due to the past deed for the one endowed with past impressions which again transmits the senses to the place of seed and then this also disappears. At the time of destruction of the body some other is born. In this way there are many subtle (bodies). According to Vindhyavāsin, as the senses are all-pervasive birth is the function of the senses at the place of seed.<sup>4</sup> Death is the renouncement of that. Therefore, there is no subtle body at all. Therefore, transmigration is not specific (or prompted by something specific) Thus is the origination of a subtle body.

## KĀRIKĀ 39

1. Since the vital airs are of the nature of air, they are specific, and since they are not as gross as the objects like pot, they may be called subtle. The sixth, seventh and eighth are the organs of knowledge, organs of action and egoism (including mind and intellect).
2. Sheath has two conditions : it covers the things and takes away the independence. Since these cover the subtle body and take away its independence, they are called sheaths.
3. These are technically called born of womb (jarāyuja), born of egg (aṇḍaja), born of sweat (svedaaja) and born of sprouting (udbhija).
4. Since the senses are all-pervasive according to him, they are available everywhere and, hence, there arises no need of subtle body to carry them to other body.

## KĀRIKĀ 40

(Characteristics and constituents of subtle body)

आह, एवमनेकनिश्चयेष्वाचार्येषु भवतः का प्रतिपत्तिरिति ?

Opponent : When there are many types of decided opinions amongst the authorities, what is your assertion about it ?

उच्यते—यत्तावत्पतञ्जलिराह सूक्ष्मशरीरं विनिवर्तते पुनश्चान्यदुत्पत्ते, तत् सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता इति वचनादस्माभिर्नाऽभ्युपगम्यते । तस्मात्

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

तत्र पूर्वोत्पन्नमित्यनेन महदादेः सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तस्य लिङ्गस्यासर्गप्रलयान्नित्यत्वमाह । असक्तमित्यनेन गूढस्थिरबीजानुप्रवेशमाचष्टे । न हि लिङ्गं क्वचिद्व्याहृत्यते, किं तर्हि लिङ्गादि बीजमप्याविशति । बदरगोलमपि भित्त्वा प्रविशति । नियतमित्यनेन प्रतिपुरुषव्यवस्थां प्रतिजानाति । साधारणो हि महान्प्रकृतित्वादिति वार्षगणानां पक्षः । महदादीत्यनेन प्राणाष्टकं परिगृह्णाति पूर्वात्मानः प्राणाद्याश्च पञ्च वायव्य इति । सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तमिति तत्त्वान्तरप्रतिषेधमाह, एतावदेव नाऽतोऽन्यदिति । संसरतीति गतिमाचष्टे ततश्चाऽविभुत्वाद् बीजावेशत्यागौ प्रख्यातो भवतः । निरुपभोगमिति शरीरान्तरस्यावकाशं करोति । सूक्ष्मशरीरस्य ह्युपभोगसामर्थ्येऽभ्युपगम्यमाने शरीरान्तरस्य निरवकाशत्वादनुत्पत्तिप्रसंगः स्यात् । भावैरधिवासितमित्यनेन भावाष्टकपरिग्रहं द्योतयति । बुद्धिरूपैरिह धर्मादिभिरधिवासितम् । तत्सामर्थ्यात्सर्वत्राऽप्रतिहतं प्राणाष्टकं सूक्ष्मशरीरेऽवस्थानगमनमात्रफले व्यवस्थितम् । द्युतिर्यक्प्रेतेषु संसरतीति तेनैव चार्थसिद्धौ शरीरान्तरपरिकल्पनाऽनर्थक्यमतो न बहूनि शरीराणि ॥ ४० ॥

Proponent : Whatever Patañjali said that the subtle body is destroyed and the other (body) is produced is not accepted by us through our statement 'out of them the subtle are eternal' (Kā 39.)

Therefore,

*The subtle body formed primevally, unimpeded, eternal, (composed of the elements) beginning from intellect to the subtle elements migrates invested with dispositions and devoid of experience.*

Through the expression formed primevally is stated the eternity of the subtle body composed of the elements beginning from intellect

up to the subtle elements from the time of (initial) creation to the dissolution. Through the expression 'unimpeded' the author states its entrance into the concealed and the hard seed. The subtle body is nowhere impeded. On the contrary, it enters even the seed of a unit. It enters even after breaking the jujube fruit. Through the word 'eternal' the author asserts its adjustment with every conscious.<sup>1</sup> The thesis of the followers of Vārṣaganya is that the intellect being the cause (of the rest of the elements) is common to all. Through the expression intellect, etc., the author states the eight vital airs. The five vital airs like prāṇa are the same (mentioned) earlier.<sup>2</sup> Through the expression 'upto the subtle elements' the author expresses the exclusion of some other elements, as it is this much only and not different from it. Through the expression 'migrates' (the author) states the motion and from this are said entrance into and abandonment of the seed since it is non-pervasive. Through the expression 'devoid of experience' (the author) leaves scope for the other (i.e., the gross body). If the subtle body itself is admitted to be capable for enjoying, since there will be no scope for the other body, there will arise the undesirable contingency of non-origination of the gross body. Through the expression 'endowed with disposition' the author suggests that the eight dispositions should be taken here. It is endowed with virtue, etc., forms of the intellect. The eight vital airs are unobstructed everywhere as they are due to their own capacity attached to subtle body which has the only purpose of staying (in the body) and going (out of it). Since it migrates in the animals in the sky and as spirit of the dead person, and since (consequently) the purpose is fulfilled with that only, there is no purpose in postulating some other body (different subtle body). Hence, there are many (subtle) bodies.

## KĀRIKĀ 40

1. This adjustment brings out the differentiation in the living beings.
2. Through the term ādi the author of the Yuktidīpikā seems to understand the vital airs also. However, no other commentator includes vital airs in subtle body. The organs of senses, organs of action and egoism (including mind and intellect) are the further three to raise the number to eight.

## KĀRIKĀ 41

(All-pervasiveness of the senses criticised)

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम्-विभुत्वादिन्द्रियाणां स्वात्मन्यवस्थानं वृत्तिलाभो वृत्तिनिरोधश्च संसार इति, अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? विभुत्वासिद्धेः । न हि विभुत्वमिन्द्रियाणां कश्चिदभ्युपगच्छति । किं कारणम् ? सततोपलब्धिप्रसंगात् । युगपदुपलब्धिप्रसंगाच्च । कार्यकरणपुरुषाणां हि विभुत्वे सततोपलब्धिप्रसंगोः । विषयाणां प्रतिबन्धाभावात्प्रसज्यते । प्राप्त्यविशेषाच्च सर्वविशेषाणां युगपदुपलब्धिप्रसंगः । व्यवहितविषयग्रहणं च । सर्वत्र सन्निधानात्सन्निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टयोः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमानां चाऽविशेषः प्रसज्यते । वृत्तिविशेषात्तद्विशेष इति चेत् न, हेत्वभावात् । विभूनामिहाऽस्ति वृत्तिविशेष इत्यत्र हेतुरनुक्तः । तस्मान्न करणानां विभुत्वमुपपद्यते । तस्मात्

चित्रं यथाऽऽश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा च्छाया ।

तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

यथा हि चित्रस्य कुड्यमृतेऽवस्थानं नास्ति, स्थाणुपुरुषादिभ्यो वा विना च्छायायाः तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् । तस्मादुपपन्नमेतत् सविशेषः संसारः ।

The statement that since the senses are all-pervasive, transmigration is the attainment and cessation of the functions in their form in a body, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because the all-pervasiveness is not established. No one accepts the all-pervasiveness of the senses.

What is the reason here ?

Because it would involve the undesirable contingency of continuation of knowledge all the time and because of the undesirable contingency of the simultaneity of knowledge. When the organs and the conscious entity are all-pervasive, there arises the undesirable contingency of the knowledge of the object at all the times because of the absence of some obstruction (in knowledge). And, since they are common to all the objects, there would arise the undesirable contingency of simultaneous knowledge of all the specific object.<sup>1</sup> (or specific qualities). And, there would also be (undesirable contingency of) the knowledge of the objects obstructed by other object. Because of

the contact everywhere, there would arise the undesirable contingency of non-difference between the (knowledge of) the objects situated near and at a distance (from the knower) as also the (knowledge arising of) perception, inference and verbal testimony. If it is argued that the differentiation is due to the particular function (of the senses, we reply) no, because there is no reason here. No reason is stated to establish that there is a particular kind of function, in case of the objects of senses which are all-pervasive in nature.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the all-pervasiveness of the organs is not (justified).

Therefore,

JUST AS A PICTURE (DOES NOT EXIST) WITHOUT A SUBSTRATUM, A SHADOW WITHOUT A (SOLID OBJECT) PILLAR, ETC., SIMILARLY, THE SUBTLE BODY DOES NOT SUBSIST SUPPORTLESS, WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC OBJECTS.

Just as there is no subsistence of a picture without a wall as also that of a shadow without a pillar or a man, etc., similarly, the subtle body does not subsist supportless without the specific objects. Therefore, it is justified to say that the transmigration is with the specific objects.

आह, यदि सविशेषः संसार बीजदेशगमने शरीरमुपलभ्येत । न त्वेवम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : If the transmigration is with specific objects, the body would have been available by going at the place of its seed. It is, however, not so. Therefore, this is wrong.

उच्यते-न, विशेषितत्वात् । सूक्ष्मं तत्क्षरीरमिति विशेषितम् । ततो नाऽस्याहेतुकमग्रहणमिति ।

Proponent : No, because of the peculiar-characteristic. The peculiar characteristic of that body is that it is subtle. Therefore, its non-perception (or non availability) is not without a person.

आह, सूक्ष्मशरीरयोगात्पूर्वैश्वरत्वप्रसंगः । तस्मादयुक्तं तन्निमित्तमस्याग्रहणमिति ।

Opponent : There arises the undesirable contingency of its being all-powerful in case of the earlier (gross body) due to its being related to the subtle body.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it is wrong to say that its cause is not perceived.

उच्यते-न अनेकान्तात् । तद्यथा क्षुद्रजन्तूनां सूक्ष्मशरीरं लघिमा च, न चैवामीश्वरत्वमेवं सर्वप्राणिनां स्यात् । अथ मतमगृह्यमाणेन सम्बन्धात् स्थूलस्यापि शरीरस्याग्रहणं प्रेताञ्जनसिद्धमाल्यादिवत् । तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । अनेकान्तात् । तद्यथा करणैर्गृह्यमाणैः शरीरस्य सम्बन्धः । न चाऽग्रहणम्, पिशाचादिभिर्वा तथैतदपि स्यात् । किंच अन्तःकरणाऽनुविधाने चैश्वर्याभिमानात् । यस्य चाध्यवसायमनुविदधत्यणिमादीनि तस्यैश्वर्यमभिप्रेतम् । न तु यस्य स्त्रभावासिद्धानि । अन्यथा तु पिपीलिकादीनामप्याकाशगमनादैश्वर्यं स्यात् ।

*No, because it is non-conclusive.* Just as both—the subtle body and the small size is observed in vile creatures, but still there is no lordliness in them, similarly, may be the case with all the beings. If it is argued that there would be the non-perception of the gross body also because of its association with non-perceptible just as the wreath formed with a fabulous serpent belonging to a ghost and the ghost; it is also wrong because it is non-conclusive. It may be like the relation of the body with the organs when organs are not perceived and there is no absence of knowledge of (gross body) or the one possessed by the ghost etc.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the notion of possessing the lordly powers is when it is connected with the internal organ. The lordly powers are intended in case of one whose powers of being small in size, etc., are controlled by the determination.<sup>5</sup> It is not in the case of him in whom those are natural. Otherwise, the lordly powers would be (considered) in the case of small red ant or the female ant on account of its going in the sky.

आह, न, शरीराऽनुपपत्तिप्रसंगात् । सूक्ष्मशरीरोत्पत्तौ तर्हि चरितार्थयोः शरीरान्तरसामर्थ्यं विरुध्यते । तस्मादयुक्तम् सविशेषः संसारः ।

*Opponent : No because that involves the undesirable contingency of impossibility of the body.* The power for producing some other body is obstructed in case of those two (dharma and adharma mentioned later on) which have fulfilled their purpose in producing the subtle body.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, it is wrong that the transmigration is with the specific elements.

उच्यते-न अनभ्युपगमात् । न धर्माधर्मनिमित्तं वैवर्तं शरीरम्, किं तर्हि आधिकारिकमित्यदोषः । न चानेकशरीरत्वमभ्युपगम्यते । तस्मात्पश्चान्तरोपालम्भोऽयम् । किं च कृत्स्नाशयपरिणामाऽप्रतिज्ञानात् । कृत्स्नस्याशयस्य परिणामं जानन्नेवमुपालभ्यः स्यादेकदेशस्तु नो विपरिणामी । तस्मात् किंचिदेतत् । निमित्तावशेषादाशयैकदेशाभिव्यक्तिरयुक्तेति चेत्, स्यान्मतम्-इह निमित्तानामल्पबहुत्वविशेषादाशयाभिव्यक्तिविशेषो दृष्टः । तद्यथा वाय्वादि-क्रोधादिषु । प्रायणकालश्चायं फलाभिव्यक्तौ निमित्तम् । अविशिष्टश्चासौ । तस्मादाशयैक-

देशपरिणामौऽनुपपन्न इति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? नैमित्तिकत्वात् । पूर्वकृतस्य कर्मणः फलभोगपरिसमाप्तिः, साम्प्रतस्य च फलोपभोगार्थं विपरिणामः प्रायणस्यनिमित्तम् । न तु प्रायणो विपरिणामस्येति । किंच शरीरान्तराभावश्च । कृत्स्नस्याशयस्याभिव्यक्तिमिच्छतः शरीरान्तराभावो निमित्तान्तराभावात्प्राप्नोति । तत्र कृतेनेति चेत् न, कललाद्यवस्थानाशो तदसम्भवात् । तत्र कृताभ्यां हि बीजावेशः करणस्य निष्पादितो यावत्कललाद्यवस्थायामेव तच्छरीरं विनष्टमिति तत्र कृताशयासम्भवाच्छरीरान्तरानुपपत्तिप्रसंगः । किं च स्थावराणां च शरीरान्तरासम्भवः । आशयस्य स्थावरशरीरारम्भे चरितार्थत्वात्स्थावरशरीरेण चाशयोपादानासम्भवात्तस्य संसाराभावः प्राप्तः । तस्मादुपपन्नमेतत्पुरुषार्थमादिसर्गोत्पन्नं सूक्ष्मशरीरं संसरति । यावच्च स पुरुषार्थो न परिसमाप्यते तावत्तिष्ठत इति ॥ ४१ ॥

*Proponent : No, because it is not accepted by us.* The vaivarta body is not caused by virtue and vice; on the contrary, it belongs to the principal element (or it is due to the potentiality of the constituents) and hence there arises no defect. Nor are accepted (by us) many subtle (bodies). Therefore, the defect is applicable to the thesis of the opponent (lit. others) only. Moreover, because of non-admitting the maturity of all the past impressions. The fault would have arisen in the case of one admitting the maturity of all the past impressions. In our theory, however, the maturity of the past impressions is partly. Therefore, it carries no force.

If it is argued that their partial manifestation is illogical because there is no particularity in the cause (through which the modification is caused partially and not full), it may be like this. The particularity in the manifestation of the past impression, is observed to take place due to the particularity into less or more degree in the causes just as in case of the air,<sup>7</sup> etc., in anger, etc. The cause in the manifestation of the result is the time of departure. And, that is without particularity. Therefore, the partial modification of the past impressions is not justified. This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because that (departure) is caused. The completion of the experience of the results of the acts done earlier and the maturity of the acts done at present for the experience of their results is the cause of departure ;<sup>8</sup> the departure, on the other hand, is not (the cause) of the maturity (of acts for fruits). Moreover, there is the absence of some other body. In the case of the one who intends the manifestation of all the past impressions there arises the undesirable contin-



gency of the absence of some other body due to the absence of some other cause. If it is argued that it is due to the act done at that time.<sup>9</sup>

No, because that is not possible when the state of embryo, etc., meet destruction. That act of inception of the seed of the organs is caused by the act done at that time, that body, the seed (kāraṇaśarīra) is destroyed at the end of the state of embryo and, hence, since there is no impression of past deeds, there arises the undesirable contingency of absence of possibility for the other body. Moreover, there arises the undesirable contingency of the impossibility of the other body for the immovable being. Since the impression of the past deeds is effective for the production of the body of the immovable beings and since the impression of the past deeds is not produced by the body of the immovable beings, there arises the undesirable contingency of absence of the transmigration of that (being).<sup>9</sup> Therefore, it is right that the subtle body, which originates for the purpose of the conscious entity in the initial creation, transmigrates, and until the purpose of the conscious entity comes to an end, it continues to exist.

## KĀRIKĀ 41

1. The senses would always be in contact with the object, and there would not be the absence of knowledge any time. Moreover, if the senses would be all-pervasive, all the senses would come in contact with all the objects and it would result into the knowledge of all the objects simultaneously.
2. If the senses would be all-pervasive, they would come in contact with all the objects and there would remain no object obstructed from the senses where inference and verbal testimony would be applied.
3. The body with which it is related would be capable of doing and knowing everything because of having an all-pervasive subtle body.
4. The one possessed of ghost is perceptible while the ghost is imperceptible. Therefore, the relation with imperceptible does not turn the perceptible also imperceptible.
5. Determination (adhyavaśāya) stands for intellect here.
6. The virtue, vice, etc., are the factors for a particular subtle body and they do not produce a gross body also. The two are clarified by Chakravarti within parenthesis as dharmādharmayoh.
7. Here, air seems to denote the vital airs which are variously observed (as more or less) in accordance with the situation or emotions.
8. When the result of the works done earlier is experienced and there is no work which is matured for giving its result immediately, the beings meet death.
9. In the theory of the Sāṃkhyas, however, such a defect does not arise because all the past impressions are not exhausted in one birth and the remaining cause the further body.



## KĀRIKĀ 42

(Transmigration of subtle body)

आह, यदि पुरुषार्थो लिङ्गस्योत्पत्तिरभ्युपगम्यते तत्समनन्तरमेवानेन पुरुषार्थोऽवसाय-  
यितव्यो न पुनर्देवमानुषतिर्यग्भावेन पुनः पुनरावज्जन्तुभावोऽनुष्ठातव्य इति ।

Opponent : If the origination of the subtle body is admitted to be meant for the conscious entity, the purpose of the conscious entity should be realised or finished by it (subtle body) at the time of that (first creation) only. The transmigration in the form of an individual soul in the form of god, man, and vile animal should not take place again and again.

उच्यते-

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।

प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्तवद् व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

यद्यपि पुरुषार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं लिङ्गमुत्पद्यते, तथापि सत्त्वरजस्तमसां त्रयाणामपि प्राधान्या-  
द्रजस्तमोभ्यामभिभूते सत्त्वे तत्प्रेरितं निमित्तनैमित्तिकशरीरेन्द्रियविषयोपभोगनिर्वर्तकं  
शृणोति । तद्यथा अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकामो, यमराज्यमग्निहोत्रेणाऽभिजयतीति । तत्र  
फलेच्छया योनीः प्राणादीश्च सम्मुखीकृत्य क्रियामारभते । गुणवृत्तवैचित्र्याच्च प्रयत्नवानपि  
मनोवाग्देहैर्मलिनमपि कर्म करोति । ततश्च प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगात्तेन तेन निमित्तेनोपस्थापितं  
देवमनुष्यतिर्यक्प्रेतादिशरीरमेकस्वभावमपि सन्तवद्भवतिष्ठते लिङ्गमाकृतिविशेषोपादान-  
त्यागसाम्यतः । विभुत्वं गुणानां त्रयाणामपि साम्यादितरेतराभिभवो दृष्टः । तस्माद् भावनि-  
मित्तः संसारः । तन्निमित्तानुपादानान्मोक्षः ॥ ४२ ॥

Proponent : THE SUBTLE BODY THROUGH ITS CONNEC-  
TION WITH THE MEANS AND THEIR RESULTS ACTS  
LIKE A DRAMATIC ACTOR ON ACCOUNT OF ITS  
BEING UNITED WITH THE ALL-PERVASIVE POWER  
OF THE COSMIC MATTER.

Though the subtle body originates for the accomplishment of the purpose of the conscious entity, yet since all the three of the cos-

tituents can be dominant, when the Sattva is dominated by Rajas and Tamas and prompted by that, one hears from the śruti about the means causing the experience of the cause, the effects like the objects of the body and the senses, as the desirous of heaven should perform Agnihotra ; 'through the performance of Agnistoma one wins over the kingdom (domain) of Yama.' Then, he begins his activities with the desire for their results, taking delight in the causes and the vital air etc. He performs even impure actions through mind, speech and body on account of the strange nature of the activities of the constituents, even though he is very cautious. Then, due to the association of the cosmic matter with all-pervasive powers, the subtle body even though remaining of the same nature acts like a dramatic actor acquiring the bodies of a god, man, animal and ghost ; the similarity being in case of acquiring and giving up the particular form. Since the all-pervasiveness is common to all of the three constituents, there is observed the mutual suppression in them. Therefore, the transmigration is caused by dispositions. Liberation is caused by not acquiring the cause of that.

## KĀRIKĀ 43

(Dispositions)

आह, भावा इति तत्र भवताऽभिधीयते, न चास्य शब्दस्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे । तस्माद्वक्तव्यमिदं के पुनरमी भावा इति ?

Opponent : The dispositions are mentioned by you in that connection,<sup>1</sup> and we do not understand the meaning of the word. Hence, it should be stated as to which are these dispositions?

उच्यते— धर्माद्या भावाः । धर्मो ज्ञानं वैराग्यमैश्वर्यमधर्मोऽज्ञानमवैराग्यमनैश्वर्यमित्येते भावाः ।

Proponent : The dispositions are the virtues, etc. Virtue knowledge, non-attachment, lordly powers, vice, ignorance, attachment and absence of lordly powers are the dispositions.

(Sub-divisions of disposition)

तत्राचार्याणां विप्रतिपत्तिः । पञ्चाधिकरणस्य तावद्विविधं ज्ञानं प्राकृतिकं वैकृतिकं च । प्राकृतिकं त्रिविधं—तत्त्वसमकालं सांसिद्धिकमाभिष्यन्दिकं च । तत्र तत्त्वसमकालं संहतश्च महोस्तत्त्वात्मना महति प्रत्ययो भवति । उत्पन्नकार्यकारणस्य तु सांसिद्धिकमाभिष्यन्दिकं च भवति । सांसिद्धिकं यत्संहतव्यूहसमकालं निष्पद्यते यथा परमर्षेर्ज्ञानम् । आभिष्यन्दिकं च सांसिद्धिककार्यकारणस्य कारणान्तरेणोत्पद्यते । वैकृतं तु द्विविधं स्ववैकृतं परवैकृतं च । स्ववैकृतं तारकम् । सिद्ध्यन्तराणि । आह च

तत्त्वसमं वैवर्तम् तत्राभिष्यन्दिकं द्वितीयं स्यात् ।

वैकृतमतस्तृतीयं षाट्कौशिकमेतदाख्यातम् ॥

अत्र तु तत्त्वैः सहोत्पत्त्यविशेषात्सांसिद्धिकमभेदेनाह—

वैकृतमपि च द्विविधं स्ववैकृतं तत्र तारकं भवति ।

स्यात्सप्तविधं परवैकृतं स्वतारादि निर्दिष्टम् ॥

इति यथा ज्ञानेमेवं धर्मादयोऽपीति ।

There is the difference of opinion among the authorities in this regard. According to Pañcadhikaraṇa, knowledge is of the two

kinds—natural and acquired. The natural is of three kinds : arising with the origination of the element, innate and the growing one. That arising with the origin of the element arises in the intellect in the form of the high understanding. The innate and growing one arise when the body is accomplished. The innate is that which arises at the time of the production of the group of (the cause and the effect), as for example, the knowledge of the great seer, viz., Kapila. That which grows arises with the application of some other cause in the case of one whose body is already accomplished (i.e. created). The acquired one is of two kinds—acquired by oneself and acquired with the help of others. That acquired by oneself is Tāraka.<sup>2</sup> That acquired with the help of others refers to the other accomplishments. It is stated also :

The knowledge which arises with the origination of the element itself is called vaivarta, the second may be that which grows and the third is the acquired one. This is said to have six sheaths.

Here, since the innate is similar to that originating with the production of the elements themselves, the innate is described without distinction. The acquired is also of two kinds. Out of them, that acquired by himself is the Tāraka; that acquired by the help of others is of seven kinds said to be svatāra, etc.

As the knowledge, so are the virtue, etc., also.

(Different views about the sub-division of Dispositions)

विन्ध्यवासिनस्तु नास्ति तत्त्वसमं सांसिद्धिकं च । किं तर्हि सिद्धिरूपमेव । तत्र परमर्षेरपि सर्गसंघातव्यूहोत्तरकालमेव ज्ञानं निष्पद्यते यस्माद् गुरुमुखाभिप्रतिपत्तेः प्रतिपत्स्यत इत्यपीत्याह—सिद्धि निमित्तं नैमित्तकस्यानुग्रहं कुरुते, नापूर्वमुत्पादयतीति । निमित्तनैमित्तिक-भावाच्चैवमुपपद्यते । तत्र परमर्षेः पटुरूहः अन्येषां क्लिष्ट इत्ययं विशेषः । सर्वेषामेव तु तारकाद्यविशिष्टमाचार्य आह—त्रिविधा भावाः सांसिद्धिकाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्चेति । तत्र सांसिद्धिकग्रहणात्तत्त्वसमकालं प्रत्याचष्टे, नैवतदस्तीति । कथम् ? यदि हि तथा स्यात्तत्त्वान्तरानुत्पत्तिसंघातो व्यूहश्चानर्थकः स्यात् । महत्युत्पन्नं ज्ञानं तत्रैवोपलब्धमिति कः संघातार्थः ? तथा च परैरूहो नोपपद्यते, प्रतिबन्धाभावात् । न हास्य कार्यकारणव्यूहसमकालज्ञानोत्पत्तौ कश्चित्प्रतिबन्धोऽस्ति । अपरिवृतखलत्वाद्यतः कालान्तरं प्रतीक्षते । तस्मादस्य सहैव कार्यकारणाभ्यां ज्ञानमभिनिष्पद्यते प्रदीपप्रकाशवदित्यतः सांसिद्धिकम् । अन्येषां तु सत्त्वस्याऽपदुत्वात्कालान्तरेण प्रकृत्यभिष्यन्दाद् द्रागिति भवति । कृष्णासर्पदर्शनवत् । तत्राकृतम् । वैकृतं तु द्विविधं पूर्ववत् । यथा च परमर्षेर्ज्ञानं सांसिद्धिकमेवं माहात्म्यशरीरस्यैश्वर्यं, भृग्वदीनां धर्मः, सनकादीनां वैराग्यम् । अधर्मो यक्षरक्षप्रभृतीनाम् । अनैश्वर्यं षट्सिद्धिक्षयकालोत्पन्नानां मानुषाणां तिरश्चाञ्च । रागोऽज्ञानं परमर्षिवर्ज्यानाम् । प्राकृतास्तु तद्यथा वैराग्यं भगवदासुरैः । तस्य हि परमर्षिसम्भावनादुत्पन्नो धर्मः, अशुद्धिं प्रतिद्वन्द्विभावादपजगाम । तस्यामप-

तायां प्रकृते शुद्धिस्त्रोतः प्रवृत्तं येनाऽनुगृहीतो दुःखत्रयाभिधातादुत्पन्नजिज्ञासः प्रव्रजितः । तथा महेश्वरसम्पर्कान्दिन ऐश्वर्यम् । नहुषस्यागस्त्यसम्पर्काद्धर्म इत्यादि । वैकृतास्तु भावा अस्म-  
दादीनाम् । एवं त्रिविधभावपरिग्रहात्वाचार्यस्य न सर्वं स्वतः पतञ्जलिवत्, न सर्वं परतः पञ्चा-  
धिकरणवत् । किन्तु महती स्वभावातिवृत्तिः प्रकृतितोऽल्पा स्वतो विकृतितः ।

However, in the view of Vindhyavāsin the knowledge arising with the origination of the elements themselves and the innate does not exist. On the other hand, knowledge is accomplished (acquired) only. Here, the knowledge of the great seer (Kapila) also is accomplished after the group of the composite objects is originated on account of which the knowledge begins from listening to the preceptor. It is also stated that the cause which is accomplished and promotes the effect, does not give rise to something fresh. It is justified through the relation of cause and the effect. Here, it originates sharply (or in short time) in the case of the great seer (Kapila) and it is difficult for others (to acquire).<sup>3</sup> This is the difference in this case. The authority has stated that the Tāraka etc., are common to all as — the dispositions are of three kinds— innate, natural and acquired. Through the mention of innate he rejects the knowledge arising at the time of the (origination of the) elements. It does not exist at all.

How ?

If it would be so, the bringing together and arrangement of objects and (the statement of) origination of other elements would be meaningless. When the knowledge arising in the intellect is cognised in the intellect itself, what is the purpose of bringing together of other objects? *Moreover, in that case, the thinking of the seers is not justified, because there is no restriction.* There is no restriction in the origination of the knowledge at the time of the arrangement of the causes and effects (body). He is not fenced with wickedness due to which some more time is required for (the rise of knowledge). Therefore, the knowledge originates along with the cause and effect (body) just like the lamp and the light and, hence, it is innate. In the case of others, however, on account of the awkwardness (dullness) of the intellect on account of its coming from the cosmic matter after some time it becomes soon; like that at the sight of a black serpent. That is natural. The acquired also is twofold as is the case with the earlier, just as the knowledge is innate in the case of the great seer; the lordly powers in the case of mātmyas śārīra; the virtues in Bhṛgu, etc.; and non-attachment in Sanaka, etc.; vice in the case of yakṣa, devils, etc.; absence of lordly powers in case of the, men and the animals born at the time of destruction of the six attainments,

attachment and absence of knowledge in the people other than the great seer. They are natural also as the non-attachment in case of lord Āsuri. Virtue originated in him because of his being born as the great seer. He drove away the impurity because of its being contradictory to the virtue. When that (impurity) was destroyed, the stream of purity proceeded from the cosmic matter and favoured by that he in whom the desire to know was born due to the stroke (or affliction) of the three constituents, renounced the world. Similarly, the lordly powers of the Nandī (the bull of lord Śiva) through the contact with the great lord (Śiva), and the virtues, etc., of Nahuṣa through his contact with Yagastya. The acquired dispositions are like those of ourselves. In this way, since the authority mentions the dispositions of three kinds, they are not all natural as held by Patañjali, nor are they all acquired from others as held by Pañcādhikaraṇa. On the other hand, the great part of the growth (i.e. transgressing the natural quantity) in the inherent dispositions is from the cosmic matter (natural, arising spontaneously) and the less from acquisition.<sup>4</sup>

(Three kinds of Dispositions)

एवम्

सांसिद्धिकश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतश्च धर्मोद्याः ।

दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः

यथा चैते तथा

कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

त्रिविधा एवेति कललादिग्रहणेन शरीराण्याह । तेषामाकृतवैश्वरूप्यं चतुर्दशविधे संसारे त्रिविधम् । तत्र सांसिद्धिकस्तावत् वैवर्त्तानां ग्रहनक्षत्रतारादीनाम् । जातिकृतश्च विशेषः हंसानां शौक्यम्, तित्तिरिमयूरादीनां चित्रच्छदत्वमिति । प्राकृतं यथामाहात्म्यं शरीराभिमानात् तस्य ह्यभिमानो भवति— हन्ताहं पुत्रान्मुख्ये ये मे कर्म करिष्यन्ति । ये मां परं च ज्ञास्यन्ति । स यादृक्सर्गमभिध्यायति तादृक्प्रधानादुत्पद्यते । तद्यथा महेश्वरस्य रुद्र कोटिसृष्टाविति । वैकृतास्तु कललाद्याः । यथा भिषग्वेदेऽभिहितम्—क्षीरं पीत्वां गर्भिणी गौरं पुत्रं जनयतीति । एते भावा व्याख्याताः । एषां वैश्वरूप्याल्लिङ्गस्य गतिविशेषः संसारे भवतीति ॥ ४३ ॥

Thus,

**THE DISPOSITIONS LIKE VIRTUE, ETC., ARE INNATE, NATURAL AND ACQUIRED AND ARE OBSERVED TO BE DEPENDENT ON THE ORGANS AS THESE SO ARE EMBRYO, ETC., AS DEPENDENT UPON THE EFFECT (I.E. THE BODY)**

Through the mention of embryo, etc., the author has stated that the bodies are of three kinds only. Their form found in whole world of fourteen kinds is of three kinds.<sup>5</sup> The innate is that of the vaivarta body like planets, stars and other small stars, as also the particularity due to the race as the whiteness of the swan and the variegated (colour) and clearness (not darkness) in a partridge and the peacock. It is natural also as – on account of the notion of possessing a magnimous body one comes to have the notion 'I will produce the sons who will work for me, will know me and the others', the creation as he ponders over comes out of the cosmic matter as in the case of lord Śiva in producing thousands of Rudras. The embryo, etc., are acquired, as it is stated in the veda of medicines—the pregnant woman gives birth to a son after drinking milk. Thus are explained the dispositions. Since they are universal (i.e. found everywhere in the universe), the transmigration in the form of a particular state (or mode of existence) of the subtle body takes place.<sup>6</sup>

## KARIKA 43

1. I.e., in context of transmigration of subtle body.
2. It is a kind of attainment.
3. Here, the causal relation may present some problem from Sāṃkhya point of view. The effect exists in the cause prior to its origination. Knowledge could also be considered as existing earlier. Even if knowledge is considered to be acquired, the above maxim holds good with regard to the material objects and should not be stretched too far. Knowledge is a particular form or state of intellect and, hence, a change in state does not disturb the theory of causation.
4. This is proved through our common experience also. Due to the natural dispositions a man is inclined to a particular thing.
5. The fourteen kinds of worlds are the fourteen regions (lohas) . Three kinds may mean either gods, human beings and lower animal, or the bodies like embryo of three kinds: innate, natural and acquired. The latter interpretation seems to be nearer the intention of the present author.
6. Since no being is found without those, we can conclude that they are everywhere and the subtle body transmigrates with them. Of course, some dispositions are acquired which also follow in the next

## KĀRIKĀ 44

(Results of disposition)

आह, कस्य पुनर्भावास्यानुष्ठानात्को गमनविशेषो लिङ्गस्य निष्पद्यत इति ?

Opponent : Through the practice of which disposition what particular state (or mode of existence) is acquired by the subtle body ?

उच्यते-

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम्

उक्तो धर्मः । तदनुष्ठानादष्टविकल्पायां देवभूमावुत्पत्तिर्भवति ।

गमनमधस्ताद् भवत्यधर्मेण ।

अधर्मोऽप्युक्तः । तदनुष्ठानात्पञ्चविकल्पायां तिर्यग्भूमावुत्पत्तिर्भवति ।

Proponent : Through virtue is the rise upwards.

The virtue is already explained. Through the practice of this there takes place the birth in the land of gods (i.e. heavenly reigns) of eight kinds.

Through vice becomes the departure (or state of birth) downwards.

The vice is also already explained. (Kā. 23). Through the practice of that takes place the birth in the five kinds of land of the animals.

आह, एकभूमिविशेषानुपत्तिः गतिविशेषात् । यदि भावानां भूमिविशेषनिमित्तत्वं नियम्यते तेनैकस्यां भूमौ हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टत्वं जात्याकृतिस्वभावानुमहोपघातानां न प्राप्नोति ।

Opponent : There is no propriety (in experiencing) one particular land (through a particular disposition) because there is a particular state of beings on it. If the causality of a particular land is restricted to the dispositions, there would be no low, medium and high qualities in the birth, form, nature, favour (i.e. occupations) and diseases on the same place.

उच्यते- न तर्ह्यनेन भूमिविशेषो नियम्यते, किं तर्हि ऊर्ध्वशब्द उत्कृष्टवचनः । धर्मेण देवेषु मानवेषु तिर्यक्षु चोर्ध्वगमनमुत्कृष्टं जन्म भवति । तथाऽधर्मादधोगमनमपक्वजन्म भवति ।

ज्ञानेन चाऽपवर्गः

चशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः । ज्ञानेनैवापवर्गः, न भावान्तरेणेति । यदुक्तमन्यैराचार्यैः- वैराग्यात्पुरुषकैवल्यं ज्ञानवैराग्याभ्यां चेति तत्प्रतिषिद्धं भवति ।

Proponent : A particular land is not restricted through it. On the contrary, the word high means the 'superior'. Through virtue there is rise upwards, i.e. ensues a superior birth in gods, men or animals. Similarly, through vice is the departure downwards i.e. the inferior birth.

## THROUGH KNOWLEDGE ONLY IS ACQUIRED THE LIBERATION.

The word *Ca* means restriction. The liberation is (attained) only by knowledge and not by any other disposition. Thus, the statement of the other teachers that the isolation ensues through non-attachment and through (combination of) knowledge and non-attachment, becomes negated.<sup>1</sup>

आह, यदि पुनर्वैराग्यात्पुरुषकैवल्यमभ्युपगम्यते क एवं सति दोषः स्यात् ?

What is the fault if it is held that the isolation of the conscious entity ensues through non-attachment ?

उच्यते- न शक्यमेवं प्रतिपत्तुम् । कस्मात् ? संसारनिमित्ताऽप्रतिपक्षत्वात् । यदि रागादिनिमित्तः प्रधानपुरुषसंयोगः स्यात् प्राप्तमिदं तत्प्रतिपक्षेण वैराग्येण वियोगो भविष्यतीति । न त्वेवम् । कुतः ? संयोगकृते कार्यकरणसर्गे सति निष्पत्तेः । कार्यकरणव्यूहोत्तरकालं हि रागो भवति । तस्मान्नासौ कार्यकरणनिष्पत्तेर्निमित्तमिति शक्यमाश्रयितुम् । यस्य तु ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति पक्षः, तस्य प्रतिपक्षादज्ञानाद्वन्ध इति प्राप्तमस्ति, न चासौ प्रागपि कार्यकरणनिष्पत्तेः । तस्मान्न वैराग्यानमोक्षः । अतएव न ज्ञानवैराग्याभ्यां मोक्षोऽस्ति । उभयनिमित्ताऽसम्भवात् । तस्मात्सूक्तं ज्ञानेनैवाऽपवर्गः ।

विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

ज्ञानविपर्ययोऽज्ञानम् । तस्माद् बन्धस्त्रिविधो भवति प्रकृतिबन्धो दक्षिणाबन्धो वैकारिकबन्धश्चेति ॥ ४४ ॥

Reply : This cannot be (held so).

Why?

Because it is not in opposition to the cause of transmigration. If the contact of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity would be caused by attachment, their disjunction (or separation) would be through non-attachment opposite to that (cause of contact). It is, however, not so.

How?

Because it comes into existence after the origination of body which is caused by that contact. The attachment comes into existence after the composition of body. Therefore, it cannot be considered as the cause of the origin of body. In the theory of one holding that the liberation ensues through knowledge, in his case it comes to be that bondage ensues through absence of knowledge because the latter stands in opposition to the former, and it is not that that did not exist earlier to the origination of body. Therefore, the liberation does not ensue through non-attachment. Therefore, liberation does not ensue from (the combination of) knowledge and non-attachment, because both cannot be the cause (at a time). Therefore, it is rightly said that the liberation ensues from knowledge only.

Therefore,

**BONDAGE IS INTENDED (TO ENSUE) FROM THE REVERSE (OF KNOWLEDGE)**

The absence of knowledge is opposite to knowledge. From that ensues the bondage of three kinds : natural, personal and evolutionary.

## KĀRIKĀ 44

1. The liberation cannot be attained by non-attachment or the combination of non-attachment and knowledge. Non-attachment may lead to knowledge and this only leads to liberation. The other dispositions regulate a particular state of birth.

## KĀRIKĀ 45

(Natural bondage)

आह, कस्माद् भावात्मकृतिबन्धो भवति ?

Opponent : Through which disposition ensues the natural bondage ?

उच्यते—

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः

वैराग्यादष्टसु प्रकृतिषुलयं गच्छति, असावुच्यते प्रकृतिबन्ध इति ।

Proponent : THROUGH NON-ATTACHMENT (RESULTS) MERGER INTO (EIGHT) CAUSES.

Through non-attachment one merges into eight causes,<sup>1</sup> this is called the natural bondage.

आह, यदि वैराग्यात्मकृतिलयः प्राप्तो यदेतत्प्रकृतौ वैराग्यमाञ्जसम् । अन्या प्रकृति-स्त्रिगुणा, कारणभूता, कार्यभूता, कार्यकारणभूता, अकार्यकारणभूता अचेतना परतन्त्रा चेति । अन्यः पुरुषो निर्गुणो, न कार्यं, न कारणं, न कार्यकारणं, तद्विपरीतः चेतनः स्वतन्त्रश्चेति ततोऽपि प्रकृती लयः ततश्चाऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग इति ।

Opponent : If there is merger in prakṛti through non-attachment, it is immediately realised that it is no attachment towards cosmic matter. The cosmic matter, composed of three constituents existing in the form of the cause, or effect and both the cause and the effect, non-sentient and dependent is distinct. The conscious entity which is devoid of constituents is not an effect, cause, both cause and effect, opposite (in nature) to that (cosmic matter), sentient and independent. Then, also there is the merger in cosmic matter and thereby arises the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation.<sup>2</sup>

उच्यते—विपर्ययादिति वर्तते । तदिहाभिसम्भन्तस्यामः । ततश्च विपरीतं यदेव वैराग्यं तुष्टिकाण्डानुपतितं प्रकृत्यादिषु परत्वाभिमानः तत एव प्रकृतिलयो भवति नान्य-स्मात् । अथवाऽत्रापि यत्तत्प्रकृतावन्यत्वज्ञानं तत एव मोक्षो न वैराग्यात् । कुतः ? भवबीजा-



प्रतिपक्षत्वादिति ह्युक्तम् । आम्भसिकस्य च मोक्षप्रसंगात् । तुल्या ह्यस्य नानात्वसंविद, आसंगदोषनिवृत्तेः । न चैतदिष्टम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् वैराग्यात्प्रकृतिलय इति ।

**Proponent :** It is the case 'from the opposite'. We shall break it (explain) like this. The opposite of it which is non-attachment falling under the section of (satisfactions) and (in the form of) notion of highest towards the cosmic matter etc., from it only takes place the merger into the cosmic matter and not through anything else.<sup>3</sup> Or, in this case also the liberation ensue through the knowledge of distinction of the cosmic matter and not through the non-attachment.

Why ?

Because, as it is already stated that it is not opposite to the cause of the birth. Moreover, there would arise the undesirable contingency of liberation in case of the 'acquatic'.<sup>4</sup> Its knowledge of distinction is similar (to the one knowing its distinction from cosmic matter) because its blemish of attachment has come to an end. This is, however, not desirable. Therefore, it is right that the merger in cosmic matter takes place through non-attachment.

(Personal Bondage)

आह, अथ दक्षिणाबन्धः कुतः ?

**Opponent :** How does the personal bondage take place?

उच्यते—

संसारो भवति राजसाद् रागात् ।

योऽयं दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयाभिलाषः स रागः । तत्र दृष्टविषयरागात्तत्प्राप्तिनिर्वर्तकं कर्म करोति । ततश्च तत्रोपपद्यते । आनुश्रविकविषयाभिलाषादग्निहोत्रादिषु प्रवर्तते । ततश्च स्वर्गादिषूपपत्तिर्भवति । असौ दक्षिणाबन्धः । दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयाभिलाषद्वारेण तन्निर्वर्तके कर्मणि प्रवर्तमानो गुणवृत्तिवैचित्र्यादनिष्टफलनिर्वर्तकमपि कर्म करोति । एवं मानुष्ये गत्यन्तरे योपपत्तिः सर्वाऽसौ रागात् ।

**Proponent :** Through attachment abounding in Rajas takes place transmigration (world).<sup>5</sup>

Attachment is the lust for the objects—perceptible and taught in the scriptures. Through the attachment to the perceptible objects one performs the acts causing the attachment to them. Therefore, he is born there in the world.<sup>6</sup> Through the desire for the objects taught

in the scriptures one begins sacrifice etc. From that takes place the birth in the heaven, etc. This is the personal bondage. A person who starts the acts through the desire of the objects—perceptible and taught in the scriptures with a view to get these objects, performs the acts leading to the undesirable results also due to the strangeness in the functioning of the constituents. Thus, the birth in human form or in some other state is caused by the attachment.

(Propriety of the term abounding in Rājas)

आह, राजसंग्रहणानर्थक्यम् तत्पूर्वकत्वाद्वागस्य । रजोनिमत्त एव हि रागः । तत्र संसारो रागादित्येव वक्तव्यम्, राजसग्रहणमनर्थकमिति ।

**Opponent :** The mention of the word abounding in Rajas in the text carries no sense because the attachment is caused by that (Rajas) itself. The attachment is caused by Rajas only. Hence, only this that transmigration is caused by attachment should be stated. The mention of Rajas is meaningless.

उच्यते—न, विषयविशेषणत्वात् । विषये यो रागः स संसारहेतुरित्यस्यार्थस्य ज्ञापनार्थमिदमुच्यते । अन्यथा यो यतेः सात्त्विको यमनियमध्यानाद्यनुष्ठानानुरागः प्रवचनरागो वा सोऽपि संसाराय स्यात् ।

**Proponent :** No, because the object serves as a qualification. This is stated so to suggest the meaning that the attachment in the objects only is the cause of transmigration. Otherwise, the attachment of an ascetic towards the practice of restraint, observance and meditation, etc., which is abounding in Sattva or the attachment to religious discourse would also be for the sake of (i. e. would lead) to transmigration.

(Non-obstruction through supernatural powers)

ऐश्वर्यादविघातः

यददृष्टगुणमैश्वर्यमणिमादि प्रागुपदिष्टं तस्मात्स्वे स्वे विषयेऽविघात उत्पद्यते । तदभिहितवै कारिको बन्धः ।

**FROM SUPERNATURAL POWERS (RESULTS) NON-OBSTRUCTION.**

From the eight types of supernatural powers, to be atomic etc.,

stated above, arises the non-obstruction in the respective objects. The lust (i.e. attachment) to that is the evolutionary bondage.<sup>7</sup>

(Absence of knowledge is the root of dispositions)

आह, यदि त्रिभिस्त्रिभिर्निमित्तैर्वैराग्यादिभिस्त्रिविधो बन्धो निर्वर्त्यते यदुक्तमज्ञानाद् बन्ध इति तदयुक्तम् । भावान्तरं ह्यज्ञानमतः फलान्तरेण भवितव्यमिति ।

Opponent : If the three kinds of bondage is caused by three respective causes like non-attachment, the statement that the bondage is caused by absence of knowledge comes to be wrong. The absence of knowledge being a different disposition should have a different result.

उच्यते- न, मूलकारणत्वात् । ज्ञानवर्जितानां हि भावानां यत्फलं तत्राज्ञानं मूलम् । तन्निमित्तत्वात्सर्वेषाम् । न हि ज्ञानिवैराग्यमलं प्रकृतिलयाय । तथेतराणि परमर्घ्यादावदृष्टत्वाद् विचित्रं कार्यमेकस्मात्कारणादयुक्तमिति वैराग्यादीन्यसाधारणानि पृथक् कल्प्यन्ते, साधारणं त्वज्ञानमतो न कश्चिदोषः ।

Proponent : No, because of its being the root-cause. The absence of knowledge serves as a (general) cause for all the results of the dispositions devoid of knowledge,<sup>8</sup> since all the others are caused by that i.e. absence of knowledge. The non-attachment of a man possessed of knowledge is not for the sake of (i.e. does not lead to) the merger into the cosmic matter. Thus, since the others are not observed in case of the great seer, etc., and since it is wrong that the different results proceed from the same (one) cause, the uncommon causes like non-attachment, etc., are postulated separately; the absence of knowledge, however, is common and hence there is no fault.

(Result of absence of lordly powers)

विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

अनैश्वर्यात् अणिमादेरष्टविधादविघातविपर्ययो विघातो भवति । तदेवमेतदष्टविधं धर्मादिविधानमुपादायाऽष्टविधं नैमित्तिकमुपपद्यते । एवमेष तत्त्वसर्गो भावसर्गश्च व्याख्यातः । एतच्च व्यक्तस्य रूपं प्रवृत्तिश्च परिकल्प्यते फलमिदानीं वक्ष्यामः ॥ ४५ ॥

॥इति युक्तिदीपिकायामष्टममाह्निकं तृतीयं च प्रकरणम् ॥

FROM THE REVERSE (RESULTS) THE OPPOSITE (THEREOF).

From the absence of lordly powers results the obstruction opposite to the eight kinds of non-obstruction like atomic size, etc. Thus, after acquiring the eight types of dispositions, virtue, etc., the eight types of results take place. Thus is explained the creation of the elements and the dispositions. This is postulated as a form and activity of the manifest. We shall speak of the result now.

(Here ends the eighth discourse and the third chapter in the Yuktidīpikā)

## KĀRIKĀ 45

1. The eight causes are cosmic matter, intellect, egoism and five subtle elements which produce the dissimilar objects.
2. The cosmic matter is in four forms : cause, i.e. the root cause of everything, effect, i.e. the objects which do not produce anything, both the cause and effect i.e. intellect, egoism and the five subtle elements. The fourth kind is that which is neither the cause nor an effect. This may signify the cosmic matter in the state of dissolution when it does not produce anything and there is only sadrsaparinama (modification into their own form) in the constituents.
3. It does not mean that the conscious entity physically merges in cosmic matter; but one is satisfied with the notion that the cosmic matter is the highest principle.
4. Cf. Y.D. on karika 50.
5. Attachment is a factor for determining further state of birth.
6. Man develops intense desire for an object and acts accordingly which determines his nature and this serves as a factor leading to a particular state of birth.
7. It is called vaikarika because it is with reference to the vikaras (evolutes) of the cosmic matter. Such a man does not experience obstruction in his way to get any evolute.
8. Cf. Yogasutra 2.4

## KARIKĀ 46

(Creation of the intellect)

आह. किं पुनस्तत्फलमिति ?

Opponent : What is the result thereof.

उच्यते- यः खलु

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाऽशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।

तत्फलमिति वाक्यशेषः । एष इति वक्ष्यमाणस्य सम्मुखीकरणार्थमुच्यते । प्रत्ययसर्ग इति प्रत्ययः पदार्थो लक्षणमिति पर्यायाः, प्रत्ययानां सर्गः प्रत्ययसर्गः पदार्थसर्गो लक्षणसर्ग इत्यर्थः । अथवा प्रत्ययो बुद्धिनिश्चयोऽध्यवसाय इति पर्यायाः । तस्य सर्गोऽयमन्तः प्रत्ययसर्गः प्रत्ययकार्य प्रत्ययव्यापार इत्यर्थः । अथवा प्रत्ययपूर्वकः सर्गः प्रत्ययसर्गः । बुद्धिपूर्वक इत्युक्तः । कथम् ? एवं हि शास्त्रम्-“महदादिविशेषान्तः सर्गो बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वात् । उत्पन्नकार्यकरणस्तु माहात्म्यशरीरं एकाकिनमात्मानमवेक्ष्याभिदध्यौ हन्ताऽहं पुत्रान्क्षये ये मे कर्म करिष्यन्ति । ये मां परं चापरं च ज्ञास्यन्ति । तस्याऽभिध्यायतः पञ्च मुख्यस्तोतसो देवाः प्रादुर्बभूवुः । तेषूपनेषु न तुष्टिं लेभे । ततोऽन्ये तिर्यक्स्तोतसोऽष्टाविंशतिः प्रजज्ञे । तेष्वप्यस्य मतिर्नैव तस्ये । अथाऽपरे नवोर्ध्वस्तोतसो देवाः प्रादुर्बभूवुः । तेष्वप्युत्पन्नेषु नैव कृतार्थमात्मानं मेने । ततोऽन्येऽष्टवर्वाक्स्तोतस उत्पेदुः । एवं तस्माद् ब्रह्मणोऽभिध्यानादुत्पन्नस्तस्मात्प्रत्ययसर्गः । स विपर्ययाख्यः अशक्त्याख्यः तुष्ट्याख्यः, सिद्ध्याख्यश्चेति ।” तत्राऽश्रेयसः श्रेयस्त्वेनाभिधानं विपर्ययः । वैकल्यादसामर्थ्यमशक्तिः । चिकीर्षितादूनेन निर्वृतिस्तुष्टिः । यथेष्टस्य साधनं सिद्धिः । तद्यथा धर्मार्थप्रवृत्तोऽग्निष्टोमादीन्परित्यज्य संकरं कुर्वीत सोऽस्य विपर्ययः । साधनवैकल्यादसामर्थ्यमशक्तिः । आधानमात्रसन्तोषस्तुष्टिः । कृत्नस्य क्रियातिशेषस्यानुष्ठानं सिद्धिः । एवमर्थादिषु योज्यम् । यश्चायं चतुर्विधः फलविशेषो विपर्ययादिराख्यातः

Proponent: Which is indeed-

**THIS IS THE CREATION OF THE INTELLECT AND IS CALLED PERVERTED KNOWLEDGE, DISABILITY, COMPLACENCY AND ATTAINMENT**

The remaining of the sentence is 'this is the result of that'. The term 'this' is mentioned to present before (the listener) the object to

be stated. In the expression 'creation of the intellect' the terms *pratyaya*, *padārtha* and *lakṣaṇa*—(all meaning object) are synonymous.<sup>1</sup> The creation of the *pratyayas* is denoted by the term *pratyayasarga* which means the creation of the *padārtha* of *lakṣaṇa*. Or, *pratyaya*, knowledge, determination and ascertainment are synonyms.<sup>2</sup> This is the creation of that and, hence, is called the creation of intellect—which means the effect or function of the intellect. Or the term *pratyayasarga* means that caused by the intellect. That which is said to be 'caused by the intellect'.

How?

The scripture also says: since the creation beginning with the intellect upto the specific objects is caused from intellect. The *māhātmyaśarīra* in case of whom the body was produced finding himself alone pondered—oh, I will create the sons who will work for me, and who will know me only to be highest or the lowest. From him who was thinking like this, five gods took birth from the five main apertures. He was not satisfied with the birth of those. Then took birth the twenty eight from other apertures opening on sides. With the birth of those also his mind did not settle. Then were born the other nine gods from the apertures opening upwards. He did not consider him successful (or with the object fulfilled) with the birth of them also. Then were born the other eight from the aperture opening downwards. Thus born from that thinking, of *Brahmā* were consequently called the creation of the intellect or knowledge.<sup>3</sup> That is named as perverted knowledge, disability, complacency and attainment respectively. Out of these, the perverted knowledge 'is considering the object not conducive to welfare as conducive to welfare'. Disability is the incapability due to the defect (in the means). Satisfaction is the desistance (or to stop the activity) with getting less than desired. Attainment is the accomplishment of an object as it was desired. For example, when one engaged in the activities for virtues and (earning) wealth after leaving the performance of the *Agnihotra*, etc., starts intermixture (of castes by marrying a woman of the other caste), it is his perverted knowledge. Disability is the incapability due to the defect in means. Complacency is to be satisfied only by receiving only whatever is received. Attainment is the accomplishment of the whole of the remaining (ritualistic) act.<sup>4</sup> Similar should be stated with reference to the wealth, etc., also. Whatever is that fourfold result is called perverted knowledge, etc.

(Kinds of dispositions)

गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात् तस्य भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

गुणानां, वैषम्यं गुणवैषम्यम् । गुणवैषम्यं प्राधान्यगुणभावयोग इत्यर्थः । गुणवैषम्याद्विमर्दो गुणवैषम्यविमर्दः, प्रत्ययपर्यायेण सत्त्वरजस्तमसामितरेतरभावः । तन्निमित्ता एषां प्रत्ययाणां पञ्चाशद्भेदा भवन्ति ॥ ४६ ॥

**DUE TO THE MUTUAL SUPPRESSION OF THE GUNAS BECAUSE OF THEIR RELATIVE INEQUALITIES, ITS KINDS COME TO BE FIFTY.**

The term 'their inequalities' means the inequality of the constituents. The inequality of the constituents means the association with the state of dominating and less. The term '*guṇavaisamyavimardah*' means the suppression due to the inequality of the constituents. The notion of distinction (or mixture) amongst the *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* is in accordance with the dispositions. Due to that takes place the fifty kinds of the dispositions.

## KĀRIKĀ 46

1. The object stands for intellect in the present case. The expression comes to mean the creation of intellect.
2. This comes to mean the creation of the modes of intellect.
3. Here, four refers to perverted knowledge, twenty eight to disabilities, nine to complacencies and eight to attainments.
4. This is the case of the one engaged in virtuous act of performance of sacrifice.

## KĀRIKĀ 47

(Kinds of dispositions)

कथमित्युच्यते-

Now we reply how it is stated (that they are of fifty kinds)

(Kinds of perverted knowledge)

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्ति

तमो मोहो महामोहस्तामिस्रोऽन्धतामिस्र इति । तत्राश्रेयसि प्रवृत्तस्य प्रत्ययावरो श्रेयोऽभिमाने आद्यो विपर्ययस्तम इत्यभिधीयते । भौतिकेष्वकारेषु शिरःपाण्यादिष्वात्मग्रहो योऽयं व्यूढोरस्कः सितदशनस्ताम्राक्षः प्रलम्बबाहुः सोऽहमिति । तथा श्रवणस्पर्शनरसनघ्राणवचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दसंकल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायलक्षणासु करणवृत्तिष्वहं श्रोता द्रष्टा चेत्येवमादिराद्यकालप्रवृत्तो ग्रहः सर्वस्मादवरो मोह इत्युच्यते । कथं पुनरयमवरः इत्युच्यते पूर्वं शरीरेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तमुपलब्धुमिच्छन्सौक्ष्म्याच्चतदनधिगमे भूताकारमभूतं प्रमाणं परपरिकल्पितं वाऽनुमन्येत, स्वयं वा परिकल्पयेदिति न मार्गाद् दूरापगतमेतत् । अयं तु प्रक्षादिगतोत्पत्तिस्थितिविनाशेष्वनेकरूपकेषु कार्यकरणेष्वहमिति अभिमन्यते, तस्मात्पूर्वस्यादवरः । बाह्ये तु विषये ममेदमित्यभिनिवेशः पूर्वस्मादवर इत्युच्यते । पूर्वं शरीरिणोऽप्रत्यक्षत्वात्करणवृत्त्यविशेषाद् वात्मवृत्तेः कार्यकरणे कुर्यादात्मबुद्धिमिति शक्यमेतद् भिन्ननिमित्ताकारदेशस्वभावप्रयोजनानुग्रहोपघातोत्पत्तिस्थितिविनाशाश्च मातृपितृपुत्रभातृपुत्रदारगोहिरायवसनाच्छादनादीनयमकस्मादात्मत्वेन पश्यति, तस्मात्पूर्वस्मादवरः । क्रोधश्चतुर्थो विपर्ययः पूर्वस्मादवरः तामिस्र इत्यभिधीयते । कथं पुनरयं पूर्वस्मादवर इति ? उच्यते—पूर्वोऽभिनिवेशप्रतिषेधमभ्यनुजानाति । यदाऽस्य बाह्यद्रव्यवियोगे कश्चित्कुशलसंसृष्ट एवं ब्रवीति संसारस्य—बुद्धाववस्थाप्य विमृश्यतां यावदयं कालो यदि कश्चित्त्रियेणावियुक्तपूर्वः । तस्मादागमापायिषु बाह्येषु द्रव्येषु विदुषा नाभिनिवेशः कार्य इति, तदा प्रत्याह सत्यमेवमेतदिति । सन्निकृष्टस्तु वियोगकाल इति न बुद्धिरवस्थापयितुं शक्यते । क्रोधाविष्टस्तु स्वविकल्पितग्राहविपरीतबुद्धिरशक्यो दण्डेनापि निवर्तयितुम् । तस्मात्पूर्वस्मादवरः । मरणविषादः पञ्चमो विपर्ययः पूर्वस्मादवरोऽन्धतामिस्र इत्यभिधीयते । कथं पुनरयं पूर्वस्मादवर इत्युच्यते—पूर्वोऽभिनिवेशात्प्रतिषिध्यमानः प्रतीकारमन्ततो जीह्वाक्षिनिरीक्षितो (?) नापि तावदारभते । न तु ब्रह्मादौ स्तम्बपर्यन्ते संसारे स्वनिमित्तनियततमपातस्य विनाशस्य केनचित्प्रतीकारः कृतः । तस्मादपरिहार्यं मरणमनुशोचत्पूर्वस्मादवर इति । एते पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्ति ।

There are five kinds of perverted knowledge. These are the error,

delusion, extreme delusion, gloom and utter gloom. The first is the perverted knowledge called error found in the case of the one who is engaged in the act not conducive to the welfare but has the notion of being engaged in the act conducive to welfare and thus remaining in this lower disposition.

The cognition of soul in the material form like head, hands, etc., as the notion that 'that with broad chest, white teeth, red eyes, long arms is 'I'(the soul)' the cognition prevailing from beginning that 'I' am the hearer, seer, etc., with reference to the function of the organs as hearing, touching, tasting, smelling, speaking, seizing, walking, excretion, gratification, observing, ideation and ascertainment, is the one inferior to the first.

How is it inferior ?

To this the reply is : In the earlier case one desiring to know (the soul) as distinct from the body and the senses and failing to cognise so due to its subtlety, wrongly admitting as a proof in postulating its elemental notion as established by others or postulating himself has not gone so far from the right (path). This person, however, has the notion of 'I' in the body in which various forms of origination, sustenance and destruction are directly perceived. Therefore, it is inferior to the earlier. The adherence to the notion of mine with reference to the external object is inferior to the earlier. The earlier may have the notion of soul in the body because the soul is non-perceptible or the function of the soul is not found separate from that of the organs, it is possible. This suddenly comes to consider as soul, the mother, father, son, brother, wife, cow, gold (wealth), cloth, shelter, etc., which are of different causes, form, place, nature, purpose, favour, weakness, birth, sustenance and destruction. Therefore, it is inferior to the earlier. Anger is the fourth perverted knowledge. It is inferior to the earlier and is said to be gloom.

How is it inferior to the earlier ?

To this the reply is—He permits the negation of the earlier adherence also. When someone gets separated from the external object, the expert when approached speak like this of the world.....<sup>1</sup>

Having this in mind you think over whether there is someone upto now who is not yet separated from his dear one, therefore, the intelligent man should not adhere to the external substances, then he replies, it is true; the time of separation is short (i.e. the separation has just taken place), therefore, the intellect is not controlled.<sup>2</sup> The angry man, however, who has the opposite ascertainment due to the

adherence to the object imagined by himself, cannot be made to desist from it even when punished. Therefore, it is inferior to the earlier. The dejection of death is the fifth perverted knowledge. It is inferior to the earlier and is called the utter gloom.

How is it inferior to the earlier ?

To this the reply is : the earlier being desisted from the earlier adherence when looked with squinting eye does not start reaction (or counteracting), but by no one is negated (warded off) the destruction which is most certain in the world beginning from Brahmā right upto the piece of grass. Therefore, the dejection over inevitable death is inferior to the earlier. These are the five kinds of perverted knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

(Kinds of disability)

अशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।

अष्टाविंशतिभेदा

भवतीत्यनुवर्तते । तत्र बाह्यकरणवैकल्यं सह मनसैकादशप्रकारम् । सप्तदशविधं बुद्धिवैकल्यम् । एतेऽशक्तिभेदाः ।

*The disability arising due to the defect in the organs is of twenty eight kinds.*

'is' follows from earlier context. Out of them, the defect in the external organs alongwith (that in) mind is of eleven kinds. Of seventeen kinds is the defect of the Buddhi.<sup>4</sup> These are the kinds of disability.<sup>5</sup>

(Kinds of contentment)

तुष्टिर्नवधाऽष्टया सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

एवं चतुर्विधस्य प्रत्ययसर्गस्य गुणवैषम्यविमर्दनेन पञ्चाशद् भेदा भवन्ति ॥ ४७ ॥

*The contentment is of nine kinds and the attainment (is) of eight kinds.*<sup>6</sup>

Thus, due to the (mutual) suppression (of the constituents) due to their inequality result the fifty kinds of the fourfold creation of the dispositions.



## KĀRIKĀ 47

1. Some portion of the text is missing here.
2. I.e., he has mentally composed himself, but is unable to control his sentiments fully because the incident has just taken place.
3. These are sometimes listed as avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dveṣa, and abhiniveṣa. Cf. Yogasūtra 23.
4. These are explained in 49th kārīkā.
5. These are discussed in kārīkā 50.
6. These are discussed in kārīkā 51.

## KĀRIKĀ 48

विस्तरेण तु पदार्थशतसाहस्रमानन्त्यं वा लक्षणानाम् ।

If we speak elaborately, there are hundred or thousand or even infinite kinds of the objects. If it is asked how, we reply, because :

(Kinds of Ignorance)

कथमित्युच्यते यस्मात् —

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधः

य एते पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा व्याख्याताः तेषु तमसोऽष्टविधो भेदः । कथम् ? परविज्ञान-  
माश्रित्य प्रवृत्तस्याऽष्टासु प्रकृतिष्वपरासु पराभिमानग्रहात् ।

*There are eight forms of ignorance.*

Out of the five kinds of error explained above, there are the eight kinds of ignorance.

How ?

This is through the notion of higher with reference to the lower eight causes in case of one who starts his activities depending upon the knowledge of higher.

(Kinds of delusion)

मोहस्य च

किम् ? अष्टविधो भेद इति । चशब्दात्कार्यकरणसामर्थ्येऽष्टविधेऽणिमादावहमिति-  
प्रत्ययः ।

दशविधो महामोहः ।

मातृपितृ-भ्रातृ-स्वसृ-पत्नीपुत्रदुहितृगुरुमित्रोपकारिलक्षणे दशविधे कुटुम्बे योऽयं  
ममेत्यभिनिवेशः । दृष्टानुश्रविकेषु वा शब्दादिष्वित्यपरे । स दशविधो महामोहः परिसंख्या-  
यते ।

*And of the delusion.*

What ?

There are eight kinds. Through the force of the word 'and' is conveyed the sense of 'I' in the eight kinds, viz, atomic forms etc.

(really) belonging to the capability of the body.

(Kinds of great delusion)

तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा

अष्टविधे कार्यकरणसामर्थ्ये दशविधे च कुटुम्बे विषयेषु वा यः प्रतिहन्य-  
मानस्यावेशः ।

*The great delusion is of ten kinds.*

It is the notion of mine in the family of (consisting of) ten kinds (of persons), viz., mother, father, brothers, sister, wife, son, daughter, preceptor, friend and well-wishers. Or according to the others it is (the notion of mine) in the word, etc., (i.e. objects of the senses)—perceptible and those taught in the scriptures.<sup>1</sup> That great delusion is enumerated as of ten kinds.

(Kinds of gloom)

*Gloom is of eighteen kinds.*

It is the anger of the one tormented with reference to eight kinds of the capability of the body and the (members of) family of ten kinds. Or ten kinds of objects of the senses.

(Kinds of utter gloom)

तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

तथेति सामान्यातिदेशार्थः । अन्धतामिस्रोऽष्टादशधैवेति । कथम् ? असावप्यष्टवि-  
धात्कार्यकरणसामर्थ्यादशविधाच्च कुटुम्बालत्यवसानस्य विषादः ।

*So is the utter gloom.*

The term 'so' is to apply the common qualities (viz. number of eighteen in the present case). The sense is that the utter gloom is (also) of eighteen kinds only.

How ?

Because it is the dejection of the one being separated from the eight kinds of the capability of the body and ten kinds of family.

(Further division of error)

एवमेते पञ्च विपर्ययभेदाः स्वलक्षणतो विषयविशेषा लक्षिताः । तत्रापि  
चाष्टासु प्रकृतिषु सत्त्वरजस्तमसां संहतविविक्तपरिणतव्यस्तसमस्तानां परत्वाभिमानभेदादे-  
कैका प्रकृतिः पञ्चदशभेदा । अत एव तेऽष्टौ पञ्चदश विंशं शतं च भवन्ति । यथा मोक्षे प्रवृ-  
त्तस्य एवं धर्मकामेष्वपि । एकः पदार्थो विस्तरेण परिसंख्यायमानोऽनन्तभेदः सम्पद्यते । निद-  
र्शनमात्रमेतदाचार्येण कृतम् । एवमशक्त्यादिष्वपि लक्षणान्तरेषु योज्यम् । सेयमविधा पञ्च-

पवा सप्रपञ्चा व्याख्याता । तदनन्तरोद्दिष्टानशक्तिभेदान्वक्ष्यामः ॥ ४८ ॥

Thus, are the five kinds of error; the particular kinds are in-  
dividually defined. In this context also, each cause is of fifteen kinds  
in accordance with the notion of higher in eight causes in the form of  
the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas collected together separately modified,  
individually and collectively. In this way, they became of fifteen,  
twenty and of hundred kinds. As is the case with the one engaged in  
(the path of) liberation, so with the other engaged in the virtue and  
enjoyments. Single object when enumerated elaborately comes to be  
of infinite kinds. This is merely the illustration given by the authority.  
Similarly, should be related to the other objects like incapability, etc.  
Thus, the ignorance of having five joints is explained with details.  
Now we shall speak of the kinds of incapability mentioned after that  
(in the text).

## KĀRIKĀ 48

1. Here, ten objects are five worldly and five divine objects of sen-  
ses. Cf. Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, 48.

## KĀRIKĀ 49

(Kinds of Disability)

आह, अतिव्यासाभिहितमिदमिति नास्माकं बुद्धाववतिष्ठते । तस्माद्विपर्ययोक्तं भेदाभिधानं परित्यज्य वक्तव्यम् कथमशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिभेदेति ?

Opponent : It is stated very broadly and, hence does not enter our intellect (i.e. is not understood). Therefore, leaving aside the kinds stated in the context of perverted knowledge, it should be stated as to how the disability is of twenty-eight kinds.

उच्यते—

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।

इन्द्रियाणां वधा इन्द्रियवधाः । स्वसंस्कारविषययोगात्प्रार्पणेन तमसा ग्रहणरूपस्य सत्त्वस्याभिभवात्स्वविषयेष्वप्रवृत्तयः । तद्यथा

बाधिर्यमान्द्यमघ्नत्वं मूकता जडता च या ।

उन्मादकौष्ठ्यकौण्यानि क्लैव्योदावर्तपङ्कताः ॥

तत्र बाधिर्यं श्रोत्रस्य, आन्ध्यं चक्षुषः, अघ्नत्वं नासिकायाः, मूकता वाचः, जडता रसनस्य, उन्मादो मनसः, कौष्ठ्यं त्वचः कौण्यं पाणोः, क्लैव्यमुपस्थस्य, उदावर्तः पायोः, पङ्कता पादयोरित्येवेन्द्रियवधा एकादश ।

*The eleven kinds of the injuries to the organs alongwith the injuries to the intellect are declared to constitute the disabilities.*

The term *indriyavadhāh* means the injuries to the senses. These are the absence of activity (of organs) with respect to their respective objects on account of the dominance of Tamas on account of its connection with the object having its (of Tamas) own impression over the Sattva which is in turn of the nature of knowledge. For example:

Deafness, blindness, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, numbness of tongue, insanity, insensibility to touch, palsy of hands, impotency, intestinal paralysis, and lameless. Out of them, deafness is of the ear, blindness of eyes, insensibility of olfactory nerves,

ves, dumbness of the organ of speech, numbness of the tongue, insanity of the mind, insensibility to touch of the skin, palsy of hands, impotency of the organ of generation, intestinal paralysis of the anus, lameless of the feet. These are the eleven injuries to the organs.

(Disabilities of Intellect)

अन्ये तु

सप्तदशवधा बुद्धिर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

तत्र तुष्टयः प्रकृत्याद्या वक्ष्यमाणाः, तासां द्विविधो विपर्ययः । अव्युत्पन्नस्य योगधर्मेण तस्यां भूमावप्रवृत्तिः, व्युत्पन्नस्य चोत्तरभूम्यपरिज्ञानात्पूर्वस्यां भूमावक्षेमरूपेण ग्रहणम् । आत्मविदो वा सर्वासु भूमिषु । तेषु यत्पूर्वं तदशक्तिभावाभिप्रेतम् । यन्मध्यमं तदापेक्षिकम् । कथम् ? तन्मात्रभूम्यवस्थो हि योग्यस्मितादिभूम्यनवजयात्तुष्टो महाभूतातिक्रमात्सिद्धः । तथा विजिताऽस्मितारूपो महदाद्यवस्थापेक्षया तुष्टः, पूर्वभूम्यपेक्षया सिद्धः । एवं महदवस्थः प्रधानापेक्षया पूर्वपेक्षया च । प्रधानावस्थः पुरुषापेक्षया पूर्वापेक्षया च । गुणपुरुषान्तरज्ञस्तु सिद्ध एव । तस्मादव्युत्पन्नस्याम्भःप्रभृतिषु नवाऽनम्भःप्रभृतयो बुद्धिवधाः । तारकादिविपर्ययेणाष्टाऽवतारकादयः । एषा खल्वशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिभेदा ।

The others, however,

*Seventeen are of the intellect due to the reversal of contentments and attainments.*

Out of them, the contentments are the Prakṛti, etc., which are to be spoken of later on. There is twofold reversal of them. The absence of activity for that state through the yogic practices in the case of an unintelligent person, and the knowledge of insecurity in the earlier state itself without knowing the highest state in case of an intelligent person, or the same in all the states in case of one who knows the soul. Out of them the first is intended to be of the nature of inability, the middle is so comparatively.

How?

The yogi who is present at the state of the subtle elements and is contented upon without conquering the state of *asmitā* has accomplished super natural powers because he has gone above the gross elements. Thus, the yogi who has conquered the *asmitā* is contented from the standpoint of the intellect etc., and has accomplished supernatural powers from the standpoint of the earlier state. Similarly, the one situated at the State of intellect, from the standpoint of the cosmic matter and from the standpoint of the earlier State. One situated at the state of cosmic matter, from the standpoint of the conscions entity and from the standpoint of the ear-

lier. The knower of the distinction between the constituents and conscious entity, has certainly accomplished supernatural power. Thus, in case of one having not known the conscious entity, are the nine injuries to the senses opposite to ambha, etc. Due to the reversal of Taraka, etc., there are eight avatāraka, etc. This is the inability of twenty-eight kinds.

(Division of contentment)

तुष्टिस्तु सन्निहितविषयसन्तोषाच्चिकीर्षितादर्थानुनेन निवृत्तिः सामान्यत एकैव, प्रत्यर्थमनन्ता, शतेन तुष्टः सहस्रेणेति । शास्त्रे तु बाह्याध्यात्मिकानां सुखदुःखमोहानां प्राप्तिष्वपगमेषु वाचाऽव्यवस्थ्यलक्षणा उपायनवत्वान्नव तुष्टयो भवन्ति ॥ ४९ ॥

The contentment which is of the nature of desisting from the effort with the attainment of less than desired due to the satisfaction over the object possessed, is of one kind in general. It is of infinite types with reference to each object of desire as one is satisfied over the hundred and thousand, and so on. In the scripture it is of nine kinds because of the nine varieties of the means (of its attainment), these are not ascertainable in nature through words with regard to the attainment or avoidance of the external and internal pleasure, pain and indifference.

## KĀRIKĀ 50

(Internal contentment)

तासाम्

आध्यात्मिकव्यश्चतस्रः । प्रकृत्युपादानकालभागाख्याः ।

आध्यात्मिकी इति शरीरशरीरिणोर्विशेषमुपलिप्समानेन योगिना यदनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिरवस्थाप्यते सा खल्वाध्यात्मिकी सिद्धिः तुष्टिः सन्तोषः क्षेम इत्यर्थः ।

Out of them. *Four are the bodily or internal called cosmic matter, means, time and luck.*

The internal (bodily) is thus :

The attribution of the nature of soul to the non-soul by a yogin who wants to know the distinction between the body and the soul is the internal attainment, which means the contentment, satisfaction and rest (or peace).<sup>1</sup>

(Contentment of cosmic matter)

तासां प्रकृत्याख्या । यदा वीतावीतैः प्रधानमधिगम्य तत्पूर्वकत्वं च महदादीनां विकाराणामानन्त्याच्च प्रधानात्मनः कृत्स्नस्य महदादिभावेन विपरिणामाऽसम्भवादेकदेशस्याऽप्रकृतिविकारभूतस्य भोक्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वंचाऽध्यवस्य सङ्गद्वेषनिवृत्तिं लभते, साऽऽद्या तुष्टिरम्भ इत्यभिधीयते । कस्मात् ? अमितं हि प्रधानतत्त्वं भाति जगद्बीजभूतत्वान्महदादिभावपरिणामेन न्यूनस्यैकदेशस्यात्मन एवाऽऽपूरात् । तद्व्यतिरेकेण चान्यस्यैकदेशस्योभयधर्मिणो भोक्तृभूतस्य सद्भावात्संप्रक्षालनेऽपि चापसंहृतम्, वैश्वरूप्यस्याऽनुच्छेदात् । तथा च शास्त्रमाह—अम्भ इति गुणलिङ्गसन्निचयमेवाऽधिकुरुते । गुणाश्च सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि । लिङ्गं च महदादि अत्र सन्निहितं भवति । तदिदं प्रधानममितं भात्यमितमुपलभ्यत इत्यम्भः । स खल्वयं योगी प्रधानलक्षणां भूमिमवजित्य तन्महिम्ना च तदशून्यं दृष्ट्वा व्यतिरिक्तस्य पदार्थान्तरस्याभावं मन्यमानस्तामेव भूमिं कैवल्यमिति गृह्णाति । भिन्ने च देहे प्रकृतौ लयं गच्छति, ततश्च पुनरावर्तते । तस्यां च तुष्टावन्ये सप्त महदादिकारिणोऽवरुद्धा द्रष्टव्याः । तत्र यथा प्राधानिकस्य पुरुषे नास्ति विज्ञानं एवमितरेषामुत्तरेषु तत्त्वेषु । महत्कारिणः प्रधानेऽस्मिताकारिणो महति, तन्मात्रकारिणोऽहंकारे । तदेकदेशाश्चैषां भोक्तारं पूर्ववत् । अत्राति च सत्त्वादीनां संहतविविक्तपरिणतव्यस्तसमस्तानां भेदादविद्याऽवच्छेदानन्त्यमवसेयम् ।

Out of them, that which is called cosmic matter is this : When one gets rid of attachment and hatred after knowing the cosmic matter through direct inference and inference by implication and (knowing) that the intellect, etc., come out of that, and thus ascertaining the enjoyership and non-doership with reference to the part (of the cosmic matter) which is (considered by him as) neither a cause nor an effect because there is the impossibility of evolving in the form of intellect, etc., in case of the whole of the cosmic matter because the evolutes of the cosmic matter are innumerable. That initial contentment is called the Ambha.<sup>2</sup>

Why ?

*The cosmic matter appears to be infinite.* Since cosmic matter serves as a cause of the universe, it fulfills the need of the other remaining part, viz., soul through its modifications into the form intellect etc., because its nature of being universal does not come to an end; moreover since the part which is devoid of both the above stated qualities and is the experiencer is not destroyed even when the world meets destruction. So says the scripture : " Ambha refers to the collection of the constituents and the subtle parts of the body. And, the constituents are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Subtle parts of the body are the intellect etc., (and) it is all accumulated here. The cosmic matter appears to be unlimited. Ambha is that which is cognised as unlimited. That yogi indeed after conquering over (i.e. having attained) the state of cosmic matter and after seeing everything as not devoid of that due to the greatness of that (cosmic matter) and (thus) believing in the absence of any category other than that cognises (i.e. considers) that state only as the isolation. After being separated from the body, he gets merged in the cosmic matter and then returns back. At the state of that satisfaction, the other seven modifiabls should be seen as restricted (or obstructed) from evolution. As in this case of the one believing in the cosmic matter ultimate truth there is no knowledge about cosmic matter. Similarly, in case of the others (i.e. considering the lower elements as the ultimate truth) there is no knowledge about the higher principles, i.e. of those considering intellect as the highest, about the cosmic matter, of those who consider egoism as the highest principle, about intellect, of those considering subtle elements as highest principle about the egoism. According to those, the parts of them (i.e. category believed to the highest) are the experiencers, as in the earlier case (of the cosmic matter). Here also due to the differentiations of Sattva etc., which are together, individual, modified and separated (internally) and put together, the

destruction of the ignorance should be understood as endless.<sup>3</sup>

(Distinction between contentment and ignorance)

आह, तुष्ट्याविद्यायोरभेदः लक्षणैकत्वात् । अष्टासु प्रकृतिष्वात्मबुद्धिस्तुष्टिः । तदेव च तम इत्यविद्याकाण्डे निर्दिष्टम् । तस्मात्पदार्थसंकर इति ।

Opponent : The contentment and Ignorance are not different because the definition is the same. Contentment is the considering of the eight causes (i.e. productives) as the soul. It is mentioned as the Tama in the section of Ignorance. Therefore, there is the intermixture of the above categories.

उच्यते-न, प्रत्ययविशेषात् । तमप्रधानपुरुषोपदेशे सति प्रत्ययनिर्दिधारयिषया तयोः प्रधानमेव ज्यायो न पुरुष इत्यभिनिविशेत । तुष्टिस्तु किं परमित्याश्रित्य प्रवृत्तः प्रधानज्ञानमात्रे सन्तोषपदार्थान्तरं विज्ञातुमेव नाद्रियते । किं च प्रहाणविशेषात् । निरूढमूलो ह्यनात्मनि आत्मग्रहो ज्ञानोत्तरकालभावनया प्रहातव्यः । तमोबहुलत्वात्तम इत्यभिधीयते । पेलवस्तु सत्त्वबहुलो दर्शनप्रणयस्तुष्टिः । किंच तत्त्वाभिजयात् । विजितभूमिकस्य हि योगिनस्तन्माहात्म्यवशीकृतत्वाद् भूम्यन्तरे प्रवृत्तिस्तुष्टिः । इतरस्य त्वभिनिवेशमात्रमेवेत्यनयोर्विशेषः । तस्मान्न पदार्थसंकर इति व्याख्याता प्रकृत्याख्या तुष्टिः ।

No, because it is a particular disposition (or type of knowledge). Tama is that when one is taught of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity, he would with a view to ascertain the knowledge may resort that the cosmic matter is preferable to the other two. In the case of contentment, however, when one is engaged (in having) what is the highest (principle), one does not want (or attach importance) to know the other category due to the satisfaction in knowing the cosmic matter only.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, because of its particular abandoning. The deep-rooted understanding of soul in the non-soul is to be abandoned by the state succeeding knowledge. Since it abounds in Tamas, it is called Tama. Contentment is, on the other hand, tender attachment for philosophy (i.e. philosophical thinking), thus, abounding in Sattva. Moreover, on account of the victory over the category. The contentment is the inclination to some other state by the yogin who has won over that (former) state because he has brought under control its power. The other, however, is of the nature of adherence only. This is the difference between the two. Therefore, there is no intermixture of the categories. Thus is explained the contentment called cosmic matter.

However, inspite of the capability of the cosmic matter, the production of objects is not possible without their respective material

causes. Since there is no specification in cosmic matter, it would involve the undesirable contingency of the origination of the objects at all the time. In the case of one who admits that this universe is a creation of the cosmic matter, (without considering other material causes) due to the non-specification in that (cosmic matter) there arises the undesirable contingency of origination of cow from the man and that of the man from buffalo. Moreover, there arises the undesirable contingency of the absence of differentiation into various classes. In the case of one who admits that the world is a creation of cosmic matter, there would be no differentiation (or classification) into classes, because that cosmic matter is common or devoid of differentiations.

(Salila)

यदा तु सत्यपि प्रकृतिसामर्थ्ये नाऽनपेक्ष्य यथास्वमुपादानं भावानामुत्पत्तिः सम्भवति प्रकृत्यविशेषे सर्वकालमुत्पत्तिप्रसंगात्, प्रकृतिकृत्यमेवेदं विश्वमित्यभ्युपगच्छतस्तदविशेषाद् गोः पुरुषादुत्पत्तिप्रसंगः, पुरुषस्य वा महिषात् । किं च जात्यभेदप्रसंगात् । प्रकृतिकृत्यमिदं विश्वमित्यभ्युपगच्छतो जातिभेदो न स्यात्, तदविशेषात् । दृष्टं तूपादानाज्जात्यनुविधानं भावानाम् । तस्मात्तदेव कारणत्वेन परिकल्पयितुं न्याय्यम् । उपादानैकदेश एव च कार्यकारणविधात्मा भोक्तृत्येतस्माद् दर्शनात्सङ्गद्वेषनिवृत्तिं लभते, सा द्वितीया तुष्टिः सलिलमित्यभिधीयते । कथं पुनरेतत्सलिलम् ? सत्युपादाने विकारो लीयत इति । तथा च कृत्वा शास्त्रमाह “सलिलं सलिलमिति वैकारिकोपनिपातमेवाधिकुरुते, सति तस्मिंल्लीयते जगदिति” । स खल्वयं योगी पार्थिवानवजित्य तन्महिम्ना जगदशून्यं दृष्ट्वा पदार्थान्तरस्याऽभावं मन्यमानस्तामेव भूमिं कैवल्यमिति गृह्णाति । भिन्ने च देहे पृथिव्यादिषु लीयते । ततश्च पुनरावर्तते ।

However, the objects are observed to be classified due to the material causes. Therefore, it is right to consider that (material cause) only to be the cause. When one gets rid of attachment and hatred through the philosophy that the soul as an experiencing principle which is (according to him) of the nature of the effect and the cause is part of the material cause itself, that is the second contentment called Salila. Why is it (called) salila?

Because the modification gets merged if there is the material cause of that.<sup>5</sup> With this purport the scripture says—Uttering salila, salila one takes recourse to the merger of the modified when that (material cause) is present (or when it is so), the world gets merged in that. That yogi after getting over the earthly element and after finding the world as not a void through the greatness of that (material cause) and, thus, considering (or believing in) the non-existence of some other object considers that state only as the state of liberation. And, after leaving the body he gets merged into the earth, etc. And, from that he returns back to the universe.

(Ogha or Time)

यदा च सत्युपादानसामर्थ्ये न तावतैव भावानां प्रादुर्भावः किं तर्हि सन्निहितसाधनानामपि कालं प्रत्यपेक्षा भवति—कालविशेषाद्वीजादङ्कुरो जायते, अङ्कुरात्रालं, नालात्काण्डम्, काण्डात्प्रसव इत्यादि । अन्यथा तूपादानानां सन्निधानमात्रात्क्षणेनैवाऽमीषामवस्थाविशेषाणामभिव्यक्तिः स्यात् । किंच कालविपर्ययेणोत्पत्तिप्रसंगात् । उपादानपूर्वकं विश्वमित्यभ्युपगच्छतः शरदि यवानां, वसन्ते ब्रीहिणामुत्पत्तिं प्राप्नोति । न चैतदिष्टम् । किं च तदनभिधानात् । दृश्यन्ते च प्राणिनां कालानुरूपाः स्वाभावाहारविहारव्यवस्थाः । तस्मादसावेव कारणम् । तदेकदेशश्चाप्रकृतिविकारभूतो भोक्तृत्येतस्माद्दर्शनात्सङ्गद्वेषनिवृत्तिं लभते, सा तृतीया तुष्टिरोध इत्यभिधीयते । कथं पुनरयं काल ओघ इत्युच्यते ? सलिलौघवत्सर्वाभ्यावहनात् । तद्यथा सलिलौघस्तृणं काष्ठमश्मानं प्राणिनं वा स्वमूर्तिसंसृष्टं सर्वमेवाभ्यावहति, एवमयं कालो गर्भाद्बाल्यं, बाल्यात्कौमारं, कौमाराद्यौवनं, यौवनात्स्थाविर्यम्, स्थाविर्यान्मरणं, तथा बीजान्मूलं मूलादङ्कुरमिति वहति । तथा चाह

यामेव प्रथमां रात्रिं गर्भे भवति पुरुषः ।

संप्रस्थितस्तां भवति स गच्छन्न निवर्तते ॥

तस्मादोषसामान्यादोषः कालः । स खल्वयं योगी कालमवजित्य पदार्थान्तराभावं मन्यमानस्तामेव भूमिं कैवल्यमिति मन्यते । देहभेदे च कालमनुप्रविशति । ततश्च पुनरावर्तते ।

And, when (it is realised as follows, there takes place third contentment) . Even if the capability in the material is present, the origination of the objects does not result from that only; on the contrary. Time is needed by those who have the other material with them—the sprout comes out of the seed due to a particular period of time (season); similarly, the stalk from the sprout, the joints of the stalk from the stalk and the origination of the other plant from that joint, etc. Otherwise, there would have been the manifestation of these particular (states in the plants) within a moment merely through the presence of the material cause. Moreover, there would arise the undesirable contingency of the origination when the time is not suitable. There would be the origination of barley in winter and the rice in spring, in the theory of those who hold that the world is caused by the material cause only. This is, however, not desirable. Moreover, that is not explicitly mentioned.<sup>6</sup> The different adjustments of nature and behaviour of the beings are observed in accordance with Time. Therefore, it is verily the cause. When one gets rid of the attachment and hatred through such a philosophy that the part of that (Time) is experiencer which is neither a cause nor an evolute, that third (type of) contentment is said to be ogha.



Why is the Time called ogha?

Because it carries away or drives near everything like the stream of water. Just as the stream of water carries away or drives near commingling with itself everything like straws, log of wood, a stone or being, the Time also carries (or takes) one from embryo to childhood from childhood to maidenhood, from maidenhood to youth, from youth to old age, from old age to death; as also from the seed to root, from the root to sprout. And, it is stated so:

Whatever first night the man enters into the womb (of mother) that night only he sets out (worldly journey) and goes on without any return.

Therefore, due to its similarity to the stream of water, the Time is called ogha. The aspirant after winning over the Time and believing in the absence of any other entity considers that stage only as isolation. And, after getting separated from the body, he enters Time. And, from there he returns back. (When a person gets detached from realising the following, it is the fourth contentment).

(Vṛṣṭi or destiny)

यदा तु सत्यपि कालसामर्थ्ये भावानामुत्पत्तिः भाग्यान्वपेक्षते। कस्मात्? तत्सन्निधानेऽप्यप्रादुर्भावात्। सत्यपि साधनसामर्थ्ये कालविशेषे च कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिर्भवति कस्यचिन्नेति। तस्मादस्ति कारणान्तरं यदपेक्ष्य भावानामुत्पत्तिरनुत्पत्तिश्च। किं चाभ्युत्थानानुपपत्तिप्रसंगात्। कालमात्रात्फलं भवतीत्येतदिच्छतः शास्त्रोक्तेषु क्रियाविशेषेष्वभिषेचनव्रतोपवासाग्निहोत्रादिष्वभ्युत्थानं न स्यात्। कस्मात्? आनर्थक्यात्। अस्ति च, तस्मान्न कालनिमित्ता भावानामुत्पत्तिः। किं च तदनुविधानात्। दृश्यन्ते खल्वपि प्रकृत्युपादानकालाविशेषेऽपि भाग्यविशेषात्फलविशेषाः। तस्मात्तत्संकार एव करणम्। तदेकदेशश्चाप्रकृतिविकारभूतो भोक्तृत्येतस्माद्दर्शनात्संगद्वेषनिवृत्तिर्लभते। सा चतुर्थी तुष्टिर्वृष्टिरित्यभिधीयते। कथं पुनर्वृष्टिरित्युच्यते? सर्वसत्त्वाप्यायनात्। यथा हि शीर्णानामपि तृणलतादीनां वृष्टिं प्राप्य पुनराप्यायनं भवति, एवमेव सर्वेषां प्राणिनां भाग्यविपरिणामात्पुनराप्यायनं भवति। तस्माद्वृष्टिसाम्याद् भाग्याख्या तुष्टिर्वृष्टिरित्यभिधीयते। शास्त्रमप्याह—“वृष्टिर्वृष्टिरिति श्रिय एवोपनिपातमधिकुरुते। सा हि वृष्टिवत्सर्वमाप्यायतीति।” स खल्वयं योगी भाग्यान्ववजित्य तन्महिम्ना जगदशून्यं दृष्ट्वा पदार्थान्तरस्याभावं मन्यमानस्तामेव भूमिं कैवल्यमिति गृह्णाति। स तस्यामेव देहभेदे लीयते। ततश्च पुनरावर्तत इति।

Even in the presence of the capability of time the origination of objects requires destiny.

Why?

Because there is no origination even in presence of that 'Time'. Even when the capability in the means, and a particular Time are

present, the origination of some (object) takes place and the origination of some does not. Therefore, there does exist some other cause on which depends the origination and non-origination of the objects. Moreover, on account of the undesirable contingency of impossibility of the progress. In case of the one desiring (i.e. believing in the notion) that the result comes out the time only, there would be no progress in the particular acts mentioned in the scriptures—such as sprinkling with water, (different) vows, fasting and sacrifice, etc.

Why?

Because of their futility.<sup>7</sup> On the contrary, the progress is there. Therefore, the origination of the objects is not caused by the Time. Moreover, it is in conformity (to common experience). The particular result is observed to be caused by particular destiny only, even when, cause, material cause and time are common. Therefore, the past dispositions only are the cause. One gets rid of attachment and aversion through the philosophy that the part of that only is the experiencer which is neither cause nor an effect, that fourth contentment is called the vṛṣṭi.

Why is it called vṛṣṭi?

Because it causes all the beings to thrive. Just as the dry stalks and creepers thrive after getting rain, similarly, all the beings thrive or increase due to a particular change of destiny. Therefore, due to its similarity with rains the contentment named bhāga is called vṛṣṭi. The scriptures also say :

“The vṛṣṭi (contentment) and rains are riches depending upon a sudden event. That (contentment) like rains increases everything”. That ascetic after failing to conquer the destiny and on account of the greatness of that finding the world as not a void and grants the absence of all other objects, then he takes that stage only as the state of isolation. He merges in that only after getting separated from body. From that he returns back.

(Time and destiny)

आह, कालभाग्ययोरप्रतिपत्तिः, समाख्यापरिज्ञानात्। प्रकृत्यात्मकस्य तावद्योगिनोऽष्टौ प्रकृतयो विषय इत्युक्तं पुरस्तात्। उपादानात्मकस्य च पृथिव्यादीनि महाभूतानि। कालभाग्ययोस्तु न तथोक्तम्। तस्माद्वक्तव्यं कस्य तत्त्वस्यैषा समाख्येति?

Opponent : Time and destiny are not admitted; because their denotations are not thoroughly cognised. It is stated earlier that in case of the yogin who is of the nature of (or has identified

with) the cosmic matter, the eight causes form the object. The elements like earth (form the object) of the yogin who is of the nature of (has identified himself with) material objects. There is no statement like this about Time and destiny. Therefore, it should be stated which element does it denote<sup>8</sup>.

उच्यते-न, उक्तत्वात् । प्रागेवैतदपदिष्टं न कालो नाम कश्चित्पदार्थोऽस्ति । किं तर्हि क्रियासु कालसंज्ञा । ताश्चकरणवृत्तिरिति । प्रतिपादितम् । न चान्या वृत्तिवृत्तिमतः । तस्मात्कारणचैतन्यप्रतिज्ञः कालात्मक इति । भाग्यसंज्ञा तु धर्माधर्मयोः । तौ च बुद्धिधर्माविति प्रागपदिष्टम् । तस्माद्भाग्यवादी बुद्धिचैतनिक इति ।

Proponent : No, because it is already stated. We have already stated that there is no element called Time. On the contrary, the term time is applied to the activities. It is also established that it is the function of the organs. And, the function is not different from the agent. Therefore, one identifying himself with time believes (or declares with faith) that the sentient object is the organs. The name (destiny) refers to virtue and vice. And, it is already stated that these are the attributes of the intellect. Therefore, the believer in destiny is the one who proclaims that the sentient object is intellect.

आह, न, तुष्ट्यन्तरत्वात् । प्रकृतित्वान्महान्पूर्व प्रकृत्याख्यायां तुष्ट्यावरुद्धः । तस्येदानीं तुष्ट्यन्तरत्वेन परिकल्पनं नातिसमञ्जसमिति ।

Opponent : It is not so, because, it is a different type of contentment. The intellect is the cosmic matter itself. (trṣṭi called) the Mahat is the detainment in the cosmic matter itself. There is no much propriety in postulating that intellect is a different contentment.

उच्यते-महांस्तर्हि पूर्वतुष्टिविषयभावादपकृष्यत इति । अथवा कार्यकरणवृत्तिक्रिया रूपां वृत्तिमद्द्योत्यां परिकल्प्य तस्यां कालत्वमयमाह । महतश्च रूपं धर्मादिकं महतोऽर्थान्तरं भाग्यमिति भाग्यवान् । अथवा बाह्य एवायं कालः कर्मकारणं निर्दिश्यते । तत्र चान्येऽपि स्वमतिपरिकल्पितपदार्थान्तरात्मभावग्राहा एवाति साङ्ख्यया प्रवादिनः प्रतिक्षिप्ता बोद्धव्या इति ।

अपर आह, प्रकृतिचैतनिकः प्रधानभावाशाद्युपादानकालभाग्यवादिनो महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रवादिन इति । तदेतदपसिद्धत्वादयुक्तम् । न हि महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रलक्षणाः प्रकृतय

उपादानकालभाग्यभावेन प्रसिद्धाः । तस्मादिदमप्ययुक्तम् । एवमेता आध्यात्मिक्यश्चतस्रस्तुष्टयः ।

Proponent : The intellect is taken out of the scope of the earlier contentment.<sup>9</sup> Or, after postulating the activity subsisting in and indicated by the effect (body) or the senses. With an intention to refer to that Time is stated so. And the virtue, etc., are the form of intellect, the destiny is different from intellect and, hence, one is said to be destiny. Or the time is the external cause. Then, the other theorists who take some other object postulated through their mind as the soul should be understood to be refuted.

Other interpretation:

The believers in the sentient nature of cosmic matter who believe in the cosmic matter, dispositions, hope, etc., as also the material cause, time and destiny are the believers in intellect, egoism and the subtle elements. That is wrong because it is disproved. The causes like intellect, egoism, and subtle elements are not well-known as the material cause, time and destiny. Therefore, this is also wrong. Thus, there are the four internal contentments.

(External Contentments)

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च च नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः ॥ ५० ॥

चशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः । अव्युत्पन्नात्मविचारस्य योगिनो विषयदोषदर्शनमात्रात्संगदोषनिवृत्तिर्बाह्या तुष्टिः । तत्र यदाऽर्जनदोषमवगच्छति न तावत्सर्वस्याभिजातितिरस्तीति अर्थिनाऽवश्यं विषयार्जने वर्तितव्यम् । तेषामस्वाभाविकत्वात्त्वचिदेवावस्थितिरित्युक्तं प्राक् । किं च सप्रत्यनीकत्वात् । स्वाभाविकमवस्थानं विषयाणामपरिकल्प्याऽपि यदा प्रतिग्रहादिभिरर्जनं प्रत्याद्वियते तदप्ययुक्तम् । कुतः ? सप्रत्यनीकत्वात् । एवमपि नास्ति कश्चिदप्रत्यनीको विषयार्जनोपाय इति तद्विधातेऽवश्यं प्रयतितव्यम् । स च यदि प्रतीयतमानः प्रतनीकिविधातं कुर्यात्प्ररोपघातेनात्माऽनुग्रहानुष्ठानाच्छास्त्रविरोधः । यस्मादाह-

न तत्परस्य सन्दध्यात्प्रतिकूलं यदात्मनः ।

एष संक्षेपतो धर्मः कामादन्यः प्रवर्तते ॥

पुनरप्याह —

प्राणिनामुपघातेन योऽर्थः समुपजायते ।

सोऽनपेक्षैः प्रहातव्यो लोकान्तरविधातकृत ॥

तस्मात्संघातमात्रत्वात्सत्त्वादीनां घटादिवत् ।  
 आब्रह्मणः परिज्ञाय देहानामनवस्थितिम् ॥  
 सत्यं सद्भिरादीप्तं तृणोल्काचपलं सुखम् ।  
 सुदुर्लभं निपातव्यं दुःखैर्देहान्तरोद्भवैः ॥

अथ पुनरयं प्रत्यनीकैर्विहन्यते, ततोऽस्य विषयाभावः । सुखार्थं च प्रवृत्तस्य भूयिष्ठं दुःखमेवेत्येतस्माद्दर्शनान्माध्यस्थ्यं लभते, सा पञ्चमी तुष्टिः सुतारमित्यभिधीयते । कथं पुनः सुतारमित्युच्यते ? सुखमनेनोपायेन तरन्ति विषयसंकटमिति सुतारम् ।

*And the five external are due to the abstinence from the objects (of the five senses). Thus, are said to be the nine kinds of contentment.*

The term 'and' is for restriction. The external contentment is the getting rid of the blenfish of attachment merely by observing the faults in the objects, in case of an ascetic who is not advanced in thinking over the soul.<sup>10</sup> When one comes to know the defect in earning, (he gets an idea that) everything is produced (and hence, non-eternal). The persons desiring (for worldly objects) should not always engage in earning. Because of their unreal nature, their existence is for sometime only – it is already said earlier. *Moreover, because it is associated with many obstacles.* Even without postulating the natural subsistence of the object when a favour is shown towards earning them through accepting them as presents, that is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is associated with many obstacles. Thus, there is no means of earning the objects, which is free from obstacles; hence, it becomes obligatory to make efforts in removing that (obstacle). If that person struggling (for earning money) destroys some person presenting obstacles, there will be the contradiction with the scriptures because of managing for one's own welfare through injury to others. Because it is stated :

Whatever is disagreeable to one's own self, one should not present that for others. This is briefly the virtuous conduct, the other than that is through lust.

It is stated again :

The objects (wealth) which come through troubling the beings should be left by those who do not desire for that (as it is) the cause of spoiling this birth as well as the other births.

Therefore, after realising the unstability of the bodies of all – right from Brahmā, because of their being the composite of

Sattva, etc., like a pot, the worldly pleasure which is burning due to the suffering of other bodies and is momentary (lit. fickle) like a straw and a meteor, should not be enjoyed by powerful gentlemen.

Now, this man is again attacked by obstructions, then there remains no object for him.<sup>11</sup> When one attains neutrality through the realisation that there is a stock of miseries for the one starting working for attaining pleasure, that is fifth contentment called sutaram.

Why is it called sutāram?

It is called sutāram because through this means people easily cross the miseries of the objects; it is when an aspirant after knowing the faults, experienced earlier or through their birth, even after earning the objects through efforts, puts forth the fault in protecting them.

How?

The objects are common to all the living beings because the relation of an enjoyer and the object of enjoyment is common for all beings. Therefore, arrangement should be made for their protection. While engaged in that (act of protection) if one debars the others from (attaining) them, there would be the contingency of the faults mentioned above;<sup>12</sup> if (one debars) oneself, there is absence of objects for him.

(Supāram)

यदा तु योगी पूर्वदोषाधिगमेऽभिजात्या वा यत्नार्जितविषयत्वे सति रक्षादोषमुपन्यस्यति । कथम् ? भोक्तृभोग्यभावाऽव्यतिरेकात् सर्वप्राणिसाधारणा विषयाः, तस्मात्तेषां रक्षा विधेया । तस्यां च प्रवर्तमानो यदि परमुपरुन्ध्यात् तदा पूर्वोक्तदोषः, अथात्मानं, विषयाभावः । रात्रिन्दिवं च तदेकाग्रमनसः सुखार्थं प्रवृत्तस्य भूयिष्ठं दुःखमेवेत्येतस्माद्दर्शनान्माध्यस्थ्यं लभते । सा षष्ठी तुष्टिः सुपारमित्यभिधीयते । कथं पुनः सुपारमित्युच्यते ? सुखमनेन पारं विषयार्णवस्य प्रयान्तीति ।

When one attains neutrality through the realisation that there is a stock of misery only even in case of a man who acts for (attaining) pleasure after fixing the mind upon it day and night, that is sixth contentment called supāram.

Why is it called supāram?

Because through it people easily get over the ocean of objects

(Sunetram)

यदा तु सति पूर्वदोषे, सति वा ग्रामनगरनिगमसन्निवेशाद्युपायानुष्ठानाद्वा कृतविषय-

रक्षो योगी क्षयदोषमुपन्यस्यति । कथम् ?

येन द्रव्येण मोहाद्वरन्तु मिच्छन्ति देहिनः ।  
तदेवैषां विनाशित्वाद् भवत्यरतिकारणम् ॥  
यत्लोपात्ताः सुगुप्ताश्च विषया विषयैषिणाम् ।  
पश्यतामेव नश्यन्ति बुद्बुदाः सलिले यथा ॥  
न तदस्ति जगत्यस्मिन्भूतं स्थावरजङ्गमम् ।  
प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानाद् वा विनाशो यस्य नेक्ष्यते ॥  
तस्माद्विनाशिष्वासक्तानां पुत्रदारगृहादिषु ।  
ममेति बुद्धिं यत्नेन बुद्धिमान्विनिवर्तयेत् ॥

इति एतस्मादर्शान्माद्यस्थं लभते, सा सप्तमी तुष्टिः सुनेत्रमित्युच्यते ।

(There is the seventh contentment) when even inspite of the faults stated above or after making arrangements for protection—like staying near the village, city, market and others, the aspirant who has protected the objects puts forth or faces the fault of (their) decay.

How?

From whatever object the embodied beings want to derive pleasure, the same object becomes the cause of their non-attachment to it due to its destructibility. The objects earned through much efforts and protected well belonging to (even) those who hanker after them meet destruction even in the presence (of the owner) just like bubbles in water. There is in this world no object mobile or im-mobile the destruction of which is not observed directly or through inference. Therefore, a wise man should turn away with efforts the sense of mine with reference to son, wife, house, etc., belonging to those attached to the destructible objects.

When one gets neutrality through this kind of philosophy (thinking), that is the seventh contentment called sunetram.

कथं पुनः सुनेत्रमित्युच्यते ?

Opponent : Why is it called sunetram?

सुखमनेनात्मानं कैवल्योऽवस्थां नयन्तीति सुनेत्रम् ।

People easily take themselves to the state of isolation. That is why, it is called sunetram.

(Sumāricam)

यदा तु सत्सु पूर्वदोषेषु प्रसङ्गदोषमुपन्यस्यति । कथम् ? प्राप्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां तदभिलाषान्निवृत्तिस्तत्सुखम् । विषयजिघृक्षया च दुःखम् । प्राप्तिरप्येषामनुपशान्तये तदुप-भोगकौशलाय च । यस्मादाह—

यदा प्रबन्धाद्विषयी विषयानुपसेवते ।  
तदास्येतस्त्वभिप्रायः सुतरां संप्रवर्तते ॥  
अतोऽपि येन पुरुषः शमयेद् बडवानलम् ।  
नेन्द्रियाण्युपभोगेन विषयेभ्यो निवर्तयेत् ॥

तस्माद्विषयसम्पर्कमसमर्थं निवर्तने ।  
इन्द्रियाणां परिज्ञाय निरासङ्गमतिश्चरेत् ॥

इत्येतस्माद् दर्शान्माद्यस्थं लभते साऽष्टमी तुष्टिः सुमारीचमित्युच्यते । कथं सुमारीचमित्युच्यते ? अर्चतेः पूजार्थस्य शोभनमर्चितं विषयसंगनिवृत्तस्य योगिनोऽवस्थानं भवति ।

When, however, inspite of these faults one puts forth the fault of a deep attachment to them.<sup>13</sup>

How?

The desire for the object comes to an end in case of the senses which have attained the object—that is the pleasure. The desire to obtain the objects is a source of misery. The attainment of these (objects) also does not evoke peace but evokes the cleverness in the way of enjoying them. That is why it is stated :

When the one hankering after the objects enjoys the objects continuously, his desires (for it) become more. Then, the man may extinguish the forest-fire, but he cannot withdraw the senses from the objects through enjoyment. Therefore, after knowing that the contact with the objects is not capable in withdrawing the senses, one should act with absence of attachment. When one attains neutrality by realising this, that is the eighth contentment called sumāricam.

Why is it called sumāricam.

It is the good abode of the yogi who is devoid of the attachment towards the objects and who is an object of worship.

(Abhayam or uttamā)

यदा तु पूर्वदोषेषु हिंसादोषमुपन्यस्यति । कथम् ? अनुपहत्याऽन्यभूतानि विषय-भोगाऽनुपपत्तेः । उपभोगो हि नाम मनोज्ञाभ्यवहारः, स्त्रीसेवा, हयगजनरादिभिर्यानमित्येव-

मादि । तत्र मनोज्ञाऽभ्यवहारचिकीर्षुणा तदङ्गानां गोऽजाऽविबलीवर्दस्त्रीपुरुषादीनामवश्यमु-  
पघातः कार्यः । अनुपघाते वा विषयाऽनुपपत्तिप्रसंगः । स्त्रियमासेवमानेनाऽन्यासां स्त्रोणां  
मातृपितृभ्रातृप्रभृतीनां च, अन्यथा तदभावो हयादीनाम् । तस्मादुपभोगार्थिनाऽवश्यमन्योप-  
घातः कार्यो निहितदण्डेन वा विषयोपभोगस्त्याज्य इति । आह च

यथा यथा हि विषयो वृद्धिं गृह्णाति देहिनाम् ।

अपघातस्तदङ्गानां तथैवास्य विवर्धते ॥

तस्मादनच्छन्नन्येषां प्राणिनां देहपीडनम् ।

सन्तोषेणैव वर्तेत त्यक्तसर्वपरिच्छदः ॥

सत्यवाचः प्रशान्तस्य सर्वभूतान्यनिच्छतः ।

भावात्कारान्तज्ञानमचिरेण प्रवर्तते ॥

इत्येतस्मादर्शानाम्नाध्यस्थं लभते, सा नवमी तुष्टिरुत्तमाऽभयमित्यपदिश्यते ।  
कथम् ? उत्तमं हि प्राणिनां सर्वेभ्यो भयेभ्यो हिंसाभयमिति तदपगमादुत्तमाऽभयमिति ।

It is when he puts forth the blemish of injury in (addition to)  
the faults mentioned earlier

How?

Because the enjoyment of the objects is not possible without  
diminishing others' objects. Enjoyment means the eating of agreeable  
objects; enjoying a woman and travelling on horse, elephant or man,  
etc. Here the injury must be caused to cow, goats, sheep, bullock,  
woman and man, etc., which form the accessories (means) to that (en-  
joyment), by a person desirous of enjoying agreeable objects. Other-  
wise, without causing injury to them there arises the undesirable  
contingency of the impossibility of (getting) the object ; by the one  
enjoying the woman injury must be caused to the other women and  
mother, father, brother etc. Otherwise, there will not be horses, etc.<sup>14</sup>  
Therefore, the injury to others must be caused by the one who  
desires for enjoyment, or showing clemency to the enjoyment of the  
objects should be given up. It is state also :

As the objects of enjoyment increase in case of the embodied  
beings, the injuries to its accessories also increase. Therefore, not  
desiring to cause bodily injury to other beings one should live with  
satisfaction after giving up all property or paraphernalia. The  
knowledge (leading to) the cessation of the darkness of becoming  
(i.e. the world) comes to existence without delay in case of one who  
tells truth, is calm and does not have desire for all the objects (or  
beings).

When one gets indifference through realising this, that is the  
ninth contentment best of all called abhayam.

Why?

The fear of injury (to himself or to other) is the best of the fears  
in the beings. With the removal of that results the best, (i.e. the fear-  
lessness.

आह, अर्जनरक्षणलक्षणयोरपि तुष्टयोः परोपघातदोषाः, अपदिष्टोऽस्यामपि च । तत्र  
कथमनयोर्विशेषः प्रतिपत्तव्य इति ?

Opponent : In case of the contentment of earning and protecting  
also there is the fault of injury to others. The same is spoken of  
here also. How then (you should tell), can be understood the  
distinction between the two?

उच्यते न, विषयभेदात् । तत्र येषामर्जनरक्षणे प्रत्याद्रियते विषयी तदर्थिना प्रत्यनीका-  
नामवश्यमभिधातोऽनुष्ठातव्य इत्यादावुक्तम् । इह तु येषामेवार्जनरक्षणे तदनुपघा-  
तेनाऽशक्यो विषयोपभोग इत्येतद्विवक्षितम् । तस्मादसंकीर्णमेतदित्येवमम्भ्रभृतयो नव  
विषयेभ्यः संगद्वेषनिवृत्तिहेतवो व्याख्याताः । ते ज्ञानविरहितानां योगिनां तुष्टिशब्दवाच्यतां  
लभन्ते । ज्ञानिनां तु वैराग्यपर्वसंज्ञिता स्वासु स्वासु तत्त्वभूमिषु सिद्धा एवेति ॥ ५० ॥

Proponent : It is not so, because the objects of two are different. It is  
stated in the beginning that in the case of earlier the desirous of  
objects shows respect to earning and protecting, by that  
desirous man destruction of the obstruction must be made. In  
the present case, however, it is intended with reference to those  
by whom the earning and protecting (has taken place), (but)  
the experience of the objects is rendered impossible without  
the destruction of the obstruction that (object).<sup>15</sup> Therefore, it  
is not mixed up. Thus are stated the nine means of getting rid  
of the attachment and aversion to the objects viz., ambha, etc.  
They get the denotation of the word contentment in case of the  
yogins who are devoid of knowledge. In the case of the person  
possessed of knowledge, however, they are called the stages in  
non-attachment and are accomplished in their respective  
stages in realisation.

## KĀRIKĀ 50

1. It is because one is satisfied with the attribution of nature of soul to some other element.
2. Briefly, such a man is contented with the idea that soul is the part of cosmic matter itself.
3. The sense is that since objects composed of the constituents are infinite, the ignorance about them is also infinite.
4. Ignorance is the absence of a right decision after comparison between a few things while in contentment one does not want to know the other objects after knowing one object and thus considering it to be the highest.
5. The meaning intended is that just as things get merged in water, the material objects get merged in their cause. If soul according to the above is product of material cause, it would also get merged in that.
6. It is not mentioned that the material cause like cosmic matter gives rise to the object in accordance with the suitable time.
7. The sense is that these acts would be turned futile if it is accepted that everything happens in accordance with time and requires no other factor.
8. An object can merge into some other material object only. Time and destiny do not denote some material object. Hence, the objection.
9. I.e., cosmic matter is restricted only to the root cause and intellect is considered as a distinct element.
10. He is externally satisfied because he does not hanker after the objects, but he has not channelised energy for the realisation of soul.
11. The sense is that he gives up his desire for the objects without getting them.
12. It would involve the enjoyment of the objects by causing violence to others.
13. Here starts the description of the next contentment called *sumāricam*.

14. Here injury is not physical, but also in the form of taking away an object from other's use.
15. In short, through the earlier a man gets detached with an idea that the earning and protection of the objects require injury to others while through the latter a man gets detached with an idea that the enjoyment of the objects is not possible without injury.



## KARIKA 51

(Attainments)

आह, प्रागपदिष्टमष्टधा सिद्धिरिति तदिदानीमभिधीयतामिति ।

Opponent : You have stated earlier that there are eight kinds of attainment, now you should state them.

उच्यते—

ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविधातास्त्रयसुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।

दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ

तत्रोहो नाम यदा प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमानागमव्यतिरेकेणाऽभिप्रेतमर्थं विचारणाबलेनैव प्रतिपद्यते, साद्या सिद्धिः तारकमित्यपदिश्यते । तारयति संसारोर्णवादिति तारकम् । यदा तु स्वयं प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिहन्यमानो गुरूपदेशात्प्रतिपद्यते सा द्वितीया सिद्धिः, सुतारमित्यपदिश्यते । कथम् ? सुखमनेनाद्यत्वेऽपि भवसंकटात्तरन्तीति । यदा त्वन्योपदेशादप्यसमर्थः प्रतिपत्तुमध्ययनेन साधयति सा तृतीया सिद्धिः, तारयन्तमित्यपदिश्यते । तदेतत्तारणक्रियाया अद्यत्वेऽपि अव्यावृत्तत्वान्माहाविषयत्वात्तारयन्तमित्यपदिष्टम् । त एते त्रयः साधनोपायैराब्रह्मणः प्राणिनोऽभिप्रेतमर्थं प्राप्नुवन्ति । आह, च—“साक्षात्कृतधर्माण ऋषयो बभूवुः । तेऽपरेभ्योऽसाक्षात्कृतधर्मेभ्य उपदेशेन मंत्रान्सम्प्रादुरुपदेशाय ग्लायन्तोऽपरे बिल्मग्रहणायेमं ग्रन्थं समाम्नासिषुः वेदं च वेदाङ्गानि चेति ।” बिल्मं भासनं सम्यक्प्रतिभासाय विशिष्टः संकेतः उक्तः । एषां तु साधनोपायानां प्रत्यनीकप्रतिषेधाय दुःखविधातत्रयम् । दुःखानि त्रीण्याध्यात्मिकादीनि तत्र चाध्यात्मिकानां वातादीनां सिद्धिप्रत्यनीकानामायुर्वेदक्रियानुष्ठानेन विधातं कृत्वा पूर्वेषां त्रयाणामन्यतमेन साधयति, सा चतुर्थी सिद्धिः प्रमोदमित्यभिधीयते । कथम् ? निवृत्तरोगा हि प्राणिनः प्रमोदन्त इति कृत्वा । यदा त्वाधिभौतिकानां मानुषादिनिमित्तानां सिद्धिप्रत्यनीकानां सामादिना यतिधर्मानुगुणेन वोपायेन पूर्वेषां त्रयाणामन्यतमेन साधयति, सा पञ्चमी सिद्धिः प्रमुदितमित्यभिधीयते । कथम् ? अनुद्विग्नो हि प्रमुदित इति कृत्वा । यदा तु शीतादीन्याधिदैविकानि द्वन्द्वानि सिद्धिप्रत्यनीकानि स्वधर्मानुरोधेन प्रतिहत्य पूर्वेषां त्रयाणामन्यतमेन साधयति, सा षष्ठी सिद्धिर्मोदमानमित्यभिधीयते । कथम् ? द्वन्द्वाऽनुपहता हि प्राणिनो मोदन्त इति कृत्वा । सुहृत्प्राप्तिः । यदा तु कुशलसंस्पृष्टं सन्मित्रमाश्रित्य सन्देहनिवृत्तिं लभते, सा रम्यकमिति सप्तमी सिद्धिरपदिश्यते । रम्यो हि लोके सन्मित्रसम्पर्कः । तस्य संज्ञायां रम्यमेव रम्यकम् । दानम् । यदा तु दौर्भाग्यं दानेनातीत्य पूर्वेषां त्रयाणामन्यतमेन साधयति साऽष्टमी सिद्धिः सदाप्रमुदितमित्यभिधीयते । सुभगो हि

सदाप्रमुदितो भवति । तस्मादौर्भाग्यनिवृत्तिः सदाप्रमुदितम् । इत्येवमेताः सिद्धयोऽष्टौ व्याख्याताः । एतासां संश्रयेणाऽभिप्रेतमर्थं यतः संसाधयन्तीत्यतः पूर्वाचार्यागतं मार्गमारुरुक्षुस्तत्प्रवणः स्यादिति ।

Opponent : The eight kinds of attainments are : (1) reasoning, (2) word, (3) study, (4-6) cessation of three kinds of misery, (7) attainment of a friend and (8) charity.

Out of these reasoning is that when one understands the intended object only through thinking power, without perception, inference, and verbal testimony. That is the first attainment and is called *tārakam*. *Tārakam* means that which makes one cross the world-sea. When one faces the obstruction in understanding oneself and understands through the instruction by the teacher, that is the second attainment called *sutāram*.

How ?

Because one easily crosses over the world—misery. When one is not able to understand through other's instruction also and accomplishes (the understanding) through study, that is the third attainment called *tārayantam*. It is called *tārayantam* because it does not turn away from the act of causing to cross even now and because of its causing to cross the great object. These are the three means through which the beings beginning from *Brahmā* attain the desired objects. It is stated also : “The seers had direct insight into virtuous conduct. They handed through oral teachings the hymns to the later generation who were destitute of the direct insight into virtuous conduct. The later generations, declining in the (capacity of) oral communication compiled this work as also the Vedas and the auxiliary vedic treatise in order to understand their meaning,” Bilman means to illumine, it is stated to be the particular hint for the right illumination (understanding).<sup>1</sup> To destroy the obstructions in these means of accomplishments are the three kinds of destruction of miseries. The miseries are of three kinds—bodily, etc.<sup>2</sup> Out of them, after destroying the bodily miseries like wind, etc., which stand as the obstruction in the attainment, through the acts prescribed in the Ayurveda, on one accomplishes the (knowledge) through any of the three mentioned above, that is the forth attainment called *Pramoda*.

How ?

Because the beings which are devoid of the diseases feel happy. However, when one accomplishes the knowledge through any of the three mentioned above after destroying the obstruction caused by

living beings in the accomplishments, like man etc., through the means like those in accordance with the duties of an ascetic or with giving gifts, etc., that is the fifth type of attainment called pramudita.

How?

Because one who is not grieved, is happy.<sup>3</sup> However, when after destroying the super-natural pairs (of opposites) like cold etc., given by gods and serving as the obstruction in the accomplishment, through following one's natural duties, accomplishes (the knowledge) through any of the above three mentioned, that is the sixth attainment called modamānam.<sup>4</sup>

How?

The beings not afflicted by the pairs of opposites feel happy. Acquisition of friends (is the next). When one attains the absence of doubts after taking recourse to some good friend who is thoroughly happy, that is the seventh kind of attainment called ramyaka. In this world the contact with a good friend is pleasing. To designate the term ramyaka is used in the sense of ramyaka (pleasing) itself. (The next is) bestowing gifts. When after overcoming the bad luck through bestowing gifts one accomplishes (the knowledge) through any of the three, that is the eighth attainment called sadāpramuditam. The one having good luck is always pleased. Therefore, the alleviation of bad luck is the ever-happiness.

Thus, are explained these eight attainments. Therefore, since one accomplishes the desired object by taking resort to them, the one desirous of following the way handed down through earlier authorities should be inclined to (accept) that path.

(Curbs for attainments)

आह, कः पुनरत्र हेतुर्न पुरुषार्थत्वाविशेषे सति गुणानां सर्वसिद्धिनिमित्तं त्वनुभव-  
तीति ?

Opponent : What is the reason that even when the purpose of the conscious entity as the aim of the constituents is the same, one experiences the attainments also as the cause ?

उच्यते—यस्मात्

सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

साध्यप्रतिपत्तिसामर्थ्यसामान्यमङ्गीकृत्याह सिद्धेरिति । पूर्वो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टि-  
लक्षणः अङ्कुश इवाङ्कुशः, निवर्तनसामान्यात् । नित्यप्रवृत्तस्यापि प्रधानात्सिद्धिस्रोतसो विप-

र्ययाऽशक्तितुष्टिप्रतिबन्धात्सर्वप्राणिष्वप्रवृत्तिर्भवति । विपर्ययात्तावत्स्थानेषु । ते हि मुख्याः  
स्रोतसो विपर्ययात्मानः । अशक्तेस्तिर्यक्षु । ते हि तिर्यक्स्रोतसोऽशक्त्यात्मानः । तुष्टिर्देवेषु ।  
ते ह्यूर्ध्वस्रोतसस्तुष्ट्यात्मानः । मानुषास्त्वर्वास्रोतसः संसिद्ध्यात्मानः । तस्मात् एव तारका-  
दिषु प्रवर्तन्ते । सत्त्वरजस्तमसां चाङ्गाङ्गिभावनियमाद्विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिभिः प्रतिहन्यन्ते  
इति न सर्वेषां सर्वदा सिद्धिर्भवति । अत एतदुक्तं सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशः शास्त्रिविध इति ।

Proponent : Because

*The three preceding the attainments are curbs.*

Accepting the capacity in general of attainment of the object to be attained the author has stated of the attainment (in singular).<sup>5</sup> The above mentioned perverted knowledge, incapability and contentment are the curbs as they work like a curb because they have got the commonness of preventing.<sup>6</sup> The current of attainments always flowing from the cosmic matter does not reach all the beings as it is obstructed by perverted knowledge, incapability and contentment. On account of perverted knowledge (the attainments are obstructed) in the immovable objects. They are mainly of the perverted knowledge by nature. On account of incapability (it is obstructed) in the beasts. They are incapable by nature and have their current of attainments horizontal. Contentment is (the obstruction) in the gods. They have the current of attainments upwards (and) are contented by nature. The men have their current of attainment downwards and (try to) attain by nature. Therefore, they proceed towards tāraṇa, etc. All the human beings do not accomplish all the attainments always as they are obstructed by perverted knowledge, incapability and contentment because there is the rule of the relation of principal and subordinate in case of the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Therefore, it is stated that there is the above mentioned threefold curbs of the attainments.

(Attainment removes perverted knowledge, incapability and contentment)

यथा च सिद्धेः विपर्ययाऽशक्तितुष्टयः प्रतिपक्षाः, एवं सिद्धिरपि विपर्ययादीनाम् । सा  
ह्यत्पन्ना सर्वनितात्रिवर्तयति । कथम् ? अविपरीतज्ञानं विपर्ययमतीतानागतवर्तमानेषु सन्नि-  
कृष्टेषु विप्रकृष्टेषु इन्द्रियग्राह्येष्वतीन्द्रियेषु चाऽप्रतिघातादशक्तिं पुरुषस्य प्रकृतिविकारव्यति-  
रिक्तस्य दर्शनात्सर्वासु भूमिषु तुष्टिम् । एवमेतानि स्रोतांसि प्राणादयः कर्मयोनयश्च  
व्याख्याताः । एतेषां भार्गोऽवस्थापनात्परां सिद्धिं कैवल्यलक्षणामचिरेण प्राप्नोति । आह च

योनीनां सप्रमाणानां सम्यङ् मार्गे नियोजनात् ।

स्रोतसां च विशुद्धत्वात्त्रिरासङ्गमतिश्चरेत् ॥ इति ॥ ५१ ॥

॥इति युक्तिदीपिकायां नवममाह्निकम् ॥

As the perverted knowledge, incapacities and contentment are opposite to the attainments, so is the attainment to the perverted knowledge, etc. When that (attainment) originates, it dispelles all of these.

How ?

It dispells the perverted knowledge as it is the non-perverted knowledge; it dispells the incapability as it is not obstructed in case of the objects of past, future and present, situated near or situated away, perceptible to the senses and those beyond the reach of the senses; it dispells the contentment at all the stages as it leads to the perception of the conscious entity different from the evolutes of the cosmic matter.<sup>7</sup> Thus are explained the current (of attainments), the vital airs and the sources of actions. Taking recourse to these in the way of (spiritual life) one attains without delay the highest attainment, i.e., the liberation. It is stated also :

By applying the sources of action alongwith the sources of knowledge in a right path and on account of the purity of the current (of attainment), one should behave with the mind free from attachment.

Here ends the ninth discourse of the Yuktidīpikā.

## KĀRIKĀ 51

1. Cf. Naigamakāṇḍa of Nirukta.
2. For the miseries and the means of alleviating them see kārīkā 1-2.
3. When one is free from bodily miseries and is free from the pains caused by other beings, one is still more happy than the former.
4. In this case one is free from the miseries caused by gods also in addition to the above two, viz., bodily and those caused by other beings.
5. Though attainments are of eight kinds, yet the author has mentioned them in singular in the kārīkā. It is through taking their general purport of attainment of objects without considering the specifications.
6. They prevent a man from realising the highest aim of life.
7. Contentment is the chief obstruction to the discriminative knowledge of cosmic matter and conscious entity because an aspirant is satisfied at some lower level and does not aspire for the discriminative knowledge.

## KĀRIKĀ 52

(Interdependence of subtle body and dispositions  
and two kinds of creation)

एवं यत्पूर्वमपदिष्टं संयोगकृतः सर्गः (क. २१) इति तद्व्याख्यातम् । अत्रेदानीमाचार्याणां विप्रतिपत्तिः । धर्मादीनां शरीरमन्तरेणानुत्पत्तेः । शरीरस्य च धर्माद्यभावे निमित्तान्तरासम्भवादुभयमिदमनादि । तस्मादेकरूप एवायं यथैवाद्यत्वे तथैवातिक्रान्तास्वनागतासु कालकोटिषु सर्ग इति । आचार्य आह—नैतदेवम्, किं तर्हि प्राक्प्रधानप्रवृत्तेर्धर्माधर्मयोरसम्भवो बुद्धिधर्मत्वात्तस्याश्च प्रधानविकारत्वात् । ततस्तदव्यतिरिक्तं शब्दाद्युपलब्धिगुणलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं चार्थमुद्दिश्य सत्त्वादयो महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियभूतत्वेनावस्थाय परमर्षिहिरण्यगर्भादीनां शरीरमुत्पादयन्ति । षट्सिद्धिक्षयकालोत्तरं तु गुणविमर्दवैचित्र्याद्रजस्तमोवृत्त्यनुपाति संसारचक्रं प्रवृत्तम् ।

न विना भावैलिङ्गम्

देवमनुष्यतिर्यग्भावेन व्यवतिष्ठत इति वाक्यशेषः ।

न विना लिङ्गेन भावसंसिद्धिः ।

संसिद्धिरत्र निष्पत्तिरभिप्रेता ।

लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

सोऽयं लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यश्च षट्सिद्धिक्षयकालादूर्ध्वं भवति । गुणसमनन्तरं तु अधिकारलक्षणः । तस्माद् द्विधा सर्गः अधिकारलक्षणो भावाख्यश्च । येषां तु धर्माधर्मशरीरयोः पर्यायेणहेतुहेतुमद्भावस्तेषां कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमित्यत्र (क. १६) प्रतिविहितम् । येऽपि च सांख्या एवमाहुः—“धर्माधर्माधिकारवशात्प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिरिति” तेषामन्यतरपरिकल्पनानर्थक्यमिति । कथम् ? यदि तावदधिकार एवायं प्रधानप्रवृत्तयेऽलम्, किं धर्माधर्माभ्याम् ? अथ तावदन्तरेणाधिकारस्य प्रधानप्रवृत्तावसामर्थ्यम्, एवमपि किमधिकारेण ? तयोरेव प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात् । तस्मादधिकारभावनिमित्तो द्विधा सर्गः । तत्र यथेदं शरीरमविभक्तं धर्मार्थकाममोक्षलक्षणासुक्रियासु विभक्तं भवेदित्यतः पाण्यादिविकल्पोऽस्य भवति, एवं सत्त्वसर्गोऽप्यविभक्तो धर्मार्थकाममोक्षलक्षणासु क्रियासु समर्थो भवेदिति । ॥ ५२ ॥

Thus is explained the statement made above that the evolution is brought about by the union (k. 21). There prevails the difference of opinion among the authorities in this context. Because the virtue,

etc., do not arise without the body and since there is no possibility of some other cause for the body in the absence of virtue, etc., both of these are beginningless. *Therefore, the creation is the same; it was the same in the period of past and future periods of time as it is at present.* The (present) authority says : It is not so. On the contrary, there is no possibility of virtue, vice, etc., because they are the forms of intellect and because intellect is the evolute of the cosmic matter. Then, with the purpose of the cognition of word, etc., and the cognition of the distinction between the constituents and the conscious entity which is different from that cosmic matter, the Sattva, etc., remaining situated in the form of intellect egoism, subtle element, senses and the gross elements produce the body of the great seers and Hiranyagarbha, etc. And at the time when the six attainments<sup>1</sup> have been destroyed, there proceeds the cycle of the world following function of the Rajas and the Tamas due to the variegation, suppression (and dominance) of the constituents.<sup>2</sup>

*There would be no subtle body without the dispositions.*

The remaining sentence is that it (subtle body is) in the form of god, man and beasts.<sup>3</sup>

*There is no accomplishment of the dispositions without subtle body.*

The accomplishment is intended in the sense of the production.

*Therefore, creation proceeds in two ways—the subtle body and the dispositions.*

The evolution called subtle body and that called dispositions takes place at the time after the destruction of the six attainments. The body in the form of the adhikara (office bearer like Brahma etc.)<sup>4</sup> are produced just immediately after the cosmic matter. Therefore, the creation is of two kinds : of the form of the bodies of the office bearers and of that called dispositions. The theory of those who hold that the virtue and vice, and body are mutually the cause and effect, is refuted through the statement ‘the cause is the unmanifest’.<sup>5</sup> In the case of the Sāṃkhya who state that the initial activity of the cosmic matter is due to the virtue, vice and authority (or inherent capacity of constituents to evolve), the supposition one of these serves no purpose.

How?

If the authority (or inherent capacity of the constituents) is enough for the initial activity of the cosmic matter, what is the purpose of virtue and vice? If it is argued that the above two have capacity for the initial activity of the cosmic matter without the (in-

herent capacity of the constituent) in this case also what is the use of authority (or inherent capacity of constituents), (Because) the capability for initial activity of the cosmic matter is in those two only. Therefore, the creation is twofold caused by the inherent capacity or constituents and the dispositions.<sup>6</sup> Just as the body which is undivided (in itself) may be divided in case of the activities leading to virtue, wealth, enjoyment and liberation and, hence, there are the postulations of hands, etc., similarly, the creation of all the beings without division may be capable in the (different) acts leading to virtue, wealth and enjoyments.

## KĀRIKĀ 52

1. These are explained latter on.
2. The rajas and tamas start dominating the objects and, hence, the deterioration in everything starts.
3. It is because the nature of further birth is determined through the dispositions or the subtle body.
4. Adhikāra in Sāṃkhya-Yoga is a technical term denoting the very capacity of the constituents to evolve in the form of the object. In the present case it seems to denote the body produced out of the capacity of the constituents.
5. The sense is that the ultimate cause is the cosmic matter only which automatically evolves without standing in need of some dispositions, etc. Therefore, virtue and vice do not serve as the cause in initial state of creation.
6. The former works for the creation of the elements while the latter is useful for transmigration as it determines the nature of further birth.

## KĀRIKĀ 53

(Creation of the living beings)

अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योन्ष्ट पञ्चधा भवति ।

मानुष्यश्चैकविधः

अष्टौ विकल्पा अस्य सोऽयमष्टविकल्पः । अष्टप्रकारोऽष्टभेद इत्यर्थः । तद्यथा ब्रह्मप्रजापतीन्द्रपितृगन्धर्वनागरक्षपिशाचाः । तैर्यग्योन्ष्ट पञ्चधा भवति-पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृप-स्थावराः । मानुष्यश्चैकविधः च जात्यन्तरानुपपत्तेः । आह किमेतावानेव भूतसर्गविकल्पः, आहोस्विदन्योस्तीति ? उच्यते-विकल्पान्तरमस्त्येतेषामेव स्थानानामन्तर्गणभेदात् । अयं तु

समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥

किम् ? उपदिष्ट इति वाक्यशेषः । तत्र देवानां साध्यमरुद्रादिभेदात् । तिरश्चांप्राम्या-रण्यादिभेदात् । मानुषाणां च ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियविट्शूद्रभेदात् । उद्भिद्देदश्च विस्तरेणापदिश्यमान आनन्त्यमापादयेत् । तस्मात्समासतो भूतसर्गोऽपदिश्यते ॥ ५३ ॥

*The divine beings are of eight kinds; that of the lower beings is of five, and that of the human beings is of one kind.*

The expression 'of eight kinds' means 'of whom there are eight kinds'. 'Of eight kinds' means 'of eight varieties'. They are Brahmā, Prajāpati, Indra, Pitr Gandharvas, Yakṣa, Rākṣas and Piśāca. The animals are of five kinds: cattle, wild beasts, birds, reptiles and immovable objects. That related to human beings is of one kind only, because there is no possibility or propriety of some other species in it.

Question : Is the creation of beings of these kind only, or is there some other kind also?

Reply : There are the further kinds of these only due to the differentiation found in the classes of various places.<sup>1</sup> This is however,

*Briefly the creation of beings. What (does it mean) ? 'Is taught' is the remaining sentence. There, those of the celestial beings is due to the differentiation into sadhya, Marut, Rudra etc., of the lower animals due to the differentiation into tame and wild, etc., of the human beings due to the difference into Brāhmāṇa, Ksatriya, Vit and Sudra. The difference in the plants would be endless if stated in details. Therefore, the creation of beings is stated in brief.*

1. There may be some internal differences among these, but they are not taken into consideration, as it is explained latter on.

## KĀRIKĀ 54

(Division of creation into three justified)

आह, विकल्पान्तरवचनम् स्रोतोभेदात् । दैवमानुषतैर्यग्योना इति त्रिविधो भूतानां विकल्प उपदिश्यते । स्रोतांसि तु चत्वार्युक्तानि । तस्माद्विकल्पान्तरं वक्तव्यमिति ।

Opponent : The other kinds also should be stated, because of the difference of the *aperatures* of life. The difference into beings is taught here as threefold into gods, human beings and lower animals. The apertures of life are, however, told as four. Therefore, the others (remaining) kinds should also be stated.

उच्यते-न, गुणधर्मसंग्रहसामर्थ्यात् । सत्त्वबहुला ऊर्ध्वस्रोतसः । रजोबहुला अर्वाक्स्रोतसः । तमोबहुलास्तिर्यक्स्रोतसो मुख्यस्रोतसश्च । तस्मादनयोरभेदेनोपदेशः ।

Proponent : No, because of the capacity of their inclusion into the qualities of the constituents. Those whose apertures open upwards abound in Sattva. Those whose apertures open downwards abound in Rajas. Those whose apertures open on sides and those possessing the main aperture abound in Tamas. Therefore, these (last) two are mentioned without difference.

(creation in upper order abounds in Sattva)

आह, असुराद्युपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम् । इतरेष्वनन्तर्भावादभेदेन वोपदेशः कार्या न तु दैवमानुषतिरश्च इति ।

Objection : The demons also should be mentioned. Or, the mention should be made without differentiation into gods, men or lower animals.<sup>1</sup>

उच्यते-न, उक्तेष्वेव तत्संग्रहात् । असुराणां तावदैन्द्र एवं स्थानेऽन्तर्भावः, पूर्वदेवत्वात् । पूर्वदेवा ह्यसुराः । किंच पर्यायेणेन्द्रत्वात् । धन्विप्रभृतीनां पर्यायेणेन्द्रत्वं श्रूयते । तथा यक्षाणां रक्षस्त्वेकरूपत्वात् । किन्नरविद्याधराणां गन्धर्वेषु, समानशीलत्वात् । प्रेतानां पितृष्वधिपतिसामान्यात् । तस्मात्त्रिविकल्प एव भूतसर्गः । स चायम्

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालः



ऊर्ध्वमित्यनेनाष्टौ देवस्थानान्याह । तत्रायं सर्गः सत्त्वविशालः पिशाचेभ्यो रक्षसाम्, रक्षोभ्यो नागानाम्, नागेभ्यो गन्धर्वाणाम्, गन्धर्वेभ्यः पितृणाम्, पितृभ्यस्त्रिदशानाम्, तेभ्यः प्रजापतीनाम्, तेभ्योऽपि ब्रह्मणः । एवं विशालग्रहणं समर्थितं भवति ।

Proponent : No, because they are included into the above mentioned only. The demons are included in the place of Indra because they were the gods earlier. The demons were the gods earlier. Moreover, because of their being Indra alternatively. The state of Indra is found mentioned in the śruti alternatively with reference to Dhanvi, etc. Similarly, because the Yakṣas are identical with the Rākṣas. The kinnaras and the Vidhyadharas are included into gandharvas because of the similarity of their nature.<sup>2</sup> The diseased souls are included into ancestors because of their similarity in respect of having the same lord. Therefore, creation of the beings is of three kinds only. And this —

*The creation abounding in Sattva is in upper region.*

Through the word 'upper' the author has stated the eight places of the gods. The creation there abounds in Sattva. There is more Sattva in Rākṣas than the Piśacas, more in Nagas than the Rākṣas, more in gandharvas than the Nagas, more in Pitṛs than the gandharvas, more in Tridaśa than Pitṛs, more in Prajāpatis than them, (Tridaśas), and more in Brahmā than them. (Prajāpatis). In this way the mention of abounding becomes justified.

(Creation in lower order abounds in tamas)

तमोविशालस्तु मूलतः सर्गः ।

मूलतस्तु सर्गस्तमोविशालः । पशुभ्यो हि मृगाणां प्रकृष्टतरं तमः । मृगेभ्यः पक्षिणाम्, पक्षिभ्यः सरीसृपाणाम्, सरीसृपेभ्यः स्थावराणाम् ।

*The lowest order of creation abounds in Tamas.*

The creation of the lowest order abounds in Tamas. The Tamas in the wild animals is more than that in the beasts; in the birds more than the wild animals, in the reptiles more than birds and in the immobile beings more than reptiles.

(Creation in the middle abounds in Rajas)

मध्ये रजोविशालः

देवेभ्यस्तिर्यग्भ्यश्चावकृष्टासु भूमिषु यथा यथा सत्त्वतमसोर्निहसः तथा तथा रजसो वृद्धिः । मनुष्यास्तूभयोर्मध्यमिति तत्र परमः प्रकर्षो रजसः । अर्वाक्स्त्रोतसः सिद्धिरूपत्वादत्यन्तं क्रियाप्रवृत्तत्वात् । यथा च मानुषेषु रजप्रकर्ष एवं ब्रह्मणः स्थाने सत्त्वस्य, स्थावरेषु तमसः । स खल्वयम्

ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥५४॥

चतुर्दशभेदस्त्रिविकल्पः सत्त्वाद्यतिशयनिर्हा सविषयभावेन यः सर्गो व्याख्यातः ॥ ५४ ॥

The creation in the middle abounds in Rajas.

In the region from the gods to lower beings as there is the decrease in Sattva and Tamas so is there the increase of Rajas. The human beings are in the middle of the two; hence the Rajas is in its greatest quantity in them. They are of the apertures downwards because they are of the nature of attainment and are most active. As the Rajas is dominant in human beings, similarly is the dominance of Sattva in the place of Brahmā and of the Tamas in the immobile beings.

*This is the creation from Brahmā upto the blade of grass.*

Thus is explained the creation in accordance with the more and less quantity of Sattva, etc., as divided into fourteen types<sup>3</sup> and of three kinds.<sup>4</sup>

## KĀRIKĀ 54

1. The objector means to say that the enumeration is not correct as it does not apply to demons, etc., because they are not included into any of the above. If such a differentiation is not desirable, the differentiation into gods, men and beast should also not be accepted.
2. It is because all of them represent the artists.
3. The fourteen kinds are : eight kinds of divine or celestial beings, five kinds of lower animals and one kinds of human beings.
4. The three kinds are those stated above as abounding in sattva, abounding in rajas and those abounding in tamas.

## KĀRIKĀ 55

(Pain caused by old age)

अत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।

जरकृतं मरणकृतं जरामरणकृतम् । तत्र जरकृतं तावद्यथा बलीतरंगितगात्रत्वम्, दण्डमन्तरेण चङ्क्रमणादिष्वप्रवृत्तिः, सर्वेन्द्रियाणां विषयोपभोगेष्वसामर्थ्यम्, प्रबलकासश्चासता, सास्त्रविलेक्षणता, दशनानामस्थिरत्वम्, वर्णविकृतिः, शैथिल्यमभिव्याहारसंगो मन्दा स्मृतिरित्येवमादि ।

*Here, the sentient Puruṣa experiences the pains caused by old age and death.*

The expression caused by old age and death refers to pains caused by old age and those caused by death. The pains caused by old age, are like the wrinkles on body, incapability in the activity of walking, etc., without the stick, incapability of the senses in the enjoyment of objects, excessive breathing, the turbidity in eyes due to the water coming out of them, falling of the teeth, deformity in complexion, break of continuity in utterance, dull memory, etc.

(Pain caused by death)

मरणकृतमपि पृथिव्यादीनां शरीरभावेनावस्थितौ सहभावप्रतिपक्षता स्वभावभेदवृत्तिसंग्रहपन्थिव्यूहावकाशदानादेरुपकारस्य प्रच्युतिः । इन्द्रियाधिष्ठानविकाराच्छब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धानां सतामग्रहणमसतां च ग्रहणमभूताकारं सम्भवविपरीतं वा सर्वार्थानां ग्रहणम् । तद्यथा पौर्णमास्यां दक्षिणतः खण्डस्येन्दुमण्डलस्य पिशाचादीनां पाण्डरस्य च नभस इत्यादि । तथा वातादिवैषम्यात्समुपजनिताऽनेकप्रकारव्याधिः प्रभ्रश्यमानसकलेन्द्रियवृत्तिः सस्ताङ्गः ताम्रपीतास्त्रविलेक्षणो भ्रमदाहश्चासादिपरिगमान्तर्मर्मसन्धिर्जलार्थं दिशोऽवलोकयन् सब्रह्मलोकेष्वपि लोकेषु त्रातारमविन्दन् रागाद्यनेककालात्पक्वेनात्मग्रहेणात्मकार्यकरणोपहिमाणबुद्धिर्मन्दमन्देष्वपि स्मृतिप्रलम्भेषु दयितजनस्यात्मनश्चानुस्मरन्दशविधात्कुटुम्बाद्यः प्रभ्रश्यते सोऽयमवश्यम्भावी सर्वसत्त्वानां प्रकृष्टोद्वेगकारी चाव्युत्पन्नश्चापरिहार्यश्चानियतकालश्च महात्मभिः परमर्ष्यादिभिरन्यतामिस्रशब्देनापदिष्टो मरणकृतं दुःखम् । तत्त्वेदं दुःखं प्रधानमहदहंकारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियभूतविशेषलक्षणस्य तत्त्वपर्वणश्चैतन्यासम्भवात्पुरुष एव चैतन्यशक्तियोगादुपलभ्यते । तदपि समीक्ष्योक्तमाचार्येण अत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुष इति ।

The pain caused by death is like the desisting of the union of the earth, etc., in respect of the situation in the form of the body, and their desisting from the favour of giving scope to the body caused by the collection of the activities (of various limbs) for bringing out the difference in the nature (of many objects). Due to the deformity in the substratum of the senses, the word, touch, form, taste and smell are not cognised as they exist, and they are cognised as they do not exist as also the cognition of all the objects not in conformity with the object or as included (in other object) or contradictory (to the object), for example, cognition of devils etc., in place of the part of the disc of the moon from south and of the whitish sky, etc.,<sup>1</sup> Similarly, having many kinds of diseases arising of non-balanced proportion of air, etc., suffering from destruction of all the functions of the senses, becoming loosened of all the limbs, looking of the eyes as red, yellow and full of water, with the joints of the inner vital parts as looking erroneously burning and breathing, not finding any protector in the worlds even when the worlds are with Brahman (as the protector of all) while looking in all the directions for water, with the knowledge brought near one's own body (i.e. self centred), due to the knowledge of soul (in the body) due to the attachment, etc., for much time, remembering of himself and of own kith and kins in the attainment of faint memory (of past), he becomes deprived of the ten kinds of family—this is the misery caused by death which is must, most painful to all the beings, unproduced, inevitable and lasting for indefinite time, which is called utter gloom by the high souled and the great seers. This misery is observed in the conscious entity due to its association with consciousness because there is no possibility of consciousness in the joints (stated) of the elements, viz., cosmic matter, intellect, egoism, subtle elements and the gross elements. Having considered this it is stated by the authority that the sentient conscious entity gets the misery caused by old age and death.

(Pain caused by birth need not be mentioned)

आह, जन्मकृतस्योपसंख्यानम् । यथैव हि जरामरणं चात्मनः प्रकृष्टोद्देगाकारकमेवं जन्माऽपि । तथा ह्ययं मातुरुदरे जरायुपरिवेष्टितशरीरोऽमेध्यपरिस्नुतो व्रणमात्रायां गर्भधान्यां यथासुखमसम्भवात्परिपीतितगात्रो मातुरशनादिभिः पीड्यमानो गर्भावासे दुःखमनुभूय पश्चात्संवृतेनास्थिद्वयविवरेण निस्सृतो मूत्ररुधिरकलिलैः परिषिक्तगात्रो बाह्येन वायुना कौश्ल संस्पर्शादसिभिरिव तुष्टमानः स्वसंवेद्यं दुःखमात्मनि वर्तमानमाख्यातुमसमर्थः स्वसुखदुःखसामान्यात्परत्र परिकल्पिसुखदुःखबुद्धिभिर्दृढगात्रैरुपचितक्लेशैश्च यात्यमानो जन्मदुःखमनुभवति तस्मात्तदपि वक्तव्यमिति ।

Opponent : Mention should be made of the misery caused by birth also. As the old age and death cause great misery to the soul, in

the same way the birth also (causes that). For example, it experiences the misery caused by birth as it remains with the body covered with the outer skin in the belly of the mother, covered by dirt, with the limbs troubled because of the impossibility of the required pleasure, remaining in the (small) receptacle of the size of bruise only, troubled by the eating, etc., of the mother, after experiencing the misery of remaining in fetus and afterwards coming out of the contracted hole in the two bones, with the body covered with urine, blood and uterus, and troubled by the touch of the external air and the hands comparable to a sword, incapable of conveying the self-experienced misery present in his own body, and troubled by postulating the pleasure, pain, in other one the analogy of his own and troubled by strong limbs and thus accumulating various miseries one experiences the misery of birth. Therefore, that should also be mentioned.

उच्यते—न, अव्यापित्वात् । मानुषतिरश्चामेव जन्मकृतं दुःखं भवति न देवानाम् । कथम् ? तडिद्विलसितवत्क्षणमात्रेण शरीरप्रादुर्भावात् । जरामरणकृतं तु तेष्वपि न निवर्तते । तस्मात्प्राधान्यादेतदेवोपदिष्टं नेतरदिति ।

Proponent : No because it is not applicable to all. The misery caused by birth takes place in case of human beings and lower animals only not and not in the case of gods.

How ?

Because their body originates only within a moment like a flash of lightning.<sup>2</sup> The misery caused by old age and death does not cease to be for them also. Therefore, this only is mentioned prominently and not the other.

आह, इतरग्रहणाप्रसंगः, तुल्यत्वात् । न हि देवस्थानेषु जरामरणं वा श्रूयते, तस्मादव्यापित्वात्तयोरप्यग्रहणप्रसंगः ।

Opponent : It leaves no contingency for the mention of the other, because the case is similar. The old age or death is not heard with reference to the places of gods. Therefore, on account of its non-applicability to all, there arises the undesirable contingency of the non-mention of these two also.

उच्यते—न, स्मृतिवचनात् । जीर्यतेऽनयेति जरा क्षय इत्युक्तं भवति । स च देवभूमा-  
वर्तते । कस्मात् ? एवं ह्याह

रजोविषक्तिरङ्गेषु वैवर्ण्यं म्लानपुष्पता ।

पतिष्यतां देवलोकात्प्राणिनामुपजायते ॥

शक्रादीनां व्याधिश्रवणोच्छरीरक्षयः । एवं ह्याह—“त्वाष्ट्रीयं साम भवति इन्द्रं क्षाम-  
मपि न सर्वभूतानि प्रस्वापयितुं नाशक्नुवं स्तमेतेन साम्ना त्वाष्ट्रीयेणास्वापयदिति ।” तथा  
प्रजापतेर्वायुरक्षयीत् । दक्षाभिशापाच्च सोमस्य क्षयः । तथा “प्रजापतिर्वै सोमाय राज्ञे दुहितृ-  
रदानक्षत्राणि, स रोहिण्यामेवावसत् । तान्यनपेक्ष्यमाणानि पुनरगच्छन् । तस्मात् स्वाननुपेय-  
माना पुनर्गच्छति । तान्यन्वागच्छतानि पुनरयाचत । तान्यस्मै न पुनरददात् । साऽब्रवीत्सर्वे-  
ष्वेव समासत् वसाथ ते पुनर्दास्यामीति । स रोहिण्यामेवावसत्तस्मिन्ननुते यक्षोऽगृह्णात् ।  
चन्द्रमा वै सोमो राजा यद्राजानं यक्षोऽगृह्णात्तद्राजयक्षस्य जन्म । स तृणमिवाशुष्यत् । स  
प्रजापता अनाथत । सोऽब्रवीत्सर्वेष्वेव समावद्वसाथ त्वाऽतो मोक्ष्यामीति । तस्माच्चन्द्रमाः  
सर्वेषु नक्षत्रेषु समावद्वसति । तं वैश्वदेवेन चरुणाऽमावस्यां रात्रीमया यजन्ते नैनं यक्षोदमुञ्च-  
दित्यादि ।” तस्माद्देवभूमावपि जराकृतं दुःखमस्ति । तथा मरणकृतं भूम्यन्तरगमनात्तत्रोत्प-  
न्नानां ययातिरुदाहरणम् । तथा गोपथब्राह्मणम्—“देवानां ह वा पञ्चदशशतानि आसंस्तानि  
ब्रह्मकिल्बिषादक्षीयन्त । ततस्त्रयस्त्रिंशदेवास्त तदेतदुच्चाप्युक्तम् । सोदर्याणां पञ्चदशानां  
शतानां त्रयस्त्रिंशदुदशिष्यन्त देवाः । शेषाः प्रासीयन्तेति ।” श्वेतारण्ये चाऽन्तकस्य रुद्रेणकृतं  
दुःखमस्तीति । उदाहरणमात्राद्वा । अथवोदाहरणमात्रमेव दुःखानाम् । आदिशब्दलोपो वा  
वक्तव्यः । जरामरणकृतमेवोदाहरणत्वेनाभिप्रेतम् । न पुनर्दुःखान्तरम् । कस्मात् ? तत्रापि  
ह्यादिशब्दलोप उदाहरण मात्रत्वात् शक्त्या परिकल्पयितुमिदमित्युच्यते । न सर्वदुःखास्पद-  
त्वात् । सर्वेषां हि दुःखानामास्पदं जरामरणकृतं साधारणम् । कथम् ? तद्वन्धुमित्राणामप्युद्वे-  
गहेतुत्वात् । न तु जन्मकृतम्, सम्बन्धिनां प्रहर्षनिमित्तत्वात् । यतश्च ब्रह्मादौ स्तम्भपर्यन्ते  
जगति जरामरणकृतं दुःखं न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ।

No, because of the statement of the smṛti. Old age is that which  
meets decay, thus it conveys decay. That takes place in the place of  
gods also.

Why?

Because it is stated :

In case of the beings falling from the world of gods there takes  
place close clinging to Rajas, deformity in the limbs of the body, and  
their blooming becomes fade.<sup>3</sup>

There was, the decay of the body of Śakra, etc., due to the fact  
of mention of the disease with reference to them. It is stated : It is the  
tvāstīryam chant. It is not that Indra though toiling hard could not  
make all the beings sleep, he made them all sleep with this chant.  
The air of Prajāpati met destruction. There was the destruction of

soma due to the curse by Dakṣa. Thus, Prajāpati gave his daughters  
in the form of the Nakṣatras to the king Soma. The Soma stayed with  
Rohiṇi only. Those ignored Nakṣatras went back (to Prajāpati).  
Therefore, when not approached by them he (Soma) goes back to  
him Prajāpati. He requested him (Soma) that they should also be  
given to him. He did not give them again to him. He said I will give  
them to you again if you stay with all equally. He stayed with Rohiṇi  
only and for telling that lie he became sick. The King Soma is the  
moon itself and the disease which associated with the King  
originated as the disease of the King. He dried up like a piece of  
grass. He approached Prajāpati. He (Prajāpati) told, if you stay  
equally with all, then, only I will release you from that. Therefore, the  
moon stays equally with all the Nakṣatras. Therefore, there is the  
misery caused by old age in the place of gods also. There is the  
misery caused by death due to entering the interior of the earth in  
case of them who are born there; Yayāti is the example of that. Thus  
is stated in the Gopath Brahṁāṇa, there were fifteen hundred gods.  
They decreased due to their sin to Brahṁā. Then there were only  
thirty-three, that is stated through the verse also. Out of the fifteen  
hundred brothers the thirty three gods only remain. The remaining  
disappeared.

In the Śvetāraṇya also there is the misery caused by Rudra to  
Antaka.

Or because it is merely an example. Or it is merely an example  
of the misery. Or the elision of the word 'etc.', should be stated (as  
intended here).<sup>4</sup> The misery caused by old age and death is intended  
in the form of the example, and not some other misery.

Why is it so?

In that case also we can postulate through the power of words  
the elision of the word 'etc.', on account of its being an example. It is  
not so, because that (misery caused by old age and death) is the  
abode of all the miseries.<sup>5</sup> The misery caused by old age and death is  
the abode of all the miseries, common to all.

How?

Because it is a cause of misery to the relatives and friends also.  
It is not so in case of that (misery) caused by birth, because it is the  
cause of happiness to relatives. And because in the world beginning  
from Brahṁā upto the blade of grass, no one rises above the misery  
caused by old age and death.

(The world is full of misery)

लिङ्गास्याऽविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद् दुःखं समासेन ॥ ५५ ॥

सुखलेशस्य तदव्याप्तत्वात् । यावदिदं लिङ्गं न निवर्तते तावदवश्यं दुःखेन भवित-  
व्यम् । पर्यायेण संस्कारस्य सामर्थ्याल्लोकान्तरोपपत्तेः । तथा चाह-

सुखं च दुःखं च हि संशयं वारेणायं सेवते तत्र तत्र ।

कथम्पुनर्दुःखेन व्याप्तं सुखमिति चेत्, आब्रह्मणोऽशुद्धियातिशयोपपत्तेः । तस्याश्च  
दुःखमूलत्वात् । प्रजापतेरक्षिरोगश्रवणात्, इन्द्रस्य कामोपतापात् । गौतमपरिभावाद  
रम्भायाश्चाऽभिशापात्पाषाणभावोपपत्तेः, नागानां सर्पसत्रायासात्, वैश्रवणस्य यस्काभिशापा-  
द्भस्तिभावोपपत्तिः । जरत्कारोः पितॄणां च गर्तेऽवलम्बनात्, पिशाचानां मन्त्रौषधिमङ्गलप्रयो-  
गैरुद्दासनान्मानुषतिरश्चां प्रत्यक्षत एव प्रायेण दुःखास्पदत्वात् । तस्मान्नास्ति संसारेकश्चित्प्रदेशो  
यत्र सह लिङ्गेनात्मानं दुःखं नाऽवाप्नुयादित्यत एव प्रयतितव्यं येन लिङ्गस्यैवात्यन्तो-  
च्छेदः । ततो हि सर्वदुःखानामत्यन्तोपशमः । समासग्रहणं तु सुखमोहयोरवकाशदानार्थम् ।  
अन्यथा संसारे तयोरभाव एवाऽभ्युपगतः स्यात् ॥ ५५ ॥

*Up to the time the subtle body does not retire. Therefore, briefly speaking misery is (found in the world).*

Because the small pleasure is pervaded by that (misery). Misery must be there as long as the subtle body does not retire, there is the possibility of (birth in) other worlds one after the other on account of the capability of the past impressions. Thus, it is stated:

*The pleasure, pain and doubt are entertained (experienced) at many places in accordance with the occasion (or in succession).*

If it is asked how the pleasure is pervaded by misery, (we reply), because of the possibility of impurity, decay and surpassability right from the (world of) Brahmā. And, because that (possibility) is the cause of misery (It is known through the following). : because the disease of eyes is heard in case of Prajāpati, because of the trouble of sexual desire in case of Indra, because of the defeat of Gautama and because of the attainment of the state of stone in case of Rambhā through the curse, because of the trouble of Sarpasatra to the serpents, and there is the attainment of the state of elephant in case of Vaisravaṇa on account of the curse of Yaśka, because of the stay in hole in case of the parents of Jaratkāru, because of banishing the Piśācas through the use of vedic chants, medicines, and auspicious things, and because the human beings and the lower animals are directly observed to be the abode of misery. Therefore, there is no place in the world where misery may not approach the soul present with the subtle body, and hence such a means should be known through which the absolute destruction of the subtle body takes place. From that only takes place the cessation of all the miseries. The term 'briefly' is used to give scope to the (existence of) pleasure and indifference also. Otherwise, there would have been accepted their absence in the world.

## KĀRIKĀ 55

1. The sense is that due to the deformity in the material components of the body one gets psychologically disturbed and thus does not cognise the objects truly.
2. The gods do not undergo the above process in the origination of their body.
3. It is the misery of death in them.
4. The word 'etc.', should be understood as occurring in the kārīkā but elided.
5. The na in the text become meaningful only if we punctuate the original sentence in the following way—*parikalpayitumidamiti. Ucyate-na, sarvaduḥkḥāspadatvāt*. Pandeya and Chakravarti do not give comma after na, which makes the sense of the text just opposite of what the author intends.



## KĀRIKĀ 56

(Creation meant for conscious entity)

एवं यथावत्सर्गमुपाख्यायोपसंहरन्नाह-

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतः प्रवर्तते तत्त्वभूतभावाख्यः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

इतिकरणेन सर्गसमाप्तिं द्योतयति । एष इत्युक्तमपि प्रत्याम्नायार्थं पुनरपेक्षते । प्रकृत्या कृतः प्रकृतिकृतः । अनेन वाक्यपरिसमाप्त्यर्थं वीतावीताभ्यां सिद्धं प्रधानास्तित्वम् । अण्वादिप्रतिषेधं चापेक्षते । प्रकृतिकृत एव नाऽण्वादिकृतः । प्रवर्तते इति क्रियाप्रबन्धमाह । प्रवृत्तो न प्रवर्तस्यति किं तर्हि प्रवर्तते एवानन्तानां शरीरादिभावेन परस्परानुग्रहेण च । नेयं क्रिया कदाचिदपि भूतभविष्यद्रूपा भवति । किन्तर्हि वर्तमानरूपा । यथा वहन्ति नद्यः तिष्ठन्ति पर्वता इति । तत्त्वभूतभावाख्य इत्युक्तानां निगमार्थं प्रत्याम्नायं करोति । तत्त्वाख्यो महदादिर्भावाख्यो धर्मादिर्भूताख्यो व्योमादिः । पुरुषं पुरुषं प्रति विमोक्षः प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षः । तदर्थं प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थम् । सर्वपुरुषाधिकारनिबद्धायाः सर्वशक्तेर्निराकांक्षीकरणार्थमित्यर्थः । स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः । कार्यकारणभावेन । तत्र कार्यस्य तावच्छब्दादेः स्वार्थं इवेन्द्रियाणां विषयभावः । इन्द्रियाणामप्राप्तविषयाणां लौक्यमधिष्ठानविकारानुमेयं स्वार्थमिव । करणानां च संकल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायानां विषयद्वारिभावोपगमनं मनःप्रभृतीनां च स्वप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वम् । मनोऽहंकारयोश्च बुद्धौ स्वप्रवृत्त्युपसंहारो बुद्धेश्च शान्तधोरमूढत्वं व्यवसायकर्तृत्वं च सत्त्वरजस्तमसां च प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमलक्षणैर्धर्मैः परस्परपकारित्वम् । न चैष स्वार्थः, सर्वस्यास्याचैतन्यात् । किं तर्हि परार्थं एवायमारम्भः । संघातत्वादिति ।

Thus, after duly explaining the evolution, the seer states summarising the same:

*This evolution (of three kinds) called the evolution of elements, evolution of objects, and the evolution of mental dispositions brought about by cosmic matter itself proceeds for the emancipation of each conscious entity (and thus) for other's sake (though appearing) for the sake of (cosmic matter) itself.*

Through the mention of the word 'iti' (the author) suggests end of (the discussion about) evolution. Through the word 'eṣa' the (subject matter) already stated is intended again for the sake of conclusion. The term 'brought' out by cosmic matter means that which is

done by cosmic matter. Through this (is suggested that) for the purpose of ending the discussion the existence of cosmic matter is already established through the direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. The negation of the atom, etc., is intended. It (the evolution) is brought by cosmic matter and not through something else like atom.<sup>1</sup> Through the word 'proceeds' the (author) states continuance of the activity. It has neither finished its activity nor will it undertake the activity in future. On the other hand, the activity is going on in the form of the bodies, etc., of infinite souls and also through mutual favour (i. e. to both cosmic matter and conscious entity).<sup>2</sup> This kind of activity is never of the form of past or future. On the contrary, it is in the form of presence, as in the case of 'the rivers flow', 'the mountains are there', etc. Through the expression 'the evolution of the elements, beings and mental disposition', the author names (those) earlier stated to conclude. 'Of the element' refers to the intellect, etc., 'of dispositions' refers to virtue etc., and of elements to the sky, etc. The expression emancipation of each conscious entity means the emancipation of all the conscious entities individually. That proceeding for that is conveyed through the expression for the liberation of each of the conscious entity. The sense is that for the purpose of removing (fulfilling) the desire of the power attached to all the conscious entities separately. The evolution is meant for other appearing (as if) it is meant for the (cosmic matter) itself. It is through the relation of effect and cause.<sup>3</sup> The effects like word are related to the senses as their objects; hence the creation is as if for themselves. The greediness of the senses which have not attained their objects, inferred through the change in their location is as if for their own sake. Similar is the case with becoming the gate of the objects in case of raising doubt, ideation and determination; similar is the case of becoming the object of the activity in case of mind, etc. Similar is the case with the merging of their activity by mind and egoism into intellect; intellect's attaining the state of calm, turbulent and deluding as also the agency of determination; similarly, becoming mutually helpful in case of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas which have the characteristic features of light, activity and restraining respectively. It is in fact not meant for their own sake (i.e. for agent) because all are non-sentient in nature. On the contrary, the commencement of the activity is (actually) meant for other; because of their being composite in nature.<sup>4</sup>

(Multiplicity of the cosmic matter refuted)



आह, यदुक्तं प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थमयमारम्भ इति तदयुक्तम् । आचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः । प्रतिपुरुषमन्यत्रधानं शरीराद्यर्थं करोति । तेषां च माहात्म्यशरीरप्रधानं यदा प्रवर्तते तदेतराप्यपि । तन्निवृत्तौ च तेषामपि निवृत्तिरिति पौरिकः सांख्याचार्यो मन्यते । तत्कथमप्रतिषिध्यैका प्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते इति ?

Opponent : The statement that the commencement of activity is meant for the liberation of each conscious entity is wrong; because there is difference of opinion amongst the authorities. The cosmic matter attached with each conscious entity forms the objects like body, etc. (for that conscious entity). Out of them, when the magnanimous body starts functioning, the others also do so. And, when that stops activity, they also stop functioning—thus believes the Sāṃkhya authority Paurika. Then, without refuting it how can it be accepted that the cosmic matter is one.

उच्यते—न, प्रमाणाभावात् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षत एव तच्छक्यं निश्चेतुम् । प्रधानानामतीन्द्रियत्वात् । लिङ्गं चाऽसन्दिग्धं नास्ति । आप्ताश्च नो नाऽभिदधुरतो मन्यामहे नैतदेवमिति । किंच एकैकार्थपरिसमाप्तेः । अपरिमितत्वादेतदेकं प्रधानमलं सर्वपुरुषशरीरोत्पादनाय । तस्मादन्यपरिकल्पनानर्थक्यम् । परिमितमिति चेदथ मतम्, परिमितं प्रधानमिति न, उच्छेदप्रसंगात् । एवमपि तस्योच्छेदः प्राप्तः क्षीरवत् । तथा च संसारोच्छेदप्रसंगः । किं च अनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । एकस्येश्वरस्य योगिनो वेच्छोयोगादनेकशरीरत्वम् । तत्परिमितादयुक्तम् । प्रतिशरीरं वा प्रधानपरिकल्पने प्रधानाऽनवस्था भवति । परिमितशरीरकारणत्वाभ्युपगमादन्यपरिकल्पनानर्थक्यम् । ततश्च प्रधानैकत्वमेव । तस्मादयुक्तं प्रतिपुरुषं प्रधानानीति । यत्तुक्तं माहात्म्यशरीरप्रधानप्रवृत्तावितरेषां प्रवृत्तिस्तन्निवृत्तौ निवृत्तिरित्यत्र ब्रूमः—न, अतिशयाभावात् । यथा क्षेत्रज्ञानां निरतिशयत्वादितरेतराऽप्रवर्तकत्वमेवमेषामपि सातिशयत्वे वा प्रधानानुपपत्तिप्रसंगः, वैषम्यात् । तस्माद्युक्तं प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थमेका प्रकृतिः प्रवर्तत इति ॥ ५६ ॥

Proponent : No, there is no proof (for it). It cannot be decided so through perception, because all the cosmic matters are beyond the reach of the senses. Nor is there some undoubtless probans. We have not accepted the person stating like this as reliable and hence we believe that it is not so.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the purpose can be fulfilled with one (cosmic matter) only. Since it is not limited in magnitude, the single conscious entity only is enough to produce the bodies for all the conscious entities. Therefore,

the postulation of some other serves no purpose. If it is argued that since the cosmic matter is limited in magnitude, it may be like this : if it is said, that the cosmic matter is limited in magnitude. It is not so because it would involve the undesirable contingency of its complete destruction. In this way also arises the undesirable contingency of the destruction of that as in the case of the milk.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, there arises the undesirable contingency of the complete destruction of the world. Moreover, it involves the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. (Also) because a single yogi or Īśvara attains many bodies through will, which becomes unjustifiable due to the finite nature of the cosmic matter. Or, if the cosmic matter is supposed to be different in case of each body, there arises the undesirable contingency of (the number of) cosmic matter. Since it is accepted as the cause of the body which is limited in magnitude, the postulation of some other cosmic matter serves no purpose. And, hence, this cosmic matter is one only. Therefore, it is wrong that the cosmic matters are different in case of conscious entity. As regards the statement that the others start functioning when the cosmic matter attached with the principal conscious entity starts functioning and when that ceases to function, the others also cease, we say: no, because there is no superiority. Just as the souls cannot activate each other due to the lack of superiority amongst them, in the same of these way, (cosmic matters) also. Or, if the superiority exists (in cosmic matters), there will arise the undesirable contingency of the un-justification (of acceptance of cosmic matter) because of the dissimilarity. Therefore, that only a single cosmic matter proceeds to act for the purpose of liberating each conscious entity, is right.

## KĀRIKĀ 56

1. The expression brought about by cosmic matter implies :  
(i) the existence of cosmic matter, (ii) causality of cosmic matter, (iii) refutation of the other causes like atoms postulated by other systematists.
2. The sense is that the cosmic matter always goes on doing the activity. It is inferred through the bodies always produced from the cosmic matter.
3. I.e., the cosmic matter fulfills the purpose of the conscious entity by creating the bodies.
4. The sense is that a composite is necessarily meant for some non-composite. Cf. Kārikā 14.
5. It wards off the possibility of the third means of knowledge, viz., verbal testimony.
6. If it is admitted that many cosmic matter act for the fulfilment of the purpose assigned to them separately, the cosmic matter would be limited in magnitude and consequently non-eternal. It is justified through an analogy. Milk is limited in nature and comes separately from many cows for individual calves and is destructible. The same would be the case if the cosmic matters are considered to be many.

## KĀRIKĀ 57

(Activity of the non-sentient cosmic matter)

आह, तदनुपपत्तिराचेतन्यात् । इहाऽचेतनानां घटादीनामुद्दिश्य प्रवृत्तिरदृष्टा । सा चेदियमचेतना प्रकृतिरस्या अप्युद्दिश्य पुरुषार्थं प्रवृत्तिर्नोपपद्यते । भवति चेच्चेतन्यं तर्हि प्राप्तमस्याः । तत्र यदुक्तं प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्तिरिति एतदयुक्तमिति ।

Opponent : *There arises the impossibility of that (activity of cosmic matter) because it is non-sentient in nature.* The activity is not observed in case of the non-sentient objects like pot. If the cosmic matter is also non-sentient, the activity for the object of the conscious entity is not possible in case of it also. If the activity is there, it (cosmic matter) would be sentient. Then, the statement that the cosmic matter acts for the purpose of liberating every conscious entity becomes wrong.

उच्यते- न, दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेः ।

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।

पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

यथा क्षीरमचेतनं वत्सविवृद्धिमुद्दिश्य प्रवर्तते, एवं प्रधानमपि पुरुषविमोक्षमुद्दिश्य प्रवर्तते । न चास्य चैतन्यं स्यात् । साध्यत्वादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यात् मतम्, साध्यमेतत् किं क्षीरस्योद्दिश्य वत्सविवृद्धिं प्रवृत्तिः, अथ नेति ? तस्मादुदाहरणं साध्यत्वादयुक्तमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? तदभावेऽभावात् तद्भावे च भावात् । यत्र नास्ति वत्सविवृद्धिस्तत्र न क्षीरस्य प्रवृत्तिरुपलब्धा । यत्रास्ति तत्रोपलब्धा । यद्यस्मिन् सति भवति तस्य तदर्थं प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथा घटे कुम्भकारस्य । स चाऽयमीदृशोऽस्माकमुद्देशोऽभिप्रेतः यदुत तादर्थ्यम् । तस्मान्नास्त्युदाहरणसाध्यत्वमिति ।

Proponent : No, because of the justification through an example. *As there is the activity (of flowing) in the non-sentient milk for the growth of a calf, so is the activity of the cosmic matter for the liberation of the conscious entity.*

As the insentient milk acts (i.e. flows) for the purpose of the growth of the calf, so the cosmic matter also acts for the purpose of the liberation of the conscious entity. And, it would not come to be sentient also. If it is argued that it is wrong because it is still to be proved, it may be like this : It is still to be proved whether the activity (of flowing) in case of milk is for the purpose of the growth of calf or not. Therefore, the example is wrong because it is still to be proved. This is also wrong. Why? Because it (i.e. flowing of milk) is absent in the absence of that (purpose) and it is present in the presence of that. Wherever the growth of the calf is not present, the activity (of flowing) of the milk is not observed. And it is observed wherever the earlier exists. If it is observed in the presence of this (purpose), the activity is observed to be meant for this (purpose), just as the activity of a potter with reference to a pot. This kind of purpose is meant by us when we say that it is meant for that. Therefore, the example is not yet to be proved.<sup>1</sup>

(Evolution does not contradict the theory of Satkārya)

असद्भावाऽभिधानात्सत्कार्यविरोध इति चेन्न, व्यक्तिपर्यायत्वात् । व्यक्तिपर्यायो हि तदिति शास्त्रलोकप्रामाण्यात् । शास्त्रं तावत् सत्तामात्रमहान् व्यक्तिमात्र इत्यर्थः । लोकेऽपि नास्त्यस्मिन्कूपे सलिलमित्युच्यते । न क्वचिदपि कूपे सलिलं नास्त्यभिव्यक्तं न तद् भवति । तस्मान्न सत्कार्यविरोधः ।

If it is argued that it would contradict the theory of pre-existence of the effect in the cause because of the statement of its (earlier) non-existence. We reply No, because that (production) is synonym of the manifestation. Through the authority of the scriptures and the worldly behaviour (we maintain that) that (production) is synonym of manifestation. The scripture also declares that the intellect is only existent which means that it is only in manifest form. In the worldly usage also it is stated that 'there is no water in this well'. It is not that the water is not there anywhere in the well, (the fact is that) it is not manifest. Therefore, it does not involve the contradiction with the theory of the prior existence of the effect in the cause.

(God does not inspire for the activity)

अदृष्टप्रेरणत्वादसिद्धिरिति चेदथ मतम् धर्माधर्मप्रेरितं क्षीरं प्रवर्तते न वत्सविवृद्धयर्थमिति, तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? दोषसाम्यात् । धर्माधर्मावचेतनौ विवृद्धिकाले क्षीरं प्रवर्तयतस्तदवसाने च निवर्तयतः । तस्मादित्यमपि परिकल्प्यमाने समानो दोषः । ईश्वरप्रेरणादिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् ईश्वरस्तत्र क्षीरं प्रवर्तयते वत्सार्थं, न स्वयमिति । तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? प्रतिषे-

धात् । प्राकप्रतिषिद्धमीश्वरकर्म । तस्मादिदमप्युक्तम् । एवं चेदवस्थितो दृष्टान्तः । वार्षगणानां तु यथा स्त्रीपुंशरीराणामचेतनानामुद्दिश्येत्तरेतरं प्रवृत्तिस्तथा प्रधानस्येत्ययं दृष्टान्तः ।

If it is argued that the case is not proved because the cosmic matter is inspired to act by the unseen factor like virtue, vice, etc., the case may be like this. The milk fows when inspired by virtue and vice and not the growth of the calf.

That is also wrong.

Why?

Because it involves the similar defect. Virtue and vice which are non-sentient in nature inspire the milk to flow at the time of growth and cease to do so when the (purpose of) growth is over. Therefore, even in this postulation, there arises the same defect.<sup>2</sup> If it is argued that it (flowing of milk) is due to the inspiration of God, the case may be like this. The God causes the milk to flow for the calf and the milk does not flow itself. That is also wrong.

Why?

Because it is (already) refuted. The act in God is already negated (by us). Therefore, it is also wrong. If this is the case, the example stands (unrefuted). The followers of Vārṣaganya put forth this example (in this context). Just as there is the activity in the non-sentient bodies of man and woman towards each other, similarly (there is the activity) in the case of non-sentient cosmic matter.

आह, कथमवगम्यते तादर्थ्यादुत्पन्नेन व्यक्तेन पुरुषस्य सम्बन्धो न पुनः सान्निध्यमात्रात्, भिक्षुवदिति ?

Opponent : How is it known that the conscious entity is related with the manifest which originates for that and not merely through vicinity, as in the case of a mendicant<sup>3</sup>.

उच्यते—न, अनपवर्गप्रसंगात् । सान्निध्यमात्रात्पुरुषोपभोगमभ्युपगच्छतो नापवर्गप्रसंगः स्यान्नित्यसान्निध्यात् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Proponent : No, because it involves the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation. In the case of one who admits the experience of the conscious entity merely through vicinity there arises the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation because the vicinity is eternal (always). Therefore, it is wrong.

(Activity towards the one not causing it)

अप्रवर्तयितारं प्रति कार्यकारणानां प्रवृत्तिरयुक्तेति चेत् स्यान्मतम्— अप्रवर्तयिता कृष्यादीनां भिक्षुरतो न तेषामपि तं प्रति प्रवृत्तिः। एवमप्रवर्तयिता कार्यकारणानां पुरुषः। तस्मात्तेषामपि तं प्रति प्रवृत्तिरयुक्तेत्येतदप्यत एवाऽनैकान्तिकम्। वत्सो हि क्षीरस्याऽप्रवर्तयिताऽथ च तं प्रति तस्य प्रवृत्तिः। तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्पुरुषविमोक्षार्था प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्तिर्न चैतन्यप्रसंग इति ॥ ५७ ॥

If it is argued that it is wrong to admit the activity of the causes (to bring out an effect) towards the one who does not instigate? It may be like this. The mendicant is not an instigator of the harvest etc., hence the harvest does not grow for him. Similarly, the conscious entity is also not an instigator of the act. (But) it is non-conclusive to say that it is wrong that the activity of those is meant for him. The calf is not the instigator of the activity of milk but still the flowing of the milk is there for him. Therefore, it is right to say that the activity of cosmic matter is for the liberation of the conscious entity, and it does not involve the undesirable contingency of (admitting) the sentient of the cosmic matter.

## KĀRIKĀ 57

1. The argument has met severe criticism at the hands of other systems specially the Advaita vedānta. The interpretation of purpose offered by the Yuktidīpikā minimizes the force of the criticism. It is true to say with the critics that the milk is observed to come out of cow's udders even after the death of the calf leading to admit that the purpose of calf does not inspire the flow of the milk of the cow. Similarly, the purpose of the conscious entity also does not inspire the cosmic matter to evolve. The Yuktidīpikā gives a clue to interpret the argument as everything in the universe is designed naturally and the purpose of others is served thereby. Just as milk comes out of the udder of the cow naturally and the nourishment of the calf takes place. If such a purpose is not admitted, the objects of the universe become purposeless.
2. The sense is that in this case also activity would be inspired by non-sentient only.
3. What the objector means is that the conscious entity should be considered to come in contact with anybody and not with the one specially prepared for it just as the mendicant gets any food not specially prepared for him.

## KĀRIKĀ 58

(Activity is natural in cosmic matter)

आह, न, अप्रवृत्तिप्रसंगात् । यदि प्रधानस्य पुरुषकैवल्यार्था प्रवृत्तिस्तेन तदभावे कैवल्यं सिद्धमेवेत्यप्रवृत्तिप्रसंगः । अथ केवले पुरुषे प्रधानं प्रवर्तते न तर्ह्यस्य तदर्था प्रवृत्तिरिति ।

Opponent : No, because it involves the undesirable contingency of absence of initial activity. If the initial activity of cosmic matter is meant for the isolation of conscious entity, in that case the isolation is already accomplished in the absence of that (activity) and, hence, arises the undesirable contingency of the absence of initial activity. When the cosmic matter starts its initial activity. When the conscious entity is in the state of isolation, its initial activity is not meant for that (isolation) of the conscious entity.

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।

पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

प्रागेवैतदपदिष्टम्—यथा दृश्यदर्शनशक्तियुक्तत्वादन्तराभावे च तयोरानर्थक्यात्प्रधानपुरुषयोरितरेतरसम्बन्धं प्रत्यौत्सुक्यम् । दृष्टा चोपरमार्थाऽपि लोकस्यौत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्था प्रवृत्तिस्तथा प्रधानस्याऽप्युपरमार्था प्रवृत्तिः । अथ दृश्यदर्शनशक्त्यत्योरौत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं प्रवर्तते इत्येकत्र कृतार्थं त्वादितरेष्वप्रवृत्तिप्रसंग इति चेत् स्यादेतत् । प्रधानमेकस्य पुरुषस्यात्मानं प्रकाशयोपरमेदेदृश्यदर्शनशक्त्योरौत्सुक्यनिवृत्तिर्भविष्यति ॥ ५८ ॥

Proponent : AS THE WORLDLY MAN BEGINS ACTIVITY TO SATISFY THE DESIRE, IN THE SAME WAY THE COSMIC MATTER STARTS ITS ACTIVITY FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY.

It is already stated earlier that there is the desire for mutual contact in cosmic matter and conscious entity since they are respectively possessed of the power of being an object of enjoyment and the agent of enjoyment, and because both will be meaningless in the

absence of the other. In the worldly life also it is observed that the activity for the purpose of satisfying the desire is meant for its cessation only; similarly, the activity of the cosmic matter is also meant for its cessation only. If it is argued that cosmic matter starts the activity for the satisfaction of the desire due to the power of the object of experience and the agent of experience, there would arise the undesirable contingency of non-proceeding to the activity towards the other conscious entities when it has fulfilled its purpose in one case (i.e. has proceeded for activity for conscious entity), it may be like this. The cosmic matter would desist from the activity after showing itself to one conscious entity and in this way there will result the satisfaction of the desire of the power of being the object to be enjoyed and that of being an agent of enjoyment.<sup>1</sup>

## KĀRIKĀ 58

1. It explains that the cause of initial activity is the inherent nature of cosmic matter to evolve, while the cessation of it is caused by the fulfilment of the purpose of conscious entity.

## KĀRIKĀ 59

(Cosmic matter desists from activity after rise of knowledge)

अप्रवृत्तिश्चेत्येतदपि नोपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? दृष्टान्तान्तरसामर्थ्यात् । तद्यथा किम् ?  
उच्यते—

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।

पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाशय विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

तत्र नानावर्णस्वभावविज्ञानानां प्रेक्षार्थिनां पुरुषाणां संपातो रङ्ग इत्युच्यते । नर्त-  
क्याश्च तदाराधना नृत्तिक्रियाऽनेकपुरुषार्था । यदि वाऽत्र कश्चिद् ब्रूयात् नृत्ताचार्येण कुशील-  
वैर्वा दृष्टव्यं कस्मान्न निवर्तते ? कथम् ? अकृतार्थत्वात् । एवं सर्वपुरुषाणां कार्यकारणस-  
म्बन्धेनौत्सुक्यवतां निराकांक्षीकरणार्थं प्रवृत्ता प्रकृतिः कथमेकस्य पुरुषस्यौत्सुक्यनिवृत्तौ  
कृतार्था स्यात् ? तस्मान्नैकस्य पुरुषस्यात्मानं प्रकाशय प्रकृतेर्निवृत्तिर्युक्तेति । अत्र च—

It is also not correct to say that there is no activity at all.

Why?

Because of the force of the other example.

What is that like?

*Just as a female dancer having shown (her dance) to the spec-  
tators (stage) desists from dancing, the cosmic matter desists from ac-  
ting after showing herself to the sentient entity.*

The stage is the group of people desirous of seeing (the dance),  
are of various castes, nature and knowledge (intellectual develop-  
ment). The act of gratifying that i.e. the act of dancing by the dancer  
is meant for many persons. If someone asks here why does it (danc-  
ing girl) not desist (from dancing) when it is seen by the teacher of  
dance or the other actors or the newsmongers?

How is it?

Because it has not fulfilled her purpose. Similarly, how can the  
cosmic matter be contented after satisfying the desire of a single con-  
scious entity when it starts its activity for the purpose of satisfying  
the desire of many person through the cause-effect relation?

Kārikā 59

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Therefore, the desisting from the activity is not justified after  
showing itself to a single conscious entity (in case of cosmic matter).  
And here<sup>1</sup>.....

KĀRIKĀ 59

1: Some portion of the text is lost here.



## KĀRIKĀ 64

(Rise of true knowledge)

कार्यकरणक्रियासाक्षी पुरुषः। तस्माद्ये भौतिकाः शिरस्याण्यादयो ये चाहंकारिकाः श्रवणादयो वचनादयः संकल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायाश्च ते लक्षणविपर्ययात्— नाहं नाष्टौ प्रकृतयः। तदेतदेवं तत्त्वानामभ्यासैकाग्रमनसो यतेः पुनः पुनरभ्यासात् एकस्याप्यस्मितारूपस्य परिकल्पितविषयभेदप्रतिषेधमुखेन

नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम्।

आप्रकृतेः प्रतिपक्षग्रहणात्

अविपर्ययात्

पञ्चस्रोतसोऽस्याऽविद्यापर्वणो निवृत्तेः शान्तं ध्रुवं सकलभावानुबन्धप्रतिपक्षभूतं धर्माद्याप्यायितस्य बुद्धितत्त्वस्याऽसन्दिग्धमविपरीतं

विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

The conscious entity is the witness of the effect, instrument of activity and the acts. Therefore, the elemental objects like head, hands, etc., and the products of egoism like the ears etc., and the organ of speech, etc., and also the doubt, I-notion and determination— are not myself since their nature is opposite. Nor am I the eight causes (modificants). Through the repeated practice in this way in case of self-controlled aspirant who concentrates on the practice of (pondering over) the categories (or Truth), about the egoistic sense through the negation of identity with the imaginary objects (following is the result):

The complete (knowledge arises that) *I am not, nothing is mine, not-I*

And due to the cognition of the opposite nature (of the categories) right from the cosmic matter.

*On account of absence of Error.*

Due to the cessation of the states of ignorance of five kinds (lit. flowing in five streams), there arises undisturbed, eternal, contradictory to the adherence to all the mental dispositions, without doubt

## Kārikā 64

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non-perverted knowledge of the intellect in which virtue, etc., have increased,

*arises pure and absolute knowledge.*

(Difference between pure and absolute)

आह, विशुद्धं केवलम्। अन्यतराऽनभिधानमर्थाभेदात्। यदेव विशुद्धं तदेव केवल-  
मत्यर्थाभेदादन्यतरच्छक्यमवकुमिति।

Opponent : The pure is itself the absolute,<sup>1</sup> one of them should not be mentioned because there is no difference in meaning. Whatever is pure, is absolute and, hence, because of the non-difference in meaning it was possible not to mention the one of the two.

उच्यते— गुणान्तररूपनिवृत्तिहेतुत्वात्। रजस्तमोधर्माणां तावद् ग्रहणाच्छुद्धं संशयवि-  
पर्यव्यतिरिक्तं च केवलं क्षेत्रज्ञपरिज्ञानेऽपूर्वमेव इति ॥ ६४ ॥

Proponent : Because it is the cause of dispelling the form of the other constituents (than Sattva). It is pure which is so due to non-accompaniment of Rajas and Tamas, and is absolute, devoid of doubt and perversion and is extraordinary (or quite a new) knowledge of soul.

(The body is not destroyed first after attaining knowledge. . .)

आह, तत्समकालमेव शरीरस्य पातः प्राप्नोति। सति ध—वस्थानेनाज्ञानहेतुकं शरीर-  
मिति।

Opponent : It comes to imply the destruction of the body at the rise of that kanteā the result of ignorance.<sup>2</sup>

## KĀRIKĀ 64

1. The sense is that the pure knowledge would be devoid of any kind of mistake while the absolute also means the same.
2. Some portion of the text after it which also perhaps contained the commentary on Kārikā 65 and 66, is lost.

## KĀRIKĀ 67

उच्यते—अज्ञानहेतुकं शरीरम् । अथ चायं नानात्वदर्शी ।

धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रभ्रमवद् धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

य—शरीरान्तरोपार्जिता धर्मादयो न तावत्कारणम् । बुद्धि—मुपसंप्राप्ता अकृतार्थत्वाद् बुद्धिश्च प्रधानं तदा तिष्ठत्ययं नानात्वदर्शी तस्य संस्कारस्य सामर्थ्यात् । को दृष्टान्तः ? चक्रभ्रमवद् धृतशरीरः । तद्यथा कुम्भकारप्रयत्नविशिष्टेन दण्डेन घटादिनिष्पत्तियोग्य-क्रिया चक्रस्य भ्रमः । तेन तुल्यं चक्रभ्रमवत् । यथा चक्रभ्रमणं घटार्थम् । निष्पन्ने घटे पूर्वसं-स्कारानुरोधान्न निवर्तते न च तदा निवृत्तिमिति कृत्वा संस्कारक्षयेऽप्यवतिष्ठते, एवं सम्यग्द-र्शनार्थं शरीरं सम्यग्ज्ञानाऽधिगमे ऽपि न निवर्तते पूर्वसंस्कारवशात् । न च तदा निवृत्तिमिति कृत्वा संस्कारक्षयेऽप्यवस्थाप्यत इति ॥ ६७ ॥

Proponent : The body is the result of ignorance.<sup>1</sup> Hence, the aspirant is the knower of the distinction. *When virtue and the rest cease to be the cause, the knower (of discrimination) remains invested with the body due to the past impression (impulse) just as the revolving of the potter's wheel through the earlier momentum (or impulse).*

The virtue, etc., acquired in earlier life (body) do not serve as the cause. Intellect<sup>2</sup>. . . (The virtue, etc.,) are located in the intellect as they have not served their purpose. The intellect is, however, the cosmic matter itself, then the person invested with the discriminative knowledge remains (embodied) due to the force of past impression (impulse).<sup>3</sup>

What is the example here?

*He remains with the body like the revolving of potter's wheel.* It is like this. The revolving of the potter's wheel is the act capable of (meant for) producing the pot, etc., caused by the stick which has come to be an object of the effort of the potter. Similar to the potter's wheel means 'like that'. The revolving of the wheel is meant for (the production of the) pot. It (the revolving) does not come to an end even when the pot is produced on account of the past

momentum or impulse. Nor does it subsist after the impression of past momentum is over. Similarly, the body meant for the rise of right knowledge exists even when the right knowledge is acquired on account of the past impressions. Nor does it subsist after the past impressions are over.

## KĀRIKĀ 67

1. The author introduces the problem as to why the body does not perish just after the attainment of knowledge.
2. Some part of the text is lost here.
3. The cause of further birth is over but the liberated person remains embodied.

## KĀRIKĀ 68

(Merging of the objects into cosmic matter)

यदा तु संस्कारक्षये तन्निमित्तस्य शरीरस्य भेदः, अतः

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे

धर्माधर्मौ कृतार्थौ कारणे बुद्धिलक्षणे लयं गच्छतः । यश्चास्य भूतावयवः शरीरारम्भकः स सर्वभूतेषु भूतानि तन्मात्रेषु, इन्द्रियाणि तन्मात्राणि चाहंकारे, अहंकारो बुद्धौ बुद्धिरव्यक्ते । सेयं तत्त्वानुपूर्वी तदर्थं प्रधानादुत्पन्ना परिसमाप्ते पुनः प्रधानं प्रलयं गच्छति । प्रधानमप्यर्थ-वशादेवास्य शरीरणि तेषु जात्यन्तरपरितेषु करोति । स चार्थश्चरितार्थः

When the dispositions come to an end, the body caused by them is separated ( from the conscion entity), then :

*After attaining the separation from the body.*

The virtue and vice which have fulfilled their purpose get merged into the intellect the parts of the material elements which cause the formation of the body (get merged) in all the gross elements, the gross elements into the subtle elements, the senses and the subtle element into egoism, egoism, intellect into the unmanifest (cosmic matter). This series of elements is produced from the cosmic matter for that purpose and gets merged again into the cosmic matter when that (purpose) is over.<sup>1</sup> The cosmic matter also produced the body in different series of births for the conscion entity for that purpose only. And, that purpose is fulfilled ; therefore.

(Attainment of liberation)

अतः

चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।

अतीन्द्रियमसंवेद्यं लघु सर्वत्र सन्निहितं प्रशस्तमनिर्मितं विशुद्धमक्षयं निरतिशयम्

एकान्तमात्यन्तिकमभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥६८॥

एतच्चावस्थानं बौद्धैर्निरुपदिशेष निर्वानलक्षणमपवर्गो व्याख्यातः । एतत्परं ब्रह्म ध्रुवममलमभयमत्र सर्वेषां गुणधर्माणां प्रतिप्रलयः । एतत्प्राप्य सर्वायासैः सर्वबन्धनैरनादिका-लप्रवृत्तरागद्वेषवियुक्तो मुक्तो भवति । एतदर्थं ब्राह्मणा दयिपुत्रदारधनसम्बन्धमपहाय गुरु-

शुश्रूषापराः शरीरमरणेषु यातयन्ति । कथं नामैकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकं च कैवल्यं स्यादिति । यत्रैवोत्थानं शास्त्रस्य तत्रैवोपसंहार आचार्येण कृतः ॥६८॥

*When the cosmic matter ceases to act because the purpose is fulfilled.*

Then (the conscion entity attains liberation) is felt by the one who has got over the senses, subtle, present everywhere, praiseworthy (commended) non-created, pure, non-destructible and complete:

*(The conscion entity) attains liberation which is both eternal and final.*

This state has been explained by the buddhists as the liberation in the form of nirvana in which no condition for attribute exists. <sup>1</sup> Above this is the Brahman eternal, pure and devoid of fear. <sup>2</sup> Here is the re-merger of all the attributed of the conscion entity. After attaining this and after getting devoid of attachment and aversion which took place for a beginningless time one is liberated from all troubles (or efforts), and bindings. For this the Brahmins after abandoning the relation with all dear ones, son, wife, and wealth exert their bodies in the forests engaging themselves in the service of the preceptor. How may there arise the eternal and final isolation — with this the preceptor concluded the sastra with which he started it. <sup>3</sup>

## KĀRIKĀ 68

1. The process of merging back is opposite to that of evolution.
2. This is the sign of influence of upaniṣadic philosophy on Sāṃkhya. In strict Sāṃkhya terminology Brahman may be interpreted as the creative aspect of the cosmic matter.
3. With this the doctrinal part of the bood comes to an end.

## KARIKĀ 69

(Purpose of the Sāṃkhya philosophy)

आह, किमर्थं पुनरिदं शास्त्रं केन वा पूर्वं प्रकाशितमिति ?

Opponent : For what purpose and by whom was this śāstra related in the Beginning.

उच्यते—यदुक्तं किमर्थमिति—

पुरुषार्थार्थमिदम्

कथं नामाज्ञानवशात्तत्संस्कारोपनिपतितानां प्राणिनामपवर्गः स्यादित्येवमर्थमिदं शास्त्रं व्याख्यातम् ।

Proponent : As to the question for what purpose (was this śāstra related) —

### FOR THE OBJECT OF HUMAN LIFE WAS THIS...

How can there be the liberation of the beings who fall pray of the past impressions due to their ignorance—for this purpose the śāstra is related.

(Kapila expounded the Sāṃkhya system)

यतूक्तं केनेति, उच्यते—

गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।

गुह्यमिति गूहनीयम् । रहस्यमकृतात्मनां यमनियमेष्वनवस्थितानामादरादप्यन्यथेयम् । परमर्षिर्भगवान्सांसिद्धिकैर्मर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्चर्यै राविष्टपिण्डो विश्वाग्रजः कपिलमुनिः । तेन कपिलमुनिना समाख्यातम् ।

As to the question by whom, the reply is: *The secret (śāstra) was expounded by the great seer.*

Secret means 'not to be disclosed'. The secret taught by the men who are not disciplined and not engaged in social restrictions and personal restrictions etc., are not worth studying even if there is

some respect for them. The greatest seer Kapila possessed of a body with natural virtue, knowledge, detachment and lordly powers is the first-born in the world. (It is) expounded by that Muni Kapila. The term expounded means expounded in a right manner—it is because of his capability of expounding the stream of learning practised for a long time.

(Secrecy of the subject matter)

सम्यगाख्यातम्, चिराभ्यस्तस्य विद्यास्रोतसो निर्वचनसामर्थ्यात् स्यादेतत्, कथमिदं गुह्यमिति ? उच्यते—कथं वेदं गुह्यं न स्यात् ?

It may be asked how is it secret. To this the reply is: how can this Veda (source of learning) not be a secret?

(Contents of the Sāṃkhya philosophy)

भवाप्रोत्पन्नैरपि सनकसनातनसन्दनसन्तकुमारप्रभृतिभिरनित्यानां

स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते च यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

तत्र स्थितिस्तावद्रूपप्रवृत्तिफलनिर्देशेनोत्पत्तिरपि प्रकृतेर्महानित्यादिः । प्रलयोऽप्यविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्येति वचनात् । औत्सुक्याऽनुपरमात्मकतिपुरुषयोः स्थितिरुत्पत्तिर्दृश्यदर्शनशक्तयोः सापेक्षत्वात् । तथा चोक्तं—

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थः कैवल्यार्थस्तथा प्रधानस्य ।

पञ्चवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ इति (का. २१)

प्रलयः प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात्प्रधानविनिवृत्ताविति (का. ६८) । अथवा स्थिति-क्षणभङ्गप्रतिषेधात्कालान्तरेष्वस्यानाशादुत्पत्तिर्विपरिणामात्राभूतप्रादुर्भावादकस्मादसम्भवात्, प्रलयोऽपि निमित्तान्तरात्तत्त्वाभाव्यादेव भूतानामपि व्यक्तानां निष्पत्तिमतामिति यावत् । एवं च महदादयोऽपि परिगृहीता इति ।

(Where) by Sanaka Sanātana, Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, etc., who were born in the beginning of the world, with regard to mortals:

*The origin, duration and dissolution of the objects is considered.*

Out of them duration (is considered) through the mention of form, activity and result; origination (is considered) through 'from the cosmic matter arises intellect, etc.'; the dissolution is also (taught) from the statements as because of the non-difference of the world. The duration and origination are caused by non-satisfaction of the desire of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity because the power of experiencing and the power of being experienced mutually require each other. It is stated also.

For the perception of (the cosmic matter by) the conscious entity, and for cosmic matter's purpose of the isolation (of the conscious entity) takes place the contact of the two like that of the lame and the blind. The creation is caused by that .(k. 21).

Dissolution (is considered) as 'after getting separated from the body, when the cosmic matter ceases to act because the purpose is fulfilled', etc. Or duration (is taught) through negating the momentariness because it does not meet destruction at the other time; because the production is the modification (of the material cause) because that which did not exist is not produced and because there is no possibility of a sudden production (i.e. without a cause). The dissolution also (is taught) with regard to the manifest objects which are produced and are liable to that by nature with some other efficient cause. And thus, the intellect, etc., are also included (considered).

आह, पुरुषादयस्तर्हि परित्यक्ताः । कथं वा भूतशब्द इति ?

Opponent : Then, the conscious entity, etc., are left out. How then the word object (in the Kārikā) holds good?

उच्यते- वितथप्रतिषेधार्थत्वात् । यावत् किं चिदवितथं भूतं तस्य सर्वस्येह स्थित्यादय उच्यन्त इति । उत्पत्तिविनाशप्रतिषेधाविशेषात् । एवमपि पुरुषादीनामुत्पत्तिप्रलयावपि प्राप्नुतः । किं कारणम् ? अविशेषादिति । उच्यते- सम्भवतो विशेषणं भवति । तत्र स्थितिरेव पुरुषादीनाम् । इतरेषां तु स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलया इति विज्ञास्याम् ॥ ६९ ॥

Proponent : This is to negate the falsity of the objects. The sustenance, etc., are said with reference to all the objects which are not false because the fresh (production) and absolute (destruction) are commonly negated.

In this case also, the production and dissolution also become applicable to conscious entity, etc., also.

What is the reason?

Because it is common (to all objects) .

Reply : The characteristic is applicable (only) where it is possible. Hence, in case of conscious entity, etc., there is merely the sustenance. In case of others, however, there are all- sustenance, production and dissolution—it is what we understand.

1. This refers to the highest end of life, viz., liberation.

## KĀRIKĀ 70

(Kapila related the sāstra to Asuri)

आह, कस्मै पुनरिदं शास्त्रं परमर्षिणा प्रकाशितमिति ?

Opponent : To whom was this sastra related by the great seer?

उच्यते -

एतत्पवित्रमयं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।

तत्र पवित्रं पावनात् । अन्धं सर्वदुःखक्षपणसमर्थत्वात् । पवित्रा-न्तराणि पुनरेकदेशं-क्षालयन्त्यधमर्षणगङ्गादीनि । तस्मादिदमेवाग्रां मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।

Proponent : THE MUNI IMPARTED THROUGH COMPASSION THIS SUPREME AND SACRED SASTRA TO ASURI.

It is sacred because it purifies. It is supreme because it is capable of destroying all the miseries. The other pure (or purifying) things like the recitation of particular group of mantras known as aghamarsana and flowing Ganges, etc., wash away the sin partly only. Therefore, the Muni imparted through compassion this supreme sastra to Asuri.

(Compassion made Kapila to relate the sāstra to Asuri)

आह, सम्प्रदानस्याकस्मिकत्वम्, धर्मादिनिमित्ताऽनुपपत्तेः । न तावत्परमर्षेर्धर्मार्थं शास्त्रप्रदानमुपपद्यते, फलेनाऽनभिष्वङ्गात् । नार्थकामार्थम्, शिष्याणामनायासप्रसंगात् । न मोक्षार्थम्, सांख्यिकेनैव ज्ञानेन तत्प्राप्तेः । तस्माद्विपरीतार्थाऽसम्भवात् परिशेषाद्रकस्मादाचार्यः शास्त्रनिधानं प्रददाविति ।

Opponent : This imparting is without some cause, because there is no possibility of virtue, etc., as the cause. The imparting of this sastra by the seer for the purpose of virtue is not possible because there is no attachment to the fruit of the act. It is not for wealth and the gratification of desires for it would involve the undesirable contingency of absence of efforts (exertion) on the part of the disciples. It is not for the purpose of liberation because that is attained by the innate knowledge itself. Therefore, because of the

impossibility, of some object other than these, through remainder it is (the conclusion) that the author imparted this treasure of sastra without some cause (or purpose).

उच्यते-नाऽकस्मात्, किं तर्हि अनुकम्पया प्रददौ । आध्यात्मिकाधिदैविकाधिभौति-  
कैर्दुःखैः पीड्यमानमासुरिमुपलभ्य स्वात्मनि च ज्ञानसामर्थ्यात्सति कार्यकारणसम्प्रयोगे  
दुःखानामप्रवृत्तिं परिज्ञाय शिष्यगुणांश्च कथं नाम यथा मम सुखदुःखेषु ज्ञानोपनिपातात्साम्य-  
मेवमासुरेरपि स्यात्तद्द्वारेणाऽन्येषामपि पुरुषाणामेवमनुकम्पया भगवान्परमर्षिः शास्त्रमाख्या-  
तवान् ।

Proponent : It is not without some cause. On the contrary, he im-  
parted it through compassion. After coming into contact with  
Asuri who was tormented by bodily, extrinsic and divine  
miseries and due to his on capability of imparting knowledge,  
and thus due to the association of the cause and effect, after  
knowing the presence of the miseries as also the qualities of the  
disciple, thinking how can there be equilibrium in midst of  
pleasures and miseries due to the occurrence of knowledge in  
case of Asuri and of others through him as it happened in his  
own case, -- through this type of compassion the lord great  
seer imparted the sastra.

(Asuri related the sastra to Pañcasīkha)

यथा च परमर्षिरासुरये तथा

आसुरिरपि

दशमाय कुमाराय भगवत्-

पञ्चशिखाय

तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

बहुभ्यो जनकवशिष्टादिभ्यः समाख्यातम् । अस्य तु शास्त्रस्य भगवतोऽग्रे प्रवृत्तत्वात्  
शास्त्रान्तरवद् वंशः शक्यो वर्षशतसहस्रैरप्याख्यातुम् ॥ ७० ॥

As the great seer imparted it to Asuri, in the same way:

ASURI ALSO

to the tenth son lord:

## PANCASIKA

AND BY HIM THE PHILOSOPHY WAS VARIOUSLY EXPLAINED.

It was explained to many like Janaka and Vasista. Since the  
sastra enhanced further from the lord, its heritage unlike other  
sastras cannot be stated even in thousands of years.

## KĀRIKĀ 70

1. If this would have been the purpose of the teacher, the teacher  
would have approached some disciples and the latter would not  
have taken the trouble of approaching and requesting the  
teacher.



## KĀRIKĀ 71

(Authors between Pāñcaśikha and Īśvarakṛṣṇa)

संक्षेपेणतुद्वाव— हारीतवाद्धलिकैरातपौरिकार्षभेश्वरपञ्चाधिकरणपतञ्जलिवार्षग-  
ण्यकौण्डिन्यमूकादिक—

शिष्यपरम्परयाऽऽगतम्

भगवानीश्वरकृष्णश्च साहायकं शास्त्रम् ।

In brief this sastra (is handed over to us) through..... Hārīta, Vaddhali, Kairāt, Paurika, Aṛṣbheśvara, Pāñcādhi karesna, Patanjali, Vārsaganya, Kauṇḍinya, Mūka, etc. (thus):

THROUGH THE TRADITION OF PUPILS WAS THIS ŚĀSTRA,  
THE ŚĀSTRA IS HELPFUL AND COME THROUGH IS-  
VARAKRSNA ALSO HANDED DOWN TO US

(Purpose of the SĀMĀKHYAKĀRIKĀ)

पूर्वाचार्यसूत्रप्रबंधे गुरुलाघवमनाद्रियमाणः पौरस्त्यान्याख्यानव्या...न गर्भमतिप्रमादं  
ददातीति ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वमुपजायते । तच्चेदानीन्तनैः प्राणिभिरल्पत्वादायुषो ग्रन्थत एव न सूप-  
पादं किं पुनः श्रवणप्रयोगाभ्याम् । आह च—चतुर्भिः प्रकारैर्विद्या सूपयुक्ता भवति—  
आगमकालेन स्वाध्यायकालेन प्रयोगकालेन च । तत्र चास्यागमनकालेनैवायुः पर्युपयुक्तं  
स्यात्ततश्च शास्त्रानर्थक्यम् । इत्यस्य मन्दधियामप्याशु ग्रहणधारणप्रयोगसम्पत्त्यादिति  
षष्ठितन्त्रादुपाख्यानगाथाव्यवहितानि वाक्यान्त्येकत उपमृद्य शिष्यानुकम्पार्थं यावत्

ईश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।

सप्तत्या

संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना ।

सर्वसत्त्वहितप्रवृत्तेन

सम्यग् विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

कथं चाऽस्य सम्यक्सिद्धान्तविज्ञानस्याप्यनेकग्रन्थशतसहस्राख्येयं सांख्यपदार्थं सत-  
त्वमखण्डमार्याणां सप्तत्या संक्षिप्तवान् ॥ ७१ ॥

## Kārikā 71

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In the case of one who does not like voluminousness and brevity of the work written in the aphorism style by the earlier authorities, the descriptions of the social stories ..... this may have given rise to the indifference. Due to the short span of life, that is not properly expounded (known) only through the text, not to speak of hearing and practising it. The learning becomes well used or employed in four ways; at the time of study and at the time of practising it. There, the whole span of life would be consumed at the time of composition of the sacred work and as such there would arise the purposelessness of the scripture. Hence, in order that there may be the capability of acquiring, retaining and practising it quickly even in case of dull-intel-lected also, having altogether surpassed the sentences put in the midst of the narration of the stories in the Śaṣṭitantra for the compas-sion towards the disciples:

BY ĪŚVARAKṚṢṆA IN THESE VERSES IN ĀRYĀ METRE

Through this treatise containing seventy verses

WAS SUMMARISED BY THAT NOBLE MINDED (SAGE)

Who engaged in the welfare of all the beings

AFTER DULY KNOWING THE THEORY (OF THE SĀMĀKHYA)

Somehow he summarised in seventy of the āryās the theory of the Sāṃkhya contained in that (Śaṣṭitantra) which is a science of right theories, entirely and in its essentials which is worth explaining in the many hundreds and thousands of the texts.

## KĀRIKĀ 72

आह च-

सप्तत्यां किलयेऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्ठितन्त्रस्य ॥

आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

यतश्च नारायणमनुजनकवशिष्टद्वैपायनप्रभृतिभिराचार्यैः प्रधानपुरुषादयः पदार्थाः परि-  
गृहीताश्चोपदिष्टाश्च प्रशस्ताश्चातः स्वभावतः प्रसिद्धमैश्वर्यस्य फलत ऋद्ध्या आर्यमार्गमलंक-  
तुमिति भगवदीश्वरकृष्णेन पदार्थस्वरूपनिरूपणनिपुणसारमतिना परमर्ष्यादियथोक्तागमेन  
प्रमाणत्रयं पुरस्कृत्य तर्कदृशा विचारः कृतः । न चास्य मूलकनकपिण्डस्येव स्वल्पमपि दोष-  
जातमस्तीति ॥ ७२ ॥

आह च-

अज्ञानध्वान्तशान्त्यर्थमृषिचन्द्रमस्रयुता ।

मलिनैस्तीर्थजलदैश्छाद्यते ज्ञानचन्द्रिका ॥

इति सद्भिरसम्भ्रान्तैः कुदृष्टिर्मिरापहा ।

प्रकाशिकेयं सर्गस्य धार्यतां युक्तिदीपिका ॥

स्फुटाभिधेया मधुरापि भारती मनीषिणो नोपखलं विराजते ।

कृशानुगर्भाऽप्यभितो हिमागमे कदुष्णतां याति दिवाकरद्युतिः ॥

नयन्ति सन्तश्च यतः स्वशक्तितो गुणं परेषां तनुमप्युदारताम् ।

इति प्रयात्वेष मम श्रमः सतां विचारणाऽनुग्रहमात्रपात्रताम् ॥

॥ इति युक्तिदीपिकायां सांख्यसप्ततिपद्धतौ चतुर्थं प्रकरणमेकादशं चाह्निकं सम्पूर्णम् ॥

कृतिरियं श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्राणाम् (?)

It is stated also :

WHATEVER TOPICS ARE IN THIS TEXT OF SEVENTY VERSES,  
THEY ARE THE TOPICS OF THE ŚAŚTĪTANTRA, EXCLUDING  
THE NARRATIVES AND WITHOUT THE (DISCUSSION OF )  
THEORIES OF OTHERS.

Kārikā 71

403

Since the categories like cosmic matter, conscious entity etc., are accepted, taught and praised by the authorities like Nārāyaṇa, Manu, Janaka, Vasiṣṭha, Dvaipayana, to adopt the noble path through the good fortune through the result of the natural lordly powers, thought was given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa whose intellect is efficient in describing the nature of the categories with a view to logic putting forth threefold means of knowledge in accordance with the sacred work duly propounded by the great seer, etc. There is no trace of fault in this which is like the lamp of pure gold.

It is stated also:

The light-like knowledge coming down from the moom-like-seers to remove the darkness-like-ignorance is covered by the black clouds (or dirty water of holy places). Therefore, the Yukidīpikā (illuminator of reasoning), remover of the darkness of perverted attitude and illuminator of the world, should be adopted by the gentle men without any hesitation.

The speech of a wise man even clear in meaning and sweet does not shine with a mischievous man; the lusture of the sun even pragnent with fire loses its heat when winter approaches all around. Since the noble persons raise the slightest virtues of others to height with their capability, this effort of mine may be able to receive merely the favour of its being considered by the noble persons.

Here ends the eleventh discourse and the fourth chapter of the Yuktidīpikā a commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā.

This is the work of Sri Vācaspatimīśra (?)